Trump and Petro’s unpredictable meeting could be pivotal for Latin America

Drugs, migration, China and Venezuela likely to be on the agenda as two outspoken leaders meet in Washington ahead of Colombia’s elections later this year.

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Published 3 February 2026 — 4 minute READ

Image — Colombian President Gustavo Petro speaks at an event in Bogota, Colombia, on 27 January 2026. Photo by Sebastian Barros/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Mariano Aguirre Ernst

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Over the past year, US President Donald Trump and Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro have exchanged criticism, insults and even apparent threats. On February 3, they will meet at the White House where they are expected to discuss wide-ranging topics including drug trafficking, migration, Colombia’s border security with Venezuela and relations with China. 

The meeting, which has been in preparation for months, is unpredictable due to the personalities of both men, who are known for being outspoken. 

Colombia’s President Petro has been a vocal critic of US foreign policy in Latin America as the Trump administration seeks to revive the Monroe Doctrine. Petro condemned the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and accused the US of committing ‘murder’ in its strikes against vessels allegedly manned by drug traffickers in the Caribbean. He has also criticized the deportation of migrants from the US. 

The Trump administration sees the leftist Colombian president as hostile to its strategy in the Western Hemisphere and its wider Make America Great Again ideology. In line with its new National Security Strategy, Washington has sought to curb migration and combat organized crime and drug trafficking into the US while projecting its influence and expanding its control in the Western Hemisphere. 

The Trump administration has accused Petro’s government of not doing enough to stop the drug trade (accusations Petro denies) and has pressured Bogota to clamp down on drug traffickers and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas who operate in Colombia. Cocaine production in Colombia has reportedly risen to between 2,600 to 3,000 tons in 2024 (although the figures are disputed) while armed groups involved in the drug trade have expanded their territory. 

In September, Washington removed Colombia’s certification that it is doing enough to eliminate cocaine crops. Later that month, the Trump administration revoked Petro and his family’s US visas and included them on the OFAC US Sanctions list. Trump then announced the US would stop sending subsidies to Colombia. 

In December, Trump appeared to threaten Petro when he said that ‘he better wise up or he’ll be next’ in the US’s war on drugs. However, relations appeared to thaw with a phone call earlier this month, and the US granted Petro a temporary visa, paving the way for the February 3 meeting.

Speaking to their constituents 

The meeting will be shaped by internal issues with both countries facing important election years. ‘Both presidents know that when they talk, they will be speaking to their constituencies,’ says Gimena Sánchez, a researcher at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). 

Ahead of crucial mid-term elections in November, Trump may want to show American voters who oppose US involvement in ‘endless wars’ that his actions towards Petro’s government have been taken to avoid a full-scale military intervention. 

The Trump administration may also be considering how its interactions with Colombia are perceived by Latino voters. This is especially the case in Florida, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s political base, which is home to a large Colombian diaspora alongside many Venezuelans and Cubans.

For his part, Petro is travelling to Washington just months before Colombia holds presidential elections in May. Petro is not eligible to run for re-election himself due to the country’s term limits, but his handling of relations with the US could impact the outcome. 

President Petro has been a vocal critic of US foreign policy in Latin America.

Colombian right-wing opposition members have accused Petro of ruining relations with the country’s most important international ally and creating an economic crisis; if Petro manages to ease tensions with the US, it would be a success for his Pacto Histórico coalition and its candidate, Ivan Cepeda. 

The Colombian business community is also closely watching the meeting in Washington. The two countries have substantial trade relations. The Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham Colombia) has just indicated that the meeting will be ‘one step in a process of gradual reconfiguration that will be subject to constant evaluation by Washington.’ 

Trump will likely demand that Petro reduce his relationship with China. While the US is Colombia’s leading overall trade partner, China is a fast-growing partner for imports. Since October 2023, China and Colombia have elevated their relations to a strategic partnership based on trade and investment. By 2024, bilateral trade in goods reached approximately $21 billion.    

The Colombian armed forces are also concerned about relations with the US. For decades, the US has maintained a close security relationship with Colombia, providing weapons, training, and military doctrine to combat guerrillas and drug trafficking. Colombia is also a global partner of NATO.

This cooperation is key for managing the crisis in Venezuela. In response to the US operation to capture Maduro, the Colombian government deployed 30,000 troops along its extensive border with Venezuela. Around 6,000 members of various Colombian armed groups, including ELN guerrillas, illegally exploit natural resources and traffic people and drugs between the two countries with the alleged complicity of the Venezuelan National Guard.

Pilar Gaitán, former deputy foreign minister of Colombia, says that ‘[Marco] Rubio knows that Colombia has been a strategic ally in the region for decades, and that the stabilization of Venezuela depends on stabilization in Colombia, and on the two states being present at the border and combating armed groups trilaterally.’ 

Possible outcomes

A constructive meeting would be based on the shared recognition that the US and Colombia should cooperate to re-establish Colombia’s full control over its border areas with Venezuela. This will help to combat drug trafficking and organized crime and regulate migration. 

Washington will also likely demand that the Colombian government ends all negotiations with armed criminal groups such as the powerful Clan del Golfo. Petro’s attempts to negotiate a ‘total peace’ with these groups has failed so far.

Petro could also offer the extradition to the US of several senior drug traffickers. And Trump could demand that Petro restart controversial aerial fumigation with chemicals, which was banned by Colombia’s National Narcotics Council in 2015.

‘Cooperation on narcotics,’ says Sánchez of WOLA, ‘should not be a repeat of Plan Colombia (2000-2015), which placed more emphasis on counterinsurgency than on social development.’ 

A useful form of cooperation against organized crime would be to work together on development programmes in the most marginalized areas of the country. Colombia would benefit greatly if the US were to lift sanctions and resume aid that Bogota used to receive for social programmes.

The meeting will show whether Petro and Trump can adopt pragmatic positions to find common ground in a highly complex context. If they can’t, and the meeting goes badly, it could cause a downward spiral of instability for Colombia and Venezuela, further straining Washington’s relations with both countries.