Trust and the Trump Economy

Attacks on economic data and institutions risk undermining trust at a crucial moment for the US economy.

Expert comment

Published 14 August 2025

Updated 3 October 2025 — 4 minute READ

Image — US President Donald Trump speaks in front of posters depicting household income data in the Oval Office on 7 August 2025 in Washington, DC. Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.

Just over six months into the second Trump administration, the White House has declared it is delivering on its promise to ‘Make America Wealthy Again.’ The economy has indeed proven resilient despite policy whiplash, but underneath exuberant markets and splashy deals, warning signs are emerging.

As policymakers and market participants weigh vexing decisions ahead, the president has been accused of eroding confidence in vital economic data and institutions. These actions hinder efforts to understand and respond to shifting economic conditions, with ramifications for the US and global economies.

Following a spate of self-described wins, the administration is touting the success of its ‘America First economic agenda’. Economic growth rebounded in the second quarter; major stock indexes are near records; tariff revenue jumped; and the White House announced eye-popping investment commitments from companies and trading partners. The administration has not been shy about taking credit, with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick proclaiming, ‘the Trump Economy has officially arrived’. But beyond framing and optics, durable results may prove elusive.

A more complex story

Behind the headlines lies a more complex story. Second quarter GDP figures reflected policy timing distortions and masked sluggish first half growth. In equity markets, a handful of companies’ growth keeps indexes buoyant, while other sectors and companies lag. And tariffs – at the highest average effective rate since the 1930s – have raised new revenue, but failed to boost manufacturing, which is contracting alongside factory employment.

At the same time, massive investment commitments may prove overstated. For instance, analysts view Apple’s $600 billion spending pledge as highly unrealistic. Trading partners’ commitments to invest in the US are similarly dubious. The European Union pledged $600 billion in investment and $750 billion in energy purchases as part of the EU–US trade deal. But the agreement is not legally binding, and EU lacks the authority to compel the private sector to invest or purchase accordingly. Likewise, Japanese and South Korean officials have clarified that their topline pledges will largely arrive as loans and guarantees rather than investment. This is hardly the first time a trading partner has fallen short; consider China’s failure to follow through on $200 billion in pledged purchases during Trump’s first term.

Underneath exuberant markets and splashy deals, warning signs are emerging.

More broadly, cracks are showing throughout the US economy. From a softening housing market and struggling commercial real estate sector, to rising consumer debt delinquency, there is cause for concern. At the top of the list are inflation and jobs. While the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) latest release showed inflation unchanged last month, it remains stubbornly above the Fed’s two per cent target. ‘Core’ CPI, on which many economists rely, jumped the most month over month since January. And the July producer price index – a gauge of the upstream prices businesses face – spiked to 0.9 per cent, well beyond the 0.2 per cent estimate, and the biggest jump since June 2022.

Meanwhile, July jobs figures fell short of economists’ expectations, with nonfarm payrolls rising just 73,000, and May and June numbers revised down 258,000. Weakening jobs data and sticky inflation have raised fears of recession or stagflation. This complicates the Federal Reserve’s pursuit of its dual mandate: price stability and maximum sustainable employment. Given that the economy has yet to feel the full effect of the administration’s tariffs, blunted by companies’ stockpiling goods and delays in policy, the Fed’s challenge may only grow if conditions deteriorate.

Undermining trust

The US’ apolitical central bank and impartial data infrastructure are foundational to its economic success and primacy in global markets. They matter even more during challenging periods with dissonant signals. The administration’s attacks on the Fed and government statistics risk undermining trust and confidence at a crucial moment.

Earlier this month, Trump fired BLS commissioner Erika McEntarfer over weak jobs numbers. To replace McEntarfer, Trump announced he will nominate a conservative economist of his own choosing, E. J. Antoni, to, as he put it, ‘ensure that the Numbers released are HONEST and ACCURATE.’ But other economists have questioned Antoni’s partisanship and suitability, with some observers raising concerns around his earlier comments such as ‘DOGE needs to take a chainsaw to the BLS’ or his suggestion that monthly jobs reports be suspended.

The administration’s attacks on the Fed and government statistics risk undermining trust and confidence at a crucial moment.

Despite the president’s claims of ‘rigged’ data, there is no evidence of interference in BLS’s survey-driven process. But the exclusion of the commissioner from the process until data is finalized is merely a norm and could face pressure under new leadership. Regardless, a former BLS chief appointed by Trump warned that McEntarfer’s removal ‘undermines credibility’ in the bureau and paves the way for suspicions of political influence.

McEntarfer’s firing builds on what looks like a longer-term campaign to exert control over government data. This has included removing experts who advise on statistical measures, cutting government surveys, replacing the government’s top statistician, and demanding a mid-decade census to exclude those without legal status.

Article second half

Then there’s the Federal Reserve. Trump continues to berate and pressure Chair Powell and has flirted with then backed away from attempting to fire him before his term as chair ends next year. Even short of such a drastic step – which raises legal issues given that the statute authorizing the Fed only permits removal for cause – Trump will have the opportunity to reshape the body that makes the Fed’s monetary policy decisions.

Eroding trust is far quicker and easier than rebuilding it.

He has already chosen to nominate Stephen Miran, the head of the White House Council of Economic Advisors who is considered a ‘loyalist’, to fill a temporary vacancy on the Board of Governors. The White House is currently considering replacements for Powell as Chair. Such appointments are the president’s prerogative, and Senate approval will likely be easy to obtain. But Trump’s pattern of prioritizing loyalty and willingness to align with his agenda is dissonant with the Fed’s tradition of independence, and will cast a shadow on even well qualified candidates.

Whether through rhetoric, extraordinary measures, or appointing loyalists, pressure on the Fed itself can reshape economic expectations. If businesses perceive politics are driving Fed policy, they may adjust their behaviour to get in front of such decisions, including raising prices in anticipation of future inflation that lower rates could precipitate.

A global impact?

It is easy to see how corrosion of trust and perceptions of reliability can affect economic decision making, and the implications extend well beyond the US. Of course, there are ripple effects of US economic prospects on trading partners and markets globally.

In addition, US data – the ‘gold standard’ – serves as a global baseline, calibrating risk, gauging market conditions, and benchmarking trade. Politicization of such data invites uncertainty throughout global markets and could undermine investment prospects – including harming US borrowing by elevating perceived risk.

To be sure, there is scope to improve key statistical measures. And reasonable debate on economic policy, including at the Fed, is warranted and beneficial. Even with perfect data and unimpeachable institutions, policymakers can still make the wrong call.

It remains to be seen whether the ‘Trump Economy’ will retreat into recession, tip into stagflation, or rocket into a new golden age. But undermining the tools necessary to navigate any scenario is short-sighted and self-defeating. As with much of the administration’s agenda, the asymmetry is stark: after all, eroding trust is far quicker and easier than rebuilding it.