Why a ‘whole-of-society’ model is essential for Ukraine’s recovery

Restoring the country’s human capital through state–civil society cooperation

Research paper

Published 22 June 2026

ISBN: 978 1 78413 686 4

A group of teenagers in white t-shirts lay on the ground, forming a circle and raising their hands together.

Orysia Lutsevych OBE

Deputy Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme; Head of the Ukraine Forum

Jaroslava Barbieri

Research Fellow, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Ukraine’s wartime resilience is due in no small part to its ‘whole-of-society’ model of defence – which requires a high level of mobilization among citizens, local community leaders, philanthropic organizations and the private sector. Civil society stands willing to apply this innovative and collaborative spirit to the post-war recovery.

A ’whole-of-society’ recovery can only happen if everyone – from the state authorities and local government to civil society, the Ukrainian private sector and international donors – is able to contribute and collaborate effectively.

This research paper by Orysia Lutsevych and Jaroslava Barbieri of the Ukraine Forum draws on the findings from the 2026 Chatham House survey of civil society organizations (CSOs), in addition to original research and relevant public opinion polling from other sources, to show which elements of the recovery are working and what more is needed to ensure that recovery processes are truly inclusive.

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136864

How CSOs view the priorities for Ukraine’s recovery: Analysis of the 2026 survey

Regional and national-based CSOs increasingly diverge on priorities

Throughout the years in which the Chatham House survey has been conducted, respondents have consistently selected modernizing state institutions, rebuilding physical infrastructure and supporting businesses to restart operations as Ukraine’s top three recovery priorities. However, in the 2026 edition, the reintegration of veterans into civilian life emerged as the top priority (see section below).16

The sustained focus on institutional modernization across the survey years demonstrates that Ukraine has a strong domestic support base for accelerating the reform agenda necessary for EU membership. Ukrainian civil society is sending a clear signal to its government and international donors that institutional modernization is essential for meeting Ukraine’s economic and social recovery needs.

The sustained focus on institutional modernization across the survey years demonstrates that Ukraine has a strong domestic support base for accelerating the reform agenda necessary for EU membership.

The decline of modernizing state institutions as a recovery priority among regional CSOs is a concerning trend, however. In 2022, 55 per cent of respondents selected it in the top three. This rate fell to just 33 per cent in 2026 (see Figure 3). If the trend continues in the coming years, it could undermine the overall speed and depth of such reform across Ukraine. The quality of recovery would then be damaged, as social policy reform, public investment management (PIM) reform and anti-corruption measures all need to be implemented at the community level. Stronger engagement with institutional reform will also be critical for a successful transition from the humanitarian to the development phase among non-profit organizations.17

The decline in salience of institutional reform could be partially explained by CSOs’ focus on immediate priorities as the social costs of the war mount in their communities. This explanation would appear to be supported by the fact that modernization remains a high priority among national-level CSOs, with over 60 per cent of groups consistently placing it at the top of the list. Even if regional NGOs become more focused on immediate social needs, national-level counterparts are well placed to campaign for institutional reform.

Figure 3. National-level CSOs continue to prioritize institutional reform, but the focus is shifting at regional level (Question: Please select three priorities for recovery that should begin even while the war is ongoing.)

The high level of priority given to supporting businesses regeneration by regional NGOs has a clear rationale. Local grassroots organizations often partner with businesses to gather equipment, medical supplies and aid for both civilian needs and the armed forces. For example, in the town of Nizhyn in the Chernihiv region, local businesses have partnered with local CSOs to create the region’s first veteran support centre.18

Companies are also collaborating with local CSOs to support veterans and IDPs, offering training and skills development to help them adapt to new communities and contribute to local economies. For example, the major Ukrainian agribusiness MHP has supported local communities through the ‘MHP Standing Together’ programme for veterans and the ‘MHP-Hromadi’ charity foundation, providing veterans and their relatives with legal, psychological and career development support.19 Another example of partnership between CSOs and business is the ‘map of opportunities’,20 a centralized, interactive online platform connecting IDPs with employment initiatives, entrepreneurship grants and training, provided by IREX.21

Ukrainian businesses are already funding local CSOs in support of recovery goals where they can, although businesses themselves are heavily impacted by the war. In addition, as in the example of the IREX opportunity map, businesses can support through employment schemes, particularly for IDPs and veterans. In 2026, survey respondents reported that 14 per cent of their recovery activities are funded through donations from Ukrainian businesses (see Annex, Q9). For smaller CSOs, it is vital that local businesses can flourish as they provide an additional source of funding at a time when those organizations face financial constraints.

Local groups place a greater emphasis on the immediate needs of fellow citizens affected by war. As the war continues, displacement remains a significant problem as people continue to flee from regions close to the front lines, such as Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia.22 CSOs are often first responders and provide help with evacuation, much-needed humanitarian aid and socialization support to this vulnerable group. It is unsurprising therefore that, in front-line regions, the focus on veterans and mental health is greater than in Kyiv.

The need for a robust mental health policy is another dominant theme on which the two levels diverge. By 2026, regional CSOs were twice as likely as national ones (32 per cent vs 16 per cent) to select mental health as a key recovery priority. This regional prevalence reflects the deep integration of regional CSOs within traumatized communities and their understanding of the most urgent local needs. When asked to define societal resilience, 42 per cent of regional CSOs prioritized ‘individual resilience’ (overcoming burnout and trauma), compared to 29 per cent of national-level CSOs (see Annex, Q22).

New inequalities are emerging between regions

Russia’s invasion has fundamentally reshaped Ukraine’s internal geography and the Ukrainian government is already acknowledging the need for a differentiated approach based on local realities.23

The proximity of communities in the east and south of the country to the front line makes them easier targets for drone and bomb attacks. This increased danger has led to business exodus and internal displacement. 72 per cent of all infrastructure damage is concentrated in just six regions – Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Kherson, Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia.24

Ukraine is witnessing a shift in economic gravity from the industrialized east and south to the western and central regions. Local budgets in front-line hromadas (communities) have effectively collapsed, as their industrial and tax bases were destroyed or fell under occupation.25

Meanwhile, regions such as Lviv and Zakarpattia in the west have seen a surge in local revenues, driven by the relocation of thousands of businesses and millions of IDPs.26 This concentration of resources in western and central regions and their major urban hubs risks leaving rural and smaller settlements to the north and east depleted of both labour and capital essential for recovery.27

Box 1. CSOs in front-line communities have different priorities to those in the rest of Ukraine

The intensity of the war varies significantly across Ukraine’s regions. This variety is clearly reflected in the survey responses of CSOs based in front-line communities compared to those in the rest of the country.

CSOs in front-line regions prioritize the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, with 34 per cent placing it among their top three recovery priorities, compared to 25 per cent of their counterparts in other regions. Notably, CSOs in the Kyiv region also show strong concern for infrastructure at 32 per cent, making them a distinct outlier among non-front-line areas. This distinction likely reflects the ongoing need to repair damage from Russian strikes on the capital’s heating and power generation facilities.

A similar pattern emerges regarding ‘demining’, which is identified as a recovery priority by 18 per cent among CSOs working in front-line regions. This compares to an average of 12 per cent among CSOs operating elsewhere. Equally, 51 per cent of CSOs working in front-line regions considered supporting the war-time generation of children as a top recovery priority, compared to 45 per cent of CSOs operating in the rest of Ukraine.

37 per cent of CSOs working in front-line regions list ‘subcontracting social services to local NGOs’ as an effective solution to improve cooperation between CSOs and local authorities, compared to 34 per cent of their counterparts in more stable regions.

For front-line regions, it appears that the distinction between humanitarian aid and recovery has understandably become blurred. A national recovery plan should be strengthened by renewing the comprehensive Regional Development Strategy which expires in 2027.28 These data points underscore the importance to tailored approaches to local needs, as those needs are informed by different experiences of war and therefore will require a different response.

Collaboration between CSOs and the state on acute social challenges is uneven

To address the most pressing social challenges of recovery, CSOs are increasingly seeking cooperation with the state. However, national and regional CSOs vary on the most critical social problems that require collaboration. In 2026, regional CSOs regarded their top three priorities as:

Reintegration of veterans (75 per cent);
Strengthening national unity around a victory strategy (51 per cent); and
IDP reintegration (50 per cent).

(See Annex, Q11 for more detail.)

The latter factor reflects a clear preference among regional CSOs for a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to recovery, where the government provides strategic policy direction and some financial resources, the private sector drives inclusive economic growth, and civil society facilitates the reintegration of the most war-affected groups into the labour market and local communities.

In contrast, the responses from national CSOs were more diffuse, with the top three similar but with different degrees of prioritization:

Reintegration of veterans (54 per cent);
Implementation of a wartime economy (e.g. prioritizing defence manufacturing and domestic procurement) (48 per cent); and
Strengthening national unity (46 per cent).

National CSOs also place significant weight on the demographic crisis and the necessity of skills retraining for the working-age population.

Support for veterans remains a high priority

A focus on support for veterans has been a constant feature of the response from CSOs at all levels since this option was included in the survey in 2025.

As noted above, some differences remain. Regional CSOs prioritize veteran reintegration significantly more than their national counterparts (75 per cent vs 54 per cent), perhaps reflecting their direct experience of working with demobilized soldiers and anxiety over how a large-scale return of military personnel post-war might affect local communities.

The prominence of veteran issues in the Chatham House survey reflects a widespread concern that state-run services may lack the capacity to meet the growing needs of those fighting the war. While most of the military remains mobilized in order to maintain troop levels during this attritional conflict, a major reform announced by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in May 2026 aims to introduce phased demobilization and clearer service terms.29

The prominence of veteran issues reflects a widespread concern that state-run services may lack the capacity to meet the growing needs of those fighting the war.

Early data indicates that those who have already been demobilized – largely comprising those with health issues – face significant barriers to reintegration, including mental health challenges, bureaucratic complexity, financial inequity and difficulties re-entering the civilian workforce.30 If people do not see a clear path to victory or a fair service model, social cohesion may begin to fray. A positive development is the emergence of veteran-led groups providing psychological support, legal advocacy and sports-based rehabilitation.31 Consistent with our broader survey findings, these groups prioritize good mental health as the foundation of successful transition to civilian life.

Box 2. The Veteran Support Fund

A positive example of how a successful social recovery model can take a holistic and collaborative approach across multiple stakeholders is the Varto (‘Worth it’) grant scheme. The scheme is designed to support veteran-owned businesses and relies on public–private partnerships – including with Kernel, a leading agricultural production company.32

A survey by the Ukrainian Veteran Fund – a state institution under the Ministry of Veterans Affairs providing financial support for veteran-led businesses, mental health assistance, and tools for reintegration – showed that 64 per cent of Ukrainian veterans want to start their own business.33 There are already many successful cases of businesses being created by veterans across Ukraine.34

Unlike veterans in the UK and the US who predominantly have professional military backgrounds, most Ukrainian veterans were civilians before the war began. This fact could, in theory, make the reintegration process easier. But a strong and well-developed infrastructure is needed to assist people in finding a new purpose and adapt to new circumstances, including living with disability or needing new skills to re-enter the labour market.

Civic oversight is essential to uphold integrity

While Ukraine’s resilience is frequently praised, it is not an unlimited resource. The cumulative pressures of prolonged, high-intensity war risk eroding the country’s social foundations. To replenish war-time resilience, as our survey shows, respondents name three key measures. First is CSOs’ strong support for strengthening institutional integrity through resolute anti-corruption measures. Second is stronger cooperation with local and regional authorities to create networks for provision of aid. Finally, gradually restoring local self-government is placed third. In the view of CSOs at all levels, modernization of political institutions must go hand-in-hand with the delivery of services essential for community restoration and the mitigation of embezzlement risks around recovery funds (see Annex, Q22).

However, as with other questions around priority, our survey reveals a notable divergence between national and regional CSOs on what is most important to boost national resilience: national CSOs place higher value on institutional accountability and effectiveness than their regional counterparts (46 per cent vs 32 per cent). Despite this difference, a broad consensus remains on the necessity of clean governance. An overwhelming majority of both national and regional CSOs (62 per cent vs 63 per cent) identify combating corruption as the primary requirement for strengthening wartime resilience. This response has remained consistent across the last three years of Chatham House surveys (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Although the levels of prioritization have changed between surveys, fighting corruption has remained a top concern throughout (Question: Which elements of societal resilience should be prioritized during wartime?)

The civil society sector remains committed to monitoring recovery expenditures, with 60 per cent of Chatham House respondents asserting that the primary value of civil society is to act as a ‘watchdog’ (see Annex, Q20). However, the commitment to civic oversight has seen a marked decline, dropping from 68 per cent in 2022 to 60 per cent in 2026. This trend likely reflects the severe funding shocks following the 2025 suspension of USAID assistance, which forced many organizations to scale back monitoring activities and lay off specialized staff.

Despite these constraints, several civil society initiatives continue to bridge the oversight gap and engage local groups. For example, the Fiscal Policy Research Centre35 monitors direct expenditure, including those from the European Investment Bank and the Fund for the Elimination of Consequences of Armed Aggression. Meanwhile, the Big Recovery Project (BRP) is Ukraine’s largest civic monitoring initiative.36 BRP focuses on public investment at the community level (specifically schools, hospitals and residential repairs) by leveraging data from the Prozorro digital public procurement platform and E-data public finance portals.

The primary obstacle to more effective oversight remains the lack of granular data at the local level about funded recovery projects. While the DREAM platform serves as a centralized hub for managing, monitoring and coordinating all recovery projects, it does not display projects that have already secured funding.37 Furthermore, the Ukrainian finance ministry does not provide real-time updates to DREAM on financial transactions related to projects approved for funding. Similarly, the ministry publishes the list of public investments approved for 2026 with the national implementing agencies, but it is not clear to which communities these resources will be allocated. For example, the State Fund of Regional Development lists 2 million UAH in the public investment portfolio, but lacks information as to what is funded.38

Meanwhile, of the UAH 256 billion allocated for public investment in 2025, approximately UAH 187 billion was sourced from foreign donors, yet tracing these funds to local outcomes remains a significant challenge for independent monitors.39

Consultation on individual projects is improving, but more needs to be done at the strategic level

The most significant evolution in Ukraine’s recovery delivery is the introduction of the Public Investment Management (PIM) framework.40 Launched in 2025, this system streamlines national and local planning by creating a single project pipeline and ensuring individual recovery projects are directly linked to broader community development strategies and national sectoral strategies.

The PIM framework aggregates the recovery pipeline within the DREAM ecosystem, aiming for a ‘single window’ for all investment activity in Ukraine. As of early 2026, the DREAM portal carries an extensive portfolio of projects worth a total of UAH 6.4 trillion. However, a significant gap remains between planning and execution: only UAH 134.6 billion ($3 billion) has been approved by the Strategic Investment Council for the Single Project Pipeline, making it eligible for state budget financing.41

The perception of DREAM as a civic engagement tool has shown modest improvement in the Chatham House survey. In 2026, 15 per cent of regional CSOs and 14 per cent of Kyiv-based groups rated the platform as ‘effective’, up from 11 per cent and 10 per cent respectively in 2024 (see Annex, Q14).42 This improvement in perception is partly due to the fact that each project on DREAM has to describe how wider constituencies have been consulted or what is planned for the future. This requirement forces local officials to think more about engagement, but leaves room for them to either avoid the process or conduct it in a limited way. They are often brought in during the final stages of a project to validate decisions already made, rather than being consulted during the initial assessment and planning phases.

The DREAM system so far remains incomplete as it fails to promote the inclusion of civil society in the process. Although a recent government resolution established the procedures for evaluating and implementing public investments, DREAM lacks specific requirements for public consultations and community-level engagement during the project preparation phase.43 The DREAM operational team is aware of this gap and is planning to develop additional functionality in reference to community engagement in 2027–28.

While the reform is an overall positive, Ukraine is currently in a transitional phase of implementation, in which the strategic planning process and public investment allocations are not fully aligned. Currently, stakeholder inclusion happens only at the stage of strategic planning in the community. Such strategies tend to be approved for between five and 10 years, meaning that many of them will not be updated as part of PIM and citizens and CSOs often will not be consulted on most local investments.

Another assessment among communities shows that civic participatory practices are rarely used in PIM at the local level.44 Most often, the local executive shares the investment portfolio only with council members, rather than discussing it with other interested stakeholders and target groups. Similarly, the guidance for community mid-term plan of prioritized public investments only briefly states the requirement for citizens’ engagement. Best practices, guidance and good models are currently lacking.

PIM is a vital step for both managing EU pre-accession and cohesion funds and preparing Ukraine for larger capital inflows. But its ability to ensure genuine local inclusion and transparency in resource allocation remains unproven.

The appeal of European practices is increasing and likely reflects the high level of support among Ukrainians for EU membership. The European Code of Conduct on Partnerships45 remains popular as an approach, but is rarely applied in Ukraine: 23 per cent of our survey respondents propose it as an effective way to improve engagement at the local level – a slightly smaller proportion compared to 2025 (27 per cent) (see Annex, Q17).

‘Veteran reintegration’ was added as a new option in the 2026 survey edition, given the high number of respondents who had already consistently named it as one of the key social challenges. Despite the risk that the introduction of a new category may dilute the figures for other responses, the overall trends identified across multiple surveys have remained consistent and clear.
Alliance UA CSOs (n.d.), ‘The Nexus isn’t jargon – it’s Ukraine’s essential framework for recovery’,  https://allianceuacso.com/the-nexus-isnt-jargon-its-ukraines-essential-framework-for-recovery.
Hornova, V. (2024), ‘U Nizhyni vidkryvsya veteransʹkyy prostir “Nezlamni”: yaku dopomohu tam mozhna otrymaty’ [A veterans’ space “Nezlamny” has opened in Nizhyn: What help can you get there?], Suspilne | Chernihiv, 27 March 2024, https://suspilne.media/chernihiv/715244-u-nizini-vidkrivsa-veteranskij-prostir-nezlamni-aku- dopomogu-tam-mozna-otrimati.
MHP (undated), ‘MHP Standing Together’, https://mhp.com.ua/en/pro-kompaniu/mhp-poruch.
Ednannia (undated), ‘Opportunities’, https://yednanniazaradydii.org.ua/cases.
Mezha (2026), ‘IREX launches map of opportunities for IDPs, simplifying access to jobs and training’,  23 March 2026, https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/irex_launches_map.
International Organization for Migration (2026), Ukraine internal displacement report: General population survey Round 22, January 2026, https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/IOM_UKR_Internal%20Displacement%20Report_GPS%20R21_January_2025.pdf?iframe=true.
Ministry of Community and Territorial Development of Ukraine (2025), ‘Terytorialʹno-orientovanyi pidkhid u stratehichnomy planuvanni [Territorial-oriented approach in strategic planning], https://mindev.gov.ua/storage/app/imported_content/67bdd50b14ab1.pdf.
United Nations Development Programme (2025), ‘Updated damage assessment finds $524 billion needed for recovery in Ukraine over next decade’, press release, 25 February 2025, https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/updated-damage-assessment-finds-524-billion-needed-recovery-ukraine-over-next-decade.
Created by the Centre for Information Resilience, the ‘Eyes on Russia Map’ is an interactive tool using verified open-source information and satellite imagery to track and visualize Russian military movements, infrastructure damage and civilian harm. Using the filter ‘industrial’ to single out instances of Russian attacks on industrial infrastructure, the map shows how these attacks tend to concentrate around urban centres in Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions (as well as in Kyiv). See CIR (undated), ‘Eyes on Russia Map’, https://www.info-res.org/eyes-on-russia/maps/eyes-on-russia-map.
Levonova, M. and Jarábik, B. (2025), ‘Ukraine’s regional shift: Realignments in wartime and beyond’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 December 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/12/ukraine-regional-realignments-wartime-postwar-reconstruction.
Ibid.
Ministry of Restoration of Ukraine (undated), Updated State Strategy For Regional Development For 2021–2027: Key Aspects, information booklet, https://decentralization.ua/uploads/attachment/document/1477/Довідка_МИУ_ІНФОРМАЦІЙНА_БРОШУРА_A4_engl.pdf.
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2026), ‘Reform of the Defence Forces of Ukraine: defined service durations and revised service remuneration’, news article, 1 May 2026, https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/reform-of-the-defence- forces-of-ukraine-defined-service-durations-and-revised-service-remuneration.
International Organization for Migration (2023), The social reintegration of veterans in Ukraine, report, November 2023, https://ukraine.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1861/files/documents/2024-01/veterans-social_reintegration_eng.pdf.
Veterans Reintegration Programme (2025), Mapping of veteran organisations 2025, report,  https://veteran-reintegration.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/report-mapping-of-veteran-organizations-2025.pdf.
Ukrainian Veterans Foundation (2026), ‘Startuvav konkurs hrantiv dlya veteransʹkoho biznesu “Varto: 4 roky pidtrymky”’ [The grant competition for veteran businesses “Worth it: 4 years of support” has been launched], 26 January 2026, https://veteranfund.com.ua/newsukr/ctartuvav-konkurs-hrantiv-dlia-veteranskoho-biznesu-varto-4-roky-pidtrymky.
Ukrainian Veterans Foundation (2023), The second anonymous online survey among veterans and active military personnel “Needs of veterans”, 6–12 February 2023, p. 6, https://veteranfund.com.ua/doc/Needs%20of%20veterans.docx.pdf.
Yankiv, O. (2025), ‘The business of recovery: how entrepreneurship is helping Ukrainian veterans reintegrate into civilian life’, Ukrayinska Pravda, 25 November 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/ 11/25/8008781.
Fiscal Policy Research Center (undated), ‘Analytics’, https://fiscalcenter.org/en/analytics.
BRP Big Recovery Portal (undated), ‘Main Page’, https://brp.org.ua/en.
DREAM (undated), ‘DREAM objects map’, https://map.dream.gov.ua.
Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2025), ‘Publichni investytsiyi u byudzheti-2026: modernizatsiya infrastruktury, enerhetyky, transportu i sotsialʹnykh posluh’ [Public investments in the 2026 budget: modernization of infrastructure, energy, transport and social services], 25 December 2025, https://www.mof.gov.ua/uk/news/publichni_investitsii_u_biudzheti-2026_modernizatsiia_infrastrukturi_energetiki_transportu_i_sotsialnikh_poslug-5511.
Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine (2025), ‘Sektoralʹni proektni portfeli’ [Sectoral project portfolios], 16 July 2025, https://mindev.gov.ua/upravlinnia-publichnymy-investytsiiamy/sektoralni-proektni-portfeli.
Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine (2025), ‘What is public investment management reform (PIM)?’, 15 August 2025, https://mindev.gov.ua/en/news/shcho-take-reforma-upravlinnia- publichnymy-investytsiiamy-rim.
Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (undated), ‘Mizhvidomcha komisiya z pytanʹ rozpodilu publichnykh investytsiy’ [Interdepartmental Commission on the Distribution of Public Investments], https://mof.gov.ua/uk/interdepartmental_commission_on_the_distribution_of_public_investments-901.
Lutsevych, O. (2024), Ukraine’s wartime recovery and the role of civil society: Chatham House survey of Ukrainian CSOs – 2024 update, other resource, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 19,  https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/2024-06-05-ukraine-wartime-recovery- role-civil-society-lutsevych.pdf.pdf.
Verkhovna Rada (2025), ‘Deyaki pytannya upravlinnya publichnymy investytsiyamy [Some questions about public investment management], Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 527, 28 February 2025,  https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/527-2025-%D0%BF#Text.
Bilyi, B. (2026), ‘Ilyuziya zaluchennya: shcho naspravdi vidbuvayetʹsya z publichnymy investytsiyamy v hromadakh?’ [The illusion of engagement: what is really happening with public investment in communities?], Institute of Civil Society, 26 April 2026, https://www.csi.org.ua/news/ilyuziya-zaluchennya-shho-naspravdi- vidbuvayetsya-z-publichnymy-investycziyamy-v-gromadah.
European Commission (undated), ‘European Community of Practice on Partnership (ECoPP)’,  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communities-and-networks/ecopp_en.

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