Ten conflicts to watch in 2021

Dr Patricia Lewis

Well, welcome, everybody. My name is Patricia Lewis. I’m the Research Director for Conflict, Science and Transformation and Director of International Security Programme here at Chatham House. Welcome to what is an annual event that Chatham House holds with International Crisis Group, that looks at ten conflicts to watch for the coming year.

I’m delighted to have here with me Rob Malley, who is the President and CEO of International Crisis Group and who will be presenting the report today. Just to say, this event is being held on the record, and it is being livestreamed. So, do please tweet, using the #CHEvents and please submit questions through the event, throughout the whole event, using the ‘Q&A’ function. And if you want to ask your questions directly, please say so and we can unmute you, or if you prefer, you can ask me to ask the question. Please don’t submit questions using the raise hand function. And also, we’re keeping the chat function open for you to be able to communicate with the wider group, so do use that, and do say hello to people.

So, just in a few words of introduction about Robert Malley. He served in the Obama administration as Special Assistant to the President, Senior Advisor to the President for the counter-ISIL campaign and White House Co-ordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf Region. Previously, Rob also served as Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs, and Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. He also has a longstanding history at International Crisis Group. He’s been Programme Director for Middle East and North Africa at Crisis Group, leading the organisation’s research, analysis, policy, prescription and advocacy in and about the Middle East and North Africa region. And then, after his time in the Obama administration, he became first Vice President for Policy, and then since January 2018, President and CEO. A graduate of Yale, Harvard Law School and Oxford University, and is widely published.

So, as you say, Rob, in this year’s publication, there are many contenders for the 2021 ugly contest of conflicts around the world. So perhaps you can start with giving us a summary of the report and then we can go on to look at them in more detail in the discussion. Over to you, Rob.

Robert Malley

Well, first, thanks, Patricia, for having me. As you said, it’s an annual event. Unfortunately, this year, not in person, but next year, one hopes. It is, you know, it’s always hard to summarise a list of ten, and as I’ve discussed with you in prior years, it’s always a bit of an arbitrary. We try to pick ten conflicts that are either conflicts that are either the most deadly or those that have the greatest geopolitical implications, or those that have an opportunity for resolution, or perhaps one that is not well-covered, and we thought it’s our duty sort of to put it on people’s screens. So, I think we’ll talk about the specifics, and people could look at the list that we chose, and we’ll debate why they’re in and why others are not.

But I just want to sort of quickly say what we saw as major trends this year, and therefore, and I detailed them in the introduction, first, and the reason why I’m here and you’re there and we’re not together, is COVID and the impact that it has had on conflict, and in particular our focus is going to be on the impact that the economic consequences of the health crisis, the long-term economic consequences, are going to have in exacerbating conflict and making it harder to resolve conflict.

Second, is the long-term effect, again, in new and – we, for the first time, we have a transnational risk, climate change, I’m sure we’ll talk about it, but that’s something that’s going to overshadow a number of the conflicts that we are watching.

The third, evidently, is the transition in the US, from President Trump to President Biden, and what that means for the conflict landscape, especially given the character of President Trump.

And finally, a trend that we have noticed, but again, one could look at it throughout many years, which is a tendency to opt for military solutions, and what does that mean to an organisation like ours, to people who are – who believe in diplomacy, who believe in negotiated solutions, when you see, whether it’s in Ethiopia or [inaudible – 06:19], that some governments decide that enough is enough, they want to take matters in their own hands, and believe that they may have settled for an outcome – reached an outcome, that could be sustainable for some time.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Oh, sorry, Rob, I thought you were going to go on to talk about some of the specific areas. So…

Robert Malley

I can, but I’ll leave it to you to guide me to which areas you want me to talk, ‘cause I could take the full hour just by doing that.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I know, I know. So I mean, it’s very interesting that, you know, you’ve looked at the issues of COVID-19 and climate as big thematic issues. But one of the big thematic issues you’ve also looked at are the legacies, and in fact, if we look at the actual sort of hot conflicts, if you like, that you’ve identified in the report, in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, in the Sahel more generally, Venezuela, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and then the whole issue around Iran, and then Syria, Turkey and Russia, the issue of legacies, it seems to me, keeps coming up, and how we approach the historical legacy, and then the new conditions, and how we might see the intersection of those things, and what that means for – you say resolution, but also prevention. Are there things that we can do to head things off at the pass, understanding those legacies better?

Robert Malley

So first, it kind of may not be a direct response to your question, but I think what’s striking is I – we went through the list, and you mentioned them. I might quickly mention them now, but of the ten, I believe six were on the list last year.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah.

Robert Malley

That’s not a sign of success. That’s a sign that these are conflicts that are enduring, that have deeper roots, that either there’s no real effort to try to resolve them, or the efforts have failed. And you know, that’s Afghanistan, that’s Yemen, that’s Libya, that’s Ethiopia, Venezuela, Iran, I think are – I think those are the ones, there may be others. I think I got the list. But those are conflicts that obviously have deeper roots, and that are – have been impervious so far to efforts at resolution. And in those cases where there’s been a military attempt at resolution, as in Ethiopia, I think, our argument would be that is not going to be a sustainable solution unless and until there is a political effort that is associated with it.

So I think, you know, there’s not only the legacy, as you say, but the legacy meaning the accumulated frustrations, accumulated conflicts, community conflicts, political or geopolitical conflicts, but when you add to that the changes in the world order, which is something again that you and I have discussed over the years, in a more fragmented and more polarised world, not necessarily worse than in the past, it’s just different, more polarised, more fragmented, where regional actors are trying to advance their interest at a time when they’re not sure where the world order’s going to go.

Is the US going to be as dominant? The answer is no. Is China going to rise? The answer is yes. What role will Russia play? And in that flux, what do countries do to advance their interests and to protect themselves at a time of uncertainty? And that has made some of these conflicts harder to resolve. Libya, obviously, comes to mind, but the Horn of Africa, where we’ve seen a lot of outside interference, the conflict between Iran and the US, where it’s not just Iran and the US, it’s the Gulf countries, it’s Israel. And so I think, when you put together the accumulated legacy of the past, and on top of it you superimpose the uncertainty of this new world order, and on top of it, the impact of COVID-19, which again, not to get into too much detail, the impact it’s had is not just the health impact, which has been dramatic, the economic impact, which has been dramatic as well, but all of that accumulated, it’s going to mean there’s going to be less attention paid for conflict resolution, less of an ability to engage in diplomatic missions, in mediation, both because of the other priorities, but also because of the restrictions on travel. And so, if you add that to everything we’ve seen before and the uncertainty and the transition in the US, it means that conflicts that have been here for a long time are likely to fester, unless – and that’s where, you know, an organisation like ours and yours come in on this, people can be mobilised with better ideas and more resources and energy to try to tackle them.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And you know, and one of the big lessons, obviously, from the last 12 months is, you know, being prepared for the unexpected, right, in terms of, yes, we knew there could be a pandemic any time, yes, we thought that was probably going to be a major influenza like it was 100 years ago. It turned out to be a coronavirus, but you know, any pandemic like that, we would have seen a lot of death, we would have seen a lot of major restrictions in the way that we are. What we perhaps didn’t expect to see is how poorly many of the developed countries were at being able to respond, and that’s been a big wakeup call.

So, one of the things that’s going on in many of our discussions around the world is about, you know, preparedness and resilience, and we have identified in this report, is climate change. And it’s really great to see that climate change is being woven into our thinking about how to – how the – what the impacts will be on conflict, but also how to prepare. We know what’s coming, to a large degree, we’ve got all sorts of predictions. So, how does knowing what’s coming down the track affect things? Can we do better than we have with COVID-19? Can we help prepare the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change? Can we help prepare them in the different ways, the way that we have been? Can we use this as an opportunity, this particular crisis that we’re in now?

Robert Malley

I mean, so your question inspires a lot of answers. I mean, the first point I’d make is, we’re not very good – and by ‘we’ I mean governments are not particularly good at long-term planning, for an obvious reason, and having served in government, it’s so much, it’s so striking, is that there’s always an inbox of urgent issues, there’s always the politics and the – of addressing those issues, because you have to think of the next election, there’s the crises that emerge, and to take the time to think about something that it appears abstract until it hits with the concreteness that the pandemic hit. And of course, one could do much better, and you know, the pandemic, some governments did better than others, but it is a hard thing to think of long-term solutions for abstract – again, abstract until they become concrete threats.

And that’s also the case with climate change, and I think we have to, you know – Crisis Group has taken this step over the last two years of plunging into this debate of the nexus between security, war and peace on the one hand and climate change on the other. The United Nations is doing it, the Biden administration, by naming John Kerry, seems to be committed to doing it as well, and we’re seeing some other countries, but it is one of those hard issues where you have to make decisions now, in anticipation of problems that may come later.

Now for us at Crisis Group it’s not so much – we’re not a climate change organisation. We are not going to come up with recommendations about how to tackle climate change at all, that’s not our expertise. What we can do is look on a day-to-day basis on what the impact is of fluctuating weather patterns on the politics of specific countries, those that we’re involved in. And we’ve seen it already, whether it’s in Nigeria, the conflict between farmers and herders, whether it’s in the Sahel, whether it’s the Nile and the conflict over the Great Renaissance Dam that Ethiopia’s building. All of these have a direct link to water scarcity, to different distribution, availability of resources, to fluctuation in weather patterns, and what that means for governments, for non-state actors, for civil society, for communities that are involved in resource allocation and resource distribution or competition for scarce resources.

And what we have seen at Crisis Group is that the same weather pattern, and we’ve written about this now at some length, the same weather pattern in location A and location B can have very different conflict impact, depending on how governments and non-state parties address community grievances, how inclusive they are, how much mediation and how effort much has gone towards fair distribution and allocation of resources. And that’s – so that’s where we come in, which is to take the weather, the climate data, and to superimpose it on the conflict situation that we deal with, and try to come up with good ideas for those who are going to have to deal with the political impact of climate change.

And suddenly, you don’t even have to be a – we happen to believe very much in the science of climate change, but even if you don’t believe in it, it is clear that there’s some places in the world that are suffering because of the impact of changing – changes in the weather patterns, and the politics are what is going to make a difference as to whether that turns into a conflict or whether it can be peacefully addressed, whether resource competition will be managed by governments and other parties, or whether they will be mismanaged and lead to more conflict.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks. Thanks a lot, Rob, and I think that, you know, one of the big issues that we’ve also seen is the impact of climate stressors and conflict stressors on migration and human migration, and this is something, I think, that is going to have a lot of future impact, unless we again, address these big problems early on, and think about them in a way that is – has as its focus the prevention of the very worst of these effects and preparedness. So a large part of it is really about, as you say, it’s about governance, it’s about the way things are managed, but it’s also about making sure that we understand what’s coming at us, and you know, this can get quite overwhelming, I think. As you know, there’s been quite a lot of debate in this country, and I’m sure in many other countries, about the amount of overseas aid that we give in order to help prevent some of the worst of these problems. Can you say something about that, and the impact of overseas aid in preventing conflict and helping resolve conflict and helping create a more sustainable situation for everybody and the Sustainable Development Goals, and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, and where we are with those? That would be really helpful.

Robert Malley

I mean, I’ll keep it at a sort of general level, because again, I know that we have to get into some specifics, but there’s – one of – and this ties into everything we’ve been talking about, which is long-term efforts, the need for prevention as opposed to simply coming into and cleaning up after the conflict has erupted, and the impact that COVID-19 is going to have on the economies and other resources that are going to be available, whether it’s for the SDGs or for any effort at development, at a time when governments, particularly Western governments that have been providing some of this support, are going to be very much inward-looking. Economic crisis of probably unprecedented since at least the Second World War, some would say since The Great Depression, and that automatically translates into a dearth of resources, and in a feeling among Politicians, an understandable one, however sometimes it may be regrettable, that they need to address concerns at home before they can invest in development assistance abroad. Even an issue like sharing the vaccine with developing nations, which is so crucial.

So, you know, the argument that we will make, that others will make, is that if you don’t deal with these issues now, if you don’t show support, economic support, again today, the urgency of providing support for countries in the developing world that have to deal with the long-term impact of COVID, or with the long-term impact of climate change, and other issues, that to make the case that it’s going to be much more costly for them, if they don’t deal with it. And you know, you mentioned migration, one could mention just instability, chaos, violence, that could emerge if not enough attention is paid to the problems that are emerging today.

So, it’s an uphill battle, always, the battle for resources, but hopefully the case, you know, one could – one can look at the silver lining of the pandemic, if ever there was a case where you can see that dealing with a problem – that problems abroad are problems at home, that a pandemic cannot be addressed, and it’s either addressed everywhere or it’s basically addressed nowhere, because our lifestyles cannot come back to normal until the pandemic is basically addressed globally. That, hopefully, will serve as one lesson for those who are dealing with any other transnational threat, that just looking at home, just thinking about how to deal with it in your own country, is not going to resolve the matter.

Again, that too is going to be a real tug-of-war, because one of the themes that we’ve been covering for the past year, since COVID emerged, is that there really is a tug-of-war between narratives. There’s one narrative, which is the one that I just presented, which is in the face of a transnational threat, it’s a powerful reminder of the need to pool resources, to pool science, to take care of what’s happening on the other side of the border, because if you don’t, it’s going to come back and haunt you. But there’s a counter-narrative, which is a narrative of more populist forces throughout Europe, throughout the US and elsewhere, which says, no, what the pandemic proves to us is that the outside is a threat, the outside world is a threat, and that we need to protect our own supply chains, we need to hoard vaccines for us, we need to build walls to protect from that virus. And the tug-of-war of that narrative, and both have real resonance, I think we can’t underestimate the resonance of the – what I would call the counter-narrative, the more inward-looking, the more, you know, populist narrative, is one that has real legs, it has real resonance, because it can – you know, for many people, it makes perfect sense.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yes, and before I go out then, to the questions from some of our audience, I’m just taken with, you know, this issue of the United States. So we’re about to see a transfer of power now back to a Democratic administration, with a Senate that will be able to pass legislation, at least in part, when it’s not required to have a two-thirds majority. And I think we’re going to see – we can imagine that we’ll see, with the Biden administration, a return to multilateralism, a return to negotiation, a return to, you know, supporting NATO and all of the things that we saw before. It won’t be easy, though. There’s been a lot of undoing of that agenda.

But you also mentioned that the US’s power is waning, not only to do with what has happened over the last few years, but also to do with just general change in relative power in the world. And China’s power, China’s economic power, China’s military power and China’s diplomatic power is also increasing. So how do you see this start to play as the US sort of slots itself back into our multilateral institutions with more enthusiasm than it had in the last few years, and China’s new rise on the world stage, particularly given, you know, China’s very strong views on its economy, on managing worldwide resources, and also, you know, it’s moving away from the universal values of human rights?

Robert Malley

So, I think – I mean, you had the three dimensions, I think, absolutely right, in terms of the transition in the US and the role and the burden that President Biden is going to carry. There’s the, sort of, I would call it the easy bar to overcome, which is to do better than President Trump when it comes to multilateralism, to caring about conflict, to working with others, to restoring alliances, to believing in diplomacy, getting back into the Paris Climate Accord, coming back into the Iran nuclear deal, back into the WHO. I mean, there’s that easy bar, and in some ways, President Trump has done his successor an inadvertent favour by setting expectations so low that it won’t take that much, I think, for President Biden, President-Elect Biden, soon to be President Biden, to show that a new page – that a page has been turned.

Then there’s a harder issue, which is – again, you mentioned it, which is what everything President Trump will not be erased on day one, and some of it may not be erased for a while. I mean, some of the damage that was done will be long lasting, and it’s going to be hard to undo what he did, but there’s also a damage that is more amorphous, in a way, which is the loss of trust and the reliability of the US, and I don’t want to paint a rosy picture. The US has been plenty – had plenty of times in its history, even in recent history, where it’s played a negative role pre-Trump, and I think there are many countries around the world, many people around the world, who don’t look get the US as a benefactor. So what I’m saying now is not to paint a picture of sort of the rosy past and then we have the dark ages with President Trump.

But I am making the case that if you’re sitting at the negotiating table with the US tomorrow, under President Biden, whether you’re Iran or North Korea or anyone else, and you think that the staying power of whatever promise, the shelf life of any promise, is now going to be maybe four years, at most eight, because the next President can come in, and given the turbulence of the US, could be a President who will tear up anything that had been agreed previously. Why would anyone rely on that word of the US? And that’s something that’s going to be extremely difficult for President Biden, however great his national security team may be, to overcome that trust deficit. So there are a lot of countries that are going to look forward to working with the US, but with a – I think, with part of their minds are going to be thinking, “Is this a power whose word is good for only four years?” So that’s the second dimension that I think is – might make it hard.

And the third, that’s going to make it even harder, is again, what you alluded to, which is the world is not where it used to be, and the US doesn’t have the predominance that it once had, what a French Foreign Minister once called the hyper French – the US hyperpower. It is now clearly – I mean, it’s still maybe a – the foremost militarily among others, there’s no doubt about that, but it has China at its heels, Russia and the regional powers, and simply this fragmentation of the world and the world system, which means that the US cannot pull the weight that it used to play – pull – and that countries are not going to be as willing to say yes to what the US demands. And again, other countries are going to emerge as rivals, competitors of varying degrees. And so, when you add those two, which is the long-term legacy of the Trump administration and then the long history, the inevitable rise and declines of powers, again, I think it’s something that we’ve discussed in years past, that’s going to be something that’s going to be even harder for the US to adjust to, but it’s going to have to adjust to it, because that’s simply the reality that it faces.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, Rob, and I’m going to go out now to some of the people participating. Some of the questions are appearing in ‘Q&A’ and some of them are appearing in ‘Chat’, so forgive me if I don’t manage to get to all of them. But I’m going to turn to Domenic Carratu and then Jane Kinninmont and then John Holmes to ask questions. But before I do that, so that we’ve got a bit of time to prepare, I wanted to go to a question that came – no, I can’t find it. Oh, here we are. Amitava Banerjee, who has asked me to ask this. So, one matter of concern, and I mentioned it in my earlier remarks, is the increased hostility between China and India, in recent months. And we always see, you know, during the summer months, a lot of activity along the line of actual control and the line of control in that region, but this year we saw border clashes leading to loss of life and greater military build-up on either side. And he asked, does this view – does this – the fact that it’s not on the list mean that you don’t consider it to be a major risk? And I’m sure the answer to that is no, but can you talk a little bit about that, and how we can perhaps place this sort of uptick in activity in that region in 2020?

Robert Malley

So first, I mean, this allows me to say something that you and I discussed beforehand, which is, it’s not an exhaustive list. There always are some that we either debate and then we didn’t put on, or that we regret not having thought of, or that comes very quickly to emerge, and there’s an obvious case, which is what’s happening in the US, which I wish we had put on the list. I must admit, we thought hard about China, in terms of China’s – not just China and India, but sort of China’s role more broadly vis-à-vis the US, vis-à-vis Europe, tensions in Hong Kong, Taiwan, within China, the South China Sea, and forgive me, there’s a dog barking in the background, if you hear it, I apologise for that, and India. But there is sort of a – China and a China question, which is quite significant.

So, it doesn’t mean that – no, we do believe that it is something that we need to follow. I would say two things. First, I think you all are aware of the fact that I should have mentioned it. You know, we just crossed the two year milestone of our colleague, Michael Kovrig, who is being detained arbitrarily, unjustly, in China. That has obviously had – and now it’s had a real impact on the – our ability to do work – could you hold on one second, I’m going to make sure that the dog is away, one…

Dr Patricia Lewis

I think the dog is very upset by what Rob is saying, quite rightly so. Just give him a minute to come back. Great, thanks, Rob.

Robert Malley

Sorry. So, Michael has been detained now for two years, and that has made real restrictions on our ability to do the kind of work on China that we want to do. We’re fighting for his release, we’ll do everything for him to be released, and we thank everyone who has invested their time and resources to see that they come as soon as possible. We are going to try to work on China’s foreign policy nonetheless, but that is one of the reasons, perhaps, I think I have to mention, as to why China has not gotten the kind of attention it will but has not gotten the kind of attention that it deserves. But on the substance of the question, I think that’s absolutely correct, that China has – that there is an issue that has to be dealt with.

I mean, there’s – and regardless of the changes between President Trump and President Biden, there’s now a consensus in the American foreign policy establishment, rightly or wrongly, that China has to be dealt with more forcefully. I think we’ve seen that same debate in Europe and in the region, again I mentioned the list of places where – that are hotspots, that people have to obviously look at. And I think what we’re going to see is a mix, certainly coming from the US, I think from Europe as well, a mix of trying to work with China on issues of common concern, but again, there will be numerous issues of rivalry and the place – and the – how China sort of conducts its policy in its own region is going to be one of those factors of tension.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, and Domenic, I wonder if I can bring you in, ‘cause you mentioned the India/China issues, but you were also talking about Taiwan and South China Sea. Do you want to take this conversation on?

Domenic Carratu

Yeah, thank you very much. Apologies that you’ve already answered a lot of it. My initial comment was that I was surprised to see neither Taiwan’s South China Sea or the Karakoram Pass being included in the report, which effectively you’ve just answered. So, given that you’ve just said that let’s just develop that. And we’re looking at ten conflicts to watch in 2011, I would have thought that conflicts, particularly say the Karakoram Pass, and potentially, but hopefully not Taiwan this year, are ones we should be looking for. I get climate change is everybody’s, you know, flavour of the day, but it’s not going to be a conflict that’s going to escalate this year. It’s a long-run endemic problem, and it may trigger some conflicts. But certainly, I’d be much more watching the South China Sea, particularly Taiwan, and I’d be particularly concerned at the moment about the Karakoram Pass. Do you want to comment on that, please, Robert?

Robert Malley

Again, I think I did answer on – in terms of China, and you know, that we debate these, it’s only ten, and this is one that, for the reason I gave, didn’t make the list this year. I don’t want to comment on climate change. I mean, I can see there’s – I mean, you’re answering and I’m not – I don’t want to dispute it, but it sort of comes into that conundrum I was mentioning earlier. Climate change every year will be one of those problems that, well, it has an impact, a long-lasting impact, but we have other things that we need to deal with in the immediate. And I think we decided that, yeah, we could do that, and probably then climate change would never make the list, because there always will be the urgent priority that comes up.

But if we don’t tackle climate change, which is going to change the conflict landscape – it is already changing the conflict landscape, and a number of the conflicts that we are addressing today have been made worse, significantly worse by the impact of climate change. So I just – I’m not saying that, you know, you’re saying the trade-off should have been China instead of climate change, but I just want to explain, I think it would be – you know, climate change can’t make the list every year, but it is time for people to pay attention to it. We are a conflict prevention organisation, which means that we have to look into the future. We are looking at 2021, but climate change will have an impact in 2021, just as it had an impact in 2020 and 2018 and will continue into the future. So, just to make a strong case that it would be – it’s precisely if we think of it in terms of, well, today’s problem is more important than climate change in the future and that’s why we decided we needed to sort of put a mark down that it is an important problem this year and every year.

But on China, again, I think you make a fair point, and we are committed to working on China and all these issues. Again, you know, we have a whole year’s of – our work goes on well beyond the ten conflicts to watch. Those are ten, but we watch many more, and we work on many more, and these are some that we want to highlight, and China’s one that we are certainly going to – and China’s interaction with this neighbourhood as well, are going to be focussed on very much.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, Rob. I’m going to turn to two people now, ‘cause they’re – their questions, I think, are connected. One is Jane Kinninmont and the other is Frank Gardner. So, if we could turn to Jane first and then Frank, please? Jane, can you unmute yourself?

Jane Kinninmont

Hello, this is Jane. I’m Jane Kinninmont, Director of Impact at the European Leadership Network. I’m curious to know whether you considered risks of confrontation between the US and Russia or also, potentially, between the US and China for inclusion in your list?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, and if I could turn to Frank to ask his question as well, which I think is important. Frank, can you unmute?

Frank Gardner

Yeah, can you hear me now?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yes.

Frank Gardner

Yes, great, Robert Malley, thanks very much for doing this. I wonder what you make of Secretary of State Pompeo’s designation of Iran as a country that is hosting Al Qaeda? I mean, yes, in August there was this mysterious assassination, and there have been a number of reports, but the evidence is pretty thin on the ground, and of course, Iran as a Shia predominant theocracy is ideologically opposed to Sunni Al Qaeda. So, you know, from your experience right in the heart of the intelligence security world, does it make sense to you that Iran would be hosting senior Al Qaeda leaders?

Dr Patricia Lewis

And mine, on this, I’m going to turn to John Holmes, ‘cause his question is also very much about this. It’s really – this is all about really this whole, for want of a better word, geopolitics. So, John, if you could also ask your question, please.

John Holmes

Thank you very much, Patricia. In fact, my question’s been partly answered, ‘cause you’ve sort of asked it yourself earlier, but I’ll say it anyway, and I might just add a more specific point to it. And the question was, the trend towards failing to find solutions to long-running conflicts, and in some cases not even trying seriously anymore, seems to be continuing over the last year, and that goes along with the tilt you mentioned yourself, Rob, towards actual military ‘solutions’. How likely is it that the Biden administration and a renewed interest in multilateralism and all that goes with that will make any difference to this, and will China and Russia be ready to play more this game, if the US is trying to play it?

And my more specific question is about Afghanistan, which is at the top of your list, and I was looking at your report this morning, and my conclusion from reading it is that it looks pretty hopeless, the task of reaching an agreement, and even if there was an agreement, that the chances of that providing any solutions to Afghanistan’s problems look rather poor. Is that too pessimistic?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Good luck, Rob.

Robert Malley

Yeah, great questions. Let me start, and I’ll be probably brief with them. I wish I could be. So first to Jane, your question about US/Russia, US/China, very good questions. I mean, I think right now the debate in the US is very much about China. I think if there is one issue that’s going to dominate the foreign policy debate in the US, and I suspect in much of Europe as well, is the relationship with China. I don’t – you know, if we’re talking about conflict, sort of, you know, deadly conflict, I don’t anticipate – I pray there won’t be one either with Russia or with China and the US.

But I think the relationship with China is going to be a conflictual one with – and I think the Biden team has made clear what the stools of their policy will be. Work with China on areas of – where you could find commonality, whether it’s pandemics, whether it’s climate change, non-proliferation. Work – no, push back on issues where China is – whether it’s on the economic side or in terms of its own policies as a neighbourhood, where China is viewed as a foe. Try to build back an alliance with Europe and others, so that when you’re dealing with China you’re doing it as a collective rather than alone, and rather than dividing among your own partners. And finally, and I probably should have started with this, and this is very much the theme of the Biden administration, strengthen the US resilience at home, infrastructure, education, etc., to be able to compete better with China.

I think that’s going to be the broad approach. Now, how it translates in practice, and does it lead to areas of real tension with China? I do think the Biden administration’s going to be tougher when it comes to issues of human rights, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Uighurs. I think that’s where you might see – well, let’s put Taiwan aside, ‘cause the Trump administration has also moved quite far in that direction, but when it comes to issues of Hong Kong and the Uighurs, I think you might find the Biden administration tougher, and those are quite neuralgic for China.

And Russia, I think it’s very interesting in some ways, because you’ve seen with President Trump a really schizophrenic policy, where he himself was trying to have good relations with President Putin and with Russia, but the US Congress and much of his administration were rowing in a different direction. I think with President Biden, it’s going to be a sort of more unified approach, but one where, particularly because of the hangover of the Russian interference in US elections and hacking, I think that’s going to weigh very heavily on the Biden administration, even as they try to work on arms control and perhaps on issues like Syria and elsewhere. But I think that’s going to be – it’s going to be a tricky relationship. Again, to a large extent, the political climate in the US is not a bipartisan basis, views Russia as having interfered and meddled in ways that it really oughtn’t to have.

To Frank’s question, listen, I’m not privy to today’s intelligence, so I can’t really comment. I do think, even just looking at what current and former intelligence officials are saying, Secretary Pompeo at a minimum overstated his case. I do think, you know, there has been – there have been instances, and we know it from the past, and it was actually made public knowledge that Iran was hosting Al Qaeda members. I view that a bit as they were doing it as an insurance policy. They wanted to make sure that Al Qaeda wouldn’t use them as a target, and so they hosted them. I’m not saying it was a good idea, by any means, but I do think that Iran has had some interaction with Al Qaeda that was – that has been – some of which has been reported publicly. Also, I wouldn’t overstate the Shia versus Sunni. I mean, Iran, and this is different from Al Qaeda, but Iran has worked with Sunni movements like Hamas and others, and so I don’t think that Iran makes it a dividing line that will only work with Shia and not with Sunnis.

But I think Secretary Pompeo’s clearly overstated the case from everything I can see, and it’s part of the broader pattern where in the waning days and weeks of the Trump administration, there is what I’d called a scorched earth policy of planting minefields to make it more difficult for President Biden to do what he wants to do. And so that’s most clear on Iran, with a raft of designations, of sanctions, you know, every week new sanctions, clearly intended to make it harder for a Biden administration to get back into the Iran nuclear deal, as you just said, accusing Iran of hosting and of being – much more than hosting, of being sort of a – what does he call it? The axis of Iran and Al Qaeda. The designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, about which we also will be writing. I think we may have published it as we speak, a piece that makes it very clear, as humanitarian organisations around the world have also done, the devastating effect this could have on the humanitarian side in Yemen, but also, on the diplomatic side. So that this is another one of those legacies. In this case, it’s a hand grenade that the Trump administration is leaving behind to make what the Biden administration want to do more difficult.

Finally, on the – on John’s questions about failure to finding solutions, there’s a lot of questions in that, so let me – I’ll try to be quick on all three. Number one, I think this is a broader trend and actually, it’s a trend that probably those of us in the diplomatic business and the peace and conflict resolution business have – we have tended to say over and over again as a mantra, there’s no military solution. We still believe it, I’m sure, many of you on this call believe it, that there are no real military solutions, but that does, to some extent, fly in the face of the conviction of governments past and present, that the best solution is a military solution, because then you can really set the terms.

And so, I see a question here about the Western Sahara. I’m sure that Iraqians believe, whether or not the Iraqi Government believes that the monarchy – that they have settled this militarily better than any diplomatic solution, UN process would have yielded. You can look at Israel/Palestine, you can look at Chechnya, had a very different registry, you can look at Syria today, and what Ethiopia and Azerbaijan have done this year. That emanates from the belief either of that a diplomatic solution is unobtainable, one that they could live with, or that it’s better – they’d be better off with a military one. And I think those of us in the business of conflict resolution and prevention have to bear in mind that there are those who believe very strongly, perhaps even more now today than in the past because of this diffusion of power on the global scale, that a military solution is what makes the most sense.

And we have to make the case that that may be true in the short-term, but in the longer-term, and the longer-term could be pretty long, if you don’t have an inclusive solution, if you don’t have one that takes into account the grievances of those against which you’ve tried to reign military power, the problem is going to fester, and it will explode at one point or another. It’s not always an easy argument to make, but we will continue to make it, but with the realism that is – that comes from understanding the perspective of those who disagree. I do think that President Biden will try to intensify diplomatic efforts, may try to work more with other P5 members in the Security Council, China and Russia, but that, you know, that crisis or that dysfunctionality of the Security Council is not simply a Trump legacy. It came before, I mean, deep divisions when it came to Syria, originated with Libya, then Syria. So, I don’t think we could expect the Security Council and the great powers to be able to work together on all these conflicts. One would hope that they’d be able to work constructively on some of the conflicts in which they don’t see that their equities are as directly at stake.

Finally, on Afghanistan, I don’t think we were intended to write this as a piece of hopelessness. I think what we try to do is identify the very real dilemmas that the Biden administration is going to face, and first of all, getting an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government is going to be enormously difficult, because they have very different interests and very different visions, and Afghan civil society has a very different vision as well. So that’s clearly going to be – that’s – we always knew that was going to be a problem. It’s not insurmountable. It’s going to take real compromise and real help from – compromise from inside actors and help from outside.

I think the dilemma for the Biden administration, which is what a lot of what we wrote today is that, you know, in terms of the US role in Afghanistan, it’s going to be very difficult to balance between the commitment that was made and the agreement with the Taliban that all US troops would be out by May, the impact that that might have, since it’s very unlikely, I’d say impossible, that a deal will be struck by then, so what impact will that have in empowering the Taliban and giving them the sense that they are in a position to simply win militarily. And President-Elect Biden’s conviction, or at least what he has said over the past, that he believes that there should be a long-term counterterrorism presence, which is at odds with the deal that was struck with the Taliban and which the Taliban may not accept, to say, to put it mildly.

So I think that’s what we’re saying. It’s going to be very difficult. It’s not impossible. We were arguing that there needs to be steps now, between now and when President Biden takes office, and then what – until he gets his team fully in place and his policy fully wrapped up, to keep the peace process alive, not to do anything that would really undermine it. But then these challenges remain. But the reason we put it number one, my last word on this, is not only because it’s been the deadliest conflict and it’s been a conflict that’s gone on for so long, but also, because we see a real opportunity.

I mean, for all my criticism of President Trump, and I’m sure you’ve heard quite a bit of it already today, his administration broke the taboo, which was the right taboo to break, which is no talk to the Taliban unless the Taliban agrees to talk first with the – talks to the Afghan Government. That was a position, which was understood, and obviously, the government in Kabul was intent on preserving, but it meant no progress, because the Taliban were not prepared to go there. And so, by taking as a first step to negotiate directly with the Taliban but making part of the deal that it was incumbent on the Taliban to then talk to the Afghan Government, and that was the right thing to do. I’m not saying that everything that the Trump administration did in Afghanistan was right by any means, but that was the right instinct, and it’s a legacy, a positive legacy that hopefully, the Biden administration can now build upon by, you know, building on that deal that was struck with the Taliban. Perhaps, I mean, again, we argue for getting an extension, in terms of how quickly US troops would have to leave. I’m sorry for having gone on, but those were a lot of rich questions.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah, they were very rich questions and a very rich response. We are of course, you know, we’re now heading up against time, thinking we had plenty. I’m going to turn next to Mariano Aguirre, who’s going to ask a question about the Israeli/Palestinian situation and then, I want to turn to a couple of regional issues. One is Nigeria, the Sahel, Morocco, so that would be Hamish Kinnear and Mustafa Mohammed and Tony Shaffer, who would be next. If I could get you to ask very quick questions, ‘cause they are in the text, in longer form. So Mariano, please.

Mariano Aguirre

Yes, thanks, Patricia. Can you hear me? Can you hear me? Yes, okay, thanks for the great conversation. What do you think, Rob, that the Biden administration will do, regarding the Trump administration, what the Trump administration did for Israel/Palestine? And moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of the sovereignty of Israel over the Golan Heights, gave the okay to the annexation of part of the West Bank, and do you think that the new administration will step back on some of these decision, and if not, what impact do you see for the conflict? Thank you so much.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, do you want to address that first, Rob, and then we can turn to the…?

Robert Malley

Sure, so there, a very good question, and obviously, my answers only reflect my own thoughts, and I’m not speaking for the administration to be. But I think on this one, the President-Elect Biden and his team have been pretty clear, in many ways, that there are steps that they would undo and steps that they would not undo. So, I think Joe Biden was clear that he’s not going to move the Embassy back to Tel Aviv, I don’t think, although I don’t know that he spoke to this. I don’t think that they’re going to reverse their – the recognition of the Golan – of Israeli sovereignty of the Golan Heights, but they might say that that – you know, the ultimate decision of the Golan Heights has to be addressed in negotiations between Israel and a future Syrian Government. I don’t believe that they would say that it should be with the current government. I also would expect or hope that the Biden administration would declare that the Trump plan is basically null and void, it does not reflect the views of the US Government, in particular the notion of endorsing annexation of 30% of the West Bank.

I think there will be – so there will be that change, I think there will also be other changes which – such as resuming aid to the Palestinians, reopening a consulate to the Palestinians, resuming engagement with the Palestinians in the US. As you know, the Palestinian mission has been shut down and there has been no interaction between Palestinian and US officials, at a political level, for a long time. So – but at the end of the day, I don’t think this will be a priority for the Biden administration. I think they’re going to try to undo what is the, sort of the most – some of the clear damage that the Trump administration did, try to reset a US policy, so it’s not perceived and it’s not in reality entirely one-sided towards Israel, in terms of having shifted the parameters for a potential solution, as the Trump so-called peace plan did. So, I think that there’ll be an effort to sort of redress that, to restore some sense of balance, not entire balance by any means, but not to invest too much in this issue, because I don’t think that they believe that it’s going to – there’s a real opportunity for a resolution, so I don’t expect a big initiative.

On the issue of normalisation between Arab states, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, and Israel, that’s something that US administrations, on a bipartisan basis, have advocated for a long, long time, so I don’t think you’re going to see a reversal of that. What we at Crisis Group have said is that there are issues. Some of the transactions that were made, in order to get these normalisation deals, the normalisation – one could applaud countries that are prepared to normalise with Israel, but two points. Number one, some of the currency that was used, like US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but that should be something – that should not have been on the table, that should not have been part of that barter. Don’t know how the Biden administration will deal with it, but at least, again, what we would say at Crisis Group, that at least for the Biden administration to reiterate support for the UN process and for the reality that ultimately, any solution is going to have to be accepted by Morocco and by the people of the Western Sahara.

And some of the arms deals that were made, again, are they – they should be looked at just in terms of fuelling an arms race in the region, and that would be, in our view, sort of a smart thing to do. So that’s in terms of what not to do, is not to have these transactional arrangements that are costly. But although what should be done, these should be linked to progress on the Israeli/Palestinian front and that has been completely absent, I mean, other than the UAE obtaining a sort of pause on annexation, there’s been no correlation between any of these normalisation deals and progress on the Israeli/Palestinian front. I think some people would say that that’s unfortunate because, you know, that conflict is still there, it is still – it’s one of those conflicts that, as I said, one can believe the solution, that the status quo is sustainable. It has been the most sustainable thing, but it is hard to imagine the people living in the – the Palestinians in Gaza, the Palestinians in the West Bank, would accept the status quo, which is already getting worse, without at some point reacting to – the sooner that there is a political solution on the table, the better I think it would be, not just for the Palestinians, but for Israel’s long-term security as well.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks a lot, Rob. You don’t come here to get cheered up, but it’s really important to address these issues. Thanks, Mariano. I just now, I’m going to turn to Mustafa and Hamish and Tony to – or Hamish, sorry, and Tony to just address their points very quickly. Mustafa, I know you had a number of questions about Nigeria, but if you could just distil it down to one quick question that would be really helpful. Thank you.

Mustafa Mohammed

Good evening, thank you for having me. You mentioned that the effects of climate change on the herder/farmer crisis, and we know that most of the climate – carbon emissions, they come from developed countries. Do you think it’s enough for the developed countries to just cut down their emissions, or do you think that they need to be doing more to address some of the crises that have been caused by these emissions in Nigeria, and Africa in large? Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, Mustafa. Hamish, do you want to go next?

Hamish Kinnear

Yeah, sure. Robert, you actually already touched on Western Sahara, but I guess maybe just a few more of your thoughts on whether the Biden administration’s going to back trap on – sorry, backtrack on Trump’s decision, and you know, what the prospects are for a peaceful solution or – given that there’s a divergence between Morocco’s key allies, that’s the US and then Europe as well.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And Tony?

Tony Shaffer

Yes, thank you. The conflict or rather multiplicity of conflicts in the Western Sahel seem to be getting worse, and they are addressed by the external intervenors, by the international community, as problems of security and – or insecurity and underdevelopment. But the underlying problems are problems of governance. So my question is, can external powers and the intervenors do anything to promote better governance, without being accused of neo-colonial or neo-imperial designs?

Robert Malley

Again, a great series of questions, for which I wish I had more time. First, to Mustafa’s question, I mean, first of all, we have put a lot of emphasis on the herder/farmer conflict, which has caused more deaths even than – at least, in recent times, than the fight against jihadists or Boko Haram. And it is – so -and then you ask the question, is it enough to cut carbon emissions? Yeah, the answer is obviously no, and again, our request is not focussed on how to address the climate change itself, but the impact of climate change, and in this case, making the herder/farmer conflict ever more intense and acute.

At one point, a colleague of mine, Tarek Ghani, who runs our future conflict programming in that respect, also runs our climate change project, what we emphasise is, in some ways, developing countries like Nigeria, but not just Nigeria, are paying doubly the price of the excess use of carbon by the West, which is number one, they’re suffering by the climate change, and now they’re being told, you know, you have to cut your emissions, even if that means – even if there’s an economic cost. Our view is, yes, there should be a cut in emissions, but that’s not what we advocate, that’s what others will advocate. But our point is, a) there needs to be political solutions to the problems that have been exacerbated by climate change, and we have proposed a number of solutions or steps that could be taken to mitigate the herder/farmer conflict. But also, that developed nations need to do more to help developing nations that are confronting the impact of climate change, from a resource standpoint, and we’ve had some recommendations, in that regard.

On the question that Hamish asks on the Western Sahara, I answered it a little bit before, is I don’t know what the Biden administration will do, and I don’t want to start acting as if I did. It’s always, you know, it’s always probably costly to reverse a recognition and it’s a crisis with Morocco, and maybe Morocco then would remove or retract it’s – whatever agreement it reached with Israel. So, I don’t know that they would go in that direction, but I would – what I would, again, what I would say, at a minimum, is that they could take steps, if they wanted to, to signal that they have not changed the position, the same position that Europe has and that others have, that this conflict needs to be resolved by – through the UN process, and that the views of the people living in the Western Sahara, the population of the Western Sahara, needs to be taken into account. They can’t have a solution that is imposed by one side on the other. It has to be a negotiated agreement, whatever the outcome may be in the end. And we know where there’s autonomy, sovereignty, whatever, that needs – and the fact that the US may have recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara should not prejudge the outcome of those talks.

That’s, again, as Crisis Group, I think that’s what we would say and that’s what we would advocate whether we – whether the US decides to change its position – the Biden administration decides to change its position or not, what matters is – I mean, that matters, but what also matters is whether there’s a new energy put to trying to – a new special envoy, a UN special envoy, charged with this file, empowered, and to try to move things along.

Finally on the question of the Sahel, which is a great question, it’s on our – obviously it’s on our list, it’s one of the key issues that we are – we’ve been focussed on, and I think Tony, you put it well. I mean, one of the most striking graphs that I have seen, since I’ve been at Crisis Group, that we produced, was a graph that showed, on the one hand, you plotted on a line the increase in military presence in the Sahel from the French and G5 or whatever. On the other hand, you plot the increase in jihadist-related violence and casualties and they both move in unison. Now, we’re not making the case that one has caused the other, that the military involvement – that the increase in military presence has caused the increase in jihadist activities, but what we’re saying is it certainly isn’t the answer to that. That the military response – there will always have to be a military component, but that’s not the answer.

The answer is exactly as you state, it’s in governance, it’s in addressing community grievances, it’s in trying to address the reasons why people turn to jihadist groups, it’s trying to address issues of resource availability, resource distribution, and land allocation, ethnic and communal problems. And, you know, you would say – you raise a good point, is – if foreign countries try to push in that direction, is that viewed as neo-colonial interference? I would say a military presence is probably even a heavy – a heavier hand, in terms of foreign interference. I think this needs to be done obviously in co-operation with local governments and with civil societies and local actors, but yes, I think they never can be put in trying to strengthen the ability of the governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and throughout the Sahel, to tackle problems of governance, of the state’s absence, from large swaths of the country. And those are the parts of the country where, in the absence of the state, people will turn to non-state actors of any stripe to provide resources, and to provide law and order sometimes, a rudimentary justice system, to take care of people when the state is simply not there. That misgovernance and absence of governance is what’s at the root of so much of what we’re seeing in the Sahel and elsewhere.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Rob, we’re running out of time and we’ve run out of time. We never have enough time on this, and I’ve been reading the questions, my goodness, they could be the basis of a book. And we’ve had questions on space war, which is, you know, coming, cyberwar, which, you know, we should be taking note of, drones, the use of and all of the history of that, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, multi-polar world and hot wars and proxy wars, many more, and I wish we had time for them all. But I’m going to turn to – for the last question, to Ambassador Simona Leskovar, who’s going to ask our very last question, so Simona?

Ambassador Simona Leskovar

Thank you very much, Patricia. It’s been really a privilege to be the last one. Rob, my question is, taking into account major trends to influence conflicts and their solutions, you mentioned, who would be at the end – who do you think will be at the end the biggest loser and the biggest winner of all? Thanks.

Robert Malley

I have to say, the biggest winner or biggest loser of what?

Ambassador Simona Leskovar

Who will be at the end – can you hear me?

Robert Malley

Yes, don’t worry, yeah, I’m only trying to understand.

Ambassador Simona Leskovar

Yeah, who – yeah, who will be at the end, at the end of the day, the biggest loser and the biggest winner of this situation, when we are taking into account all these major trends you named to influence the conflict and their solutions. Thanks.

Robert Malley

That’s – I’ve never been asked that question before. It’s obviously one I should have thought about and it’s a great question. Yeah, you know, first of all, I don’t really think in those terms. I’m not sure that there’ll be a winner or loser, I think there may be – there are many losers today already. The civilians who are suffering from the impact of conflict. There are losers, in terms of the relative distribution of power around the globe. You know, I think we are – I mean, I’ll end with this, which is probably a non-answer to a good question. I think we are in a transitional period that has been ongoing for some time. I mean, I’ve, as I’ve tried to bait it, so that some people would say the high watermark of US dominance was the first Gulf War, and that the second Gulf War starts to – is the obvious instance of overreach, and doesn’t stop then, but then there’s an accelerated pattern of the US using – losing some of its muscle and some of its influence, and as I said, having overreached. Obviously, China appears to be emerging as a major contender, but it has its – you know, I’m not going to predict that they will come out as the winner from the competition.

I think, in a period of flux, by definition, it means that numerous actors are stepping up either to protect interests that they believe are going to be threatened by the change, or to take advantage of new opportunities because of the vacuums that are being created. And I just don’t think that we are in a position now to make a judgement about what the outcome will be. One order has died, and a new order has yet to emerge, and what’s at stake in everything we’ve been discussing today and over the past few years, is what the rules of that new order will be, whether they will be more inclusive, not just within countries, but sort of internationally, and whether they want to try to tackle some of these transnational issues, or whether it’s going to be a go it alone order for at least some time and I think we’re in the middle of that fight. It’s not yet – the outcome is not yet known, and the outcome, I think, will depend very much on what people around the world do.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I wonder – I mean, just to build on Simona’s point, I think maybe one of the things that we need to look at are the incentive structures for what goes on in our world. If we look at leadership during this COVID time, we see that some of our leaders have come out very well, in terms of they clearly have been thinking about these things, they’ve prioritised society, human beings, health services, and others have prioritised other things that may be more about making money, not caring too much about, you know, the poorer people and so on, and how do we change the incentives to start shifting this? And if COVID-19 can be used for anything, if we could think about changing that incentive structure for more long-term planning, for more consideration of societal needs as a win, as opposed to something that people at the moment, I think, when they go into politics quite often, or go into leadership roles, often don’t take that into account. So, I don’t know if you can think of any of those incentives, but it’s…

Robert Malley

Well, I mean, I think the big question, and I know we’re running out of time, but the big question is, who will set out those incentives? I mean it’s, you know – and will you have – you know, ‘cause you’re going to have very different actors with very different mindsets. I mean, again, I keep coming back to the notion that we have to be careful about romanticising the past and the order that existed in the past and the rules that were established in the past, which gave rise to a degree of stability, although, again, for those who were in the grips of conflict during the many years of the post-Cold War period, this was not a stable period. So I think we have to be careful about, as I say, romanticising the past.

But who is going to set the rules is as much of an issue today as what those rules will be and there is no mechanism, there is no clear mechanism today to figure that out. I think we’re in a period now where we’re going to see sort of many sort of subsets of nations that are going to set up with their rules for themselves. I think we saw that already when the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, from the Paris Climate Accords, or others, you saw groups were cut from TPP, groups of countries come together without and sometimes against the US and establish their own rules. And we may see more of that, which is not internationally accepted orders and systems, but sort of à la carte, in which groups of nations come together to establish rules for themselves.

And I would have loved to come into the issues of cybersecurity and drones and artificial intelligence, because that’s also something that Crisis Group is now going to be looking at. It’s changing the nature of war. It’s changing how easy it is, sometimes, to create a – start a war. It’s changing how wars are conducted, prosecuted, and how they end and are there going to be rules governing cybersecurity? Are there going to be rules governing the use of artificial intelligence in warfare? The answer in the short-term is probably not, and that’s where you might see countries coming together trying to establish roles for themselves and trying to encourage others to adhere to them, not to mention the role of social media and social media platforms.

So, there’s a whole range of issues, and that’s why we’ve called it the Future of Conflict Programme, because there’s a whole range of issues right now that are at our doorstep, and sometimes they’re in our homes already, and we don’t notice it, that are going to profoundly affect – and drones are – that’s exactly – drones has made it – in some ways, it’s a quite a quote ‘good invention’ because you don’t need land interventions, but it is – it means that the cost of war, for those who are willing to wage it, is much lower, and you know, so they can do without knowing that you’re in fact killing civilians, because those who are prosecuting those wars don’t have to incur the downsides. So that’s just one example of how the whole nature and the whole physiognomy of war is changing in front of our – before our very eyes, and we have to be careful not to let it – not to let the new realities set the rules rather than decision-makers do it.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Okay, I can’t let you go on a negative note, so you have to now give us one positive thing from all of this, to take away.

Robert Malley

Well, that’s hard, after everything you’ve subjected me to. You know, I guess the positive thing is that this kind of work, at least at the level of public interest, and I’ve now been at this, as you say, and I was at Crisis Group, I started most – I guess 20 years ago, I find that the audience here today, a large audience, but also governments around the world, there is extraordinary interest in trying to think through these problems and these solutions. And as long as there’s that, as long as there’s an effort, as long as there’s an audience, as long as there’s a receptive audience to try to think of ideas other than purely military solutions, it means that there’s still hope that that will be – there will be enough of a mobilisation of momentum for that kind of thinking, that we will be able to do our work successfully, and see the – see peaceful resolutions and negotiated outcomes to conflicts, as we said, some of which have been with us for decades. So, it’s a – I don’t want to sound overly optimistic, but I do think, and I’m always – I always feel energised by the fact that there is widespread interest by people like you, all of you here, but also by a number of governments, in trying to find a way forward that does not revolve around military solutions.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Rob, thank you so much. Thank you for ending on a positive note.

Robert Malley

Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you for taking the time. I’m sorry we went over, everybody, but I think it was well worth the extra ten minutes, and I appreciate everybody’s comments, and I wish we could have got to everybody’s questions, but they’re all in there. Just thank you for all the work that you do in International Crisis Group, Rob, and for producing this every year, ‘cause I know it’s not easy.

Robert Malley

Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, with that – and normally we would clap, and I guess that would sound really weird, so we won’t do that, but we can…

Robert Malley

Next year in person.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Next year in person in London.

Robert Malley

Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you so much. Thanks everybody.

Robert Malley

Bye, bye.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Bye, bye.