Space-based assets underpin NATO’s ability to deliver collective defence, crisis management and operational coordination. As cyber and space domains become increasingly intertwined, a unified, cyber-resilient strategy is vital to ensure NATO is able to fulfil its mission.
NATO’s ability to coordinate defence and deterrence efforts has long been a cornerstone of transatlantic security. However, as the alliance faces new challenges both externally and internally, cohesion and strategic stability cannot be taken for granted. Among key member states, shifting geopolitical priorities and evolving national policies have introduced new complications for NATO’s long-term endurance, raising questions about its future role, collective defence commitments and ability to operate as a unified security actor. These shifts in member state priorities and policies have significant implications for NATO’s ability to protect critical space-based assets, which underpin much of its operational capability.
Space is critical to NATO’s ability to fulfil its mission of collective defence and crisis management. Satellites and space-based assets provide essential capabilities, including secure communication, navigation, early warning systems, intelligence and surveillance. These capabilities underpin NATO’s ability to coordinate multinational operations, monitor threats and ensure readiness in response to new challenges. At the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, NATO members also acknowledged that attacks to, from, or within space pose a significant threat to the alliance’s security and could trigger an Article 5 response. With space increasingly contested, NATO must secure these systems to maintain its operational edge and safeguard its interests.
This paper assumes that NATO will remain functional despite mounting pressures on its unity and strategic direction. However, if political divergences among member states widen or if long-standing security commitments are reassessed, NATO’s ability to coordinate joint security efforts, particularly in space, may be affected. Securing NATO’s space assets remains imperative regardless of broader political changes or challenges but the degree to which the recommendations made throughout the paper remain viable will ultimately depend on the alliance’s ability to sustain cohesion and strategic alignment in an increasingly complex security environment.
NATO and the space security challenge
In the last two decades, countries within and beyond NATO have come to rely heavily on space-based technologies for military, economic and civilian purposes. From satellite communications to global positioning systems (GPS), these technologies underpin modern life and are integral to national defence and security. However, as space becomes increasingly contested – and as a result congested – the resilience and protection of these critical assets are of paramount importance.
Space-based systems face a wide range of emerging threats. These include physical kinetic threats, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, cyberattacks and non-deliberate hazards like space debris and space weather. These threats have the ability to disrupt communications, compromise operations and fundamentally undermine global security. This paper focuses specifically on the cybersecurity of satellites and space-based assets.
In the last two decades, countries within and beyond NATO have come to rely heavily on space-based technologies for military, economic and civilian purposes.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrated the strategic vulnerabilities of space-based systems in modern warfare. On 24 February 2022, the day of the full-scale invasion, a cyberattack targeted Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite network, disrupting internet services for tens of thousands of people across Ukraine and Europe. Rather than directly attacking the satellite itself, the hackers compromised ground-based infrastructure, specifically modems used to connect to the satellite, causing widespread connectivity failures. The attack was intended to undermine Ukrainian command and control, and also had spillover effects on civilian infrastructure. Additionally, a few months later, US cybersecurity authorities and NATO members issued a joint warning that Russian state-backed cybercriminal groups were preparing cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. This attack is part of a broader trend of increasing cyberattacks on satellites and critical infrastructure.
NATO declared space as an operational domain in 2019. That declaration led to a fundamental change in the way in which the alliance conducts its missions and operations. It has also had implications for NATO’s security, defence and deterrence policy. It is expected that acknowledging space as a domain of operations will expand NATO’s collective defence arrangements and will place outer space security at the centre of NATO’s defence and deterrence portfolio. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept also underlined the vital role of space for the alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.
However, NATO’s ability to protect its space-based assets is inextricably linked to its political cohesion and strategic unity, both of which appear less certain at the time of writing. President Donald Trump has cast doubt on the US commitment to NATO, by calling into question whether he would defend NATO members if they do not meet defence spending commitments. While there have been no concrete changes to the US posture in NATO, if US backing for NATO were to diminish significantly or be withdrawn altogether, this would severely compromise the alliance’s ability to coordinate intelligence sharing, collective defence and space-based operations. Certain capabilities such as intra-NATO intelligence sharing and coordinated space operations are contingent on a functional and cohesive alliance.
Cyberthreats can target multiple components of NATO’s space-based assets system, including satellites themselves, the ground infrastructure that controls them and the transmission links that carry data between them. Rather than target a single point of vulnerability, cyberattacks can exploit weaknesses across this entire network.
NATO members, or companies based on their territories, own more than half of the operational satellites that are in orbit. However, only a handful of countries within NATO have the means to provide space support to NATO operations. In the future, more countries will gain access to advanced space equipment as these technologies become more readily available.
A previous Chatham House study analysed the role of space technology in NATO missions and operations, examining NATO’s space capabilities, including position, navigation and timing (PNT), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defence, communications, space situational awareness and environmental monitoring. That study highlighted possible cyber risks and identified potential impacts from the loss of capabilities due to cyberattacks. Several recommendations included potential capability needs for NATO, with a specific focus on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability (DOTMLPF-I) approaches.
This research paper aims to highlight mitigation, adaptation and resilience measures that NATO and its key members can implement through improved coordination to protect space assets from cyberattacks. This three-tiered framework of measures should be considered when establishing future cybersecurity standards and guidelines within the alliance.
Chapter 2 of the paper highlights existing trends and developments in space technology. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the development of NATO’s outer space policy and the national space policies of key members. Chapter 4 introduces a three-tiered framework for tackling cyberthreats in space. The paper concludes with further recommendations and areas for future research, offering a roadmap for strengthening NATO’s space cybersecurity posture.
The space–cyber nexus
The interconnectedness of space and cyber domains has become increasingly apparent in modern conflict, as illustrated by the role of cyberattacks in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Space-based systems are critical in military operations, enabling secure command and control, navigation, precise targeting, intelligence gathering and early warning of threats. Satellites also provide essential communications for coordinating forces, guiding weapons systems and monitoring adversary movements. Space-based assets are foundational to NATO’s operations and their compromise could destabilize military readiness, crisis response and broader alliance cohesion.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept highlighted the vital role of space in its deterrence and defence posture, reflecting a shared understanding among member states of the risks posed by cyberthreats to space systems. To address these risks, NATO has taken concrete steps to strengthen its space and cyber capabilities. The establishment of the NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, and ongoing efforts to integrate space considerations into collective defence strategies illustrate NATO’s proactive approach. These initiatives align closely with the national policies of member states, outlined in this paper, many of which prioritize space and cyber resilience as key elements of their security strategies. This shared commitment underscores the urgency of securing these assets to ensure NATO’s operational edge and collective security.
Cyberattacks on space-based assets may affect the way in which NATO conducts its operations. Depending on the type of space-dependent capability that the adversary chooses to attack and the type of attack (e.g. spoofing, software infiltration and signal jamming), the consequences may vary. Loss of PNT signals, for instance, may impact how warships and guided missiles function. Losing communication systems or receiving spoofed data may oblige military forces to adapt to the new operating environment in a quicker manner.
