In many of the most serious protracted armed conflicts, such as those in Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen, belligerent states and non-state armed groups (NSAG) consistently disregard their obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), as contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. Furthermore, hostile actors prevent humanitarian organizations from operating in accordance with humanitarian principles – humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – adopted by the Red Cross movement in 1965.
To compound this issue, states with no direct involvement in these armed conflicts are neglecting their responsibilities under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: to ensure that the provisions of IHL are respected by belligerents in all conflicts.
These developments have led to a state of impunity for belligerents to manipulate humanitarian operations for their own advantage – both as perpetrators of war crimes and as predators able to extract economic and political benefits from their control of territory.
In these contexts, humanitarian organizations are unable to operate in accordance with the core humanitarian principle of impartiality without engaging in what are known as ‘trade-offs’. An example of a trade-off would be when a humanitarian organization persuades a host government to allow it limited access to deliver aid in an opposition-controlled area in return for continuing its operations in government-controlled areas, even though the needs in the opposition-controlled area may be much greater. However, in most cases, humanitarian organizations are not subjecting their proposed trade-offs to a rigorous conflict-sensitivity assessment that evaluates whether the assistance is likely to provoke violence between communities. Nor are these actors employing an ethical decision-making process that examines whether the overall impact of the assistance is likely to be positive or negative. An example of how Oxfam applied these tests during its operations in Afghanistan is given in section 1 below.
In several contexts, such as South Sudan, these developments have allowed humanitarian aid to be ‘captured’ by political, ethnic or business interests in ways that could fuel the conflict.
To address these issues, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit attempted to set out new ways of framing and financing humanitarian action in armed conflict, but the promise of the Grand Bargain – the resulting agreement between donors and humanitarian organizations to improve the effectiveness of aid – remains largely unfulfilled, particularly in relation to the key objective of channelling significant funding support to national and local NGOs.
Instead, over the past decade, most humanitarian funding, provided on a voluntary basis by a small number of states, has gone to 10 countries with ongoing protracted armed conflicts. In 2022, the 10 countries receiving the most humanitarian aid were: Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Sudan and Nigeria. As a result, such funding has become a mechanism for financing essential services in failed or fragile states. Aid programmes are essential for the continuing financial health of international organizations that utilize this funding to deliver services. Consequently, these humanitarian organizations have strong incentives to accept trade-offs, proposed by host governments or other belligerents, that may compromise their impartiality, but which sustain their business models and allow them to declare that they have stayed and delivered.
Over the past decade, most humanitarian funding, provided on a voluntary basis by a small number of states, has gone to 10 countries with ongoing protracted armed conflicts.
In recognition of the significant impact of these situations on peace and security in several regions of the world, Chatham House’s International Security Programme invited the Sanguine Mirage project to explore the role of humanitarian principles in the decision-making of humanitarian organizations operating in armed conflicts. The project set out to assess the continuing relevance of humanitarian principles in contexts in which the parties to a conflict do not accept them.
In assessing the consequences of these situations for humanitarian organizations trying to operate in accordance with the principles, and the appropriateness of trying to do so in these circumstances, the project has developed recommendations to be published in three Chatham House papers. These Chatham House research papers are based on the outcomes of three workshops and related roundtables, and on consultations with the project’s advisory group and with individual scholars and practitioners.
In this first paper, recommendations are offered for short-term changes that can be implemented straightaway. These are designed to strengthen, where at all possible, genuine compliance with humanitarian principles and reduce reliance on trade-offs. In the second paper, proposed actions consider issues of gender and inclusion. The final paper in the series presents recommendations that will require long-term commitments and deeper changes in the approach of humanitarian organizations operating in these contexts. These recommendations are designed to strengthen the capacity of external states to promote compliance with IHL by belligerents, to facilitate joined-up processes of accountability and to allow humanitarian organizations to resist the negative consequences of trade-offs.
Although the failure of the World Humanitarian Summit may have dulled the collective appetite for reform of the humanitarian system, the changes proposed in these Chatham House papers could have a significant positive impact on the outcomes for civilians affected by armed conflict. However, major reforms in leadership and accountability mechanisms are required for humanitarian operations to avoid the risks of perpetuating conflicts, accepting the impunity of belligerents and entrenching humanitarian aid as a funding mechanism for fragile states in conflict.
Since the adoption of United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) resolution 46/182 in December 1991, the scale of humanitarian work has expanded dramatically. The basis of resolution 46/182 is that UN humanitarian assistance will be most effective in relieving suffering, if it is carried out in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. The principle of independence was added in resolution 58/114 in December 2003. Beyond the UN, other humanitarian organizations have adopted the humanitarian principles, particularly in the context of the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs.
With the benefit of 30 years of hindsight, the admirable ambition of these principles as guidance for providers of humanitarian aid has nevertheless led to some serious negative consequences for the people and communities receiving aid in certain armed conflict situations.
Numerous reforms, including the introduction of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the cluster system, the focus on humanitarian leadership, the Transformative Agenda, and several processes launched by the Grand Bargain, have proved unable to resolve the most insidious difficulties facing the humanitarian community in its work in countries enduring armed conflict.
Humanitarian principles
The purpose of humanitarian principles is to provide guidance to those who wish to carry out humanitarian activities (protection or assistance) in times of armed conflict. They promote a way of operating intended to assure groups involved in hostilities that humanitarian activities will not interfere in the conflict or give their opponent an advantage. In theory, compliance with humanitarian principles should make it more likely that operations will be accepted by belligerents and implemented in a manner that is unimpeded and safe for humanitarian actors and civilians. The principles define the purpose and raison d’être of the humanitarian endeavour (humanity and impartiality) and specify the ideal characteristics of actors providing humanitarian aid and protection (neutrality and independence).
The precise nature of these principles and the actions they require from organizations committed to them continue to be the subject of debate. Some have suggested that the ‘real’ principles are humanity and impartiality, and that neutrality and independence are more usefully considered as operational postures that organizations may adopt in support of core principles.
This paper argues that organizations committed to humanitarian principles and to improving outcomes for civilians in armed conflict need to consider five key issues when planning and implementing their programmes:
- Coherent approaches and conflict analysis;
- Local NGOs and humanitarian principles;
- Recruitment and training in humanitarian organizations;
- Humanitarian leadership, integration and the principles; and
- Humanitarian principles and ‘the triple nexus’.
Each of these considerations is explored in its own section below. The urgency for humanitarian organizations to confront these issues has been evident since the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011, and this has been further triggered by the start of conflicts in Myanmar, since the coup by the military junta in February 2021, and in Ukraine, since 24 February 2022. These situations have stimulated important debates about the role and relevance of the principles in different contexts, as illustrated by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) call, in response to challenges to its position of neutrality, for an urgent public reflection on the issue.
