Conflict returned to Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray on 23 September, as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces stormed three national airports in Tigray. In what the TPLF claimed was defensive combat, ground offensives were also expanded along Tigray’s southern and eastern borders with the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions. The TPLF and its allies captured parts of Afar but lost several key areas in southern Tigray, including Alamata town.
Ethiopia’s federal government forces and the allied Tigray Peace Force (TPF) are now advancing towards Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Meanwhile, reports of drone strikes in Addis Ababa and on government-controlled airbases alters the nature of the war.
Although Tigray has seen conflict before, this time there is a risk that hostilities could extend into Eritrea and Sudan.
The slow creep towards renewed conflict
The risk of renewed hostilities in Tigray had been clear for some time, given the steady decline in relations between the federal government and the TPLF. The failure to build on the Pretoria Agreement – the ceasefire deal that brought an end to the war in 2022 – was largely the result of a continued zero-sum approach by both sides, as well as weak implementation and oversight.
The agreement effectively unravelled in May, when the TPLF reinstated a pre-war legislative council, with its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael named regional president. This spelled the end of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) – a key outcome negotiated under Pretoria. The removal of interim president, General Tadesse Werede, formerly head of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), followed the ouster of his predecessor Getachew Reda in late 2024.
The TPLF views the recent escalation as a return to full-scale war. To an extent, they have been pushed towards a response. There is continued containment of Tigray; a lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement or any dispute resolution mechanism; the absence of incentives for its leadership to return to the federal fold; a weakening of TPLF legitimacy in the region; and recent drone attacks by the government in the region.
But unlike in the 2020–22 war, the federal government has been more cautious and calculated in its actions as well as public messaging. The government frames the TPLF as a rogue administration that is colluding with internal opposition insurgencies and external actors to threaten Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and its own survival.
The key question now is whether the government will seek to contain the conflict within Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia, or whether it will consider it necessary to pursue bolder options. One such option could be targeting Eritrea, which it believes to be supporting anti-government movements – something Eritrea has repeatedly denied. In a message assigning culpability to its northern neighbour, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats.
Now, much will depend on how the conflict evolves.
Internal division in Tigray and a new opposition alliance
The TPLF’s control over Tigrayan society has weakened significantly. Since the war ended in 2022, it has faced protests over crippling economic conditions, growing competition from rival parties and defections by leading members. In recent months, Tigrayan authorities have turned to forcibly recruiting young men into the defence forces and have cracked down on freedom of speech. For the people of Tigray, an already difficult humanitarian situation now looks set to worsen.
There is deep division within TPLF too. Following the start of the military offensive, there have been reports of senior TPLF officials being arrested or defecting to Addis Ababa.
Days before the fighting resumed, the TPLF and six other regional armed opposition groups – including Amhara’s Fano movement and the Oromia region’s Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – announced a coalition called the Alliance for Survival. Their common goal is to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party from power and install a transitional government.
But it is not immediately clear that this uneasy tactical alliance – among groups with unresolved tensions and very different visions for Ethiopia – will result in functional cooperation. Senior leaders of Fano have publicly opposed the alliance; while a recently divided OLA may struggle with justification to its support base. There are also historical grievances between some of these groups. The TPLF have accused Fano and the Eritrean forces of grave human rights violations in Tigray four years ago, while Fano and OLA have been bitter and at times violent enemies.
Risk of regional spillover
Opposition to the Ethiopian government also comes from beyond the country’s borders. Tsimdo is a transnational alliance which reportedly links the TPLF, the Eritrean government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
The TPLF is silently allied with its former foe, Eritrea, with supply lines chiefly secured through Tigray’s northern border. But the Eritrean government’s priority is to keep war away from its own territory, and its alleged support for opposition groups increases the risk of further regional escalation – especially with Ethiopia eyeing control over Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab.
Meanwhile, the conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have also become more intertwined. The Ethiopian government has accused the SAF of backing the TPLF – which they have denied – and is increasingly unsettled by the reported presence of Tigrayan fighters alongside the SAF in eastern Sudan. It fears that the SAF, in collaboration with Eritrea, could reinforce the TPLF from across the Sudanese border – including near strategic sites like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Sudan, in turn, has accused Ethiopia of providing support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan People’s Liberation-North (SPLM-N), including training, supplies and use of Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia’s close ally, the UAE, is also accused of supporting the RSF – although it refutes such allegations. Ethiopia’s calculus is seemingly to create a buffer on its border with Sudan. However, direct dialogue and de-escalation with the SAF would go further than retaliatory exchanges and mutual accusations of interference.
Limited options for de-escalation
The mediation landscape is very different from 2022. Members of the international community have called out the TPLF for their escalatory actions and urged a return to African Union (AU)-led talks. The Ethiopian government has so far controlled the narrative around this conflict, briefing foreign governments about the likely escalation ahead of the UN General Assembly.
The Pretoria Agreement did not produce the broader political settlement needed for durable peace and no longer seems tenable for either side. The TPLF has repeatedly discredited the only existing mediation effort under the AU. Hardening regional rivalries and the lack of US or wider Western interest to fully support the AU with the resources and leverage needed to create a viable platform, makes a sustainable resolution to this conflict seem a long way off.
Given these conditions, the conflict is likely to continue for a while. However, the danger of diplomatic inaction is that a protracted war in Tigray is likely to spill over beyond Ethiopia, into Eritrea and further into Sudan. Policymakers must find a way to take collective action to avert such a dangerous regional escalation.