Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have ratcheted up in recent weeks, prompting fears of another disastrous war in the Horn of Africa.
Relations between the neighbouring countries have been largely fractious since the devastating Eritrean-Ethiopian War of 1998–2000. They had a short-lived rapprochement in 2018 and subsequently allied against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) during the 2020–2022 war in Tigray, a region of Ethiopia which borders Eritrea.
However, relations have since deteriorated again, prompting renewed fears of war. Today, unresolved post-war issues in Tigray and Ethiopia’s designs on the Eritrean seaport of Assab have inflamed hostilities in a region of shifting alignments.
Tensions escalate in Tigray
Three years since the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) – commonly known as the Pretoria Agreement – brought an end to the fighting in Tigray, the fragile peace in the region is sliding backwards.
Several factors have contributed to rising tensions in Tigray and a breakdown in communication between the federal government and the region. Tigray, which is home to around 7 million people, has been effectively sidelined from Ethiopia’s national decision-making processes. The region is not represented at the federal level and the formerly influential TPLF has been deregistered as a political party. The disputed status of Western Tigray, from which thousands of people remain displaced, remains unresolved.
An internal power struggle within the TPLF led to the removal of Getachew Reda from the party, with confirmation of his ouster as the Tigray interim regional president in March. The removal of Getachew, a key figure in the Pretoria Agreement who had engaged in mediation with the federal government, further strained relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa.
His replacement, General Tadesse Worede, is perceived to have aligned with the TPLF on recent issues. This concerns the federal government, which has warned against the TPLF siding with Eritrea in a potential proxy war, accusations which the TPLF denies.
Eritrea and the TPLF, bitter enemies for nearly 30 years, appear to have established an informal tactical alliance referred to as ‘Tsimdo,’ a phrase denoting ‘alignment’. For Eritrea, the TPLF could serve as a buffer to war on its own territory. The TPLF could stand to gain protection and a friendly border for importing arms and exporting illicit gold.
There is a sense that the federal government has sought to cultivate factional competition within the TPLF and among the political and military groups emerging from post-war Tigray. This includes its support for Simret led by Getachew and Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae.
The TPLF, which has been increasingly isolated since the Pretoria Agreement, has been accused of attacking villages in the neighbouring Afar region and clashing with other factions on the border. It denies involvement and has called for the CoHA to be respected and for swift international mediation.
The TPLF’s military actions may reflect a strategic attempt to remain relevant and secure concessions from the federal government. But this carries a risk of unintended escalation. The fighting is also fuelling rising discontent within the region, as Tigray’s people do not want a return to war.
Harbouring ambitions of Red Sea access
Ethiopia–Eritrea hostilities are also connected to Ethiopia’s pursuit of a presence on the Red Sea. Ethiopia has a recent maritime history, only becoming landlocked after Eritrea seceded as an independent country in 1993, following a referendum granted by Ethiopia after the thirty-year Eritrean War of Independence of 1961–91.
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy has said losing access to the Red Sea was a ‘mistake’ and framed regaining it as ‘inevitable and existential’ to remove Ethiopia from its ‘geographic prison’. Ethiopia asserts it has a legal right to access the Red Sea, which it has often linked to Assab, and has recently questioned the legitimacy of how it lost this access.
Eritrea has dismissed the issue as a ‘redline that should not be crossed’ and views Ethiopia’s ‘expansionist aims’ as a threat to its sovereignty. It has argued that any landlocked state’s right to access the sea is conditional on mutually negotiated agreements with the coastal state.
Ethiopia says it has an existential need for enhanced roles on the ‘two waters’ of both the Nile and the Red Sea. The recent inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile primarily reflects the vision of former prime minister Meles Zenawi. Achieving permanent access to the Red Sea is a defining focus for Abiy’s own legacy.
Ethiopia sees a strong economic interest in diversifying its ports to serve its growing population of more than 130 million people. Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti’s ports for 95 per cent of import and export volume. It pays at least $400 million to Djibouti annually in port fees, with estimates including logistics fees far higher. Additional options could increase trade and reduce Ethiopia’s substantial port levies.
However, Ethiopia is also seeking a maritime presence that includes a military or naval base. Uncertainty over how Ethiopia intends to achieve this – whether through a lease agreement, or via the pursuit of ‘sovereign access’ – is unsettling for most regional coastal states. Egypt, already in dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD, opposes an Ethiopian naval presence as a threat to its Red Sea interests, including via Addis Ababa’s deepening alliance with the UAE.
Somalia similarly pushed back on Ethiopia’s 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, which sought to exchange sea access for potential state recognition. While this plan was ultimately shelved, it prompted Abiy to refocus on coastal access via Eritrea.
Recently, Ethiopian officials have reiterated their claims over Assab, prompting an escalating war of words with Eritrea and rising fears of conflict.
Priorities for de-escalation
The immediate concern must be to stop a war. Preventive diplomacy is needed to de-escalate tensions and provide space for peaceful solutions.
Sources say that Saudi Arabia has offered to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Turkey negotiated between Ethiopia and Somalia in 2024. The UAE also has incentives to protect its economic and maritime security interests. Western partners including the US likewise have a stake in peace and regional infrastructure in the region.
