The Houthi Red Sea blockade against Saudi Arabia, announced on 20 July, marks a dangerous new phase in the crisis affecting global maritime trade. There are already reports of attacks on Saudi shipping. Effectively that leaves the Bab-al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal closed, sealing both ends of the Red Sea – compounding the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. The world now faces a three-way chokepoint crisis. Can the international system protect global commerce?
If both the Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz remain contested, governments will increasingly face the same difficult question: how much economic disruption are they willing to tolerate before resorting to military escalation?
The situation will also test the growing ambitions of non-state actors. The Houthis have demonstrated that even a movement with limited military capabilities can threaten chokepoints and heap pressure on regional powers in the same way as Iran has done in Hormuz. But can they maintain their effort?
As the initial shock subsides, policymakers should focus less on the blockade itself and more on the question of escalation. Saudi Arabia, the United States and external trading powers will eventually have to define what a successful end to the crisis looks like and where the limits of escalation lie.
Iran and the Houthis will need to decide at what point the political and military costs of continuing the disruption outweigh the strategic benefits. The answer to that question will determine both the duration of this crisis and the likelihood of a wider regional conflict.
The limits of escalation
Iran’s return to conflict in the Strait of Hormuz is best read as a calculated gamble. The closure of the Strait and continued military strikes are meant to raise the cost of the standoff enough to force Washington back to the negotiating table on broader terms. In other words: Tehran’s plan has been ‘escalate to de-escalate’.
In this way, Houthi involvement benefits Iran by further straining US’s regional allies – especially Saudi Arabia. It is hurting oil markets, diversifying Tehran’s leverage (while providing plausible deniability) and decreasing pressure on the Hormuz front.
Washington’s logic is almost the mirror image of Iran’s. President Donald Trump’s administration seeks to restore deterrence through overwhelming military pressure while avoiding another open-ended Middle Eastern conflict.
Yet this approach also carries risks. If Trump’s strategy fails, domestic political pressure to demonstrate success may drive further escalation rather than restraint. The White House has already indicated it is prepared to strike the Houthis again should they target American shipping. That raises the possibility that US military operations in the Gulf could increasingly extend into the Red Sea.
Houthi motivations
Understanding Houthi decision-making requires moving beyond the assumption that the group simply executes Iranian strategy. The Houthis are deeply embedded within the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and reliant on Iranian military assistance. But they retain significant autonomy, particularly in pursuing domestic political objectives. Their interests frequently overlap with Tehran’s, but they do not always coincide.
For the Houthis, maritime disruption in the Red Sea serves several purposes besides supporting Iran. It provides leverage over the international community, acts as a deterrent against regional adversaries – particularly Saudi Arabia – and reinforces their domestic legitimacy by portraying the movement as capable of confronting powerful external actors. Their earlier attacks on shipping from 2023-2025, framed around support for Palestine, significantly boosted their standing among many Yemenis, despite worsening economic conditions at home.
The current escalation also reflects the Houthis’ regional ambitions. The Houthis are seeking to pressure Saudi Arabia into reviving the political roadmap suspended in late 2023. That would include renewed negotiations over financial arrangements that would strengthen Houthi governance and economic resources. More broadly, they appear intent on positioning themselves as the leading Axis of Resistance member, following Hezbollah’s weakening in Lebanon.
Therefore, the duration of the Red Sea blockade will not depend on whether the Houthis can defeat international naval forces. The question is whether they can sustain sufficient disruption to achieve their political aims.
It is not clear how long they can continue their efforts. Previous American strikes degraded their launch sites, infrastructure and smuggling routes. And the Houthis remain dependent on Iran for certain advanced technologies, despite expanding domestic production of drones, mines and missiles. These constraints will matter over time.
Still, maritime disruption is inherently asymmetric. The Houthis do not need to maintain perfect operational capability to produce strategic effects. Their objective is not to sink large numbers of ships but to create enough uncertainty for commercial shipping that insurers raise premiums, companies reroute vessels, and governments absorb mounting economic costs.
By that measure, even sporadic attacks can generate disproportionate impacts on the global economy. In many respects, the Houthis’ threshold for success is psychological rather than military – and they may already have achieved part of that objective.
Response options
The consequences of simultaneous chokepoint closures extend well beyond the Middle East. Major import-dependent economies like India, China, Japan and South Korea could suffer significant economic costs from prolonged disruption in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
In this respect, the Houthis may have underestimated the consequences of their actions. As commercial losses mount, pressure for coordinated diplomatic and security responses against them is likely to grow, particularly from states whose economic interests depend heavily on uninterrupted maritime trade.
However, there remains a significant threat in the external responses to the crisis: an ‘every man for himself’ breakdown of international rules. The longer conflict over maritime chokepoints drags on, and the more the costs of prolonged supply-chain disruption rise, the greater the risk that countries seek bilateral transit agreements with Iran and the Houthis.
There are already indications that some countries and private companies have pursued ad hoc understandings with Tehran to secure passage through Hormuz. Similar dynamics could emerge in the Red Sea. Such arrangements may reduce immediate threats to individual actors, but they also weaken collective maritime security by rewarding coercion.
Over time, a fragmented approach to this conflict risks creating incentives for both state and non-state actors to view maritime disruption as an effective tool of political leverage.
Options for action
Still, there are options available to policymakers to support security and stability in these waters. In April the UK and France proposed a 40-nation coalition to help safeguard future transit through the Strait of Hormuz. These ships are positioned to act and have been preparing for the past few months.
Likewise, the EU’s Naval Force Operation Aspides and Atalanta have been operating across the Gulf and Red Sea regions for years to help protect shipping. These existing multinational efforts all offer mechanisms through which freedom of navigation can be collectively defended.
This could include providing escorts or convoys, identifying safe transit routes, conducting freedom of navigation operations, or offering emergency response support in case of attacks. Strengthening these frameworks would be far more effective than allowing a proliferation of competing bilateral arrangements with the Houthis and Tehran.
If governments struggle to restore confidence, private maritime security firms are likely to assume a larger role in escorting commercial traffic. These companies can provide short-term protection. But their growing presence could further complicate command-and-control arrangements at sea, increase coordination challenges among national navies, and blur lines of accountability during any future incident.
A protracted crisis would also generate difficult second-order challenges. Competing naval convoys, overlapping military operations, humanitarian missions, and negotiations with coastal states around the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa all increase the risk of misunderstanding, escalation and the widening of the conflict.
Protecting freedom of navigation has therefore evolved – from a military challenge to a broader test of international coordination, under conditions of simultaneous geopolitical crises.