Since the creation, in 1991, of the post of emergency relief coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) – the body designed to ensure coordination of humanitarian operations among organizations of the UN system, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and international NGOs – there have been successive attempts to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian action in support of the UN’s overall goals at the country level, and in accordance with humanitarian principles. These efforts have been carried out in consultation with colleagues in charge of the UN’s political, peacekeeping and development efforts, and with the heads of member agencies of the IASC. In the highly politicized and complex circumstances of countries affected by protracted armed conflict, this has been an extraordinarily challenging task. ERCs and humanitarian coordinators (HCs) – the representatives of the ERC at the country level – must deal with competing priorities, conflicting interpretations of the humanitarian principles and siloed reporting and accountability processes. This, in turn, may have implications for the legitimacy of humanitarian organizations and can undermine their assistance operations.
‘Double-’ and ‘triple-hatting’
The leadership structures of humanitarian coordination systems have inherent tensions, due to different senior UN officials being in charge of different aspects of responses. The HC is responsible for supporting the coordination of all organizations involved in the humanitarian response plan (HRP) through the inclusive mechanism of the HCT. Where there is no resident special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG), the UN resident coordinator (RC) is the most senior UN representative in the country responsible for coordinating UN development activities and representing the UN in government relations, and in most crises they are also designated as the HC. This designation requires the approval of the ERC and is referred to as double-hatting.
The UN has been engaged in prolonged internal discussions with UN agencies, funds and programmes to establish the best way to manage integration and demonstrate coherence as ‘one UN’.
However, the way in which the RC manages, or is perceived to manage, their political role and the UN’s development role in support of local government often creates tension between the NGO community and both UN agencies and programmes. There are concerns that the political function in maintaining the UN’s presence in a country will limit the RC/HC’s advocacy role and support for operational independence.
In countries facing a protracted political crisis and prolonged conflict, the UN may have either a peacekeeping mission or a Special Political Mission. In such cases, the UN has tried to integrate the RC/HC functions into the UN mission structure by creating a post of deputy special representative of the secretary-general (DSRSG), which involves other mission-specific responsibilities alongside the RC and HC functions, making it a triple-hatted role. The tensions within the humanitarian community regarding UN leadership are further exacerbated by concerns regarding the DSRSG/RC/HC’s reporting line to the SRSG, and the lack of clarity regarding the SRSG’s leadership role as the most senior UN official in country. To address these issues, the UN has engaged in prolonged internal discussions with UN agencies, funds and programmes to establish the best way to manage integration and demonstrate coherence as ‘one UN’. UN agencies are concerned about maintaining their independence and worry that SRSGs may try to make use of humanitarian assistance for political objectives. Additionally, where there is a peacekeeping operation there are concerns that peacekeepers may be perceived as parties to the conflict, which could affect the neutrality of humanitarian organizations associated with the UN mission in the eyes of parties to the conflict and the civilian population.
The issue of double- and triple-hatting is one part of a broader set of questions relating to the leadership of international humanitarian efforts. In most situations where humanitarian aid is offered by international bodies, the organization of aid is highly fragmented. The coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance relies on the HC’s ability to develop a consensus among humanitarian agencies to an agreed strategy and a common appeal process. However, in the UN family it is not uncommon for some heads of larger agencies to argue that their ‘mandates’ justify their resistance to the coordinating role of the HC. In addition, international NGOs may point to the principle of independence as justification, however misguided, for operating outside of an overall coordination framework.
These difficulties are likely to be even more pronounced in two specific contexts. First, when efforts to introduce common approaches to conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity assessments are resisted by some key actors, and second, when there is a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of the UN’s senior officials. Based on a series of interviews with senior UN officials and agency heads, an ODI study found that ‘lack of clarity on the different roles and responsibilities of UN entities and leaders, and a failure to harness the organization’s multidisciplinary capacities and authority, inhibit more robust engagement by UN leaders with conflict parties and third-party states on their responsibilities to protect civilians’. Decisions around the designation of HCs, and the appointment, in some cases, of senior officials of OCHA and other UN agencies with regional responsibilities have led to some confusion. For example, OCHA and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have offered different and conflicting interpretations of the responsibilities of their regional representatives covering the Syria conflict. The lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities is compounded by weak accountability and performance management structures of the UN in the field.
To minimize the risks of confusion and maximize the chances of benefitting from a coherent approach, it is important in conflict situations that UN humanitarian actors, in the context of the coordinating role of the IASC, clarify structural relationships and responsibilities, particularly where an appeal by UNHCR for refugees overlaps with a coordinated humanitarian response plan for the country. This needs to be resolved by the ERC and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
Within this highly complex coordination framework, where clarity of reporting lines and accountability are critical, there remains in place a significant anomaly that the ERC could address immediately. At present, the heads of OCHA offices in war-torn countries report not to the HC, whose role they are expected to support and facilitate, but to the OCHA headquarters in New York. This weakens the coordinating role of the HC, increases the temptation for heads of OCHA offices to claim unjustified levels of autonomy, and increases the chances of disunity in the HCT.
