Iran’s New Foreign Policy Challenges

Dr Sanam Vakil

Good morning everyone. Thank you for joining us for this very timely event, and Iran’s New Foreign Policy Challenges, just after the re-imposition of sanctions by the Trump administration yesterday. My name is Sanam Vakil. I am a Senior Consulting Fellow here in the Middle East North Africa Programme, and it is my great pleasure to welcome back Ambassador Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, who needs no introduction. He – but I will introduce him briefly. He’s a Deputy Foreign Minister and he is President of the Institute for Political and International Studies.

Before I hand the lectern over to him, just a couple of housekeeping notes. This event is on the record and is being livestreamed. If you would like to tweet, please do so at #CHEvents and if you wouldn’t mind putting your cell phones on silent mode that would be greatly appreciated. Thank you very much. Mr Ambassador [applause].

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Thank you [applause]. Good morning everybody, it’s a pleasure to be here again at Chatham House. Though it is on the record and I was introduced as Ambassador, I don’t speak officially, because it’s my own – let’s say, I don’t have much hair, but I have two hats: a scholarly and diplomatic. I use the scholarly one, since I’m in think tank and usually, I start by a joke, which I think fits this morning, you know. There is a joke about, “What’s the difference between a – between Generals, Ambassadors and scholars?” And the answer is, “All over the world” – of course, it’s is a joke, “Generals do not do anything real, but they start very early in the morning,” you know, “all over the world.” And Ambassadors don’t do anything real, but they end very late in the evening and the scholars are confused, sometimes late, sometimes early,” so interesting to see this huge number of people at early morning. But, in any case, they need conceptual framework. They cannot live without conceptual framework.

So, I thought maybe for today’s discussion, I’d relate a situation that is one day after announcing it, you know, huge news media about new sanctions, as is it the end of the world, to talk about the issue, that’s how the situation can be analysed, and I think in this situation, three concepts or issues should be others. First, is the American side. Second, is the rest of the world and third, of course, is Iran. I will focus on Iran more, but I will touch upon these three angles, first America, then the rest of the world.

So, how we can understand US policies vis-à-vis Iran and what’s going on? First of all, I think you have a lot of confusion in United States and a lot of contradictions, politics of impulsive, you know, responses, but however, what is about Iran I think there is a very simple assumption, in United States mentality, on sanctions. I call it American [inaudible – 03:32] and the assumption is that we got the money of the oil, then Iran would be deprived, then Iranian people will revolt, then the system would be changed, then we are fine, then the paradise will come. I think this is the working assumption of the American administration and it is on the record by them. I think it is a very simple, naïve assumption, working assumption, which negates the realities of Iran, realities of the world politics and regional setting, and I think that’s very important to keep in mind.

Furthermore, there is – of course, there is a civil war in United States, a political civil war, but I think there is also, a tension between two competing camps on foreign policy. One is what I would call nationalistic approach and the other one is an internationalist approach. JCPOA was the result of those who believed in an international, let’s say, school of thinking, interaction with international community, five plus one on the no negotiation, diplomacy and so on, so forth. But now you have a nationalistic approach, which thinks the United States should be at the top of everything and not just America First, American interests and no other interests and also, what you – and United States, at least what we call American hegemony, re-establishing American hegemony globally, by a very different and a very narrow minded definition of American nationalism, which negates, I think, the interests of the world, the world at large. And here I go to my second component, that is the rest of the world. I think the JCPOA and the sanctions is not just about Iran. It’s very important, it’s not just about Iran. It is about a transformative process in international community of where you have either international law organisations, diplomacy negotiations, or you have imposition, you have what I like is the best and you have follow me, which I think is the American policy on the rest of world.

Of course we cannot live in a world with so many chaotic situations without any law, any order, any organisation, any diplomacy, international law and multilateralism at large. I’m not going to say this is good or bad. I’m just giving you the picture that it is about – not about Iran. It is about Europe also. We know how they think about Europe, even about their allies in Europe. It’s not about the European Union at large, it is also about individual allies and allies has a different meaning in this new setting and this vocabulary.

Of course, there are some American so-called allies, who, for their very immediate interests, may support this type of harsh illegal approach towards Iran, but I think if you have a bigger picture and bigger – better understanding of international relation, this is a transformative error, their multipolarity is negated and the unipolarity is, let’s say, the goal of those actors, which are in the same. And I think with this very important conceptual framework, we should look at sanctions the way they approach Iran as law JCPOA and the other issues. Not just an Iranian issue, it is a global issue. It is a global issue for every player, a small, to big, from China to Russia, to Europe and to the others, and that’s a very important component.

Now, let me go to my final angle that is Iran. Where is Iran? Of course, Iran very – Iran has always negated the assumptions, simple assumptions. Now we are in the 40th year of Iran Revolution, 40 years anniversary. I have been in this building many times. You know you generally have on 10th, 20th, 30th, now it’s 40th, 40th of these simplistic notions that we have in the scholarly community, in policy and think tanks and so on, so forth. So, how we can understand Iran today vis-à-vis the whole, let’s say, this huge media and huge political campaign and the issue of sanctions and JCPOA.

Here I have an ABC. It says I – as a scholar, I like conceptual frameworks, whether it is early morning or late in the afternoon, I cannot live without conceptual frameworks. a) Iran is an actor with self-confidence. That is very important. Iran is not just an object to be played with by Trump administration or by some of their allies in the Persian Gulf or in our vicinity. It is an actor. It is an actor with self-confidence and the self-confidence that Iran has achieved is a real achievement of post-revolutionary time. It has not been achieved easily, but it gives us the sense that we can manage our affairs in a more skilful and adapt way.

Sanctions are not new for us. The time is not as challenging as it was and look at Iran-Iraq war. Eight years everybody supported Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was fighting the Iranian threats, so-called Iranian threat. Everybody, including players in Europe, even Soviet Union at that time, was supporting him, but we could defend our country. Then came the multilateral sanctions, you know, in Resolution 1929, but we could manage it, now we also were self-confident in negotiations. I think Iran is self-confident today and that is very important, because sanctions at the end is about the psychology that you want to dominate the other by bringing, you know, the nerves. And I will inform you that Iran is standing there self-confident and this self-confidence is not a shallow one, it’s based on the second concept, builder, Iran is a builder.

How? We have built domestic institutions of different sorts, including an accountable process, different – you know, we are – there are some Western allies in the region, after 100 years of rulership of a family, still they don’t have a constitution, an institution. We have enough political institution. We have the – a set of institutions for economic issues, consultative processes, as well as the capacity. It’s not just institutions, it’s ideas and also it is the capacity that we have built, and I want to go to this statistics to different issues, but let me pinpoint a few issues on building.

Iran has built a security system, which makes Iran the only country which is – completely defends its security independently. We don’t borrow security. We are not in any alliance system. Our security is 100% homemade. Software size and hardware size, this is a bidding. We have also, in this process, our politics. Our politics is very domestic. It is not that if Washington coughs we get a cold, hmmm? We are not worried who is in the White House and we know, in our region, they were counting on the days that the previous President would leave, the new one would come, then they are shocked, you know, by the announcement of this new President, on the quality of negotiation.

I think Iranian politics is built upon the domestic source – resources and sources and the same, I think, goes with other achievements of Iran. Now, we have four million – 4½ million student – university students. I think Iran is producing 200,000 engineers a year, which I think makes Iran the fourth producing the engineer globally. I think these don’t – or, actually, we don’t borrow engineers from here and there. I think this building capacity, which goes to social sciences, to humanities, to diplomacy, you know, where diplomacy negotiations with global powers, I think this building capacity is so important to look at.

Might say Iran is a co-operative actor. We have been co-operative on all issues. Bilaterally, we co-operate with our neighbours, with other actors, and multilaterally. Actually, JCPOA was a sign of co-operation that we are for co-operation and there was nothing particular that we don’t co-operate, but the co-operation has its own principles, you know, sovereignty, independence, and independence for Iran is so important, because it’s one of the achievements of Revolution. Before Revolution, normally we were independent, but I do remember reading different memoirs and a book, Majestic Failure, on the anniversary of the Revolution. It is interesting to refer to that, you know, Shah was very psychologically dependent on British Ambassador in Tehran and American Ambassador and when they told him, “You have to leave,” he left and he was not independent. And Majestic Failure, the Author argues, “There was a dependent psychology of him.”

But what I’m suggesting is independence is very important for Iran, sovereignty is very important, allowing this co-operation, but co-operation has its own limits and frames. On JCPOA, we have been co-operating in the process of negotiation, then we have been abiding to regulations, but Iran channels have both sanctions and co-operation together. I think you have to hear that the responsibility of Europe counts and the other actors count. They have really to be not just for the interest on one party or the other, I think, for a much more broader sense of a global setting should really look at the situation and the counter, not just sanctions against Iran, countered the ideas that our produce for hegemony and I think resistance is not just a concept exclusive to Iranians. Though we like this concept and we focus on it, I think it is a global concept, when there is hegemony, there is resistance.

So, let me finish. Thank you for listening to conceptual frameworks. But what I said, we are not worried, we manage it. Thank you [applause].

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you very much, Mr Ambassador. We’re going to open the floor for questions, but before we do, I’m going to take my liberties as Chair to ask you one or two of my own, if you don’t mind.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

And difficult questions.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Try not to make them too difficult. You described the United States, under the Trump administration, as having moved into more of a nationalist approach. Would you say that Iran might be also embarking on a greater period of nationalism? Are we going to be expecting more nationalism from Iran after the US sanctions?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I think it depends on where – how you define nationalism. Iran is not the new nation there. You know, six millennium of existence, three millenniums of governance and look, all those who were, at the time, like Iran, they have gone and Iran has a say. There should be some sense in this country, some spirit and some sense of attachment to this land, to this nation who – and I think it has always been strong. But it becomes stronger at periods of crisis, where the integrity of the country is under attack, where you see this pronouncement by some of the American officials. It’s not just about the Islamic Republic of Iran as a political entity. It is against the Iranian territorial integrity. So, you see, the resurgence of a nationalistic outlook, but this is very different from what the Americans have. You know, Americans are nationalistic of Trump, he’s very narrowminded; it is based on a type of maybe xenowol – xenophobia of the others, of Europeans. He is against Europe, to put it period, in a single sense. He is against Europe, against European actors, against any type of institution. That’s very different from – Iranian nationalism is a very defensive one, and I think in foreign policy, of course, it means defence of independence of the country, defence of territorial integrity of the country and I have to say, yes, Iran has become much more nationalistic, but not in a racist – racial setting, which I think you see some elements of race – I’m not going to go to the – a racial dynamic in the United States, but you can detect elements of race, even in some of the American discourses.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. Let me ask you one more question. Depending on which faction you listen to in the United States and let’s say we’re going to listen to Secretary of State Pompeo, he has issued now, what started at 12 demands, now it’s at 13 demands, but these demands…

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

It is inflation.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Inflation, exactly. These inflationary demands are perhaps maybe the opening salvo of the American effort at launching negotiations with Iran, may be counterintuitive. You yourself said that the American position is contradictory, it’s naïve, but – and overconfident. But are there opportunities in this naivety, this approach, that is overconfident, where Washington can re-engage with Tehran, and what would be Iran’s response? Is there movement on any of these positions? Where do you see your Government compromising on some of these issues?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Very good question, but I would answer in a very pictorial way. If I put a knife on your neck, you know, a sharp and ready for cutting you and saying I am going to cut your head, and then please come and negotiate, what would be a humanistic response? I mean, this is what they are going to – they are doing today. It is opportunity. I think it is absolutely a very, very different set of what you’ve said. It’s not for negotiation. They are on the record what they want and I think this is their – any suggestion for negotiation never comes in this way.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. We’re going to open the floor to questions. Some more housekeeping from myself, please wait for the roving microphones that will be going around. Please introduce yourselves and give your affiliations as well, and it would be really nice if you could avoid making strong statements and instead, direct the question, or just one question, to the Ambassador, please. If you could just wait for the microphone. Thank you.

Saeed Kamali Dehghan

Saeed Kamali, I from The Guardian. Ambassador, can I ask you how confident you are that the European mechanism decided the sanctions, the SPV, is going to work and how much do you think that will be able to persuade Iran to remain – to be by the rules under the nuclear deal? Thank you.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

How much I – personally, I’m confident. Actually, I think what’s interesting about Europe is that Europe pass an era of appeasement of United States. If you remember, about six/seven months they tried to appease Trump. I think your Prime Minister also went to Washington, and other European key leaders went, “Oh, we accept this, add to this,” then you come and he humiliated all of them, with no exception. And I think then, Europe learned, of course, late – with, let’s say, late time has found that it is a very different setting. So, they are sorted, of course, on this mechanism. I think, personally, it is an interesting procedure, but what is lacking is the speed and efficiency, which I hope comes with it, and I think they are working on it. I’m not very detailed on the subject, but I think what we need is speed, quickness and a process, which is result orientated, you know, because it is about result and result-oriented is the key concept, then I think they should be more, let’s say, active in implementing what they promised.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay. Please [pause].

James Landale

Thank you. Good morning. James Landale from the BBC. Two questions, please. One is, under what conditions would Iran withdraw formally from the JCPOA? And secondly, can you set out your position currently on Yemen? Do you see the Khashoggi affair and the American reaction to it and the pressure on Saudi Arabia as a moment of opportunity and would you be happy to withdraw Iran’s support for the Houthi side?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I think on the first question it is very hypothetical and depends on the situation. We cannot say what exact, you know, format. But I think, on the second question, you know from the beginning was asking for a ceasefire for resolution of the conflict politically. We are on the record, actually, of a Foreign Minister, he well presented a plan, but nobody listen. I think, Khashoggi was my friend. I have been with him in think tank interactions many times, including, a few months before his death, was a real game changer. A game changer for what? They come to understand that what’s going on under the banner of Iranian threat. Actually, Iranian threat has become a strategic commodity, which you can sell and get results and you can sell any commodity under the [inaudible – 25:59].

Yemen is Iranian threat. Here is Iranian threat. While Yemen is pure, let’s say, complex conflict of many layers and variables, so the moment – any time that the conflict is getting to end, sooner, better, this is our Iranian position. I was in Turkey, a few months ago, and they asked me on television, you know, “Whom do you support in – why – on Yemen, what’s your position?” I said, “We just – the role that we have is sympathising with the victim.” I think now I am, as a person, happy that victims are recognised and the aggressors are also recognised, but still, you cannot wait and postpone. You have to be authoritative or you have to be quick and end this conflict and please, please don’t buy Iranian threat. It is a – it is really a dangerous commodity, which can be used for covering all deficiencies that some of the players in the region have, democratic deficit, efficiency deficit, and so on, so forth.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Yes, please.

Robert Gardner

Thank you, Minister. This is perhaps…

Dr Sanam Vakil

If you could give…

Robert Gardner

Oh, sorry, Robert Gardner, Chatham House. This perhaps is a very silly question. However, it niggles at my mind. Under what circumstances could Iran and Saudi Arabia sit down and talk to each other and try to resolve these differences that go back forever?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Actually, it’s a very wise question. It is not a silly question at all, it’s a very good question, and I think to answer you, we are for resolution of conflict with reality. We have been on the record that we are ready for resumption of talks, dialogues and solving the issues, but it is the rejection of Saudis. Actually, even on the so-called Track IIs and mediation processes, there are about 22 suggestions that third parties have come and, you know, we already – all have been rejected by Saudis and Iranians have been positive, yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Please.

Ian Diev

Good morning, this is Ian Diev from HispanTV. What…?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

HispanTV is on Iran?

Ian Diev

Yes.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Welcome, yeah.

Ian Diev

What reassurances have you received from the EU and the UK that companies can trade with Iran and how much do you trust these being effective?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Personally, I haven’t noticed anything, you know, because I said I’m talking personally. But I think, as I hear from my colleagues, because it’s a technical issue. SMEs, of European origin, I think small and medium sized companies or interests and there are mechanisms, some of them are working. I was talking with one of the European Ambassadors in Tehran and he said, “Oh, they are working without any noise,” and so on, so forth. So, I think there is an interest and some of the economies of European countries is highly dependent upon these SMEs, you know, and I think they are working, but European Governments try to create a space for the continuation. How can they be sure about these guarantees? I think it depends on case-to-case. But generally I think it’s on the positive track.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay, yes, sir?

Kim Sengupta

[Pause] Sorry, Kim Sengupta from The Independent. Mr Ambassador, you said that – I think, let me just paraphrase what you said that, “We’re not worried about losing the White House,” I think you said in your address. But surely, we wouldn’t be in this situation now if Mr Trump wasn’t in the White House and if he continues to be there, if he doesn’t get impeached, if he’s there for the long-term, do you think there will come a time when Mr Rouhani will be sitting down with Mr Trump in a bilateral?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

No, I’m not a foreteller at all. I cannot foretell what’s happening. But, you know, what I said needs to be discussed more that I said our politics is not dependent on American fluctuations and ups and downs, and oscillations in White House doesn’t shape your politics. That’s a very important point and actually, this is the reason that, you know, we are – and not just self-confidence, we say no to whatever we feel is a hegemonic desire. Trump, I think, is a complex personality to analyse. You know, I’ve been listening to American politics and I follow the literature, I think never, in my life, I have seen political psychology being at, you know, at the core of political services. There’s so many Political Psychologists who are writing about him to understand how he is and can you trust him or not? I think it’s all the issues to be analysed. But I think for your question, it depends upon many unknown variables of actors.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. Back there, please.

Neil Grantham

Thank you. Neil Grantham, I’m a member of Chatham House. Ambassador, thank you. Eight countries have received waivers from the US to allow them to continue to import oil from Iran and the US intent is clear, to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero. Which, of those eight countries, do you expect to be importing Iranian oil in six or 12 months?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Which is the countries I expect what?

Dr Sanam Vakil

To receive – to continue to be exporting, which countries will continue to receive the waivers?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I don’t know. I have read, but I am not in a position to say which countries. But I think the question that you have is interesting, yet even the US allies, who have been in alliances in the United States, have reservation about this policy. Simply they ask and they challenge from yes, they have alliance, but they challenge what Iran has done that should be sanctioned. And in some cases, it has – you know, if they stop importing oil from Iran, they would have domestic challenges on price of oil and gasoline and it would impact, also the election, and so on, so forth. It’s not an easy issue for them. So, I think instead of going to individual countries, the eight that were mentioned, I think the idea of even closest friends or allies, some are allies, some are friends, have a strong reservation and I think they will continue to have this reservation, because of one single factor, that Iran has not done anything wrong.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Since we’re on the issue of waivers, let me just jump in and ask you a question. Among the eight countries, Iraq was not listed as one of those countries that has been granted a waiver, and in fact, from – based on what I’ve read, they’re expected to wind down their relationship with Iran, over a 45 day period. Could you comment about the pressure the US Government is putting on the Iraqi Government and what you see, or how you see, these dynamics playing out, considering Iran has a very large influence, commercial, historical and political influence, in Iraq, how is this going to play out?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Actually, I think you have to ask this question from Iraqis, because they have to respond. But I think we have a deep relationship with Iraq, and this relationship is beneficial for both and it is multidimensional, that’s very important. It’s becoming multidimensional. That means it has economic component, it has political component. In the economic component it has different styles. Actually, one of the most important element of this multidimensional relationship is the human factor and people-to-people. We had this Arba’een, the 40th day after the martyrdom of [inaudible – 35:12] a week ago and I think 20 million participated in the ceremony in Iraq and a good number of Iranians. I’m not very exact, but it was the most, let’s say, populated exit from the country and entry from the country. And what was fascinating, you know, was the hospitality of the ordinary Iraqi people, being given to the Iranian visitors, and, you know, I listened to these different interviews and the depths of this connectivity and sympathy. So, I think the relationship is deep, multilayer and I think this 44/5/6/7, whatever are not going to really have a fundamental impact on the shape and quality of relationship.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay, Professor Hollis.

Professor Rosemary Hollis

[Pause] Thank you very much. Rosemary Hollis, formerly of Chatham House, now City University. Ambassador, my question is about Syria and there’s two parts to it. Was there any point at which you, as Iranians, felt uncomfortable about having to be so closely allied with Bashar al-Assad and his regime? And looking to the future, Chatham House has just produced an extremely interesting and well investigated report on the future of Syria and how the state is hollowed out, in effect and how influential Iranians have become on the ground in Syria. As you look to the future, do you foresee – how do you foresee using – Iran using that influence and the set of relationships on the ground in Syria and do you foresee any friction with Russia about how you use it?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

So, you have many questions in one question, but let me have a broad answer. I think Syrian crisis had different layers. One, of course, was humanitarian, human rights, democratic processes, all these issues that you see or have seen during the last few years. But there is another layer that’s a strategic one and this, a Syrian issue, Syria was used as a weapon in the broader strategic landscape of the Middle East, to change the region. It was a broader strategic social union of the region, where it was supposed to end by cutting the neck of Iran from Levant. It was a strategic desire collectively by many players and they did their best and they used human rights and humanitarian issues as weapon. So, we see weaponization of human rights, we see weaponization of humanitarian international law or international processes, but at the end, I think were – and it was not just Iran, per se, I think it was a broad strategic engineering for the region, which has started from Libya. The regime changed from there, then you add in Syria, then the continuation was going to happen in a much broader scale, and I think, in that sense, they lost, those who tried to change regimes from outside. And it doesn’t – it’s not equated to the negation of the human rights of Syrians, democratic values and processes of that very good people, I think, but you have to look at all these pictures.

For the future, I think – let me also add that, you know, all wars, including economic wars, start with a very simple optimism that we are going to win. I think the assumption, in the Syrian conflict, was that we can turn these, let’s say, demonstrations to a process where political system is going to change, then we do this and then we do that, very simple. But I think – and with sanctions. As I said, it’s – this will – war against Iran. Iraq, when Saddam Hussein had started his war with Iran, started with a simple assumption that we are going to win, you know, in a week or so. But I think the Syrian case is the resultant effect of many strategic miscalculations, which resulted, unfortunately, to the situation as we see, the rupture of a society, so many challenges, but however, what’s important right now is reconstruction. And I think the construction is not just economic reconstruction, it is also social reconstruction and social reconstruction is very important. Iran, of course, is for reconstruction, in all its dimensions and is for that. And let me also conclude on the same issue that on Iran, there were so many, let’s say, assumptions, pronouncements, attitudes, the Iranian threat in Syria, I think these are also comes under what I said, the threat industry, fear industry, which produces fear for strategic reasons, also using in Syria.

On the friction between Iran and Russia, I think if you go to the strategic level, their understanding on this engineering, regional broad engineering shared and I think is still – they share the principles. On the approaches, I think we have go – to go to the different details, different cases, different issues, but I think, fundamentally, there is no significant challenging issue, which some people hope for, friction and fracture between these players.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Please, Mr [inaudible], yes. Thank you. In the middle, right here. Thank you.

Member

Good morning, Mr Sajjadpour.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Oh, Mr [inaudible], yeah.

Member

I wanted to ask you, as a scholar…

Dr Sanam Vakil

Could you introduce yourself, please?

Member

My name is [inaudible – 41:55]. I’m a member of Chatham House. I wanted to ask you, sir, that as a scholar, when you look at – I mean, the fact is that you mentioned it, Iran has resisted and has tried to protect its independence against, perhaps unjustified, callings on the part of the United States. But as a scholar, when you look to the future and into a, sort of, a post-Trump era, even, for Iran to move beyond just protecting its independence, its sovereignty, it’s territorial integrity, don’t you see – I mean, do you see that there has to be a vision that we have to somehow resolve our problems with the United States, if we are to have a prosperous economy, if our people are to progress beyond levels that we are contending with at this time? Not just the United States, but the normalisation of some kind of relationship with Israel, you know, in the sense that ending eras of – the era of total confrontation. I mean, do you see that as something on the card as the revolution in Iran, as you say, after 40 years, has matured and must look to providing different answers to Iran’s most important needs for the future and now?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Actually, it’s a very broad question. I think talking about the future usually is a challenging one. What will happen? Really, we don’t know about the future, because there are so many variables, but you can see the trends. I think the trend on – when we study the trends, we see the animosity of United States has not decreased vis-à-vis Iran. On the contrary, the depths of this animosity, as shown in Trump’s wording, in Trump’s announcement, more importantly, maybe, by his gang and those who work with him, is obviously, some of them are not just for so-called regime change, they are also about – and some of the allies about the weakening of Iran as a state. So, I think the issue is a much broader confliction approach towards Iran, and I think on the Zionist entity you see how they kill our Nuclear Scientists and I think – and if you look at the history of the United States, is a relationship. You don’t see any other case where the Prime Minister of Israel goes to American Congress, talks against the sitting President of that country just not to make this nuclear arrangement with Iran. So, I think you have to keep in mind the way that Iran has behaved by the other actors are so important.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you.

Bozorgmehr Sharafedin

Hi, Mr Ambassador. I’m Bozorgmehr Sharafedin from Reuters. 05…

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

So, Bozorgmehr is your first name?

Bozorgmehr Sharafedin

First name, yeah.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Oh.

Bozorgmehr Sharafdin

So, OFAC put sanctions yesterday on the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. I wonder how that would affect the implementation of the JCPOA, and would that reduce the level of co-operation of – yeah, I mean, atomic co-operation of Iran with the war?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Actually, I don’t know about the details of this sanction, what does it mean, to put sanction on what, on what dimension? Because the Iranian Atomic Energy is a huge…

Bozorgmehr Sharafdin

Atomic Energy Organisation, yeah.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I mean, the totality of it is under sanction. Because you know what you see in the American way of putting sanctions, they’re also vagueness and ambiguity, but only Iranian Atomic Organisation or Energy or independent organisation is a part of the Iranian political system. And this is illegal, but how it would impact, I think it wouldn’t have any direct, as far as I know, on the implementation. It may limit the international scope of this organisation, but still, we – I think they can manage it.

However, there is one link here that is IAEA. Iran is a member of IAEA and the focal point of IAEA in Iran is International Atomic Energy Organisation and I think it would be a challenge, not just for Iran, for IAEA also, to handle this issue of a sanction. But I’m not very detailed on that issue, yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Back there, please.

Joel Gulhane

Good morning, Ambassador. Joel Gulhane, I’m a Middle East Analyst at the Risk Advisory Group and Member of Chatham House. I wanted to hear your view on the – on what happened, in the last two weeks or so, with the apparent Israeli reproach – well, open rapprochement with Gulf States, with Netanyahu going into Oman and the participation of Israel in the Martial Arts Games in UAE and also, how the development of this so-called Arab NATO, and I wanted to just, sort of, get your views on that. And do you feel in some way, in Iran, threatened by this, sort of, regional unification, seemingly against Iran and is now seeming to include Israel as well?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I said we are self-confident. Are we threatened? No. I think we feel very convenient, confident about our own situation. As I said, we don’t depend on external interactions for our security, and I think our relationship with individual states of the Persian Gulf differs one to the other and we have our commonalities and our differences and that’s a very important factor that we manage differences. It doesn’t mean that, you know, we – there is no difference with some of them, which have the highest level of interaction, but I think, look, is NATO this – I think all these are on, in a way, reflective of lack of confidence in our – some of our neighbours. You say – I said Iran is self-confident. On the other wise, you have some players in the region, which feel under confident of their own capabilities, on their own resources, and they all look at the external, let’s say, support, external backing for their daily life. So, to put it tersely, no, we are not threatened, no.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay, in the back, please.

Aleem Hamed

[Pause] Hi, my name’s Aleem Hamed. I am a Member of Chatham House. Iran has been very outspoken about the Bahrainis – about the situation in Bahrain over the last seven years. Now, I wonder how – is the Iranian foreign policy could fuel or be a factor of the Iranian threat commodity that you talked about earlier? Thank you.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Iranian what?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Threat commodity. Well, policies towards Bahrain particularly, probably in light of developments in the region, sentencing of…

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Yes, very good question. I didn’t get the latter part, which now I have the complete picture. You know in Bahrain, who invaded Bahrain, put the tanks and armaments in the streets of Bahrain? In Persian we don’t say it was not my aunt, huh, [inaudible – 50:39], no. It was one of the neighbours of Bahrain, which when Bahrainis, for their own domestic reasons, wanted human rights and resource, they were encountered by this, let’s say, type of invasion and so on, like the details you know. So, we don’t – we never do such type of activities, but we – I think it’s very clear that the base should be human rights of all individuals, equal rights of everybody, and I think if it is the case, not only Bahrain, the rest of region also, should observe these democratic processes, which it – which is healthy for their own stability, as well for the regional security.

Dr Sanam Vakil

I’m going to ask you a tough question, because conceptually, one of the ways we look at foreign policy is, it’s an expression of domestic politics.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Yes.

Dr Sanam Vakil

And recently, there has been some criticism domestically in Iran about Iran’s foreign policy and Iran’s activities in the region. Can you explain this? Can you account for this?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Well, I was preparing for a difficult question. Actually, we’re already a debating society, maybe some – we cannot see debates in some of the neighbours, but we are a debating society and debates or tokens of the strength, when we debate everything and some of the debates are tough. But when we make decisions it is a conscious decision and we will follow the – it doesn’t mean you have a country of the old Maurice, you know, everybody wearing the same clothes. You expect a one voice, you know, maybe no debate, but I think it’s debating society, yes. There are different voices, different – if you read the Iranian press every day, not just on foreign policy. On other issues you see this diversity there. But I think on regional approaches, when it comes to decision-making, we, of course, listen to all debates, but when decision is made, this is a conscious decision.

Actually, our own institute, IPIS, Institute for Political and International Studies, on these days that I’m here, on Tuesday, every week Foreign Minister comes to our Institute. I invite a good number of scholars of different orientations, as well as those who are in the foreign policy establishment and we have a debate for two/three hours. You know, I run the debate and he listens and he, at the end, you know, has his own view and gets, you know, some of the points to discuss them. And we learn from this service, but when it’s a country, we – it’s a country that totally we are behind the decisions that it made.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay, we’re coming to the end, so I’m going to take a few questions and then you can answer all in one.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I’m waiting for difficult ones.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Yes, so some difficult questions, in our last five minutes, please. We’ll start right here.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

You know, actually, I was kidding you.

Robert Carter

Thank you. Hello, Robert Carter, Press TV. I wanted to ask you about – ‘cause we hear a lot from the US these days that the – they’re a friend of the Iranian people, but these sanctions actually are going to affect the Iranian people in a negative way, so I wondered if you could perhaps expand on that and just explain what impact sanctions will likely have on the Iranian people?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. Over here, please. Over there, and thank you.

Marc Champion

Thank you. Marc Champion from Bloomberg. As I understand your address earlier, essentially, your – the strategy for Iran in dealing with the sanctions is to try and isolate, politically, the US and to persuade its allies in Europe and Asian countries and so on, that they should not co-operate. The waivers that were spoken about, it seemed to be rather successful on the US side in trying to isolate Iran by making the economic consequences all Iran’s and not for its trading partners. How long can you hold out? Because the economic consequences have been pretty severe already and they will continue, and if your only solution is to try and isolate the US, that is a generational programme.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. Back there, okay.

Stephen Porter

Thank you. My name’s Stephen Porter, I’m a Private Member of Chatham House. With Britain’s departure from the EU, how will that affect Anglo-Iranian relations?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Over there.

Zaki Mashi

Thank you Mr Ambassador. I’m Zaki Mashi, an Academy Fellow in Chatham House. Actually, in order to – for Iran to face the current challenges, will the Iranian authority strengthen the foundation of the theocratic state or it will strengthen democracy and limiting the power of the religious leader? Thank you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

And final question here, please?

Member

[Inaudible – 56:56], University College London. I wanted to ask, Mr Ambassador, about the Caspian status. I mean, after details of talks finally there’s a significant step about the status of the Caspian Sea and do you think that after these kind of sanctions by the US, the co-operation in the region, especially in the Caucasia and Central Asia, will increase and – or, as the Iran’s neighbours in these regions are huge oil and gas producers, do you think there’s also a chance of increase of competition? Thank you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

That’s a very long list.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Yes.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Can I add one more?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Please.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Sorry. You said that the foreign policy framework has always been independent and we’ve heard the phrase, “Neither East nor West,” for 40 years. But recently, we’ve been hearing the supreme leader speaking of the East as having perhaps more importance in this new sanctions busting strategy. Could you comment on that, is Iran looking East as part of its strategy?

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Okay. I answer your question first. Ladies are first, but because it’s a very important question. I think yes, of course, Iran is looking at different sources of interaction with international community. We see the US, Europe is a slow and sometimes ambivalent, but Russia is forcefully there. China, with a different degree, of course, is there. I think what our leader mentioned doesn’t negate the East-West spirit of Iranian foreign policy. It means, on the existing situation, we have to look at the diversity of interactions and sources of interaction and we have to look at not just, let’s say, China, Russia or Asia’s laws, as alternative interactive pivots, but what is important here is that we see a shift of power, a shift of wealth globally.

I mean, it relates to realities on the ground, but it doesn’t negate the spirit of Iranian foreign policy, which is neither East nor West, that means independence. That does not mean a geographical, let’s say, low quality per se. It means actually, Iranian revolution moto was [mother tongue] and [mother tongue] means independence, which stands at the heart of Iranian foreign policy at all times in post-revolutionary era. I think we have paid a lot to receive – to reach to this level and we furiously protect it, I mean this concept of independence.

And I think the same goes to the Caspian. I think Caspian is an area of co-operation. Of course, we have been – you know, Iran is not just limited to one region. We have five/six regions around us: Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Caucasia, Indian Sub-Continent, Persian Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, Arab world. I mean, Iran is at the centre of these different centres and what’s happening in the North of Iran is very interesting. Actually, we had a roundtable in Tabrīz two weeks ago on the same subject and that for me, as a student of the field, was also interesting that how, over bilateral scope on, that’s very interesting with, for example, Azerbaijan, with Armenia, with Russia I was involved. I were present, Putin came and he had three hours of talks with the scholars, and [inaudible – 61:04] it’s for their annual conference, and he personally mentioned relationship with Iran is deep. So, you are – you have an evolving relationship in the North of Iran with all Caucasian and Central Asian states, as well as Russia.

Now we have – we signed an agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, which is very important economically and I think this should be taken into the whole picture. So, I think more co-operation, but it is not defined just against sanction. I think it is the national interest all – of all individual member states of the Caspian Sea. Literally, the states I mean to have more co-operation, whether it is sanction or is not sanction. But, of course, the American approach has pushed everybody to a more regional interaction.

Now, on the first question, the Trump administration is saying that, “We are a friend of people.” I didn’t want, actually, to intend talking about Trump personally, but I read the American press every day. There was a report a couple of months ago, I think, in the Washington Post on the number of lies that Trump has said during the last almost two years, I think 3,000. Some of his lies are big, some of them are small, some of them are medium sized. It’s like a supermarket, yeah, you can’t find a very – yeah, so, it’s – it is one of the biggest lies I have ever heard that you’re a friend of people, but you put, you know, knife on the neck of not just the political system, any individual who is Iranian should not be enter to United States, because we are friends of the Iranian people. So, we – actually, I’m interested in political jokes. I have to make some jokes out of this lie.

Now, on waivers and what you mentioned, I think our policy is not per se just to pinpoint on isolating United States. United States by itself is isolated, not – I don’t mean economically. US lacks legitimacy globally when it goes to sanctions on Iran. This is their isolation. But I think what we are doing, first of all, is strategic patience. It’s not a new country. Actually, we have a great Poet in Iran, by chance he’s from my city, Shiraz office, here’s a very important poem, which is – suits the Iranian mind, the Iranian individual society, as well as nation and it says [mother tongue], which means patience and victory are good old friends. With patience comes victory. So, I think we are not rushing responding, you know, impatiently, but with multiple our sources. It’s not just we just to look at the United States. We reckon upon our domestic resources. We got some extra, let’s say, activities through the budget and so, there are many, many channels that we do.

On UK, in England and EU, Brexit, and yesterday I was in the Parliament and I saw them on session, people were saying that the UK should stay in European Union and I don’t think it would have a qualitative impact on the relationship. However, I think when Europe is without the UK, there would be, of course, different weights, collectively. Any other question?

Dr Sanam Vakil

I think there was a question about the strength of the theocratic elements of the state…

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

I say…

Dr Sanam Vakil

…against the democratic.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

…there are so many simple dichotomies on Iran, simple dichotomies. This is a good cause to ask, these guys are liberal, those guys are conservative, this is democratic, the other one is autocratic. I think all of this simple dichotomisation neglects the complex set of Iranian realities. You know, once we were hosting the Former Secretary General of United Nations, Ban Ki-moon over a school of international relations where to train our Diplomats. And he gave a speech, I was managing that meeting, moderating the meeting and in then he mentioned two/three general Western accusation about Iran. And he came – he was in Iran for the summit of an unaligned movement, four/five years ago and he said, “Oh, human rights Middle East,” and these, let’s say [mother tongue], talking about Iran. Of course, he mentioned also, that how he enjoys the beautiful carpets of Iranian gifts to him. Every day he sits within the United Nations, “It’s very beautiful, they have my portrait on these carpets, very” – and also talking about other Iranian carpets. And said – when he’d finished I said, “Mr Secretary General, you talked about the beauty of Persian carpets. Persian carpets were made of million of knots and they are reflective of Iranian society.” Iranian society is a very complex society, as the carpets were, but at the end, a carpet is beautiful and you cannot just go to simple dichotomisation or a few concepts, explaining the society.

On the same manner, I would say Iran has – is a constitutional country, we have a constitution. The constitution sets the boundaries and I think Iran remains a constitutional republic. Thank you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Mr Ambassador, you have explained the contradictions, the complexities, the carpets, the poetry. You’ve answered all of our questions very patiently and I cannot thank you enough and I hope to see you back here at Chatham House in the future.

Ambassador Seyed M. Kazem Sajjadpour

Thank you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you [applause].