President Donald Trump recently announced that the US and Iran had reached a deal that would include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. But the memorandum of understanding has not yet been officially released, and the terms of Hormuz’s reopening remain elusive.
Already, differing interpretations are emerging from each side. According to Trump, passage through the Strait will be ‘permanently toll-free’, but Tehran has said that ‘fees will be charged’ for unspecified ‘services’ going forward.
The US has reportedly agreed to lift its blockade as part of the deal. But the future of Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority – established in May to assert Iranian ‘oversight’ over the Strait – hasn’t been determined. Without an internationally recognized traffic separation scheme, ships will face navigational risks that undermine their abilities to transit.
So far, insurance companies have not significantly reduced maritime insurance premiums, which will be necessary for shipping to flow again. Insurance and shipping companies will likely require evidence of commitment from both the US and Iran.
Reopening Hormuz also requires the removal of sea mines laid by Iran during the war. Mine clearing is slow and costly. It will require both the US and Iran to limit their use of force for at least a few months. This demining will have to be paired with the removal of undetonated ordnance that fell into the sea during the war.
The Strait of Hormuz is therefore not open, nor is it close to opening. The process will take time, confidence-building and numerous security assurances. Yet in the meantime, the risk of an even worse chokepoint crisis remains.
Future chokepoint crises
Even if the Strait of Hormuz is reopened, Iran will still retain the ability to close it again. The threat of closure alone may be enough to deter shipping and create significant disruption without significant cost to Tehran.
In a future conflict, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen may also seek to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait, another major maritime chokepoint that connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
Signs of this potential strategy were already emerging before the ceasefire deal. On 8 June, the Houthis threatened to block Israeli and Israeli-linked ships sailing through the Red Sea. On 10 June, a small vessel operating off Yemen’s coast reportedly harassed a commercial ship close to Bab al-Mandab.
Shipping in the Red Sea has faced disruption before. Between 2024 and 2025, the Houthis attacked over 190 commercial ships in the Red Sea, causing major disruption to global trade. Despite the attacks ending with a May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire, the Houthis have retained the ability to threaten maritime traffic at any time.
Today, with Hormuz effectively closed, ships have been forced to seek alternative routes. Some of the remaining workarounds depend on access to the Red Sea, including transporting oil by land to Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port on the Red Sea coast. Renewed insecurity in Bab al-Mandab therefore threatens some of the existing alternatives to Hormuz.
This also has a knock-on effect on another chokepoint: the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait serves as the southern gateway to the Suez Canal. Amid Houthi attacks, vessel traffic through the Suez Canal dropped by 90 per cent in 2024. Even the threat of attacks alone is enough to disrupt shipping due to elevated insurance premiums and crew safety concerns.
The consequences of more closures
Disruption in one or more maritime chokepoints frequently generates ripple effects across the wider global shipping network. In this case, the immediate impact would be felt through rising transportation costs. Insurance premiums would rise as ships enter higher-risk operating environments. Longer voyages around the Cape of Good Hope would increase fuel consumption and vessel operating expenses. Congestion at alternative ports and transit routes creates additional delays.
Disruption to the Bab al-Mandab Strait would also put additional pressure on energy markets. Reduced access to Gulf exports and longer shipping routes would likely increase oil and gas prices, generating inflationary effects across a wide range of industries. For import-dependent economies, especially those already facing fiscal stress, higher transportation and commodity costs could reduce access to food, fuel and essential goods.
The consequences would not be distributed evenly. Smaller economies and vulnerable importers would bear disproportionate costs, exacerbating existing humanitarian crises. Economic and humanitarian pressure would potentially push countries to negotiate transit rights with Iran and the Houthis.
During the war, countries like India, Pakistan, and Malaysia sought to negotiate passage through the Strait of Hormuz with Tehran on an ad hoc basis. Private companies have also pursued individual deals for safe transit with Tehran. Over time, countries facing severe economic disruption may conclude that bilateral transit agreements are preferable to absorbing the costs of prolonged supply-chain disruption.
Existing initiatives and their limits
A range of international initiatives aimed at protecting shipping already operate in the Red Sea area. These include European naval missions, the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Security Transit Corridor, and regional frameworks such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Several countries maintain a naval presence in the region and periodically provide escorts and convoy protection for commercial shipping.