At the Munich Security Conference (MSC) – long a barometer of global security priorities – climate change is of reduced importance this year. While it features (albeit lightly) in the official programme, it barely registers in the Conference Report. That is a blind spot.
Conflict and security discussions naturally tend to focus on weapons, sanctions, and ceasefires. But many of the drivers of instability are quieter, structural and environmental: failing harvests, degraded land, water scarcity, and energy transitions. All threaten to create upheaval faster than political systems can adapt, and serve to magnify grievances, weaken the legitimacy of governments and undermine peace processes.
Yet at the 2026 MSC, climate and environmental risks are receiving less attention than in previous years. That has been mirrored elsewhere. Climate change fell markedly in priority in the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2026. And the UK’s national security assessment on global biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, initially expected for October 2025, was almost suppressed, and only came out following a freedom of information request earlier this year.
This matters because neglecting environmental stress weakens security outcomes at every stage of a conflict: security analysis that is blind to climate risks will miss early warning signals – such as drought-induced migration, food price spikes, or competition over land – that often precede outbreaks of war and terrorism.
Similarly, efforts to end active conflicts cannot succeed without understanding how environmental damage fuels humanitarian crises and prolongs fighting. And peace settlements will not hold without ensuring access to the resources people depend on – which climate change can make scarce.
Consider Haiti. It is urgent and essential to stabilize and strengthen international support. But efforts to restore security will not hold without considering how rural youth saw their livelihoods collapse before violence surged, undermined by environmental degradation and climate shocks.
If reintegration efforts simply return them to failing farms – without land restoration, water access, or climate-resilient livelihoods – evidence from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin suggests many will rejoin armed groups.
The same pattern appears elsewhere. In Yemen, water scarcity and collapsing agricultural systems have deepened local competition and undermined ceasefires. In Myanmar, floods, cyclones and extreme heat have deepened the refugee crisis and eroded the ability of the country’s regions and neighbours to cope.
In post-conflict and reconstruction contexts – such as Syria and Gaza – rebuilding roads, power plants, or governance systems without restoring soils, water systems, and energy networks risks locking in dependencies and inequalities that feed instability. To put it simply: societies cannot be rebuilt without rebuilding livelihoods.
The rise and retreat of climate at Munich
For much of the past decade, the MSC recognized the climate–security nexus. Climate and environmental issues were not always central but were increasingly integrated into security debates. As early as 2014, panels linked energy and climate security to global stability. In 2020 the World Climate and Security Report was launched on the main stage, cementing climate change as a core security risk in the eyes of political and military leaders.
In the years that followed, climate featured regularly across MSC programming. Engagement with UNFCCC COP processes further reinforced the climate–security link in multilateral forums.
Yet even at its peak, this approach had limits. Climate was often treated as an adjacent risk rather than a structural element of security strategy. Limited attention was devoted to taking climate and environmental action to prevent conflicts and boost peacebuilding. Responsibility for that was frequently deferred to development actors, reinforcing silos rather than reshaping core security planning.
Some limited events on climate are taking place at this year’s conference. However, the 2026 MSC report, Under Destruction, marks a sharper retreat. Its emphasis on geopolitical fragmentation and great-power rivalry reflects real trends. But the near absence of climate considerations from the report signals a more narrowed framing of strategic priorities.
This is a misreading of the moment. As multilateralism stalls, climate action is one of the few areas where practical international cooperation is still possible – often below the level of grand diplomacy. Cooperation to restore lands, manage water and food supplies and ensure energy access are key elements in ensuring the global stability that now seems under threat – even when higher-level politics are deadlocked. Ignoring these levers does not make security policy more realistic; it makes it less effective.
Climate security in a fragmented multilateral order
Of course, any climate-security agenda must grapple with political reality. US withdrawal or retrenchment from climate agreements limits the scope for multilateral action. But it does not preclude progress.
Regional and alliance-based approaches are important. Organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are taking important steps. The EU is embedding climate risk into its external action, conflict prevention, and resilience frameworks, while the OSCE is advancing regional dialogue and practical cooperation to address climate-related security risks. NATO’s growing work on climate impacts on operations, infrastructure resilience, and energy security avoids ideological battles while addressing real vulnerabilities.
Such efforts show that climate resilience can be productively framed not as global environmental governance, but as force readiness, supply chain security, and societal resilience. Efforts that focus on adaptation, resilience, and livelihoods are often less politically toxic than emissions targets, and immediately relevant to security actors.
At the same time, cooperation with partners in Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific can advance shared interests in stability without relying on universal consensus. The African Union, for instance, recently adopted a Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan that recognizes the links between climate change and peace and security.
Where the opportunities lie and what should come next
Evidence from multiple regions shows that land restoration, water management, food security, and climate-resilient livelihoods can serve as entry points for stabilization, dialogue, and trust-building – a form of climate and environmental diplomacy 2.0.
A future MSC should therefore move beyond diagnosis and prioritize action. Two practical areas stand out as candidates for renewed focus and coalition-building:
First, land restoration, water access, and sustainable agriculture should be embedded into stabilization missions and reconstruction plans – not as add-ons, but as important security investments. This is an area where militaries, development agencies, and local actors can usefully align.