Dr Gareth Price
Okay, well, welcome to Chatham House, everyone, and thank you for braving the weather for this meeting, a year on into Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Let me start off with those bits of housekeeping. This meeting is on the record. It’s a hybrid meeting, so we have viewers online, as well as you in person in the audience. For those of you online, can you use the Q&A function to submit questions or comments? Sorry, I’m, sort of – my first hybrid meeting, and there’s – the admin is on top of me.
We have four very good speakers to give their views on where Afghanistan is and what should be done. We have Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar, the former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. We have my colleague, Hameed Hakimi, Associate Fellow with the Asia Pacific Programme. We have Samira Sayed-Rahman, the Communication and Advocacy Co-ordinator for the International Rescue Committee. And we have, joining us from Canada, Deborah Lyons, the Former Head of UNAMA in Afghanistan.
Samira, can I just turn to you to start? Can you give us your take on Afghanistan and where it stands one year on, challenges it faces?
Samira Sayed-Rahman
Thank you, Gareth, and hello to everybody. One year on, Afghanistan is in a very dire situation. The humanitarian crisis has worsened. Afghanistan was never a very perfect country, or in, you know, great – in a great situation. Even before the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has been one of the poorest countries on the planet. The changes of the last year have only exacerbated that situation. We are now seeing universal poverty across the country, we are seeing public sector and public services collapsing due to suspensions in funding. We are seeing natural disasters, simultaneously putting an additional strain on public services and on humanitarian organisations.
Just this last year we’ve had one of the worst earthquakes Afghanistan has ever faced. These past weeks we’ve had flooding. I’m sure you’ve all seen the flooding and the impacts of that in Pakistan, but that has also impacted many provinces in Afghanistan. This comes at a time where it’s harvest season, and it’s a harvest that many people rely on for their economic wellbeing. The economy has been worsening over the course of the last year. Much of that has had to do with international sanctions and restrictions that have been put in place with the new de facto authorities taking power. These sanctions and banking restrictions are impacting the middle class. This is – the middle class is now forced to go towards humanitarian organisations and are increasingly in search of food, increasingly in search of aid. Those who do – who would have traditionally had the means to meet their basic needs, now don’t have that, because they don’t have access to the international banking system.
And all of this comes at a time when we have a worsening or, you know, limited, sort of, political sphere. You have restrictions on women and girls, most commonly known, you know, the fact that women – girls between the ages of grades six and 12 are not able to attend schools in many parts of the country. There are restrictions on women’s abilities to – women’s ability to move freely. There are restrictions in terms of dress codes, and all of this has had a detrimental impact on the situation of the average Afghan.
When we look at the impact on women in particular, we are seeing this result in, you know, the collapse, or the shutting down, of many women-led organisations, women-led CSOs and NGOs, which were critical when it came to humanitarian service delivery, primarily in remote areas, which are traditionally very conservative. You need female humanitarians in order to access the most vulnerable in these communities. Outside IRC, we recently completed a study that showed that over 70% of women-led CSOs have lost their funding over the course of the last year, and even more continue to risk losing that funding and risk getting shut down as a result of these suspensions by the international community.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you for painting that picture, Samira. Hameed, can I turn to you?
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you, Gareth. I’ll build on what Samira has just mentioned. From the work that we’ve been doing in Chatham House since Taliban took over, one of the things that we’ve been monitoring is whether the Taliban transformation from an insurgent group to a political entity of sorts is happening, and the matrix for that is not promising. So, the Taliban, I think, from re-establishing themselves as a government, the key challenge that they face is transforming into a political entity that behaves like a state that does minimum service delivery and functions like a state. And I think that also explains, largely, their failure to have an inclusivity, that we internationally, or within Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan, demand.
So, from that perspective, I think what we see on the ground, which is quite messy, difficult to make sense of at times, and I think also represents a very fragmented understanding of the Taliban, which has been there for 20 years. I think for 20 years, we always were told, “This is what the Taliban believe,” people would speak to a number of them and then, come to certain conclusions, and then you would have all these conflicting types of analyses. So, I think that fragmented understanding of the Taliban is still very much there, and it’s impacting our, kind of, ability to make sense of it. But I don’t personally believe that we will see a, kind of, seismic changes between now and end of 2023, to the extent that, you know, you would probably see a new regime, or – I don’t anticipate that, and I think this is based, you know, largely on our work at Chatham House. So, that’s one thing, the, kind of, the status quo continuing, as messy as it looks and as fragmented, our understanding, as, you know, it may be.
The other one is the, sort of – some of the assumptions, which again relates to this, kind of, you know, a, perhaps not a very deeper understanding or access to Taliban thinking, which is, you know, there was this view that the Taliban will come in, they would be able to establish rule of law, they’d be able to have – you know, there were assurances that were provided in, let’s say, Doha that those would be, to some extent, implemented, which obviously hasn’t happened. But also at the regional level, it’s not surprising to me, but I know it was surprising to a lot of people who were following it from maybe, perhaps, more of a, kind of, you know, observer perspective, that the Taliban have not received recognition, even from the, you know, so-called patrons like Pakistani Security Establishment, and, you know – I mean, the research and evidence is out there of the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban.
And the Taliban actually have not succeeded convincing anybody to give them that legitimacy, even a single country, and I think we’ve seen the, kind of, evidence of the Taliban fissures, I don’t call them fragmentation at this point, but some cracks amongst the Taliban groupings. Very recently in Tashkent, in a gathering which was attended by 30 countries’ representatives, and it was probably the largest international organisa – event that was attended by the Taliban representation, the Taliban Foreign Minister de facto said something to the effect of, you know, that they’re ready to govern, people should recognise them, they’ve severed ties with Al-Qaeda. And within a couple of days you had the drone strike in Kabul that reportedly killed Ayman al-Zawahiri.
So, the Taliban have been put on centre stage, and I think they’re discovering, very brutally, that it’s one thing to be an insurgent group, but it’s a completely different ball game once you start claiming to be the legitimate government of a country. So, I think with that, kind of, very fragmented understanding of the Taliban, the status quo carrying on and, you know, everybody, kind of, waiting and hedging, this will carry on.
And the last point that I’ve noticed is that, I think, in parts of the, kind of, exercises around challenging assumptions, I think there’s also truth to the statement that the role that the United States and the Western governments played in subsidising and paying the kinds of money that was paid and spend in Afghanistan is not being replaced by the Chinese, by the Russians or by anybody else. I mean, very, very, kind of, case in point is there were some natural disasters in Southeast and the Chinese representatives handed over $200,000 in cash to the Taliban, and on the same day, or around that same day, the Americans announced $55 million worth of support. So, that level of engagement is still there from the West, but I think Western perspective is also suffering from, you know, not really knowing what to do with this thing that Afghanistan has become. So, I’ll end there, but happy to come back to these questions.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you, Hameed. Deborah, can I turn to you for your opening thoughts?
Ambassador Deborah Lyons
Yeah, thanks very much, Gareth, and thank you, as well, to Chatham House. I just want to say, you know, as a diplomatic practitioner, I’m always grateful to organisations like Chatham House for doing some of the hard thinking and considered thinking that we sometimes don’t, as practitioners, have time to do, so, thank you for this opportunity, again.
Look, as a Former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Former SRSG in UNAMA, I wish we were speaking at this point, one year later, with a little bit more optimism, but it is very hard right now to find optimism. Let me build on what Samira and Hameed have already said, and expand out a little bit to some of the partners working to try to support Afghanistan, and maybe just add a little bit to what they both said, that as we look one year later, yes, the humanitarian crisis is horrific, and we’re going into possibly a tougher winter than last winter.
You know, Hameed’s assessment of the Taliban and us trying to understand how they move from an insurgency to a political entity or, let’s hope, one day a true governing entity, you know, again, we’re still in a learning mode of trying to understand, a) their intentions, and, you know, are decisions being made in Kandahar, or are they being made in Kabul? What is the decision-making process? What is their capacity to govern? Do they really have the capacities that they need, and is the international community, even the regional countries, willing to help them build that capacity in light of what we’ve seen, certainly in the last six to eight months, with regard to some of their announcements, decrees and policies?
So, as we look at where we are now, we see that we’re moving back to an increase in civilian casualties. We’re back to numbers of incidents and civilian casualties that predate August 2021. So, yes, we do not have the constant conflict, but we still have a very uneasy peace, with a great deal of intimidation. We continue to have restrictions on the media. I certainly will add to what Samira has said with regard to women. Nowhere in the world does any governing entity ban its children from going to school. The economy is still stalled, the banking system is still paralysed, we’ve seen very limited progress on counternarcotics. We did see an announcement, but it was rather hollow, in that there was no real plan attached to that announcement, and yet, it is an area where we all have common cause with the Taliban to try to address the cultivation of the poppy and the production of heroin, and something that’s very important to the region.
I guess we can say that, right now, we probably have the trust deficit at an extreme level, and the question for everyone is can we build back that trust? Is there a way, is there space to engage, or have we really just reached an impasse? This would be an impossible conclusion to come to. We absolutely have got to try to find points of entry. So, who are those entities? And this is where I want to expand out just briefly, Gareth, if I might. The international community, there is no question that the international community must stay engaged in Afghanistan, and right now, they are meeting. A number of the key donors are meeting in Istanbul to look at this very thorny question of how do you move from humanitarian funding, which is on condition, to basic human needs, and hopefully, at some point, to technical assistance and development? Because without that, Afghanistan will stay in this cycle of humanitarian crises for years to come.
So, the international community has to grapple with a situation that is actually quite unique, given the sanctions regime, given the non-recognised governing entity, and given the challenge that the Afghan people are facing. The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, they came out last December with a great set of initiatives that they were going to employ in order to support the Afghan people and to work with the Taliban. This commitment cannot waver and yet, the last meeting was held in China in March, I think, early April, and we haven’t seen anything since then. The OIC is an important organisation, they recently did have a – visiting scholars, ulama scholars visit to Afghanistan, but their commitment, their voice, is one that could resonate with the Afghan – with the – particularly with the Taliban and must continue.
The regional countries, Hameed mentioned the conference recently in Tashkent, which was held, by the way, by Uzbekistan to focus on counterterrorism, and no sooner did that conference finish than, within days, of course, we had the drone strike on the Al-Qaeda leader, not in a remote area of Afghanistan, but in the centre of Kabul, where he was living. That brings the regional countries into a state of sheer confusion as to how they then go forward. But they must go forward because they are the ones who will suffer the most, beyond the Afghan people, if Afghanistan continues to move forward in instability.
And then, I would just mention the UN Security Council, in that the UN Security Council, in spite of its many demands and issues, and even some of the fraction – factors that have developed in the last year or two, must continue to stay focused on Afghanistan. Must continue to support the country going forward, and to send very important messages to the Taliban, and I think that was done recently, with the decision on the travel ban exemption.
Lastly, of course, the Afghan people themselves, now more than ever, and I know Minister Atmar will speak to this, the Afghan people have got to come together, community leaders, tribal leaders, former political leaders, you know, community activists, and try to find a way to articulate a vision for how the country moves forward with this regime. Guiding this regime, explaining to this regime what the Afghan people want. Much as we saw just recently in Paktia, where in that province, the community leaders and tribal leaders came together and insisted that the Governor open the schools for high school girls, which just happened this past week.
Now, there’s other things that the most critical entity needs to do in order to build back trust, and that’s the Taliban themselves, and I’ll just mention three things quickly, and maybe we can discuss it during the Q&A. The Taliban have got to demonstrate to the international community and the regional countries, and to their own people, that they can build legitimacy. How are they going to do that? I offer three suggestions. Get the girls back in school. That single move would bring about so much goodwill and largesse that the country would spin with the positive reinforcement that that would bring. The international community would line up behind that decision. They must do it and they must do it soon, and it should have been done long ago.
Secondly, they have got to – in spite of all the good work we and the UN and others have done, the US and the other countries that have the frozen reserves, the work we have done on the issue of the economy and the paralysed banking system, the Taliban must respond by committing to an independent board of governors for the Central Bank. This would bring about an enormous shift in the solidity and support to the banking system in Afghanistan.
And then thirdly, more perhaps for their neighbours than for anyone else, the Taliban have got to demonstrate some serious action on counterterrorism. This recent move has completely thrown the region into a spiral of insecurity, and lack of faith that this governing entity of the heart of Asia can actually manage the terrorist threat, not just to Afghanistan, but to the region. I look forward to this discussion. Thank you, Gareth, for the time.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you, Deborah. Minister Atmar, can I turn to you?
Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar
Yes, thank you, Gareth, but let me, first of all, thank our colleagues at Chatham House, especially Sir Peter Westmacott, Hakimi sahib, Tom, and all the colleagues who kindly organised this event. To thank you all, my great panellists and our participants today, in person and online, for their interest in this important discussion.
Gareth, it’s always difficult to build on excellent remarks by smart people, but I’ll try to at least have a go at it and make some quick four points. First of all, what we have heard from our colleagues, the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was a catastrophe, which either triggered or created huge crises, at least five of them that are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The humanitarian crisis, the human rights women’s rights crisis, the collapse of the economy, I mean, the entire economy of a nation has gone informal – informally, because of lack of legitimate ways of economic activities, and trade with the rest of the world. The crisis of security, not only domestically, but also because, what Hakimi sahib said and Deborah elaborated, that against all of their international obligations, the Taliban did allow international terrorists organisations and their leaders, back into the country. This was against their commitment and obligations in the Doha Peace Agreement.
Now, all of these five – four crises are actually exacerbated by the fifth one, which is a political crisis, the legitimacy issue. Why is it so? Because the Taliban do not have a legitimate government and there is no national or international co-operation with it, exactly for that reason, that it is not a legitimate government. And without national and international co-operation, you cannot tackle the other four crises: the human rights, the humanitarian, the economic and security.
So, the point there is, which is my second point, that it is a shared interest and responsibility of the Afghans and the international community to tackle these crises. Well, let me begin by the first issue of responsibility that lies with the Afghan leaders, government and political. They were the first to be blamed for the fall of the Islamic Republic, the Afghan political leaders and then state leaders, me included. Because of their self-serving attitude, narrow interests, corruption and disunity, they were the main reason for the fall of the Islamic Republic. But they were not the only reason. Poor judgment on the part of our international partners, some of them, and their recklessness in terms of withdrawing troops and support to their partners, their friends, with whom they bled together, they fought together. It was such an irresponsible action on their part, as well.
Now that we’re, together, responsible for this catastrophe, we also have a shared responsibility to address the consequences of what we created for Afghans, and that will have to happen at both the national, regional and international level, but what can we do together to do this? Obviously, we have to continue with humanitarian and human rights action. There should be no reason to stop that engagement with Afghanistan. It can happen with or without Taliban’s co-operation, and it’s a responsibility. Of course, it will be more difficult without Taliban’s legitimacy and co-operation, but it is a must. The work that Samira is doing, or the work that many thousands of Afghan humanitarian workers and human rights and the great leadership and courage shown by Afghan women, that will have to be continued to be supported. But that would not be enough to reverse the situation. We need a political strategy, and a political strategy to tackle the issue of legitimacy, and we’ll have to pursue a twin set of goals.
That brings me to my third issue, that the goals that we have to, together, pursue will be, a) security and counterterrorism, on one side of the coin, legitimate governance, human rights, women’s rights, on the other side of the coin. These two will have to go together. They cannot happen without each other. Now, do we have any legal framework to guide that political strategy? As much as the Afghan people hate the Doha Peace Agreement, that is the only legal framework available to us. The Doha Peace Agreement provides for four binding obligations: counterterrorism, departure of foreign troops, intra-Afghan negotiations, and a new Afghan state, to come out of the intra-Afghan negotiations.
Now, that agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council 2513 Resolution, so, literally, it’s a binding agreement. We are not going to beg anybody, but we are going to point out to their binding obligations. The Taliban, the United States, the region, the UN Security Council, do have a responsibility to get that peace agreement implemented fully; they shouldn’t be selective. I mean, of the four interlinked obligations, only one has been implemented and that is the departure of foreign troops. What about the other three? And yet, both the United States and the Taliban continue to say that they are committed to the Doha Peace Agreement.
And this brings me to my fourth point, that expression of commitment by the two parties, plus support from the UN Security Council, will provide the greatest leverage for all of us to use to work with the Taliban for that important change. Why is it going to be an important leverage with the Taliban? To begin with, the Taliban still say that they are committed to it, so, let’s hold them accountable on that basis.
Second, the Taliban are in search of at least the following from the Afghan people and the international community: one, peace. They now want peace because they’re in power, let’s be quite honest about it. They didn’t want peace when they were not in power, but they want peace now. They hate drones and drone attacks, and they hate any kind of national ins – oh, resurgence of military groups against them.
Second, they want recognition for their government, third, they want lifting of sanctions, and fourth, they want international assistance, beyond humanitarian assistance, development assistance. Finally, which they may not talk about, but which is essential to their survival, is trade, trade between Taliban, or the Taliban-led economy and the rest of the world, which actually keeps them floating.
So, with these incentives, and a set of disincentives, including counterterrorism, we do have serious partners who will benefit from the implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement. Apart from the Afghan people, Afghan Politicians, even some factions of Taliban, would be seriously considering supporting the implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement. I mean, they’re public on it. The region that Deborah talked about, I mean, the region is deadly afraid of the Taliban policies of accommodating, harbouring international terrorism. I mean, they say, “If they didn’t deliver on their agreement with the United States, they would not deliver on anybody’s agreement.” And there’s hardly anybody in the region not having an enemy in Afghanistan, as an international terrorist, including Pakistan, China, Russia, India, Turkey, the Middle East, not to mention Europe and the United States.
So, with all of this, I believe that one year on, we must not lose courage, we must not lose the sight of the events that are happening, and we must not abandon our shared responsibility. We have to work together. We still see some light, maybe it’s quite dim, but still, at the end of the tunnel. Thank you.
Dr Gareth Price
No, thank you. I have a lot of questions, and if I could start straight back at you, Minister, and maybe to ask the others. A point that Hameed made, which I think is very interesting, do you think the current situation, which is both catastrophic, with the political crisis, is it sustainable, how long can it go on for, and if it’s not sustainable, what happens next?
Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar
It’s not sustainable. Had it not been for the generosity of the international community and humanitarian action by donors, UN agencies, NGOs, people like Samira jan, it could have been many times worse. This is the first time I’ve been engaged, also, with the humanitarian situation of the country for decades. This is the first time in our recent history that the country experiences this level of poverty and impoverishment. We’ve never seen anything before, not so many people at such a high risk.
So, number one, the Taliban are not able to handle the situation. You will have an enormous amount of forced migration from Afghanistan, let alone the people who will be at risk and losing their lives on daily basis, and that will be a serious issue for the region, for Europe and the rest of the world. Second, the Taliban cannot continue to lie to the international community that they will deliver on their obligations, and then, they continue to harbour international and regional terrorists. My biggest fear is that Afghanistan might become, because of this policy of Taliban, another battlefield, but this time for drone attacks by many actors in the region. Nobody would want to deploy troops, but everybody would want to look at drones as a weapon of choice to continue to pursue their targets in Afghanistan. So, the Taliban must not allow Afghanistan to become a haven for international terrorism, or a battleground for drone attacks, or for a proxy war.
A proxy war is in the making again, I mean, well, we must be honest about it. Afghanistan will not remain untouched by what is happening in Ukraine, or elsewhere. So, they must show wisdom and responsibility, but that must also be matched by the Afghan Politicians and the international community. I mean, yes, we are all embarrassed, ashamed for what has happened, Afghans and the international community, but we cannot live in that shame and embarrassment forever. We need to respond to what has happened there, because our interests are threatened, so therefore, it is not sustainable. It’s just a matter of time.
Dr Gareth Price
Deborah, could I turn to you with a question in similar vein? I mean, you make a point that the Taliban should allow girls to go back to school, which I think, obviously, there would be almost unanimous agreement.
Ambassador Deborah Lyons
Well, yes.
Dr Gareth Price
Taking it back a step, the question of aid conditionality, do you think that was the right approach? Because I think there was, kind of, a presumption, or seemed to be a presumption, that if we say, “These are our red lines, one of them being security, counterterrorism, another one being girls’ education,” that the Taliban would say, “Okay, we should do that,” but they didn’t. Was it the right approach, and, I suppose, to your point, what if the Taliban say, “No, we don’t want girls to go to school,” what then?
Ambassador Deborah Lyons
Well, frankly, Gareth, that is what the Taliban have said right now, and, you know, some of the predictions that I’m hearing from Afghanistan is that it could easily be another year or more, not a matter of months, but actually another year or more before girls would be back in school. And I want to come back to the question that you put to Hanif, to Minister Atmar, about, you know, is this sustainable, how long can this go on? I think it depends on your value system, you know, how much can you accept people suffering? And I think everybody in the room and online, and on your panel, would agree that Afghans have suffered enough, it needs to stop. We need to be building the country back. But I worry that there are some people who consider this suffering to be just part of the destiny, that it is, you know, Allah, it is – this is just part of life, this suffering. And we’ve heard that, actually, from some leaders, and it’s very distressing, because I’m not sure, then, how you work with that.
Now, when it comes to aid conditionality, first of all, there is a legal framework that a number of countries were trapped in, that they couldn’t provide beyond basic humanitarian because of their sanctions regime. Secondly, politically, it was extremely difficult, and I think for many countries, to go beyond humanitarian, certainly in the first six months, certainly for the first winter, I think we were all hopeful in the spring, in February and March, that girls were going to get back in school, as had been committed to by the Minister of Education and a number of the senior leaders of the Taliban.
We were getting ready to move with the donors, with the international community, beyond humanitarian, to what was defined as “basic human needs.” As the international community, particularly the major donors, turned themselves inside out trying to come up with a new definition, basic human needs, that would allow them to convince their political leaders to provide more funding that would go into helping Farmers, helping small businesses, helping women’s groups, helping the economy at the local level, to revitalise. And basic human needs was defined and clarified in a number of countries in the March Pledging Conference committed to it. But, you know, with the decision by the Taliban not to allow girls back into school, many capitals are completely paralysed politically, not just legally, in some cases, to move forward beyond the humanitarian.
Now, I guess what I would say in terms of timelines is, we’ve got to make our way through a very difficult winter. And I think, depending on how things go this winter, we could see a much greater response from the Afghan people themselves if we actually do rise to the level of famine, which is [audio cuts out – 42:04]. And I think if the Taliban continue to resist an engagement with the regional countries and with the larger international community, then it’ll be very difficult for countries to move beyond the basic humanitarian. What we need to do now is find those points of entry where we can continue to work with the Taliban to find that space so that we can make small progress, but real progress, that would allow the international community to feel some confidence that they can move forward into development. I know the discussions that are taking place right now in Istanbul by the donors are very, very difficult, because everyone, in their hearts, wants to help build that economy back up, but the Taliban have to meet the international community halfway on this.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you. Final question from me, before I open it up to the floor and we see what questions our online audience have been asking, let me address it to Samira, but, Deborah, Minister, maybe you’d have a view on this. Afghanistan was very much in the news a year ago with the evacuation and so forth. A year later, it’s much less in the news and there’s a whole bunch of other crises and Russia’s invaded Ukraine, and the cost of energy has gone up. How can Afghanistan remain centre-stage as a key country for the international community to engage with, when there are so many other crises internationally?
Samira Sayed-Rahman
Well, I think we need to consider the last 21 years. The last – everything that is happening in Afghanistan right now is a direct result of the decisions that have been made by actors who are now in power, but also the international community. Much of the humanitarian crisis, in particular, as was discussed, is as a result of these sanction regimes, is as a result of the worsening economy that is caused by these sanctions and these suspensions in funding. And the decisions such as these need to continue in order to bring to light some of the more nuanced points when it comes to humanitarian action, when it comes to engaging with the authorities.
To add onto what Deborah was saying earlier, I’ve been travelling across the country over the course of the last year, and we need to take advantage of some of these new opportunities that we have. For example, I was in Helmand just two months ago. We are now able to access districts such as Sangin, such as Kajaki. These are areas that received little to no aid, little to no support, over the course of the last 21 years. You don’t have schools there, you don’t have clinics, you don’t have the very basics of human survival and how to meet that. in there. What we are able to do now is access areas such as that.
In other instances, there is a lot that the Taliban are willing to give in, you know. There’s a lot – when we – for example, I was in Paktia, visiting the regional hospital there. I was speaking with the Director of that hospital, who is a Talib appointee, who was asking and urging us, as NGO workers, but also the international community, to help provide funding to hire more female staff. He wanted more Nurses; he wanted more Doctors. He was saying, “We need – the only way we can access those vulnerable communities is if we have female health workers, is if we have female NGO workers.”
So, it’s not all doom and gloom, per se, and there is a lot of nuance that is not really discussed when we do talk about the Taliban and engaging with the Taliban.
Hameed Hakimi
I want…
Dr Gareth Price
Yes, yeah?
Hameed Hakimi
I wanted to add very quickly, I think Afghanistan’s been competing for media attention, at least in the Western sense, since 2014, when the troops largely left at that time. So, this is not new, per se, but I think, as we know, we’re in one of the leading think tanks in the world, you know, we work around these issues, we know there’s a fatigue that happens. Often when you keep talking about the same set of issues or the same set of people, you know, there’s – some kind of fatigue sets in. So, I think – I know it’s late, but we really have to start listening to people on the ground. We really, genuinely, have to, because if we’re not, we will be continually having conversations amongst ourselves with the same number of people. So, there – that would actually entice quite a few, you know, legitimately interested, good-willing people around the world to pay attention.
And lastly, I think it – I don’t know if it’s happening already, but I think it’s really important that international engagement supports local young people, men and women, to be their own citizen journalists, people who can produce content on the ground. You know, simple stuff like that needs to happen, and for that, you don’t need sanctions to stop you, just innovative thinking. Small steps but, you know, just keep the noise, keep the voices of the real people on the ground into the conversations, and I think we, you know, we can hope for that to make a difference.
Dr Gareth Price
I’ll open up to questions here. We have a few questions from the online audience. The first one I’d like to address to you, Minister, which is, “What should happen to the frozen assets in the United States?”
Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar
Thank you. If I answer that question, would I be allowed to make some comments on the other two points? Oh, yes, good. That asset belongs to the Afghan people, and the Afghan people were not responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and it does not make sense, neither ethically nor technically, to make the Afghan people pay for the crime that others committed. So, that money should never be given to anybody, not even the Taliban. That money should be kept in good faith for the Afghan people, because that money ensures macroeconomic stability and purchasing power of the Afghan people.
Even if that money is spent on humanitarian assistance, it will make the Afghan people’s situation worse. It could provide short-term palliative impact. I think the long – medium to long term, it will affect – weaken the purchasing power of the Afghan people. So, the international community has a responsibility, an ethical responsibility, to keep that money for Afghan people until we have a legitimate government and a legitimate banking sector, and independent enough to do what, by law, they’re required to do.
Second, I am all for small or big entries, that my colleagues talked about, to improve human rights, women’s rights, humanitarian situation, and the economy. But to support that action, we also need to have a big entry politically to hold the Taliban accountable for the implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement. So, we need to start talking to them, the international community, the region and the Afghans, so that we have parallel action, action on the ground to improve the lives and livelihood and the rights of the people, and action on the political level to address the root causes and the key factors that sustain that situation.
On the issue of how to keep Afghanistan back in focus, it’s sad that we have to talk about that after 20 years of huge investment and blood and treasure, but a number of issues are terribly important for us. Number one is women’s solidarity. The world women have a responsibility to maintain their solidarity with the Afghan women. That will keep us focused. Second, Soldiers’ and their families’ solidarity with Afghanistan. Thousands of brave men and women, in uniform, and civilians, sacrificed their lives, from your countries, in Afghanistan. Many of them believe that it was a good cause. I, too, believe that this was a good cause, but we all believe that we should not let it go in vain. So, their solidarity with the Afghan people will have to be maintained.
Third is the humanitarian action. I applaud the work done by NGOs, UN agencies and donors. And finally, is the work that you do. That is education of policymakers. They need to be made aware of the mess and the disaster that they created in Afghanistan, and this will come back to them. It’s just a matter of time. I hate to speak about politics of fear, but it is a reality. It will come back, and it has already come back. If Al-Zawahiri is found in Kabul, killed – found and killed in Kabul, it has already come back. He was not there for charity work, for humanitarian work. He was there to plan something, so, it has come back. The policymakers in the West need to be educated enough on that issue. Yes, there are urgent issues with Ukraine, with energy, with living costs, etc., etc., but there’s also an urgent issue of terrorism and security, drugs and forced migration. Thank you.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you. Any…
Ambassador Deborah Lyons
Gareth…
Dr Gareth Price
…questions in the audience? We have a question at the front. A mic is just about to appear over your head, and if you could introduce yourself.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you very much. Peter Westmacott, Former British Diplomat and one who first went to Afghanistan 45 years ago, and old friend of Hanif’s. I’m so pleased that you’re here, Hanif. I’m sorry it took the UK immigration authorities such a long time to grant you a visa, but we’re thrilled to have you here, along with the other expert members of the panel.
You’ve all given a number of very good indications of what needs to be done in order to try to alleviate the terrible suffering and the mess that is now Afghanistan. Two or three very quick little questions, following on, really, what you’ve been saying. The first is, when you talk about continuing commitment of the international community, particularly those responsible for the Doha Agreement, do you think that in Washington there is the political will to do that? Because for quite a long time, put very simply, it looked as though nobody really wanted to hear the word “Afghanistan” after the end of 2021 in the United States, and I wonder what sort of impression you’ve got. I hope I’m wrong, I hope that there is a desire to really help make things better, but I’d love to know your thoughts.
Secondly, do the Taliban actually want to get rid of Daesh, Al-Qaeda, other unpleasant terrorist groups which are hiding in their midst, or do they have an agenda of their own which suggests that they really wouldn’t mind if they stick around? I’ve never fully understood that and you, Hanif, know a lot about that subject.
And then, thirdly, can you or Samira enlighten us a little bit as to what is the real problem with women and girls’ education? They’ve said they’re going to do it, some of them seem to be committed, but it’s stuck. Is this theology, is this culture, is this men frightened of women? What’s going on, why are we not seeing any progress in that area? Thank you.
Dr Gareth Price
Minister?
Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar
Ambassador, thank you so much for everything. Is there a political will in Washington? We don’t see it at the moment, and it will – it is such a sad thing to see that after all of these decades of investment and blood and treasure, then we see such an attitude, such a reaction. Yes, people have made poor choices, there was a poor judgment, but that should not be a reason to dodge the responsibility now. So, they have to engage.
And here, we are hoping that Europe and the UK, by the fact that they have a great engagement with Afghanistan at the moment, should actually play their role, because they will be first to be affected by problems coming from Afghanistan. So, they do have a responsibility to help us create the political will back in the US. And as I said, the women’s solidarity, solidarity with the poor, the Soldiers, the servicemen and women who served in Afghanis – all of those would also apply to the United States, Canada and the rest of them. They should not repeat the strategic error of 9/11 and the decades before that. I mean, for policymakers in the West to understand a problem and react to it, it should not take them a 9/11. There should be another way to create a will to deal with such problems.
With the Taliban, they make a distinction between Daesh and other foreign fighters. Daesh is their enemy, there’s absolutely no doubt, and they will continue to fight Daesh, despite the fact that some of Daesh Soldiers have been recruited from their ranks, but they will continue to fight. Nobody should doubt Taliban’s intention, because it is their enemy. However, when it comes to Al-Qaeda, to IMU, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, ETIM of China, TTP of Pakistan, LAT, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and all of those, the situation is different. They’re friends, they fought together. Ideologically, they will never be allowed to take gun against them, because most of these guys have pledged their allegiance to the Emirate, and that makes it impossible for them to disown.
Second, even if they have the will, they will not have the capacity, the capability to fight. Early messages, such as suicide attacks against Taliban leaders are well received by them, that they shouldn’t be such a thing. The only way that Afghanistan can get rid of them is to have a government that actually takes its legitimacy from the will of the Afghan people, that may also have the Taliban in it, and others, so that they can commit themselves to the twin goals, as I said: counterterrorism, not to allow these guys into Afghanistan at all, and legitimate governance. But by legitimate governance, I strongly want to emphasise that a government that is committed to human rights, women’s rights and the basic rights and fundamental freedoms, but also a government that will maintain that commitment, to maintain its legitimacy.
So, to sum it up, the expectation that the Taliban will deliver on the Doha Peace Agreement in terms of counterterrorism of their own accord is wrong, is not well-placed, but a serious engagement from the international community to make that happen is the only chance that we have. Of course, that effort will have to be coupled by a serious effort by the Afghan Politicians, political and civil society actors, and I totally agree with Ambassador Deborah Lyon on this, that this is something also missing. The situation will change in the coming weeks and months, hopefully, but this is also something we need to do.
On education, I’ll leave it to colleagues, but let me, again, say that the Taliban cannot find anything in their ideology or anything in Islam or in Afghan culture that is against education of girls. They’re totally wrong about it, they were wrong before, they are wrong now, and I hope we will find a way to correct that wrong.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you. We’re over time, but we’re okay to run over a little bit. If there’s a couple of final questions, we’ll – we could take them together. There’s a question at the back.
Albert Constantine-Miguesa
My name is Albert Constantine-Miguesa and I am a master’s student at UCL. I want, first of all, to thank all the speakers for their amazing insights into the situation. And my question relates to women’s education, and it’s especially directed at Ambassador Lyons, although maybe some of the other speakers can also enlighten me.
I am very, very interested in how has this problem been put by international partners to the Taliban? Is it about allowing girls’ educations to occur at all levels, since primary school to the 12th grade, with some conditions about what is going to be taught and what are those conditions in which the girls are going to be educated? Are there any stipulations about that, any specifications from the international partners, or is it just a matter of bringing girls back to school generally, and allowing the Taliban a free hand in deciding what that education is going to be?
Dr Gareth Price
Okay, thank you, and we’ll take the question, the gentleman in front, and then, I think…
Shams Sadiq
First of all, my name is Shams Sadiq, I’m a Teacher by profession/ So, well, the question is, I will put it to the whole panel, for just – because I think something which was left out of the box was that – whether – considering the reality on the ground in Afghanistan, so, the true identity of the Taliban, so, is there any way for the foreseeable future to work, like, just to educate and persuade, rather than just imposing sanctions and drones?
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you, so, a quick final set of remarks. Deborah, can I turn to you first?
Ambassador Deborah Lyons
Sure. A couple of points on girls’ education. Look, the international community, and we, as the representative, in our many meetings with Taliban leadership on this issue, made it clear that we wanted to see girls back at school from, you know, elementary, right through to university. We met, as well, with the Minister of Higher Education on this. As you know, there are a limited number of girls back in university, but not in high school yet. The issue with the curriculum was simply put by the international community as it meeting the international standards. And UNICEF, of course, has done a great deal of work on this, and the commitment from the Taliban was that, yes, the present curriculum that had been used under the previous regime would continue. That was the commitment made by the Taliban.
We wanted girls back in school, studying under that curriculum. I don’t think anyone doubted that, over time, that curriculum might get modified by the Taliban. But let’s first get girls back in school, and the boys back in school, benefiting from a curriculum that meets international standards, and then deal with any modifications to the curriculum as time went on. Obviously, none of this has happened, because we do not have the girls back in school. They did mention that there were other issues related to, you know, dress, related to separate schools, related to female Teachers versus male Teachers, but frankly, all of these issues were simply logistical issues that could be remedied if there was a will, and as time went on, we weren’t seeing that will.
So, let me respond briefly to the comment from the previous questioner, Peter, about, what is it with the Taliban, is it dogma, is it – what is the problem here? The Prime Minister himself, Akhund, has said that he considers secondary school for girls to be a centre of sin, of corruption, of, you know, of distraction, of immorality. This has been stated by the Prime Minister himself, so, it is certainly not Islam, as the Minister Atmar has made very clear, and as have other leading Islamic scholars. This is just simply a chosen interpretation by, I would argue, a limited number of Taliban leaders. I have spoken to many Taliban leaders, well-known to many of you, having been in the media and so forth, who are very supportive of girls getting back to school. This issue, very sadly, has gotten tied up in the overriding issue for the Taliban of internal cohesion, and they cannot allow a break in their ranks on any issue right now. It is too early in the regime for that to happen. Whether it’ll happen later, we’ll see.
I just want to make one other point, if I might, Gareth, on an issue that I’m very concerned about, and that was raised, as well, about what’s happening in the various capitals with regard to how Afghanistan is seen as a political issue, and it was specific to D.C. and Washington. And I think we do need to pay attention to whether or not Afghanistan, and certainly the departure of the troops and what happened last year in August is going to become a political football. And Politicians will use this to their own means, and they may entrap other Politicians and limit their ability to make important decisions on Afghanistan, with threats of using the sanctions to come against Politicians who release funding to Afghanistan that might appear to be getting too close to a sanctioned entity. I think this is a concern that we all have to pay close attention to, not just in D.C., but in other capitals.
And let me lastly say that with regard to the frozen reserves, please keep in mind, it is the US, but it is also United Arab Emirates, UK, with very strict reg – legal framework on this, Germany with an even stricter framework, and Switzerland. So, five countries need to come together on this issue. Thank you.
Dr Gareth Price
Thank you. We’re a little bit over time, so, I think we should probably wrap up there. A couple of housekeeping points. Thank you, Deborah. You’ll note on your desks a questionnaire about events. It would be great if you can fill those in, and there is a reception following this upstairs in the Neill Malcolm Room, which you are all welcome to attend. And that just leaves me to thank all of our speakers for their very insightful contributions. Thank you.
