Whatever the results, November’s midterm elections will not immediately transform US policy toward Israel and Palestine. In any outcome, the separation of powers means that President Donald Trump will still control American foreign policy. Even a Democrat-controlled Congress could not compel his administration to pursue a fundamentally different approach.
But the midterms may accelerate a transformation that is already underway in the Democratic Party and among the US electorate, where the political centre of gravity on Israel and Palestine is shifting rapidly.
If Democrats win a majority in either or both houses, they will gain new congressional tools to act on Israel–Palestine issues. Most importantly, the legislation they put forward would establish the policy baseline from which a future Democratic administration would govern.
The shift
Among dozens of others, Democrats like Abdul El-Sayed, running for the US Senate in Michigan, and Angela Gonzales-Torres, running in the general against another Democrat in California, have drawn considerable attention for their criticism of Israeli government actions – and US support for them. The race in Michigan, which could be decisive for Democratic hopes to retake the senate, looks tight.
But even if progressive candidates don’t do as well as expected in these elections, a shift is underway. Developments in Washington over just the past month illustrate how much has already changed.
On 29 September, 46 of 47 Senate Democrats voted for a resolution led by Senators Chris Van Hollen, Tim Kaine and Bernie Sanders. This would ‘require the Department of State to provide information and assessments related to investigations of the killing of United States citizens by violent Israeli settlers or Israeli security forces in the West Bank’. The resolution did not pass the Republican majority. But the vote was remarkable for its unanimity. Such Democratic unity on a resolution critical of Israel would have been almost unimaginable only a few years ago.
The vote follows a distinct trajectory in Democratic politics. When Senator Bernie Sanders forced the Senate to vote on blocking weapon sales to Israel in November 2024, only 18 Democrat senators supported him. This April, 40 of 47 Senate Democrats voted against a sale of bulldozers to Israel. And 36 opposed the sale of 1,000-pound bombs. Now, with the September resolution, virtually the entire Senate Democratic caucus has voted to demand accountability from Israel.
Then came the House of Representatives. On 1 October, Rep. Joaquin Castro and other members introduced the Stop the Settlements Act. This builds on the Biden administration’s 2024 sanctions on violent Israeli extremists in the West Bank, which saw a major power set up a process to sanction those undermining peace and threatening violence in the West Bank.
It also builds on the subsequent 2026 sanctions by European countries and Canada against products originating in Israeli settlements. The Act would impose sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for building or expanding Israeli settlements and outposts in the West Bank or Gaza and prohibit settlement goods from entering the US market.
These developments point toward an emerging Democratic Party position: one that more actively defends the rights of the Palestinian people and is more willing to seek to compel Israel and the White House to move in that direction. Notably, Barack Obama’s planned 24 October event with El-Sayed on the campaign trail shows a greater willingness by the party’s elite to accommodate criticism of Israeli policies.
That shift matters. Israel and Palestine remain secondary issues for most US voters, compared to the economy, healthcare, education and other domestic concerns. But firm convictions on Israel–Palestine have become important attributes for some candidates in Democratic party politics. And the midterms will, in some ways, be a referendum on how criticism of Israeli policies affects voter intentions – with candidates like El-Sayed calling Israeli actions in Gaza a genocide, a claim the Netanyahu government strenuously denies.
But one thing looks certain: US views on the Israeli government have become less favourable across age groups and political parties. Even among American Jews, 61 per cent believe Israel is guilty of war crimes and 39 per cent call it genocide, according to a 2025 Washington Post poll. The tide may already have decisively shifted, regardless of whether or not candidates like El-Sayed win their races.
A Democratic Congress
Democratic takeover of the House and the Senate would make the shift more consequential immediately. Much of Congress’s influence over foreign policy occurs not through dramatic floor votes, but through the accumulation of hearings, letters, reporting requirements, funding restrictions and private pressure on administrations.
Democratic-controlled committees could hold hearings on settlement expansion in the West Bank and settler violence, scrutinize US arms sales to Israel, demand administration briefings, investigate the treatment of American citizens, mark-up legislation and use appropriations and oversight to press the executive branch.
House and Senate Democrats should begin laying the groundwork to create an affirmative American Palestine policy. That is, a policy not only defined by a move to restrict Israeli settlement-building and the sale of weapons to Israel, but one that advocates for Palestinian self-determination and an architecture for advancing it.
Over the decades, Congress has constructed a dense web of laws that restrict American relations with the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. A Democratic Congress could therefore begin to map those restrictions and decide how to address them. Which can be addressed administratively? Which need Congressional amendment or repeal? What policy changes will the US seek from the Palestinian leadership?
This will not be straightforward: Democrats are still debating these policies, and unanimity will not always be possible: there remains a diversity of views and priorities within the party.
Congress also needs far greater exposure to Palestinian political, economic and civil-society leaders. While many US politicians routinely engage with every dimension of Israeli politics, few have sustained relationships with Palestinians who can explain Palestinian institutions, aspirations and internal debates.
Two time horizons
Were candidates like El-Sayed to lose their races, and were midterms results to be disappointing for the Democrats, it is possible that some in the party might hesitate about the trajectory on Israel and Palestine policy.
But, assuming Democrats gain control of Congress, they could use 2027 and 2028 to constrain, oversee and prepare. A Democratic Congress could press Israel for accountability for violence against Palestinians and Americans, challenge settlement expansion, scrutinize US military assistance, support viable elements of Gaza reconstruction, strengthen Palestinian institutions and begin removing legal obstacles to normal US-Palestinian relations.
These preparations will be significant if a Democrat returns to the White House in 2029. A new administration will be best able to move forward a markedly different policy if significant progress is made in the previous two years.
In this respect, though the midterms will not be the moment US policy toward Israel and Palestine changes, they can set the context for any Democrat running in the presidential primaries – which essentially begin as soon as the new Congress is seated.
Those who have been advocating for Palestinian rights for decades now see that not only their elected representatives, but the next US president may align with them as well.
That will not fix anything today for the relatives of the more than 70,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza, the millions that continue to suffer in the occupied territories, or Israelis dealing with the aftermath of the Hamas cross-border attacks of 7 October 2023. But it does provide a modicum of hope that there is a pathway to freedom and liberty for all. What we’ll learn from the US midterms is how quickly that change is likely to come.