As the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) systematically degrade Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure, Israel faces a complex challenge: to what extent can it maintain its international legitimacy and pursue existential security objectives, without the guaranteed backing of the United States?
The initial results of the strikes reveal a paradox: Israel’s strategic position is strengthening – even as fundamental questions emerge about the sustainability of its independent military approach.
The US–Israel partnership: support without commitment
The US response to the strikes exemplifies the complexities of alliance management when partners have different appetites for risk.
The administration of President Donald Trump has continued to provide military support to Israel, including intelligence sharing, and defensive coordination – while explicitly avoiding direct involvement in the strikes against Iran.
That reflects a reported divide among top Pentagon officials over the extent of US military support. Many, including chief of US Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, have requested more resources to support Israel. But their requests have drawn resistance from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, who has long opposed diverting US military assets from Asia to the Middle East.
This creates a strategic dilemma for Israel: can it achieve its ultimate objectives – including the neutralization or significant slowing down of Iran’s nuclear program – without total US commitment, including the use of American bunker-busting capabilities?
It is difficult to predict the likelihood of the US joining Israel’s military effort, in the context of Trump’s declared war-averse strategy. But the deployment of 28 American refuelling aircraft eastward, though officially unconnected to Israeli operations, suggests a US approach of providing logistical support that stops short of operational commitment. If that is the case, it raises questions about whether Israel calculated correctly in launching its campaign: some Iranian facilities will likely only be destroyed with American deep-penetration weaponry.
Perhaps the Israeli military hoped that successful initial strikes would draw American involvement or create conditions for effective diplomatic resolution. For the moment, questions remain about the level of US-Israeli coordination and the nature of Netanyahu–Trump relations. That uncertainty could become more of a problem for Israel over time.
European transformation: From Gaza criticism to Iran cooperation
Perhaps the most significant diplomatic development for Israel has been Europe’s response to its operations against Iran.
There has been bitter disagreement over Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war, which many European publics strongly disapprove of on humanitarian grounds. Israel’s hard-right government has been shunned in Europe for the last few months, with Netanyahu the subject of an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court. Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are under sanctions by the UK, with some EU countries planning to join the move.
But European actors recognize the Iranian nuclear programme as an existential threat to continental security. And, since the strikes began, The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have publicly acknowledged that Iranian nuclear weapons are a threat not only to Israel, but also to Europe.
Strikes on Iranian nuclear capabilities have drawn no significant rebukes. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, for instance, urged de-escalation but spoke of the UK’s ‘long-standing concerns’ about Iran’s nuclear programme.
In that respect, Iran has for now sidelined the war in Gaza. This represents a significant diplomatic victory for Israel, separating Iranian nuclear issues from Palestinian concerns in European strategic thinking – and creating a path for some legitimization for Netanyahu’s government on the European continent.
Arab Positions: Official rhetoric meets strategic reality
The Arab world’s response reveals the gap between their governments’ public positions and strategic calculations. Statements from Arab leaders have officially supported Iranian sovereignty and opposed Israeli aggression. But their practical cooperation tells a different story.
Most significantly, Jordan’s decisive role in intercepting Iranian drones and missiles demonstrates how traditional regional dynamics have shifted.
This broader regional realignment can also be seen in Syria. Damascus’s current weakness and effective removal from the Iranian axis means that traditional Iranian weapons smuggling routes have been disrupted, while Syrian airspace offers fewer complications for Israel. The Syrian government’s focus on internal reconstruction effectively neutralizes what was once Iran’s most important regional ally.
And yet, there is another angle to this story: the Gulf states are fearful of escalation and spillover. They do not trust Netanyahu’s government, and their level of cooperation this time seems to be lower than during the Iranian drone attacks of a year ago. The Arab states traditionally resent the existence of one strong hegemon. Even given generally good relations with Israel, they might have concerns about this scenario.
Also, grievances over Gaza will re-emerge. A Saudi-French conference on Palestinian statehood has been postponed. But the war in the Strip is still ongoing, the humanitarian suffering is still immense, and Hamas still has the hostages. Whatever the outcome in Iran, international pressure for a resolution in Gaza will return.
Russian diplomatic impotence
Russian officials have predictably condemned Israeli actions and called for international intervention, but as Russian experts privately acknowledge, Moscow lacks meaningful leverage over either Israel or Iran.
Economic sanctions limit Moscow’s ability to provide Iran with decisive military support. More significantly, Russian dependence on Iranian drone and missile supplies for its war in Ukraine creates conflicting incentives.