Egypt’s plan for Gaza may have thwarted Trump’s ‘riviera’ for now. But its loopholes need to be fixed

US involvement is essential to a credible peace. Israel-Saudi normalization may be key to unlocking President Trump’s support for the Arab plan.

Expert comment Published 7 March 2025 4 minute READ

Ahmed Aboudouh

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Egypt has finally presented its ‘day after’ plan to rebuild Gaza. It is deeper, more detailed, and far more realistic than President Donald Trump’s damaging proposal for a US takeover of the strip and the removal of its people.    

While Hamas has expressed support for the Egyptian plan, the proposal is unlikely to succeed without substantial modifications. 

Initially, Israel dismissed the plan, arguing that it fails to address the realities on the ground. The US also appeared sceptical. However, the US special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, later downplayed the Trump administration’s concerns, describing the plan as ‘a good faith first step from the Egyptians’.

Israel’s outright rejection appears to be a calculated move aimed at thwarting the plan before it can take root, thereby facilitating the displacement of Palestinians. To resolve the current impasse, Cairo should address several weaknesses in its security and governance provisions, making it more palatable to the White House, Israel, Hamas, and Arab states.

Stringent barriers  

Egypt’s plan, adopted at the Arab Summit in Cairo on 4 March, outlines a comprehensive five-year reconstruction and social rehabilitation initiative, projected to cost $53 billion. 

In the first six months, a committee of experts will manage the clearance of rubble and unexploded ordnance with a mandate from the Palestinian Authority. A four-and-a-half-year reconstruction phase will follow. 

The elephant in the room is security. Israel…distrusts the UN peacekeeping missions on its borders. And it insists on adopting a security-only approach in dealing with Hamas. 

A dedicated fund will be established, with international donors anticipated to shoulder the financial responsibilities. Egyptian companies will execute the work on the ground. The details outlined in the plan are thorough and could serve as a solid foundation for garnering international support. 

The elephant in the room is security. The plan suggests that UN-led peacekeeping forces could be deployed in Gaza and the West Bank during a transition period. However, it doesn’t address Hamas’s future, saying only that the issue must be decided by a peace process. 

Both propositions are likely to be rejected by Israel. Tel Aviv distrusts the UN peacekeeping missions on its borders. And it insists on adopting a security-only approach in dealing with Hamas. This would make it highly likely that the US will block the peacekeeping mission at the UN Security Council. 

Yet Israel’s stance on Hamas is unrealistic. The Israeli military has been unable to disarm the group despite 17 months of brutal fighting, let alone wipe it out completely. Hamas remains the dominant Palestinian political force in Gaza. And it is unlikely to relinquish its ‘resistance’ stance or voluntarily lay down arms without a credible peace process towards Palestinian self-determination and securing a role for itself in the future state.   

Gulf states also have major concerns about Hamas’s Islamist agenda and ties to Iran. And they despise the Palestinian Authority’s political stagnation, incompetence and rampant corruption. 

But they are equally frustrated with Netanyahu’s efforts to stall the peace process to preserve his political career. Gulf states participation in reconstruction is uncertain while he remains at the helm. 

The absence of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed from the Cairo Summit spoke volumes. They are extremely reluctant to pour billions in Gaza without a clear roadmap for security, peace and political reform. This Arab internal division is another drag on the plan’s feasibility. 

This makes Egypt’s vision a good starting point, not a lasting solution.

Proposed solutions

Only when the US is investing in the process will Arab states and others be willing to put boots on the ground. 

Instead of the UN, Egypt should therefore build its plan around a leading role for the Trump administration in peacekeeping. The US’s role should involve direct military deployment. If Trump rejects the idea of sending troops, the US could provide diplomatic leadership, plus operational and logistical support. 

Peacekeeping operations should be carried out in parallel to confidence-building measures and international guarantees that Israel won’t renege on the agreement and resume attacks on Gaza. Arab states should ensure Hamas’s compliance.

Israel must pledge not to violate the provisions of the second and third phases of the hostage deal. In return, Hamas should freeze all its military activities.

A coordinated US–Arab effort should also prepare the ground for the launch of peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. This should simultaneously involve reaching an agreement on a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas, following the ceasefire, to give the diplomatic path a chance to succeed. 

During the truce, Israel must pledge not to violate the provisions of the second and third phases of the hostage deal. In return, Hamas should freeze all its military activities temporarily until a peace agreement is signed. There are factions within Hamas’s leadership that would support such a move. In the West Bank, Israel should pledge to crack down on violence by settlers against Palestinian civilians. 

For any deal to succeed, Egypt and Jordan will need to address Palestinian Authority fears that it may lead to a permanent separation between Gaza and the West Bank.

Normalization’s role 

To secure US participation in a renewed Arab plan, Trump may well expect something in return. Saudi-Israeli normalization will likely be a significant incentive, as a known foreign policy objective for the administration. And Riyadh has made clear that will only be possible with a ‘credible pathway’ and ‘irreversible steps’ towards a peace deal in Gaza. 

The mandate of the committee of non-partisan experts should be extended through the five-year reconstruction phase.

A normalization-based plan would also ensure that the Arab day after proposal for Gaza is interwoven into a broader vision – one that is backed by the Arabs, the US, and the international community and addresses both Palestinian and Israeli security concerns.

Regarding humanitarian needs, the mandate of the committee of non-partisan experts should be extended through the five-year reconstruction phase. This will ensure a longer internal political consensus and support from all Palestinian factions. 

And to guarantee the success of the reconstruction phase, mediators must apply pressure on Israel to treat the delivery of humanitarian aid separately from both security operations on the ground and diplomatic talks. 

In other words, Israel must stop blocking aid delivery to pressure Hamas – starvation of civilians is one of the charges the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor listed in his application for an arrest warrant for Netanyahu. 

Once the proposal is adopted by the international community as a credible roadmap, Egypt should lead efforts to establish a broad working group that includes Egypt, Jordan, the US, the Palestinian Authority, the Gulf States, the EU and other donors. The working group should supervise reconstruction funding, and make sure diplomatic talks are on the right track.

Delivering any deal will be incredibly difficult. Even now, the second stage of the hostage deal is yet to be implemented as agreed. Meanwhile the Trump administration continues to complicate matters with needless errors: Trump made new threats to Hamas this week, after being exposed as holding secret hostage talks with the group. 

Nevertheless, a credible, effective Arab-led plan with US backing remains the only likely way to end the conflict, and begin to repair the devastating damage that has been done. The proposed changes above might increase its chance of gaining the international recognition it needs to secure a long-lasting ceasefire.