The war between the United States and Iran has entered an uncertain phase between escalation and diplomacy. At the UN General Assembly, Iran offered a proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume nuclear talks – if various conditions were met. That has apparently been rejected by President Donald Trump.
Subsequent reports claimed the president was considering new strikes on Iran. Meanwhile, attacks on ships from the Iran-backed Houthis have extended the conflict into the Red Sea.
Given the scope of disagreement between Washington and Tehran, and the global impact of the Strait’s prolonged closure, any settlement will likely need to begin with an unwinding of the Hormuz situation. Can that be achieved?
It is possible. But a successful agreement on Hormuz requires above all a technically precise, reciprocal, and verifiable process that focuses on restoring freedom of navigation. It is unlikely to be effectively addressed through another vague Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or as part of a wider grand bargain.
Status of the Strait
Tehran has enforced its declared ‘closure’ of the Strait of Hormuz by demanding that ships transit through Iranian waters, charging tolls, and striking vessels it claims have violated its policies. This has resulted in 85 maritime incidents and 24 seafarer deaths reported across the Gulf region.
The US has responded by imposing a blockade on all ships linked to Iran. As of 28 September, US forces have redirected 122 commercial vessels, disabled three, and boarded two. US forces have also created their own route along the southern side of the Strait. The result is an unstable standoff and recurrent clashes. Meanwhile, hundreds of ships remain stranded in the Gulf.
Shipping data shows only 16 vessels crossed the Strait on Monday. That compares to about 138 per day before the start of the war. Most of this traffic along the northern (Iranian) route has been dominated by Iranian, Russian and Chinese-linked vessels. (China purchases over 90 per cent of Iranian exported oil). A large share of US-assisted transits along the southern route are from UAE-flagged vessels.
In August, Iran and Oman moved toward an arrangement for jointly managing maritime traffic in the Strait. Oman’s foreign ministry said the proposed framework would establish a temporary navigational corridor, create a joint project to clear mines, and eventually provide arrangements for information-sharing.
Leaders from Oman, Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were expected to meet in Muscat to finalize the agreement. But the meeting was postponed in September following US pressure and escalations in the Red Sea.
The initiative demonstrates that reopening Hormuz does not necessarily require the US and Iran to resolve all their other disputes first. It does, however, require the parties to establish a workable system for commercial navigation.
For that to happen there will need to be a path toward de-escalation that separates deterrence from punishment. Each side will have to stop trying to inflict excessive ‘punishment’ in response to perceived hostile acts, which merely incentivizes the other to escalate again.
Make the agreement technically credible
The MOU agreed in June was a first attempt at a diplomatic off-ramp. However, it was riddled with ambiguity. The ceasefire did not hold, and no wider settlement was agreed in the 60-day timeline the MOU set.
Crucial to the MOU’s failure was the lack of technical detail regarding Hormuz. An effective Strait agreement cannot simply say that traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start. It must define which vessels can transit along which routes and what happens if a vessel deviates from its agreed route. It must state who will provide navigational information and communicate with commercial operators. And it must specify how Iranian, Omani, American, and international maritime authorities will interact.
The MOU anticipated some of these issues. But a durable arrangement will need to create an operating procedure that specifies routes and coordinates, vessel eligibility, communications protocols, rules for navigation and inspection, notification requirements and more.
Most importantly, any agreement must distinguish between commercial and military activity. Commercial vessels need predictable rules as part of a protected commercial-navigation regime – one that does not require the US or Iran to recognize the other’s broader claims beyond Hormuz.
De-escalation must be reciprocal, gradual, and verifiable
The reopening of the Strait should be treated as a process. The Obama administration’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal, much disparaged by President Trump, was a multi-year process. Expert working groups on both sides fed technical agreements into the political process, ensuring the deal was technically achievable as well as politically viable. A process for Hormuz need not be as complex or drawn out. But it will require technical expertise.
Initial efforts at reopening the Strait of Hormuz should focus on stabilizing the maritime environment. Both Iran and the US would need to commit to a progressive and reciprocal pause in hostilities in the Strait.
For example, Iran could reduce interference with commercial shipping and establish agreed communication procedures. In response, the US and its partners might reduce some blockade operations and provide limited sanctions relief tied to Iran reaching behavioural benchmarks.
Agreement on mine clearance and navigation will also be needed. Technical teams must conduct mine-clearance under a jointly agreed safety protocol, with the locations of cleared and un-cleared areas communicated to commercial operators.
The parties should establish a common incident-reporting mechanism and require vessels to follow temporary traffic lanes until authorities certify lanes as safe.
Independent maritime organizations could help verify the status of cleared areas without becoming responsible for the political settlement itself.
Repeated, predictable action at sea could build trust between the US, Iran, and other regional actors. The key to success is sequencing and verification. No concession can depend entirely on trust or the kind of broad commitments made in the MOU.
Include multilateral enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
Multilateral engagement could play an important role in creating a lasting deal. Over the course of the conflict, Oman, Qatar and Pakistan have played central mediating roles. And Gulf states have sought arrangements to restore commercial shipping. The UK and France have also organized a multinational coalition to help restore shipping through the Strait.
Such countries can help implement a reopening by monitoring compliance with an agreement and providing reassurance. The presence of reinforcing powers can also create an ecosystem in which a political agreement is easier for the US and Iran to implement than undermine.
A monitoring mechanism could include representatives from Oman and other Gulf states, international maritime authorities, and neutral technical experts. Its mandate should be narrow and operational. For example, to monitor agreed routes, document incidents and report violations.
Implementation, not a Grand Bargain
Perhaps the most important element to any agreement is that it allows both sides to describe the outcome as protecting their interests – making each concession conditional on the other side’s behaviour. That makes cooperation less politically risky for both countries.
The way out of the Hormuz trap must therefore be a carefully constructed bargain in which both sides are given a practical, verifiable, and politically survivable way to stop fighting.
The June MOU demonstrated that the basic elements of a US–Iran agreement are conceivable. Its collapse illustrated that political commitments without robust implementation mechanisms and authorities are unlikely to hold. The next agreement must learn from that experience.
Approaching elections in the US and Israel may interfere with progress on reopening the Strait. Some issues, such as Iran’s charging of tolls, could remain a significant political obstacle. But, until the parties establish a durable mechanism for managing traffic in the Strait, the risk of renewed confrontation will remain.