Venezuela shows Russia has lost the initiative in Trump’s global order

Moscow has prioritized the war in Ukraine over its commitments in Venezuela, Syria and Iran as Trump reshapes the world order.

Expert comment

Published 14 January 2026 — 4 minute READ

Image — Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow on 7 May 2025. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

Natalie Sabanadze

Former Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Russia will seek to exploit the US capture of Nicolás Maduro to its advantage. The operation, carried out in clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, has contributed to the further erosion of the rules-based order and prompted anti-American sentiment. Moscow will seek to capitalize on this while advancing its narrative of Western neo-colonialism with greater confidence. 

However, in a world increasingly shaped by Trump, and with its core objectives in Ukraine still unachieved, Moscow may ultimately have to seek accommodation rather than confrontation with the US. Ironically, Russia’s long-sought shift towards multipolar competition may end up constraining rather than enabling its ambitions.

Russia’s response to the US operation in Venezuela has been restrained. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged the US to reconsider its position and release ‘the legitimately elected leader of a sovereign country and his spouse’. He subsequently held a phone call with Venezuela’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, reiterating Russia’s support for Caracas and urging de-escalation through dialogue. 

Yet Moscow’s response has remained within its standard diplomatic playbook. Most notably, the presidential administration has remained silent, issuing no statements to date despite the close personal and political relationship between Vladimir Putin and Maduro.

Prioritizing Ukraine over Syria, Iran and Venezuela

Russia’s muted reaction reflects a broader pattern, revealing a clear strategic calculus and signs of overextension. Moscow watched from the sidelines as the Assad regime fell in Syria. Russia saw its previous intervention in Syria as a major strategic achievement and a proud symbol of its great-power status. Yet in the end, it did little to assist Assad beyond offering him and his family refuge. 

Similarly, Russia did not defend Iran’s embattled regime against Israel despite hailing its strategic partnership with Tehran. Iran had provided Russia with much-needed military support, notably Shahed drones, which proved important in the early days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Yet Moscow did not reciprocate when Israel attacked Iran. 

Venezuela, therefore, is not an exception but part of a broader trend. Russia is making calculated choices, prioritizing its war effort in Ukraine over all other commitments. As a result, Moscow is losing prestige, writing off its significant investments in faltering regimes and eroding its carefully cultivated image as a credible and predictable partner. 

The Kremlin has nevertheless concluded that these costs are secondary to its core war aims in Ukraine. Assad had become an increasingly difficult partner to manage, while Russia’s entrenched presence in Syria was sufficient to allow it to re-establish relations with the country’s new leadership. 

Iran presented a different calculation. The Trump administration’s diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine meant that the risk of jeopardizing Trump’s goodwill and provoking Israeli hostility by supporting Iran appeared too high a price to pay. 

Venezuela was arguably even less important to Russia than either Iran or Syria. Providing meaningful support to Maduro would in any case have been impractical, given the distance and logistics.

Faltering global ambitions 

Russia’s choices, however calculated, reveal signs of overextension. Aggression against Ukraine is costing Russia its global ambitions. 

Under Putin, Russia has invested heavily in expanding its global outreach with the aim of reducing Western, and particularly US, global influence. Russia has developed dependencies and partnerships in Africa and Latin America; provided security services and deepened economic ties with countries in the Global South; and leveraged the Soviet legacy to position itself as a champion of anti-colonialism pushing back against the US globally.

These investments helped Russia mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and avoid diplomatic isolation. By expanding its war objectives from subjugating Ukraine to reshaping the global order, Russia projected strength by appearing to confront the entire West. 

Aggression against Ukraine is costing Russia its global ambitions. 

Most importantly, this strategy helped Putin consolidate domestic support. He offered Russians the satisfaction of reversing the humiliation of the 1990s and restoring the country to its former glory. In return, he could count on a degree of domestic support for the war and tolerance of his increasingly repressive regime.

After Venezuela, however, many Russians are feeling envious. Moscow has been unable to pull off a similar regime-change operation in Ukraine. This unfavourable contrast undermines Putin’s narrative and could impact domestic stability. To add insult to injury, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth mocked Venezuela’s Russian-supplied air defence system for being unable to prevent the US operation.

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Taken together with the fall of Assad, the weakening of Iran, and the resurgence of jihadists in the Sahel despite Russia’s Africa Corps operating there, Venezuela illustrates how Russia’s global investments are faltering. The capture of Maduro may also have a knock-on impact in Cuba and Nicaragua, Russia’s two other long-standing allies in Latin America.

None of this suggests that Russia will not try to adapt. If anything, it is likely to double down on efforts to gain the upper hand in Ukraine to offset wider losses. The US has set a precedent that Russia will seek to exploit opportunistically elsewhere.

Trump’s global order

When Russia embarked on its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, it sought to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order and challenge the US and its global hegemony.

But since then, the second Trump administration has also sought to reshape the international order. Much like Moscow, it has advocated for a multipolar global order in which might makes right and great powers are entitled to defend their national security interests without constraint. Both Moscow and Washington have argued they are entitled to their own sphere of influence: the Western Hemisphere for the US and the so-called Near Abroad for Russia, comprising its neighbouring former Soviet states.

This appeared to be positive for Moscow: The US was set to focus on the Western Hemisphere and pursue its narrow strategic interests even at the expense of previous commitments. The Western alliance began to fracture, and Russia could sit back and enjoy the benefits.

And yet, in seeking to reshape the global order, Trump took the initiative out of Putin’s hands. Russia now has to adjust to a global order redefined by Trump and unconstrained by international norms and institutions. 

The logic of this highly competitive multipolar order dictates that great powers will seek to gain advantage over adversaries as the global balance of power is continually contested. There is therefore no guarantee that US claims of influence over the Western Hemisphere will translate into Russia being granted uncontested influence over its own neighbourhood, let alone expansion into Europe.

The irony is that Russia may have been better off in the Western-led international order, when the West prioritized dialogue, Europe sought to avoid confrontation, and the US still felt bound by the rules. As the saying goes, be careful what you wish for.