Dr Neil Quilliam
Good afternoon, and welcome to our event today. I’m Neil Quilliam. I’m a Senior Research Fellow here at the Middle East and North Africa Programme. We’re here, as you know, to talk about Iran’s Revolution at 40. The event will be on the record. If you have mobile phones, if you could put them to silent, or turn them off, that would be much appreciated, please. I’m joined by an in-house panel today. So, this is Chatham House at its best. I’m joined, to my left, by Dr – we’re four Drs, actually, today, aren’t we, which is kind of funny. Joined today by Dr Sanam Vakil, who is an Associate Fellow, or a Senior Consulting Fellow, actually, with our programme, and very much leads our work on Iran. She’ll be familiar to you from sitting up on the stage and being all over the media, and talking about being all over the media, my colleague Lina Khatib has also been on the media a lot recently, CNN and everywhere, talking about Revolution at 40, and Syria, and other areas. If you don’t know, Lina is a heavy metal fan, and used to manage a band, and is setting up a world congress on heavy metal, so I…
Dr Lina Khatib
Yeah, and we’ll talk about that later.
Dr Neil Quilliam
And to the end, we have my roomie from upstairs, Dr Renad Mansour, again, who will be known to all of you, who’s a leading expert on Iraq, and the benefit of sharing an office with him is, I get to hear these very serious conversations he has with very Senior Politicians in Baghdad and elsewhere, so it’s a pleasure. Each of my colleagues is going to speak for about seven or eight minutes. Sanam will talk about domestic issues, Lina will naturally talk about Iran’s foreign policy in the region, and then, Renad is going to do some myth busting, that’s your task for the day. So, if we can start with you, Sanam, seven or eight minutes, the Revolution at 40. Where’s the country been, where’s it heading, what should we be preparing ourselves for? You said earlier, when – in our conversation, you know, there’s this common, sort of, idea or conception out there that Iran is some sort of mastermind, or this, sort of, very serious chess player that’s able to out manoeuvre all of its neighbours. Between you and Lina, it’d be really good to, sort of, have a sense of whether that is the case, or whether, you know, this idea is very much, kind of, overblown. Thank you.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Okay, great, thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I think we wanted to just have a nice conversation about where Iran is today at 40, and what are the implications of this birthday party that was celebrated last week in Tehran and around the country. I think it’s an important event because, for 40 years, practically on every single anniversary and every single milestone and every single decade that has gone by, everyone has thought that the Islamic Republic is on its last leg, or on its last life, and here we are, 40 years later. I’m a bit older than the Islamic Republic, and I have grown up and seen the Islamic Republic change, and so what I thought I would do today is share with you how I have seen the Islamic Republic change, through my work on Iran and through my work studying Iran, and it’s a very dynamic and fascinating country, so I’m not really going to be able to do it justice in seven minutes, but I’ve come up with five areas that I think we should be looking at in Iran’s internal politics. And these areas will also shed light on Iran’s future challenges and future opportunities.
Primarily, the biggest change that has – that Iran has experienced in 40 years is demographic. Since the revolution in 1979, Iran’s population doubled, and for many years, we spoke of Iran’s population having – 70% of the population being under the age of 30. And those statistics continue to be used today, and I think we shouldn’t – we have to consider that, actually, Iran’s population is aging.
So, along with the demographic boom, the Government implemented a birth control policy in order to control its birth rate, that was almost at 4%, and now it’s below 2%, and this aging population has different needs, and maybe different requirements that we should consider. On the one hand, yes, there is a wide component of youth in Iran, and this youth is hungry for change, and wants employment and opportunity, and this youth is heavily educated, and that is an important demographic dynamic as well. But, as the population has changed, we have a larger component of the demographics that is in-between the range of 30 to 50, and I don’t know how many of you here in the audience are between the age of 30 to 50, but I can tell you that you change from being – when you’re 20 and when you’re 45. You have different needs, you have different requirements, and these different needs and requirements are very much playing out within the body politic in Iran. Security and stability are very important for this demographic, and you can see that in their voting patterns, coming to the ballot box, and voting for moderate liberalisation-directed policies, and specifically, today, when we are seeing greater calls for good governance in Iran. I very much attribute that to the changing demographics within the country.
A second change that we have witnessed within the country, and this is not unique to Iran, these are wider patterns in the wider world, but also, across the Middle East, is the impact of social media in Iran. Let’s – let me just give you some statistics. 56 million people in Iran out of 83 use the internet every day. 40 million, half of the population, have cell phones or are active on social media. This, of course, enables people to be more engaged, more aware of events going on, both inside and outside of Iran. There’s greater connectivity, and this has had enormous impact, and we’ve seen that again in demanding greater accountability from the Government. There are social media campaigns, hashtag campaigns on Twitter and Facebook and Telegram, and others, occurring every day, and it’s not just ordinary Iranians that are using social media, it’s also the Government that is using social media in a very effective way, to be aware of the divisions that exist in Iranian society, the trends that exist in Iranian society. The Iranian Government polls its population regularly and often, and uses that information in a very adept way. Not to create bonds or bring people together, actually, but more to create divisions in Iranian society and manage the different cleavages and groups that exist.
This, of course, plays out among a youth and among different cleavages, such as women and labour groups and student groups and activists of all kinds, and we can maybe talk about those dynamics in the Q&A. I do want to continue on with my points. Economic changes are also very important. Here, 40 years on, Iran is under sanctions yet again. Iran has been continuously under sanctions for 40 years, and the policy of the Islamic Republic has been to build a resistance economy, and one can question whether they’re ever going to truly be successful at doing that, because at the same time, there is a lot of push from within for integration and liberalisation, and those kind of demands, but where we stand today, Iran’s currency has lost 70% of its value. Inflation is putting immense pressure on the state. Unemployment is the other Achille’s heel of the Iranian economy, and in order to deal with the rising demands of Iran’s youthful and middle-aged population, providing jobs is the most important issue that the Islamic Republic faces day in and day out, and that’s why the Islamic Republic engage in the Nuclear Agreement, because it was Iran’s version of Vision 2030, to put it akin to the Saudi one.
One-third of university graduates in Iran are out of work, and this shows you that the Islamic Republic definitely has a challenge of – from within, in addressing the demands of its population, going forward. People are also questioning whether the Islamic Republic has made the lives of its citizens better, and a number of Economists have come out, and this is not from my work, so I do want to definitely give them credit where credit is due. Djavid Salehi-Isfahani and Nadereh Chamlou of the World Bank have recently published data that have demonstrated that Iran has not suffered, in terms of income inequality. Actually, in terms of income inequality, Iran’s – despite the growth and demographics inside the Islamic Republic, people’s livelihood have generally remained the same. This is not something that we should celebrate, but it is also nothing we can mourn because of the demographic challenges that Iran has been facing as well.
But the problem here is that, within Iran, people’s perceptions of income inequality have increased, and this is where the state has another challenge on its horizons. With perception being really important, this has fuelled many of the protests and the sense of discontent that – among the protestors that we saw last December and January, with the protest that spread throughout the country. So, the economic demands and the economic balance is going to be really an important space to watch, going forward, particularly as Iran tries to weather the storm of sanctions, and weather this new round of pressure from the United States.
Another area that I just want to mention, before I pass the baton onto Lina, is to look at the issue of ideology in the Islamic Republic. This is still an Islamic Republic, but the use of ideology has very much shifted. Islam still remains a principle mobiliser and one of the most important pillars of the Islamic Republic, and it’s going to be very hard for the state to move away from using Islamic discourse, but at the same time, we have observed that, over the past few years, actually, interestingly, since the Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and you might remember him for his very bombastic statements, the Islamic Republic has been more reliant on nationalist ideology, invoking Iran’s long history, dating back to the Persian Empire, and trying to bring more Iranians into a nationalist tent, as most people have become a little more disillusioned with the Islamic side of the ideology. There are declining statistics, with regards to mosque attendance, greater support for different religious groups within the country, higher degree of reporting, with regards to religious affiliation, maybe being agnostic and atheist, for example.
So, with fewer people subscribing, maybe, to the ideology, or to the religious edifice of the regime, the use of nationalist rhetoric is really important, and this is going to play out in Iran’s regional relationships. Yes, it is still pursuing sectarian relationships around the Middle East, but nationalism has helped sell the Nuclear Programme, has helped sell Iran’s maybe more adventurous regional position, and nationalism is going to be really important as Iran continues to make a case for itself against the United States, and we saw Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister, making a very fiery and very nationalistic speech, just a few days ago at Munich, and this is reflective of a new trend that we are going to see going forward, as they begin to rely on this new pillar to reach out and connect and build bridges with a population that might be more inclined to support the Islamic Republic in this moment of isolation. I’m going to leave it there. Obviously, I could keep going. There’s issues of women and leadership and governance, but I think we can come back to that in the Q&A.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, Sanam, you’ve really, sort of, set out your stall. I’m glad you, sort of, raised this issue on, sort of, aging youth. I confess, I’m between 30 and 50, so I sit there and I remember, in the mists of time, 1997, when Khatami came in, and there was this sense that, you know, this was a new era, change was going to take place, the youth of the time had no real memory of the revolution, and everything was going to shift and change, but it didn’t seem to go that way. Anyway, so that’s – so you’re, sort of, challenges from within is a really interesting thing to consider.
Lina, you look at Syria, you look at Iranian influence in Syria quite extensively. Is Iran – is it this hegemonic power, or is it building its strategic death, because it’s fearful of US, fearful of Israel? Where does it, sort of, sit within that?
Dr Lina Khatib
Yeah. So, I’ve been given the very easy task of talking about Iran’s foreign policy in five minutes. It’s going to be very comprehensive. I’m going to do a bit of myth busting, since Renad started that trend, and I like it. I think the key thing to remember is, as Sanam has pointed out, Iran 40 years ago is not Iran today. If you look at Iran’s regional influence in the Middle East today, it’s actually the most expensive it’s been in the history of the Islamic Republic. So, there has been growth. Iran is now active in so many places: in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq and Lebanon, and other places, including, you know, at one point, Sudan, etc. So, it is really very, very active in many places.
The other thing is that Iran’s strategy for influence outside its shores has been, now with the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude, that it’s a generation-long strategy. So, it’s not about entering a country and just saying, “We’ll just figure it out, this is going to happen for the next year,” no. Iran is willing to wait. It has a very long breath, very patient. Look at Lebanon as an illustrative example. The revolution in Iran, of course, happened in 79. I was living in Lebanon at that time. Everywhere in Lebanon, suddenly, you saw these cassette tapes of Khomeini speeches being exchanged by people, kind of like, you know, heavy metal, but Khomeini. And people just were fascinated with this phenomenon, and who knew back then that the seed planted in 79 would eventually, today, result in Hezbollah, which is Iran’s close ally in Lebanon, becoming the most influential political party in the country. It took a generation for this evolution of Hezbollah to happen, from basically, a militia to a very key part of the political milieu in Lebanon.
So, when we think about Iran, we have to think long-term. Of course, when it comes to the West, the problem is, administrations in the UK, in the US, and other places, have a very short-term, kind of, list of goals they want to achieve. So, I think this is part of the reason why we have seen so much failure when it comes to engagement with Iran, ‘cause you’re talking about two very different timelines that are not compatible. When it comes to Iranian influence, how has it done?
First of all, Iran has been very adept at taking advantage of opportunities, and I would cite Yemen as an example of this. The problem in Yemen today, you know, the war, with the Houthis, and the others, a lot of people, especially in Gulf countries around Yemen, mainly Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain, point the finger at Iran and say Iran is the source of the problem, but, actually, Iran took advantage of the problem. The Houthis in Yemen are not like Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah is very much an Iran-sponsored created project. The Houthis were approached by Iran when it saw an opportunity, and it thought this would be a great way to put pressure on Saudi Arabia next door. So – and I’m not saying that Iran is now not active in Yemen through the Houthis, of course it is, but very early on, the situation could have been different had it been handled, frankly, differently by Saudi Arabia.
So, Saudi Arabia, its rivalry with Iran, in some cases, has actually helped increase Iranian influence in the region, rather than basically, decreasing it, which is, you know, another myth, I think, you know, we should think about busting. The Iranian-Saudi rivalry, having said that – so, a lot of people explains a lot of what is happening in the region, in terms of its crises, just like people saying sectarianism between Shia and Sunnis also explains a lot of these crises. I would say we should take both these frameworks of understanding with a pinch of salt, because they are very simplistic, and they do not reflect the nuances happening on the ground. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry, yes, it’s still there, but it is no longer the driver. It’s not like each side is picking its people and mobilising them against the other side. This did happen in certain cases, but it’s not really what’s driving conflicts in the region. It’s more a case of, if I said Iran often taking advantage of opportunities or stepping up its activities in order to protect its own interests, and Syria falls under the second cap.
So, what happened in Syria is, Iran was very concerned about losing the lifeline that allows them to support Hezbollah, because Hezbollah gets its weapons through Syria, and also trains its troops in Syria. So, a regime change in Syria that would not have been sympathetic to Iran would have been, basically, an existential threat to Iran’s strategic interest in the Levant, and that’s why Iran entered the Syrian conflict, to help the regime of Bashar al-Assad. It is because of that, rather than because Iran really, really likes the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
The other issue with the Sunni-Shia, I think Renad can talk more about it, but even in Syria, we are seeing Iranian engagement that is targeting the Sunni community, and by engagement, here, I’m not talking about military engagement, ‘cause part of Iran’s method of influence is not just taking advantage of military opportunities, like what happened in Yemen, but also, grassroots bottom-up engagement with local populations. In Lebanon, this was easy, actually, for Iran, because there was a – there’s a significant Shia community that was very much disadvantaged, but in Syria, Iran doesn’t have a big Syria-Shia population that it can mobilise. So, instead, it is not just creating mercenaries, etc., that it’s sponsoring, in terms of military mobilisation, but instead, it’s also reaching out to Sunni constituents in Syria, who are pro the Assad regime, and reaching out to them through charity work, you know, engagement on the ground, and in ways like that.
This means that Iran’s engagement in Syria, or elsewhere in the region, is not going to be easy to rollback. Where Iran is – seems to be suffering right now is economically, because of the reimposed sanctions, and because the US seems to have put as a goal weakening Iran’s influence in the region, but they don’t want to reach this goal militarily. They declared a path is they’ve tried to do this economically, and this is a part of the reason why, in Lebanon, for example, Iran, through Hezbollah, is trying to find other ways of sustaining Hezbollah economically, which is part of the reason why the Government formation process in Lebanon took nine months, because nobody could agree, it’s not just about politics, but also about the division of the, basically, the cake that is public money, and who’s going to get what within the political parties, and Hezbollah wanting to make sure that it gets access to key ministries, like all other political parties in Lebanon, frankly. Everybody wanted key ministries that they could use to basically improve their economic situation.
So, when we think about rolling back Iranian influences, you have the social outreach, you have this very long, generation-long, as I said, project. It’s not something that could be just bombed out, it’s not something that could be rolled out – rolled back and in a short period of time. I think I’ll stop there, there’s a lot to talk about.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, Lina. You managed to really squeeze a lot into that five minutes, and this – I’d like to come back at some point to this, sort of, subject and rolling back Iranian influence. This is something that, you know, we talk about amongst ourselves, and maybe have different views. And on that, I would just like to say, I mean, whenever we’re, sort of, asked to go and speak somewhere, we’re quite often asked to, sort of, say, “What is the Chatham House view?” and there is no Chatham House view. We have differences amongst ourselves, and I think that – hopefully, that’s going to come out through some of the Q&A. Renad, if you could just, sort of, follow-up with – you’ve been given this role of, sort of, myth busting, that would be great if you could unpack that, and also, talk about, sort of, Iran’s influence in Iraq. I know through our own conversations, I mean, we look at how that’s conceptualised or presented in the media, that Iran is this, you know, is this malevolent or benign influence in Iraq, but it’s essentially the predominant influence. If you could perhaps unpack that a little bit, too, that would be helpful.
Dr Renad Mansour
Sure, thanks. I suppose I should begin with a bit of a disclaimer. We’ve been talking about where we all were during the revolution, and I was a bit younger than you guys. I was dancing to the song Not West, Not East, but the Islamic Republic, which was a very common song during that time. So, I’m not sure if that has had any brainwashing effect growing up partly in Iran and Syria, and listening to, you know, that – those songs. But nonetheless, I suppose what I want to address are these myths that you have on Iran. I primarily see them being played out in Iraq, and particularly the kind of US and Iran issue that you have, but also ask why that is. You know, why is it that we’re talking about international diplomacy, and we’re talking about foreign policy and maximising influence as being malign or evil? I mean, who isn’t? And so, there are these normative judgements placed on Iran, because they’re just better at it at times, as has been explained by Lina. Also, keep in mind, and I think Lina’s absolutely correct, that Iran has covered more territory now than it has during the time of the Islamic Republic, but not that that’s not – that’s a very small timeframe in its history. We’re talking about Persia, we’re talking about an empire, that through the – has hundreds and hundreds of years of knowing the landscape and knowing the terrain, and being able to maintain strong influence.
However, there are a few myths about Iran, and partly because, I think, relative to its neighbours, particularly in the Gulf, Iran seems to always come out one step ahead, but that’s why these myths have come out. First, and it’s already been discussed, Iran is this omnipotent force, it always gets what it wants, it always wins, and I think very clear examples, recent examples, would, sort of, suggest that it’s maybe not as omnipotent. ISIS was not, conspiracy theories aside, in Iran’s interest, to have a Salafi-jihadi force on its borders, that Iran has to spend all this money to go and fight and have martyrs. That was a mistake. That was a mistake of funding certain Governments, of supporting certain leaders in Iraq, that would then disenfranchise other populations. Another – Iran didn’t get its way when the Kurds in Iraq, for example, wanted to do a referendum. Iran was against it, went to their allies, and said, “Please don’t do a referendum in 2017.” They did it anyway. These two stories begin to show that Iran doesn’t necessarily get its way all the time, and sometimes the repercussions hurt.
However, why I think Iran does better than the rest is because what Lina mentioned, it’s a – the timeframe is much longer, but also, look at the way it engages. It doesn’t have these normative, “We only engage with state actors.” It’s realpolitik is much stronger than, I think, its opponents. It engages with state, non-state, any actors, as long as they can maximise influence. So, I think that’s what you’re clearly seeing in Iraq and in Syria, and elsewhere, but nonetheless, it leverages one or the other. So, if the state remains weak, then it could use non-state actors, but it doesn’t want to give up on one or the other. Ideally, it’d like to blur everything, right?
This links to the second, sort of, myth that you have, which is that Iran, fundamentally, wants its neighbours to be weak, right? So, a good Iraq for Iran, or a good Syria, is a very weak one, and I would also challenge this, because, again, in 2014, what you saw was when Iraq is at its weakest it becomes a national security problem for Iran. So, what Iran actually wants is certainly not to bring back strong central states. They don’t want a Ba’athist regime in Baghdad anymore, but they also don’t want a weak Government, they want something in-between, where you can control, to some extent, but also, where it can, kind of, govern itself. It can be self-sustaining, you don’t have to keep giving money to it or reinforcing it. That’s the ideal model, so it’s not too weak, not too strong.
Another myth, and again, it’s been already alluded to, Iran is an ideological power that wants to support Shi’ism in the Middle East. Doing that hurts its interest in several ways. First of all, Iran is Persian in an Arab world, right? It’s also Shia in a Sunni world. So, it doesn’t necessarily need to stress, oftentimes, that Shi’ism as much as it does, but not only that, look at some of its main allies. In Iraq, the Talabani family and the PUK, the Sunni-Kurdish ally that works with Iran has historical links with Iran, based primarily on – in, sort of, socioeconomic and economic relations, right? I’m not saying that many of the groups that Iran supports are and use Shiite discourse for legitimacy, and the [inaudible – 28:28], I mean some of the groups within the [inaudible – 28:30] do employ Shi’ism, particularly at times when violence and conflict is high, but it’s not necessarily only a Shia power. It’s not necessarily only exporting Shi’ism, it’s exporting Iranianism, and I think Sanam is, you know – it’s very interesting the way she puts it, increasingly, that Iran element is becoming that nationalist, is becoming important, as things move forward.
Finally, I wanted to address this issue of Shi’ism. There’s an assumption that anywhere where you have a Shia population, they’re going to support Iran, right? So, in Iraq, for example, where you have a majority of the country Shia, they’re naturally going to be an ally of Iran, but what we’re seeing, in the last few years, is actually a growing anti-Iranian movement inside Iraq amongst the Shi’is, where they say, “We’re Iraqi,” they say, “We’re Arab,” but they don’t say, “We’re not going – we’re not willing to be clients or, you know, of Iran.” So, that assumption, that there’s this big Shiite thing is being questioned, and to some extent, Iran is beginning to lose influence in places in Syria and places in Lebanon and places in Iraq, if it uses that Shia card too strong. So, again, that’s something that we need to look into, and the Najaf versus Qom thing within Shi’ism is quite important, because one is the ideology of the revolution, going back to that, which is that we need to have clerics rule, right? But I would say that in Iraq and in Syria and in Lebanon, if not in Iran as well, they pushback against the Velayat-e Faqih, right? And Najaf is not a political power. Najaf is a religious power, where it tries to stay as much as possible, notwithstanding conflicts or crises, outside of politics. This is a fundamental ideological dispute. Velayat-e Faqih is being questioned by many cities across what would be the Shiite-Arab world, and I think it’s important to keep looking at that, and again, move – I think that’ s how I’ll end it.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Great, thank you. Before I go to Q&A, there’s an issue that I’m trying to, sort of, reconcile from two different points of view. I mean, Lina has, sort of, said that Iran is more strategic, and you talked about how it, sort of, still perceives the Hezbollah, in Lebanon. So, we have that kind of dimension to it. Renad, and perhaps Sanam, are, sort of, saying, “Well, they’re not necessarily strategic, they are just in a better position than their neighbours, or better at mobilising support, or networks.” I guess, what I’d like, really, to better understand is that, I mean, when one looks at it, Iran does seem to be – I mean, Iran’s influence is larger now than it’s probably ever been, as you’ve said, or certainly under this, sort of, iteration. So, my question is, why does it seem to be outplaying, outmanoeuvring its neighbours? It can’t just be that time is on its side, can it? It must be something else, and it’s not, you know, it’s not an exceptionalism, it’s not Persian history. I mean, what is it that allows Iran to capitalise or maximise upon these opportunities, whereas, the neighbours seem to be less effective at doing that? Or maybe that’s unfair. Who wants to take that?
Dr Lina Khatib
Well, I think it’s more about the neighbours than about Iran, to be honest. As I was saying, it’s the way – for example, take the Saudi Arabian rivalry. The way Saudi Arabia thought it would counter the Islamic Revolution in Iran was – I mean, the story’s very well known, was to sponsor the spread of Wahhabism in the world, and that has backfired, and that has dragged Saudi Arabia into a different path of problems that it’s still dealing with today. And today, as we know, Saudi Arabia is still Wahhabi, but we have a new, basically, regime in Saudi Arabia that’s trying to distance itself from this past, and steer Saudi Arabia in a different direction. So, sometimes the way others have handled the situation has not been, kind of, very effective. Another issue, in addition to, say, the Wahhabism issue, is Saudi Arabia’s choice, for example in Lebanon, of political allies, who did not have the internal credibility that Iran’s allies have, within their own respective communities. So, sometimes choices made by the rivals ended up empowering Iran.
Israel is another example. The way Israel has been handling the Palestinian issue and the situation in Lebanon has given Iran a lifeline. All the transgressions that Israel engages in can only be good news for Hezbollah and for Hamas, and for all the entities that are basically saying, “We are here as resistance movements.” So, these choices made by Iran’s rivals have just, I think, made it much easier for Iran to basically extend its influence in the region.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, any other points to add to that?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I would also say that there – Iran has strong institutions, and that is because of its history, and that’s because, 40 years ago, those institutions were not demolished, they were built upon. The foundations of the Pahlavi monarchy were not ruined, and in fact, I always say, or one of the reasons why the revolution took place is that there were 1,000 families ruling Iran prior to 1979, and today, the revolution has been bureaucratised, and we have 100,000 families ruling Iran, and those 100,000 families are heavily involved in the multiple institutions that have existed, and built – created, and continue to be created in Iran, and I think that bureaucracy is really important, because the way Iran engages Lebanon, for example, or Iraq, since the Iraq War specifically, is they almost have a process that we have mapped out, and it’s, you know, bilateral diplomatic relations, the official path. There’s the economic path that they’ve been trying to build upon, and there is the soft power people-to-people ties that can be media, that can be through travel, it can be through pilgrimage, it can be through religion. And then, there’s the fourth layer, which is perhaps the most successful and the one that gets the most attention, but is the cultivation of non-state actors, and the development of non-state actors is actually one we should think about, because the biggest and strongest non-state actor is Iran’s own non-state actor, the IRGC, and the Basij that exists in Iran.
So, they developed that model themselves in their own system, without realising that it would become a challenge for them as well, but then, they’ve implemented it and created IRGC and Basij in an image of themselves, obviously, slowly and incrementally throughout the region in a very successful way. And so, on the one hand, I agree, it’s com – the region has made missteps, and there have been so many. I mean, Qatar, Yemen, Lebanon, I mean, we can just list them, and the United States has made many mistakes as well, that Iran has capitalised on, but at the same time, Iran has developed a strategy that didn’t come to fruition in 1979, as a plan to take over the region, but they realised where they’re making gains, they’re realising where they’re not making losses, and I think the fact that, as Renad said, they will talk to anyone, anywhere, anytime, regardless of ideology, political position, is what gives them a strategic advantage.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. We’ll turn this over now to Q&A. There’s a lot of areas we can discuss here. We didn’t mention Trump, JCPOA, sanctions in any detail, so there’s a lot. You’ve got a panel here that are very competent and capable. If I – if you could put up your name, please, we’ll take this gentleman here. Thank you, if you could give your name and your affiliation. If you’re a Chatham House Member, if you could give an alternative affiliation, that would be much appreciated.
Michael Barron
Thank you. Michael Barron, an Independent Consultant focusing on the Middle East, as well as being a Private Member of Chatham House. My question alludes back to Sanam Vakil’s comment, and the idea that ideology’s becoming more nationalist, or there’s a more nationalist view. While there are – have been – they’ve gained from that in some ways, are there risks, and have they made a strategic mistake in taking that ideology down that path? After all, maybe less elegantly, that’s what the Shah tried to do, and that didn’t end so well for him. So, is there a – are they sowing some seeds here that they might come to regret?
Dr Neil Quilliam
I’ll take another question, gentleman here, thank you very much. Sorry, William, can you just wait for the microphone?
William Patey
Sorry, William Patey, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and now Advisor to Control Risks. In my dialogue with Iranians over the years, there’s always been – Iranians have complained that we haven’t – we don’t take them seriously, and I came to realise that we always thought we did take them seriously, but what we didn’t accept was when they said, “Take us seriously,” they meant, “We are the regional hegemon, and, basically, you’ll come to talk to us if you want to be anything in the region.” And you’ve talked about Iran as at the furthest extent of its power, and I agree, I think it’s probably a status quo power. I think Saudi Arabia is the reginal disruptor now, but can I ask you a question about – given – picking up what Renad said, myth busting, and what Lina said about the long reach of Iran, what their long-term vision of the Middle East is, and the relationship with political Islam, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? ‘Cause they’ve, obviously, tactically aligned themselves with people like Hamas and others, and Renad spoke about the unintended consequences of what happens when, you know, Assad falls and they end up with ISIS on their doorstep, and – so, where do they, you know – and I’m asking you to have a punt at this, obviously, unless, you know, Ayatollah Khomeini has confided in you, where do they see the, kind of, long-term vision of the region? You know, ‘cause you could see a region, which political Islam has usurped all the leaderships in the Gulf, and elsewhere, and we’ve got a, kind of, rather chaotic, more chaotic Middle East, if you could imagine one. Where do they fit in all that? Is their engagement with Muslim Brotherhood, with political Islam, Sunni political Islam tactical, or do they see a region in which there are no longer any Sunni monarchs around the place is in their long-term interests? I mean, I say this, because as somebody who’s, sort of, tried to find a way to reconcile Saudi Arabia with Iran, it’s hard to know where to start.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, William, and we’ll just take one more question, just to add, just – sorry, this lady here, just, in the middle there. Thank you very much.
Marsha Sadiqua
Hi, and I’m Marsha Sadiqua from SOAS. A much more simpler question. You see Saudi Arabia, which is also building itself very differently from what it was in the past. I mean, it’s much more ambitious, much more aggressive than, you know, whatever it was and once you gain technology, etc., how do you see Iran now dealing with Saudi Arabia, especially when Saudi Arabia, unlike in the past, instead of depending entirely in non-state actors, is now trying to reach out to state actors, neighbours of Iran like Pakistan? I mean, and there is that Shia-Sunni problem that can emerge, the Balochistan problem that can emerge from Iran. Secondly, how do you see Iran using the Taliban in the future in the settlement of Afghanistan, and how would it turn that round to its benefit?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. Sanam, do you want to answer Michael’s question first, on ideology?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure. I think that’s something that we should be thinking about, the risks of nationalism, but at the same time, I see that as a national – natural progression of the shift in ideology in Iran, really because if the Islamic Republic wants to survive as the Islamic Republic, it’s going to have to look for a way to bring more people back into the Islamic Republic. It has a governance problem, it has a legitimacy problem. We’ve seen that through three decades of intermittent, but very big protests take place in the country, and by shifting the narrative to a nationalist discourse, I think that that is an intelligent way of getting people to buy in again, especially in the context of sanctions and isolation, and this defensive posture and position that they’re in. It also allows people to reconsider Iran’s role in the region, and instead of, maybe, being critical of it, thinking that, “Oh, it’s actually been successful,” potentially. I do understand that you think it’s an overextension, if we revert back to the Shah’s policy.
I think that, probably, the region and the international community should see, maybe, the return of nationalism as an indicator that Iranian foreign policy priorities have never really changed. Maybe they had a Islamic guise to them, but they’ve always been the same, and Iran – and I might just add – go into where Iran sees itself with this. Iran sees itself as a – I feel a bit uncomfortable with our word ‘hegemon’, but Iran sees itself as the country that has the greatest potential to be the economic and political powerhouse of the region. And McKinsey did a study, in advance of the JCPOA, and called it the $1 trillion economy, because Iran would be able to be the change driver and the economic driver, like the Germany of the Middle East. I mean, that’s what they were pitching for the Islamic Republic, in really creative think – big think of how to get there. And so, that works for Iran, going back to that, and then in the context of the entire region, also, sort of, invoking nationalism and, sort of, shifting national identities that we’re also seeing in the Gulf states. This makes sense for Iran as well, in terms of regional competition.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Lina, a long-term vision for Iran, how does it fit?
Dr Lina Khatib
Well, as we heard from Sanam, basically, yeah, they want to be the broker of power in the region, if not the regional power in the Middle East. It’s not in their interest for there to be Sunni monarchs, but they have long abandoned trying to recreate mini-Islamic republics elsewhere in the region. So, in Lebanon, for example, in 1985, Hezbollah declared its manifesto, and in the manifesto it said, “We don’t recognise the legitimacy of the Lebanese state. We want to replace it with an Islamic republic,” but then they nationalised the, ‘over the years’, part of participating in the political process, and I think it was an evolutionary, basically, approach that they took, realising we don’t actually have to change the political system, because as long as the political system is influenced by Iran, controlled behind closed doors by Iran, then it can look like a secular republic, it can have a Christian President, it can look whatever, you know, it looks like. So, that’s, kind of, fine, but when it comes to the monarchies, in the Gulf in particular, this is a whole other issue, because these monarchs derive legitimacy, you know, through tribal relations, etc. So, this is a fundamental challenge to Iran, in terms of how much it can go with its influence. So, I don’t think if Iran were asked today, would it like to see monarchs in UAE and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia? Of course, it would say no. It’s their common ground, between Saudi Arabia and Iran that can help us, kind of, start somewhere. I think, right now, it’s probably the worst time ever, in terms of trying to find common ground between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
You asked about the Muslim Brotherhood, which I think is very important. Now, one thing today that is unifying both countries and Israel and the United States is concern about Iran’s regional influence. The United States is not that bothered about the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey, obviously, is very much one of the big supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, as things stand, with Erdogan being in power. Turkey has similar ambitions to Iran, in that it also wants to be a regional leader. However, it sees its role as being a regional leader of the Sunni world. It kind of doesn’t mind the division of labour with Iran, where Iran to be the leader of the Shia, kind of, world in the Middle East. That is totally fine, which means it – there is a degree of accommodation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran that is also playing out in Qatar. If you think about it today, especially with the Gulf crisis, Qatar, you know, always a sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, elsewhere has increased its interactions with Iran, and Iran has actually taken advantage of the Gulf crisis, in order to also upset the Saudis, sending food to Qatar, increasing, you know, trade with Qatar. So, I think the Gulf crisis actually does not help, in this regard. It’s actually good news for Iran. So, Iran has no problem with the Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, as another example, are very happy to enter, let’s say, a National Unity Government with elements of the regime, and people sympathetic to Iran being part of this National Unity Government. So, I think – but, crucially, while UAE very much is completely adamant that the Muslim Brotherhood is an existential threat, Saudi Arabia is not as intense about worrying about the Muslim Brotherhood. So, the Muslim Brotherhood is not going to be the way into anything, I’m afraid. So, I don’t – I really don’t see common ground right now.
I will just add one thing, related to your question about the Taliban, which is not many people know that, actually, there have also been relations between Iran and Al-Qaeda, and also Iran and the Taliban. It’s not beyond Iran, as we saw even in the case of Hamas, of course, and in other conflicts, it’s not beyond Iran to sponsor Sunni armed groups, or Sunni jihadist groups. So, when it comes to the, you know, to Iran’s pragmatism and willingness to engage with whoever, it can do that because it can use them as spoilers, and that’s why its influence in the region is not just about the groups that look like Iran, like the spread of IRGC-like entities, but also, how it engages in these transactional relationships with these other entities that can be spoilers. And this is something that only now, I think, Saudi Arabia is becoming very much aware of, and trying to be vocal about, but the Gulf crisis, I personally think, is reducing Gulf countries’ ability to mobilise and get together and have a coherent strategy about Iran, as they’re busy, you know, kind of, with their internal regional affairs.
Renad, I don’t know if you want to add anything about Saudi Arabia’s engagement with states versus non-states? Just, you know, ‘cause you work on Iraq.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, sure. To pick up, but before I do that, I wanted to come in on one point, which I think is important to understanding why Iran maintains this influence in the region. A lot of it is economics. You know, Saudi Arabia will throw money at different groups, hoping that they would somehow become strong. Iran builds roads, Iran’s built connections, and they create allies that are themselves self-sustaining. So, if you look at the budget that Iran spends on its proxies, versus the budget that Saudi Arabia spends on its proxies, it’s not even the same arena, yet, for some reason, one is more effective because they’re self-sustaining, right? And I think that’s an important point, which leads us to our next point, which is the Saudi Arabia. So, I mean, Saudi Arabia’s regional policy, foreign policy has never really been that good. Any time they try and become too aggressive they, kind of, face a lot of – I mean, they haven’t been very successful as a foreign policy, or a regional actor.
Recently, you could see a lot of these hiccups, whether it’s with Lebanon, or failures in Syria, or Yemen. However, in Iraq, there was an interesting perspective. Where Saudi Arabia decided, “Wait a minute, okay, they’re Shia, but maybe some of them are against Iran. Who can we reach out to?” and they actually reached out to some interesting figures, including Muqtada al-Sadr, who is the former head of the Mahdi Army, the Shia sectarian militia that, in the 2000s, was terrorising, you know, killing Americans, killing Sunnis and others, and they brought – Muqtada came, visited Mohammed bin Salman, and they had a meeting, and they actually gave money, and tried to have an engagement with Muqtada. They did the same thing with Abadi. Abadi, who was a Shiite from the Dawa Party, was a strong – Saudi Arabia supported them. So, here you have Saudi Arabia trying to, kind of, take a page out of what would be Iran’s book, which is, “Let’s find – let’s not think about Sunni, Wahhabi or Salafi, whatever. Let’s find who it is in Iraq that we can deal with, based on one principle, which is countering Iranian influence,” and that seems to be the principle that’s been guiding Saudi’s regional policies, and I think in Iraq, you’ve started to see that.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Can I just say one more thing? Sorry. Ultimately, to your point about where Iran is going, the goal is for Iran to see the US withdraw completely from the Middle East. That is Iran’s objective. Saudi Arabia’s a sideshow for Iran, or regional competition is the sideshow. Iran has determined its threats in the region to be the United States primarily, and then, secondary, Israel, and Israel is very much about Iran’s effort ingratiating itself in the region, and of course, it hasn’t necessarily worked out as an effective policy for Iran, but everything is about the United States for Iran and the Middle East. So, in a dream scenario, the US is disengaging from the region, militarily, psychologically and physically, and Iran is going to be one of the principle regional arbiters, and that’s what it is looking to obtain.
Dr Neil Quilliam
So, they’re riding behind Trump, then, not at the front.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Pretty much, if we want to be conspiratorial, and actually, if we look at the issue of the Taliban, this is very important, because Iran is also very happy to see talks with the Taliban, and looking to push for American disengagement from Afghanistan, and they’ve had a very pragmatic relationship with the Taliban. They had their first encounter with the Taliban back in 1997, they have built a wall, they have built very pragmatic relationships with Afghanistan, and this is Iran’s sphere of influence. So, they’re going to manage that neighbourhood, in order to protect its borders, to protect migration, drug trafficking, and have a clear, hopefully, secure path for the Belt and Road policy as well. So, I mean, it’s part of a larger strategy there.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, Sanam. We have time for two more questions. I have one down here, right on the corner, please, thank you very much, and we’ll take this gentleman here. Thank you.
Andrew Penn
Hiya, Andrew Penn, University of Oxford. Question for anyone, but mainly some of it picks up from what Sanam just mentioned. The general question would be the JCPOA, crystal ball time, what’s the health of it, what are the prospects for it? And can we also see this as a reflection of the diminishing influence that US has here? There seems to be slight contradiction between a lot of tough talk coming out of Washington, Pompeo and Trump, etc., but not necessarily an appetite to follow that up. So, what can we expect from the tensions between the US and Iran going forward, beyond sanctions, or is it just sanctions?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much.
Ian Black
Thanks. Ian Black, from the Middle East Centre at LSE. We’ve talked a lot about the – Iran’s regional plans and footholds, and so on. We haven’t mentioned the name of the man most associated with it, Qasem Soleimani, who’s the Head of the Quds Brigade of the Revolutionary Guards. I just wondered, is there any – do we know anything about internal debate within Iran between the people we conventionally call the hardliners and the moderates? And it’s related, also, to the question about the JCPOA. We remember that the – on the hard-line side of the spectrum, there are people who wanted to scrap the JCPOA after Trump walked away from it. Do we know anything about those internal, I assume, divisions? ‘Cause as far as I’m aware, there’s very little public profile to them. Thanks.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. Sanam, JCPOA, dead or alive?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, it’s on life support. It’s been on life support for the past number of months, and it’s going to continue to be on life support, and Neil and I are actually engaged in a project where we’re looking to, sort of, game out what the next steps are, with regards to the JCPOA. We’re interviewing people around the world, and to see what scenarios are, and the US-Iran standoff right now is really reflective of not factionalism in Tehran, although there is factionalism in Tehran, but I think it’s a reflection of factionalism in Washington, where the State Department very much has maximum pressure to get Iran back to the table, as their strategy, and perhaps the NFC and people around the Vice President really pursuing a different path. I’m not sure it’s regime change, because I don’t think President Trump wants that either, but they haven’t aligned their positions and figured out a way to get back to the negotiating table with Iran. I do believe that is the United States’ ultimate goal. I don’t think they want to engage in a military encounter.
Of course, the risks of that are increasing, and Iran is looking to obtain leverage and attention right now, because Iran is not the number one priority on anybody’s to-do list around the world, that’s maybe fallen down, and so that’s quite dangerous, but, you know, this is the space to watch. Iran should stay in the deal, I think, for many reasons. It needs to keep the team of Washington and Europe separated from each other, and it benefits from that, but there are other reasons. They’ve already made their nuclear compromises, so why would they go back and restart a programme that they’ve already convinced their population to walk away from? And I think, finally, there’s another reason why Iran is staying in the JCPOA, and that’s because the arms embargo expires in five years. So, if you’ve already made that deal to walk away from your nuclear programme, and your five years closer to being able to buy weapons from Russia and China, better to stay in.
So, you know, I think we’re going to be okay. Qasem Soleimani and the principlists, I would just basically say there is a debate in Iran, and it’s quite visible. Even among moderates and principlists, specifically, they determined foreign policy in the Supreme National Security Council, and then they advise the Supreme Leader, and moderates really question the success of this strategy of extending into Syria, and debate – argue that this has weakened Iran, and Iran is, yes, more successful and in a stronger regional position, but more isolated than it’s ever been. We’re kind of in a position of 1980 to 1988, in terms of levels of regional antipathy and isolation. So, you have – they’re making that argument, whereas, Qasem Soleimani is successful at implementing his strategy, and so it’s very hard to walk away from a policy that has been successful, whereas, the JCPOA has not been successful. So, on balance, you sort of have to work – support something that is working for you and not the issue that is not.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Renad, Qasem Soleimani used to, sort of, pop up here, there and everywhere in Iraq. What’s the latest on him there? Support, ability to mobilise?
Dr Renad Mansour
So, beyond – I mean…
Dr Neil Quilliam
I haven’t seen him for a while, actually.
Dr Renad Mansour
He’s there, making sure things are going the way. I think the thing that’s not worthy about Qasem Soleimani is why, after 2014, all of a sudden, he became a public image, because we – everyone knew about him, everyone knew that he was working in these different countries, but he wasn’t doing pictures, he wasn’t doing any of that, you know, media campaigns. But since then, since 2014, and when ISIS really emerged, Qasem Soleimani, maybe it’s social media, everyone had phones, was, all of a sudden, everyone’s selfies, was coming out and giving interviews in Arabic, in Iraq and Syria. So, I think, very clearly, he transformed from that underground, kind of, mysterious military person, to quite a political actor, where he is in Iraq’s Parliament on the day that Syria’s votes are being had, saying, “This is what we should do,” and he’s paying visits to all sorts of Politicians. So, I think there is some kind of evolution to Qasem Soleimani.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Any final thoughts, Lina?
Dr Lina Khatib
Just very, very, very last, quick thought on Iran in Syria. As I said, it’s not going to be possible to roll it back easily. However, the so-called alliance between Iran and Russia in Syria is also a very transactional one, and we shouldn’t read too much into it, in terms of the formation of a new political camp in the world, with Russia and Iran and China on one side, and the US and its allies on another side. I think Iran in Syria is not as comfortable as it pretends to be.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. Well, this has felt like a very comfortable fireside chat. So, if you could join me in thanking my colleagues for the conversation [applause].
