In seeking to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles, organizations that provide assistance in conflict situations aim to assure all stakeholders – host governments, opposition groups, local communities and donor states – that the role of aid organizations is purely ‘humanitarian’. In other words, that they do not support any of the parties to the conflict and that they will provide assistance on the basis of need. However, this objective often proves difficult to achieve. Reasons for this include a proliferation of diverse humanitarian organizations with varied aims and potentially conflicting agendas; the far-reaching demands placed on organizations by authorities, armed groups or other belligerents in conflict situations; differing levels of understanding of the principles and competence among the leaders and staff of humanitarian organizations; constraints imposed by project design and donor requirements; and differing levels of access to coordination mechanisms, such as cluster meetings and meetings of the humanitarian country team (HCT) – a collaborative forum chaired by the UN’s humanitarian coordinator (HC) for the country. While it is important, as far as is possible, for humanitarian actors to share the same understanding of how the principles translate into practice, such common understandings are also difficult to achieve.
Coherent approaches
In situations where belligerents may seek to discredit humanitarian organizations and accuse them of being partisan, a coherent and shared approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance would improve the way that these operations are perceived by national and local stakeholders, including hostile groups and local communities. The examples below from Yemen and Syria illustrate this point. In this paper, ‘coherent approaches’ in the relief efforts of humanitarian organizations working as part of an HCT implies that these organizations must share an understanding of the context and purpose of their operations. It also suggests that the organizations that are taking part in the effort understand the roles played by others and appreciate the function of their own work in relation to that of other organizations.
In Yemen, despite efforts to develop a common approach among members of the HCT, the practical operations of aid providers varied substantially, and organizations often acted unilaterally within their individual remits. Furthermore, a lack of communication among humanitarian organizations on how to operationalize the humanitarian principles limited coherence. In some conflict situations, such as South Sudan, perceptions among communities of bias on the part of humanitarian organizations, as well as competition among political actors for control of humanitarian resources, have contributed to cycles of violence.
Coherence and joint operating principles (JOPs)
A common understanding of the humanitarian principles and a coherent approach to providing assistance are important elements to ensure that local communities, authorities and belligerents recognize the impartial nature of humanitarian action, as demonstrated by the joint operating principles (JOPs) in northern Syria in 2014. The JOPs in Syria detailed the expectation of local authorities in the affected region and the principles that guided the work of humanitarian organizations. They were negotiated among humanitarian organizations working in the area with the support of donors and the UN’s regional humanitarian coordinator, and were signed by 30 non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and included a dissemination strategy.
Such arrangements can increase the likelihood that organizations working in a region operate in accordance with a common understanding of the JOPs, which, in turn, can help in the coordination of humanitarian responses and ultimately lead to better outcomes for conflict-affected populations. Evidence from the project workshops that informed this paper and recent research shows that JOPs can lead to ‘strengthened analytic capacity’, ‘strengthened collective leadership’, and ‘improved capacity to manage risk’, while ‘acknowledging the heterogeneity of humanitarian actors’, and ‘the significant role of national and local staff’. There is general agreement among observers that the JOPs in Syria offer a positive model for improving the coherence of humanitarian responses in specific areas of a country.
However, attempts to take a similar approach in Yemen were unsuccessful. There, important stakeholders failed to comply with the JOPs, ‘which outline[d] specific points as to when to discontinue humanitarian assistance if the operating principles [were] not adhered to’. This showed that solutions, such as JOPs, need to be carefully crafted to respond to local conditions and require a high level of buy-in from all major humanitarian actors.
In South Sudan, some international NGOs – sensitive to critiques that their aid, which was provided on the basis of need, was fuelling conflict among affected communities – began to base distribution decisions on the principle of equal entitlement rather than the equity implied by adherence to the principle of impartiality. This is an example of a pragmatic trade-off relating to the humanitarian principles that, in this instance, may ultimately have better served the populations in need. It raises questions about the suitability of the principle of impartiality in situations in which communities feel a sense of equal entitlement to aid, whatever the levels of their own need.
Conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity assessments
A comprehensive conflict analysis of a country or a region of a country – examining the nature, drivers and actors of a conflict – undertaken alongside local conflict-sensitivity assessments – relating to the likely impact of programmes, involving humanitarian organizations as well as peacebuilding and development actors – should flag potential difficulties, such as those witnessed in South Sudan, and encourage a common effort to mitigate the risk of aid fuelling violence and resentment in communities. Such analyses and assessments should contribute to the development of a coherent position among participating humanitarian organizations on the role of each humanitarian principle in the provision of assistance in a specific context.
Humanitarian organizations may recognize the importance of conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity assessments in programme design and in developing a coherent approach, but it may still be difficult for them to devote the necessary time and resources to carrying out these assessments and, when they do so, to reach a consensus on the details. Even if they agree, this does not mean that organizations will systematically utilize this analysis to inform operational decisions. Instructions from HQs to implement projects chosen by donors may constrain decision-making by local managers. This disconnect increases the risk of unintended negative consequences, for example violent competition between communities for humanitarian assistance.
Conflict analyses and conflict-sensitivity assessments can prevent such negative consequences by identifying critical fault lines between communities and armed groups, and establishing the drivers of conflict that may trigger violence. While the overarching analysis will need to be examined at the national level, the significant details for humanitarian organizations will relate to local rivalries and the likelihood that, within an economy based on predation, the distribution of aid to some communities can be expected to lead to violence (see the example of Oxfam’s work in Afghanistan below).
Also, the conflict analysis may not deal with specific situations in which political actors have already exercised their powers to commandeer assistance for their own benefit. Such cases may include national or local authorities limiting the access of humanitarian organizations to people in areas outside their control – such as the Syrian government’s refusal to allow assistance into besieged areas – the levying of taxes on the import or movement of goods, the granting of visas and the localized predation on resources through the monopolization of logistics services, as seen in Somalia or South Sudan. At the level of individual organizations, it is common in many situations for people from a specific family, clan, political or ethnic grouping to ‘capture’ the recruitment process within organizations and even for senior local staff to demand a percentage of the salaries of junior personnel recruited thanks to their influence. The chances of an organization falling prey to such practices are greater when the international staff deployed to manage a national office have little knowledge of the country and are likely to be rotated frequently. For more on this point, see the next section.
The more humanitarian organizations, including local and national NGOs, take part in these analyses, and commit themselves to recognizing the implications for their programme planning and operations, the better.
While recognizing that they are not a panacea for aid delivery, in most situations, conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity assessments will result in more effective humanitarian assistance in active armed conflict. It is important for donors to understand the reasoning behind these steps and support this approach so that the necessary resources are available. The more humanitarian organizations, including local and national NGOs, take part in these analyses, and commit themselves to recognizing the implications for their programme planning and operations, the better.
For example, in Afghanistan, Oxfam staff and leaders of other humanitarian organizations used conflict-sensitivity assessments to analyse the likely impact and consequences of their own programming to help counter the risk that their assistance might stimulate conflict among communities. Oxfam staff are required, as part of the project planning process, to show that they have achieved a balanced and optimized approach that takes into account donor conditions, conflict-sensitivity considerations and the expectation that they conduct operations impartially based on needs assessments.
In the past, observers have raised concerns about the sensitivity of humanitarian organizations to the risk that their assistance may play a role in the war economy. Spurred on by crises, such as the conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan in the Horn of Africa and by the international response to the genocide in Rwanda, recent research has demonstrated how ‘political marketplace’ governance systems – where national or local economies are dependent on flows of humanitarian aid and are regulated by authorities that generate maximum benefits for themselves and their associates – have incorporated humanitarian assistance into transactional domestic politics and highlighted the paradox that providing such aid may in fact sustain conflict. The significant levels of dependence on humanitarian aid in fragile states and countries involved in protracted armed conflicts highlights the urgency of this topic and the need for serious engagement in these discussions. Concerns that aid may perpetuate conflict have to some extent been overlooked and superseded by organizational priorities of sustaining the ever-growing levels of finance requested in humanitarian appeals.
