Presidents Trump and Xi’s ‘trade war truce’ announced during their summit on 30 October contains one very important provision: China has deferred export restrictions of rare earth materials for at least a year.
China’s dominance of global production and processing of metals and minerals needed for defence, energy transition, and AI has been a significant tool in the trade war with Washington, which has seen tit-for-tat exchanges of tariffs and export controls.
That has further heightened the growing awareness in the US and Western countries of a strategic vulnerability, leading to new forms of resource nationalism, with governments seeking to shore up supplies of critical minerals and reduce reliance on China.
Leading the charge is the US. On route to his meeting with Xi, Trump signed new critical minerals deals with Australia, Cambodia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The deals included pledges of investment in processing, minimum price floors to incentivize production and investment, exploration agreements, and bans on export restrictions. Taken together, they mark the biggest push yet by a Western country to mitigate China’s hold on supply.
The initiatives amount to more than short-term bargaining chips in the trade war. The crowding in of investment from US partners – including Japan and Gulf states, which have the essential political will and patient capital – demonstrates a credible long-term commitment.
However, while the measures may restrict China’s ability to hold the US hostage over critical minerals supply, a long-term shift away from Chinese control of mass processing is unlikely.
China’s grip on critical minerals supply chains
China’s dominant control of existing critical mineral supply and refinement was established after years of subsidization, industrial policy, investment, vertical integration of processes, and a restriction on exporting skills and knowledge.
In many cases, minerals processing is not commercially profitable. Western investment in mining has not reflected the increasing importance of these materials. Neither have market prices. A globalized economy seeking low-cost materials and manufacturing was happy, until very recently, to allow China to carry the cost.
This reliance is now being politically challenged. But there is a big leap from identifying supply chain vulnerabilities to following through with the scale of finance needed to resolve the problem.
President Trump is clearly prepared to foot the bill to create alternatives – believing that the political significance outweighs the economic cost. His direct government investment shows tangible financial commitment to support mineral mining, and crucially, refining and processing, to tilt the needle away from Chinese control. But the strength of China’s hold on critical minerals supply chains cannot be underestimated. It will take some time for any new US investment to have any impact.
While the Trump administration is moving faster than other nations, the scale of ambition is more focussed on national security interests and defence industries, for which a smaller amount of material is required. US investment does not yet have the requisite scale to provide for the energy transition imperatives outlined by the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act.
Where the US is a leader is in its decision to allow direct investment into minerals by the Department of War (DoW) and the Department of Energy, through equity stakes, or arranging offtake agreements with companies across the USA and Canada.
Partnering with purpose
The most significant of the new agreements is that between the US and Australia, announced on 20 October. The agreement is billed as the US’s largest international partnership to secure the supply of critical minerals and metals, particularly those essential to the defence industry.
As part of the deal, the Export-Import Bank of the United States is issuing seven Letters of Interest for more than $2.2 billion in financing. And the US DoW will invest in the construction of a 100 metric ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia. Japan is also collaborating on projects within the US-Australia deal.
The US is also driving other partnerships: On 23 October, investment firm Orion Resource Partners launched the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (Orion CMC) – intended to ‘support the development of secure and resilient supply chains for critical minerals essential for future growth and security’. The fund is backed by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Abu Dhabi-based sovereign investment fund ADQ with $1.8 billion in committed capital and a target of $5 billion.
The US is also cooperating with Qatar to find new forms of supply. Both financially support Tech Met – an Irish company with American DFC backing. And the countries collaborated on parallel peace processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a major source of cobalt as well as tin, tungsten, and tantalum.