Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. Fantastic to have you with us this afternoon. For those of us in London, London weather has finally arrived, and miserable, grey, and rainy. I suspect it’s not like that in Stanford, General, if that’s where you are. I know that’s where you’re affiliated, but you’ll tell us in a minute if that’s actually where you are physically. But let me just say a first few words of formal welcome, if I may, to this next in our Centenary Lecture Series. As all of our members who are joining us today know, we have been, through the course of this year, inviting some of our speakers to our members’ events to share with us their thoughts at a, if I may say, kind of, a strategic level as would befit the centenary of Chatham House, founded in 1920 in the shadow of a Great War, and, ironically, in the shadow of a great pandemic. And here we are on the case again, 100 years later, with some worrying echoes, or rhymes as some people have put it, of that period.
And we’ve been fortunate to have some great speakers join us over the course of the year, specifically under this Centenary Lecture moniker. And, with that in mind, delighted to have General HR McMaster with us to share his thoughts on, I think, a very, very important big topic: Unalienable Rights and the Democratic World’s Competitive Advantages. And I’m glad, General, that you’ll be sharing with us your thoughts about the competitive advantages of liberal democracies at a time when they’re coming in for such a beating, in many cases and in many parts of the world, and the press, if I could say as well.
Before I introduced – before I introduce General McMaster properly, let me just remind you all that this meeting is, as you would expect, on the record. It is being recorded as well. You can tweet off it, obviously, use the hashtag #CHEvents, as you’ve done in the past. When it comes to questions, and we will definitely want to have your comments and thoughts, please use the ‘Q&A’ option in the middle. Do not use the ‘Chat’ option for that purpose. Put your questions in the ‘Q&A’. We will turn to you to ask those questions yourselves. If you would rather not, let us know there, and I’m happy to ask the question on your behalf.
What we will also have is a little innovation afterwards for those of you who wish. There will be a LinkedIn conversation that a couple of my colleagues at Chatham House will convene amongst you, the members. I did let General McMaster know that he was not expected to be at that call afterwards when I say that conversation. But it’s really a chance for you who would like to, to compare notes on what you heard, in a curated conversation amongst our members. So, there will be a link provided in the chat line for you to go to at the end of this session if you would like to.
What I would like to do obviously now is introduce General McMaster properly. As I mentioned, he is a Senior Fellow now at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a great centre of thinking. I think it’s been thought of as a centre of how would I call it? I’m going to call it pragmatic conservative thinking on the West Coast, which is sometimes – not that the West Coast is always associated with a good colleague and friend of ours, Corey Sharkey, who was based there. I always think that’s also a good measure of the kind of quality thinking that takes place at the Hoover Institution. He was obviously, I think, probably known to many people on this call, National Security Advisor to the President between 2017 and 2018 but drew obviously, the bulk of his career experience from his time in the US Army, where he retired as a Lieutenant General. I will not call it a Lieutenant Journal – General, as we might do here in the United Kingdom, as Lieutenant General.
But, also, as many of the top cadre of American serving Military Officers, has been somebody who is a thinker as well as a commander. Got his PhD in military history. Author of a number of books, most recently, very recently, just actually in September, as I was checking with General McMaster a minute ago, of Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World, which came out literally two months ago. He, as I said, applied some of that intellectual part of his thinking as Commanding General of the Maneuver Center for Excellence at Fort Benning. He oversaw all training and military education, but he was also a war-fighting and a wartime Commander in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and also back in Operation Desert Storm. So, as we’ve often found, over the course of American history, leading political appointees, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, have been able to draw on the experience of Military Officers who’ve had that experience in the field, but also, the time to be able to think, which is something that, in my experience from my days at CSIS as well, has always been one of the big advantages that the US Military has nurtured, amongst its most Senior Officers.
So, with that introduction, we really look forward, General, to your thoughts on this big topic, which especially in the wake of COVID or in the midst, I should say, probably still of COVID pandemic is particularly relevant. Over to you, General. We look forward to some opening remarks, in the context of this lecture, and then you and I can go backwards and forwards on a couple of points, and we will draw you, our members, into the conversation, and we’ll finish pretty much on the hour. We might drift five or ten minutes over if the conversation is as rich as I know it will be. Over to you, General.
General H. R. McMaster
Well, Robin, thank you so much. Thanks for your kind hospitality and the privilege of being at Chatham House to help celebrate the centenary of a great organisation. And I’m sure that in your second century, you will continue to host the meaningful discussions and to conduct important scholarship to help build a better future for generations to come. So, a real privilege to be with you. And so, what I’d like to talk with you about today is what I think is going to be the defining competition of this second century of Chatham House, and I think it’s a competition between closed, authoritarian systems and free and open societies. And, as you mentioned at the outset, Robin, you know, at the moment, free and open societies appear at a position of disadvantage, I think, in large measure, because of the crises we’ve been in this year, crises associated with the pandemic, the mishandling of that pandemic in many of our free and open, democratic societies, a recession associated with it in the United States, of course, the social divisions, and racial divisions laid bare by George Floyd’s murder and the aftermath of that murder, concerns about inequality of opportunity and unequal treatment under the law. And then you may have noticed a vitriolic partisan political seas in here with the Presidential election when – that we’re still in the midst of.
But I think also that we appear to be at a disadvantage in our free and open societies because the United States, European countries, Japan, Australia, and others were, I think, for much of the past two decades, absent, absent from critical arenas of competition. That absence was due to what we might call strategic narcissism. What I define in Battlegrounds as an American and European tendency in particular, since the end of the Cold War, to define problems as one might like them to be and indulge in the conceit that others have no aspirations or agency of their own, except maybe in a response to our actions and policies and initiatives. And strategic narcissism, I believe, led some to conclude that an arc of history had guaranteed the primacy of our free and open societies over authoritarian and closed systems. The expansion of liberal democracy was inevitable. Some also assumed that old features of geopolitics and international relations had become passé. Global governance and a great power condominium had displaced great power competition. A corollary to those assumptions was that China, having been welcomed into the international order, would play by the rules and, as it prospered, would liberalise its economy and its form of governance.
Overcoming this self-referential view of the world requires an emphasis on what the Historian Zachary Shore calls ‘strategic empathy’. Strategic empathy attends to the ideology, aspirations, and emotions that drive and constrain competitors. Empathy fosters a higher degree of competence because understanding the other exposes unrealistic, often implicit assumptions that underpin policies, and flawed policies, and it also helps us reveal and expose dangerous cognitive traps, such as optimism bias and confirmation bias.
The assumptions about the post-Cold War world turned out to be false. In this century, a new great power competition has emerged, and the actions of the Chinese Communist Party today are driven, I believe, by a combination of fear and aspiration. And these actions have revealed to the world that it is the greatest threat to achieving the positive vision that Chatham House has developed under your second century goals of sustainable and economic growth, and peaceful and thriving societies, and accountable and inclusive governance. Chinese Communist Party leaders continue to speak the [laughs] language of co-operation and global governance, while conducting one of the greatest peacetime build-ups in history, suppressing freedom at home, exporting an authoritarian mercantilist model, and subverting international organisations.
Chairman Xi Jinping pledges carbon neutrality by 2060, while China builds 50 to 70 coal-fired plants globally a year. He gives speeches on free trade, while engaging in economic aggression and unfair trade and economic practices. He boasts of the superiority of the Chinese Communist Party system, while he interns millions of people in concentration camps, and wages a campaign of cultural genocide against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. He speaks of a community of common destiny as the People’s Liberation Army bludgeons Indian soldiers to death on the Himalayan Frontier. The party is intensifying efforts to extend and tighten its exclusive grip on power internally, and to gain preponderant power in pursuit of national rejuvenation externally, through a campaign of co-option, coercion, and concealment.
China co-opts countries, international corporations, and elites through false promises of impending liberalisation, insincere pledges to work on global issues such as climate change, and especially the lure of short-term profits, access to the Chinese market, investments, and loans. Co-option makes countries and companies dependent and vulnerable to coercion. The party coerces others to support its efforts to extinguish human freedom internally. The National Basketball Association is a case in point. Establish areas of primacy often through – you have the debt trap that is set for corrupt or weak governments and reshape the international order in a way that favours China and its authoritarian mercantilist model, such as its subversion of the World Health Organization and other international organisations from the Human Rights Council to UNESCO to even the International Civil Aviation Organization.
So, while there are some who advocate still for accommodation and appeasement of the Chinese Communist Party, it is now painfully clear that the Free World must return to arenas of competition, vacated based on the forlorn hope that the Chinese Communist Party would see the light and change its ways. If we fail to build a team across the Free World, and compete effectively, Chatham House’s vision for its second century will have proven illusory, and our world will be less free, less prosperous, and less safe. So, to compete effectively, I think we might correct first some fundamental misunderstandings, concerning the nature of the threat from the Chinese Communist Party, and then maybe discuss how the Free World might compete effectively, and secure a better future for generations to come. In particular, we might resolve to mount a sustained effort to turn what authoritarian regimes regard as our free societies’ weaknesses into our greatest competitive advantages.
But first, I think it’s important to correct what we might call the three misunderstandings about the danger associated with the party’s aggression, because the party uses these misunderstandings as cover for its campaign of co-option, coercion, and concealment. It uses these misunderstandings to get away with various forms of aggression internally as it perfects its Orwellian surveillance state, and externally as it pursues primacy through programmes such as Military-Civil Fusion, Made in China 2025, and One Belt, One Road.
The first misunderstanding is that Chinese aggression is the result of US-China tensions or is a reaction to the Donald Trump administration’s description of China as a rival. This misunderstanding is a form of strategic narcissism. It is an arrogant, self-referential view because it is based on the assumption that the party has no aspirations of its own, and that it has no volition, except in reaction to the United States. But even the most cursory survey of recent Chinese Communist Party actions should correct this misunderstanding. Consider the party’s deliberate suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the persecution of Doctors, Journalists, and others who tried to warn the world, the subversion of the World Health Organization. Consider the addition of insult to injury with the party’s global ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, attempting not only to obscure China’s responsibility for foisting the pandemic on the world, but also, to portray its response and its authoritarian system as superior, and the free world’s response, the democratic systems of government, as inferior.
Consider the massive global cyberattacks on medical research facilities in the midst of a pandemic, and the punitive cyberattacks on an economic coercion of Australia, for having the temerity to suggest an inquiry into the origins of the virus. Consider the expulsion of international Reporters, and the party’s unabashed announcement that it will continue to use hostage-taking, such as the jailing of Canadians Michael Spavor and Michael Kovig, now for almost two years, and the round-up as well of so-called Taiwanese spies, to coerce others to accommodate its various forms of aggression.
Consider physical aggression on India’s Himalayan Frontier, in the South China Sea, in the [inaudible – 17:37] and especially towards Taiwan. Consider the long sentences given to peaceful protestors and critics of the party, as well as the extension of the party’s repression into Hong Kong. Consider Xi Jinping’s boasts of his intention to expand concentration camps in Xinjiang, as he races to perfect this Orwellian surveillance state, and build the great firewall even higher. Consider the brazen hypocrisy of Xi Jinping posing as an environmentalist, as China continues to increased its carbon emissions and destroys coral reef ecosystems in the South China Sea.
I’m sorry to go on, but it should be clear to all that it was not the United States or even the mean and much disliked Donald Trump that caused this behaviour. So, let all of us acknowledge that the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression is not a US problem; it is a whole world and especially a Free World problem. It is important that we correct this misunderstanding because it’s corollary, among nations in Europe and across the Indo-Pacific region, is that the United States is asking them to choose between Washington and Beijing. Well, if there is a choice to be made, it is a choice forced upon us by Xi Jinping and his party, and it is not a choice between Washington and Beijing. It is a choice between sovereignty and servitude.
The second misunderstanding derives from the first, that there is little international co-operation in the effort to counter Chinese Communist Party aggression because of President Trump’s America First, go it alone approach, and the corollary that America is ceding leadership and influence in the world. But there has been a very high degree of international co-operation to defend against the party’s aggression, and co-operation is growing. The Quad Format of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States is invigorated. Consider the recent ministerial meeting in Tokyo. Law enforcement and intelligence co-operation against Chinese cyber-warfare and cyber-espionage is growing. Consider the multinational indictments and sanctions against the party’s main hacking organisation, APT10.
Economic co-operation is growing. Consider efforts to establish international standards for infrastructure investment to counter the CCP’s concessional financial efforts, or to bring complaints concerning Chinese economic aggression to the World Trade Organization. Democratic countries are working together to prevent China from subverting more international organisations and turning them against their purpose. There is certainly more to do, and President-Elect Biden’s emphasis on expanding international co-operation bodes well for this vital competition.
The third misunderstanding is that competition with China is dangerous and even irresponsible because of a Thucydides Trap that presents us with a binary choice between passivity and a destructive war. That is a false dilemma and, I would argue, that passivity in connection with Chinese Communist Party aggression in the South China Sea and elsewhere had put us on a path to conflict. Had we remained complacent under the strategy of engagement and co-operation China would likely have become even more aggressive. Transparent competition can prevent unnecessary escalation and enable, rather than foreclose on co-operation with China. But the party promotes the false dilemma associated with the Thucydides Trap to portray efforts to defend against its aggression as simply the status quo power, the United States, trying to keep the rising power, China and its people, down. Calls to co-operate with China without reference to the need to defend against the party’s increasingly aggressive stance reinforce that narrative.
It is important to correct these misunderstandings because they provide cover for the party’s aggression, and a rationalisation for those who are eager to shrink from competition in support of short-term profits. So, if we correct these misunderstandings, and resolve to compete, the free world can turn what the Chinese Communist Party views as the West’s weaknesses into our greatest competitive advantages. Competing might also generate confidence in the principles that distinguish our free and open societies from the closed, authoritarian system China is promoting. The Free World has competitive advantage in what we regard as unalienable rights, freedom of expression, of assembly, and of the press; freedom of religion and freedom from persecution based on religion, race, gender, or sexual orientation; the freedom to prosper in our free market economic system; rule of law and the protections it affords to life and liberty; and democratic governance that recognises that Government serves the people rather than the other way around.
The Chinese Communist Party views freedom of expression as a weakness to be suppressed at home and exploited abroad. We can strengthen freedom of expression in our democratic societies, as a way of turning that perceived weakness into strength. In particular, we should protect the experiences, I think, of Chinese students who attend our universities. Protect them from the coercive power of the party that tries to reach into our democratic and free and open societies and stifle the freedoms that they ought to enjoy on our college campuses and in our societies. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press also play a key role in promoting good governance and have inoculated many countries from the bad deals under One Belt, One Road.
As with freedom of expression, the Chinese Communist Party views tolerance of diversity as a threat. It is in this area that nations across the free world might draw a strong contrast. Although some might see expanded immigration from authoritarian state as a danger, I think that the United States, the United Kingdom, and other free and open societies should consider issuing many more visas, and providing paths to citizenship for more Chinese, especially those who have been oppressed at home. I recall George HW Bush’s policy after the Tiananmen Square massacre where he gave any US student – Chinese student in the United States a Green Card, and so many of them took him up on that. 58,000, to be exact or around 58,000, and many of whom became our greatest citizens, our greatest entrepreneurs.
So, the Chinese Communist Party views its centralised statist economic system as bestowing advantages, especially in the ability to successfully co-ordinate efforts across government, business, academia, and the military. And this is why our free-market economies need to demonstrate the competitive advantages of decentralisation and unconstrained entrepreneurialism, while defending ourselves from Chinese predation. Here, the private sector plays an immensely important role, and we can talk maybe more about this. But we ought to first maybe aim to not do any harm economically, and to aid and abet the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to steal technologies, to transfer dual-use technologies, and to gain a competitive advantage, an unfair advantage in the emerging data-driven global economy, as well as militarily. So, there’s much to do to prevent China from exploiting our free and open economic system to its advantage.
The – I think defensive measures are important, but inadequate. We have to – we need more private sector investment in technologies and the areas of artificial intelligence, robotics, augmented virtual reality, and so forth. And we do need an approach to economic statecraft that is fundamentally different from what we’ve practised in the past. And just as the Chinese Communist Party views our free markets as a disadvantage, so too they see the rule of law in democratic nations as a relative weakness. They consider the supremacy of the law as unacceptable encumbrance to them. You wouldn’t be able to put millions of people in concentration camps, for example. And here again, what the Chinese see as a weakness is in fact a fundamental advantage of our free and open societies and must be strengthened. We see this in connection with law enforcement investigations, for example, in Huawei in a way that exposed the grave danger of allowing Huawei and, by extension, the Chinese Communist Party to have access to our citizens’ data through a company that must act as an extension of the Chinese Communist Party.
So, freedom of expression, entrepreneurial freedom, and protection under the law are interdependent, of course. Together, they bestow competitive advantages, useful not only in countering Chinese industrial espionage and other forms of economic aggression, but also, in defeating Chinese Communist Party influence campaigns, designed to mute criticism and generate support for their policies. It has been Investigative Journalists who have been at the forefront of the effort to protect ourselves against the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression. John Garnaut in Australia, I think, is foremost among those who did tremendous work. And, of course, you know, strengthening democratic governance and at home and abroad could be the best means of also inoculating our free and open societies against the party’s campaign of co-option, coercion, and concealment. The party sees its exclusive and permanent grip on power as a strength relative to our pluralistic democratic systems. There’s growing evidence, however, that citizens’ participation in the democratic process in countries targeted by the CCP is the best and first, and first line of defence.
So, in closing, just to maybe bolster our confidence in our democracies, recognising that we are a work in progress, I’d like to quote Wang An, who migrated to the United States from China in the 1950s and, of course, founded the ground-breaking computer company, Wang Laboratories. Of his adopted country, the United States, he observed, “As a nation, we do not always live up to our ideals. But we have structures that allow us to correct our wrongs by means short of revolution.” And so, this is why I think the mission of Chatham House, as you go into your second century, remains essentially critical – essential and critical to the fate of all humanity, and why it is a great privilege to be here with an organisation that’s committed to building a better future for generations to come.
Thank you, Robin, and I look forward to the conversation.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much, General McMaster, and I know that there are a whole bunch of themes that you didn’t have time to cover, which hopefully we’re going to have an opportunity now to dig into. And let me remind our guests, our members here, that you can put your questions into the ‘Q&A’ box, and we’ll turn to them. There’s a couple in there already, a few more already coming in. But I will take the privilege of my chairing this discussion to put a couple of questions on the table myself. And there were so many angles, and I’m trying to think of the best one to come in through.
I think where I’d like to start with is this one, HR, if I may. Obviously, in this big question, as you said, about the defining competition of 2020s, maybe even to the 2030s, and between free and open societies and autocracies, are the autocracies that you are concerned about in particular, in essence two, China and Russia, or is this more of a global competition, as you see it emerging? In other words, is there an emerging group around China?
It strikes me that looking at the world, admittedly the Warsaw Pact was hardly a voluntary alliance, but certainly the leaderships in many of those countries were loyal to the idea of communism or to the idea of the Eastern Bloc being dominant. And, you know, they had a group. They had some pretty strong proxies around the world as well, whether in the Middle East, whether in Latin America, parts of Asia-Pacific as well. It looks to me as if Russia and China are pretty lonely at the moment. So, my question to you, just to start with on this big one of ideological competition, do you think we’re at a, sort of, pivot moment where actually the China model could be taken up by others, or is this a moment where really, ideological competition is between the West and China, with Russia hanging in there somewhere? Is it really China and Russia versus many others, or is it something bigger than that, more global?
General H. R. McMaster
Well, I mean, Robin, you’re getting into one of our important competitive advantages, and that’s our alliances and partnerships relative to those of the Chinese Communist Party. But they may be lonely, but they’re not alone. I mean, if they held a cocktail party with, you know, with their client states and their partners, it’s not one that I would want to attend. But, you know, but they do have growing influence, especially among other authoritarian and repressive regimes. And so, I think it’s important to recognise the role that China has played, for example, in strengthening the theocratic dictatorship in Iran, and giving them, you know, a lifeline associated with the ability to, you know, to sell their oil.
Look, for example, now at just recently at how, you know, China has reinvigorated its efforts to buy oil from Venezuela to keep the Maduro regime on life support. Maduro just look at that, for example, the catastrophe that he’s created in Venezuela. Who was it enabled by? It’s by the club of authoritarian regimes, and he relies on Cuban intelligence and security structures. He relies on Russian assistance, Chinese assistance, and now elements of the Ministry of Information to – MOIS, the intelligence arm of Iran, and RGC officials have arrived in Venezuela just in the past week. We see it, I think, as well in the enablement of other authoritarian regimes that, you know, that oppress their own people. The Chinese model has perhaps been replicated on small scale, and most perfectly in Zimbabwe, you know, and I think we can look at Hun Sen’s regime in Cambodia as another.
I mean, the list goes on, right? That he’s not alone, and it’s quite clear that he’s promoting, you know, promoting this authoritarian model in a way that is damaging to human freedom across the world. And it’s, I think, extremely important for us to recognise the pernicious nature of the threat, and to not be, you know, lulled into a sense of complacency because we say, “Look, you know, we have much stronger partnerships than China does.” But China is creating servile relationships through the debt trap as well. The new vanguard of the Chinese Communist Party is a Party Official accompanied by a Chinese National Bank Official with a duffle bag full of cash to pay off the corrupt officials, and to indebt generations of these countries, not for, you know, for any anticipated return on investment, on the Chinese part, but to gain strategic advantage, and oftentimes control over strategic locations and infrastructure. So, I think we shouldn’t undersell, Robin. I think it’s a…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah.
General H. R. McMaster
It is a serious threat, and of course these partnerships among authoritarian regimes, you know, they do co-ordinate their efforts, align their efforts. We see this with, you know, with the elements of – with North Korea as well where…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, I mean, just quick…
General H. R. McMaster
…slave labours essentially from North Korea are the main source of North Korean regime’s revenue, and that’s mainly in Russia and China.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I mean, when I look at that list that you were giving, and it is obviously a biggish list, as you said, and a true list, you know, it’s hardly a list to be proud of, in terms of success: Iran, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, even Cuba, I suppose, in that sense. And I suppose one could’ve said the same was the case of the Warsaw Pact, in terms of that wasn’t one of the most successful lists of countries either. Are you worried, however, that some of the attraction seems to drift over to countries that should technically be seen to be part of the West, of the democratic camp that you were notifying – sorry, that you were signalling? Let me just throw a few out there and get your reaction to this. We have in Europe quite a bit of discomfort in parts of the European Union with the, I think it’s now 19-plus-one arrangement where China has struck up an infrastructure investment partnership with a number of countries, principally across Central and Eastern Europe, who are willing to engage in a more forward-leaning, shall we say, at least economic partnership with China.
But if we look at the BRICS Summits or the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, we’re seeing countries like Brazil, India in the mix. I would note that a country like Saudi Arabia has not always been critical of China, for obvious reasons, perhaps ‘cause of the energy connection. But one thing that seems to unite them is this idea that China, while people might not agree what it does internally, it stands up for an international system in which countries are sovereign, and non-interference in your internal affairs dominated. You can hear it in Bolsonaro. You can hear it a bit in Modi, you hear it in others. Do you think there is actually an appeal that’s beyond the nefarious aspects that you correctly identified with China? Are there aspects that are perhaps attractive? But I’m meaning that this linkage isn’t just the Zimbabwes, the North Koreas, but actually, it seems to be attractive to a group of countries that I imagine you’d be fighting for to be on the liberal democratic camp. What – are you concerned about this, or what’s your analysis about attractiveness of the Chinese narrative?
General H. R. McMaster
Hey, Robin, I think the attractiveness is wearing out because, really, I mean, the, you know, the Chinese definition of ‘sovereignty’ and, again, this is a great example of, you know, of the Chinese Communist Party using our language to create the impression that its supportive of the sovereignty of citizens within sovereign states, while it creates servile relationships and dependencies that, for example, the, you know, the President of Uganda has called it a new form of the unequal treaties, right? Or the President of Malaysia, I think, used that term and – or the President of Uganda has called it the, you know, a new form of colonialism. So, I think there’s a recognition that there really is a choice to be made, and the choice is between sovereignty and servitude.
And we’ve seen the reaction to this kind of debt trap that’s been set, the indebtedness, and then the coercive power that that cedes to the Chinese Communist Party. We’ve seen, where elections still matter, a reaction against that, in Ecuador, for example, after indebting the Ecuadorian people with this massive dam project that where there were cracks in the dam as soon as it was finished. The first time it was powered on, it blew out the country’s whole power grid. And in exchange, China requires export of all of Ecuador’s oil to China at a discount, right? This is indebting future generations. This was a big part of the election that turned out that the regime in Ecuador, and they’ve been under rule of law and due process of law, investigations, and prosecutions, and corrupt officials punished. I mean, there are many examples of this, so I won’t go on with specific examples.
But I think there’s reason for hope in this connection, Robin. There’s a recognition, you know. And I think in terms of the multinational formats, like BRICS, I think that’s fine, you know. Shanghai Co-operation Group, I think it’s good to have India and Brazil on the inside. And when we were trying to convince China that it was in its interests to approve UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions on North Korea, you know, we used our relationship with India and Brazil to say, “Hey, in your next BRICS meeting, you know, how about talking to your counterparts about this problem or…?”
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah.
General H. R. McMaster
You know, I – so I think I’m all for multinational fora that may be helpful in convincing Chinese Communist Party leadership. Hey, they can have enough, without repressing their own citizens, and advancing their interests at our expense.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Look, we’ve got so many questions coming in. I’m going to make sure we start to get to them, and maybe weave some of my follow-ups into theirs. Kind of, top of the list in, terms of liked as well as written is one by Rob May, who asks about the US role in all of this. What can the US do, and what could it do differently? And he notes that the impression has been that there’s been a very transactional, conditional, punitive approach to American leadership in recent years. It’s, kind of, withdrawn a Pax Americana security architecture is the way it’s phrased here. What can the Biden administration do to restore American leadership? And, I’m wondering, I thought I was going to maybe hear more, and maybe this is your opportunity to say more, about what America’s role is in rebuilding that Western leadership, and does it have to be a leadership role, or is that – would that be strategic narcissism again of its own – of a different kind? So, could you say something about what you think America’s role would be, what could a Biden administration do differently, has America been too transactional, punitive, conditional in its approach?
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah, well, I mean, I think these are all fair criticisms, but there has been a high degree of international co-operation, as I mentioned. I just gave some examples of it. But I think the overall approach has to be that we have to demonstrate to one another the value of our alliances and our partnerships. And, of course, there’s been a lot of talk about how much better the transatlantic alliance will be under a Biden Administration, but it has to be better than, you know, just better mood music or a better atmosphere at the cocktail parties with our Diplomats, right? It has to be for a purpose.
And I think what’s important is to recognise that the scepticism that Donald Trump had about international partnerships and alliances reflects scepticism among a large portion of the American people. And that scepticism, I think, grew mainly out of portions of our population that were left behind by transitions in the global economy, and therefore became disenchanted about America’s role in the world, which it viewed as wasteful, you know, given the fact that they were left behind in these transitions. So, I think what the Biden administration can do first and foremost is establish a common agenda, especially with the world’s largest economies, and especially in connection with major arenas of competition that are emerging instead of – and associate with data standards, internet privacy standards, rules that will help maintain, you know, a fair, free, reciprocal competition in the emerging global economy.
So, I think it’s, hey, it’s alliances and partnerships, but for a purpose. I think also, you know, countering more pernicious threats to our security, those that operate below the threshold of what might elicit a conventional military response. There’s a great paper that Chatham House just did on this topic, by the way. And I think that taking on that agenda within NATO, within the transatlantic context, is going to be immensely important as well. So, I would just say set the agenda, and the second thing is, the American people need to understand better the tremendous value of our alliances and partnerships. We took it for granted. Like, I’m on an internationalist, right? I was labelled in the Trump administration a globalist, which is a pretty low bar, actually, you know, in the Trump administration.
But, you know, I think, you know, I think we have to not think that it’s going to be over, that scepticism, when Donald Trump leaves. Actually, we have to make a better case to the American people about the tremendous value associated with our alliances and partnerships. Hey, none of the problems we’re facing, I just mentioned one of them, which is the Chinese Communist Party’s, you know, exportation of its authoritarian mercantilist model. But, as we know, none of the problems we’re facing today, whether it’s health security, whether it’s climate change, you know, jihadist terrorism, can be solved unilaterally, right? And so, we have to work together, and we have to be working in a purposeful way.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
You were tough, I’m just adding my own question here, follow-up on that, I mean, you were tough on China for the duplicity, I think, ‘cause you – would be a fair way of putting it, of their climate commitments, as you said, making commitments domestically, while helping promote coal production globally, etc. Again, you’d expect this to come maybe from a London angle on this. You know, it’s noticeable that the carbon emissions per capita in the US is roughly 16 tonnes per capita. China currently is eight per capita. I note actually, the UK right now is down to five tonnes per capita, which is interesting, for various reasons. But, again, I get to this point that, you know, China seems on the climate agenda to be while perhaps keeping going on some of those fossil fuel exports and still investing in fossil fuels domestically, it seems to have got the wave of climate change becoming the largest countries in the world have deployed renewable energy. How can America play that line, the leadership line you were just describing, when it seems to be so conflicted domestically about whether to actually play that line in the climate agenda, which takes up so much bandwidth here in Europe in particular?
General H. R. McMaster
Right, well, you know, I think there’s opportunity here, Robin. I think if you look at the Biden plan for climate change, it’s something that I think both political parties in the United States are, you know, significant numbers of people from both parties can get behind. And – but I think that we all need to do some work, okay? Now, I argued to stay in Paris, right? It’s one of the, you know, it’s one of the wounds I received in the Trump administration because I didn’t see any benefit in getting out. I mean, you know, these were non-binding commitments and what, you know, I think we needed to move to a much different type of agreement because – but, in retrospect, and I write about this in Battlegrounds, you know, hey, as I did more research on this and, as I was writing the book, I think Paris is a danger. It’s a danger because it makes us feel good about ourselves, and it does nothing to address the problem.
But, you know, the world’s greatest polluters and, you know, and China is – all the trends are in the wrong direction right now. They’re in the wrong direction in India, and they’re in the wrong direction in developing economies, you know, across Africa and other parts of the world. So, what we need, okay, I think what we need on climate is we can’t afford any more non-solutions like the Green New Deal, right, and like the, you know, the proposed European version of Green New Deal. We need solutions that are economically viable in developing economies and so, I think there are tremendous opportunities here, right? The opportunities that are associated with what was the greatest reduction in manmade carbon emissions in history, which was the conversion to natural gas from coal in the United States. I mean, that happened by, you know, fracking, right, and cheap natural gas. Well, that can apply globally now as well, and this – and these and other methods of power generation using fossil fuels that are cleaner can be a bridge to renewables.
As you mentioned, renewables are getting much more affordable. Many of these renewables bypass the problems associated with energy infrastructure, so it can allow power to get to more people in more rural areas, and lift more people out of poverty, and give them more economic opportunity. But then, also, a big part of the solution is going to be next-generation nuclear, Robin, I mean. And, you know, I mean, how can you be concerned, gravely concerned about climate change, and be against the next-generation nuclear power? That doesn’t make sense, right? So, I just think, you know, none of these solutions are one-off. It’s going to be a combination of all of the above. And what’s going to be immensely important, I think, is to look at the problems associated, the challenges associated with energy and climate and environment in the context of food and water security as well, because sub-optimising in any one of those areas creates problems in others.
India, writ large, is a case in point, and what I would put on the top of a Biden administration agenda and a European Union agenda, and a UK agenda, and a Japan agenda is let’s all help India succeed, right, because a small problem in India is a big problem for the world just because of scale, right? And if India can succeed in overcoming the challenges that the world’s largest democracy faces in these areas, you know, it can be a model for the world, and it can be readily adopted by other countries, including China. So that’s – I think there’s an opportunity there potentially with India.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, and, again, playing the European card here, I’d say that the reason there’s such a big debate across European governments, including, as you know, in Germany on the future role of nuclear power is not its potential commitment to climate targets. But I think the two great fears are waste, nuclear waste, that there’s still no idea what to do with it, and proliferation, and…
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah, so, yeah, so, absolutely, absolutely. But you know…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…eventually it ends up in developing countries. If that’s the solution…
General H. R. McMaster
Hey, Robin…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…that’s taken up, yeah.
General H. R. McMaster
That’s right. If we’re not doing it, right, if we’re not building a next-generation nuclear reactor in Saudi Arabia, you know, China’s going to do it, and how’s that going to be for the rest of the world [inaudible – 47:33] regime? So, hey, and also, these new reactors, as you probably know, I mean, they can be assembled in three years, they use nuclear waste, many of them, and the waste that they generate is hundreds of years, in terms of the half-life and the danger, instead of thousands of years. So, I mean, I think…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Quite right.
General H. R. McMaster
I think there’s plenty of these.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
No, that’s important.
General H. R. McMaster
And there are other sources as well, right? I mean, there’s, you know, all kinds of, you know, emerging technologies associated with renewables that we ought to pursue also. But, anyway, I think, you know, and…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Because we’ve got the questions pouring in at the moment, so I’m going to try and do my very best, even blending a couple together. I mean, one of the very important parts of your remarks was you noted this isn’t about governance or not about governance alone. You mentioned the private sector. You mentioned academia. I think in there probably rolled in would be civil society. I’ve got a couple of questions really about, I think, which are maybe linked, one from Euan Grant, you know, “Which organisations in the West, do you think, that are really joining up the dots about the impacts of Russia and China are having in Western societies?” And another question from William Crawley about the role of investigative journalism, and whether you see that aspect of civil society, and how much do you refer to it in your book in Battlegrounds about the importance of these non-state actors in strengthening the liberal democratic card? Could you just say a word or two about that?
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah, so, first of all, I think obviously, the role of investigative journalism has been foundational to countering the party’s aggression. I do cover it pretty extensively in a book that covers so much, but pretty extensively in Battlegrounds, and see it as part of the solution. As I mentioned, John Garnaut’s work in Australia, but others who’ve been able to penetrate, you know, the repressed, and exposed the repressive actions of the Chinese Communist Party are immensely important. Those actions are broad, but also, internal to China. And, Robin, I’m sorry, but the first part of the question, I thought I had it, but what was the first…?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
The first part of it was, which countries are joining up the dots, or which organisations, sorry, which organisations are joining up the dots, understanding what the Russia/China impact is outside governments?
General H. R. McMaster
Right, right, so, you know, I think all think tanks in the United States have taken this on now, right? There’s been this, you know, that we made a concerted effort to highlight the nature of this competition, return a great power competition in December 2017, national security strategy. That was reflected in our strategies across the, you know, the US Government, and that bled over into think tanks. You know, I’m biased, but in an organisation that also celebrated its centenary here, the Hoover Institution, an institution that was founded to preserve peace and to promote ideas that define a free society, I think we’re doing some very important work here on the competition between authoritarian closed systems, and our free and open societies.
We’ve initiated a China Global Sharp Power Project, which is just getting off the ground, and has been, I think, a very, you know, very effective so far at exposing the threat, for example, to research facilities and organisations, and within academia of Chinese industrial espionage, for example. And it’s really through this kind of scholarly research, combined with investigative journalism, that we can combat this because we really need to convince, Robin, as you mentioned already, those in the private sector and civil society that, hey, this competition cuts across our whole of society in ways that the Cold War with the Soviet Union never did. And so, I think that – I think we’ve caught on here in the United States. There have been, as you know, other examples in other countries. New Zealand has done a great job, kind of, modelling the Garnaut approach to investigative journalism, and exposing, you know, maligned Chinese influence there. The recent UK study, you know, that exposed in part, you know, the co-option of elites, which is one of China’s tactics. So, yeah, I think it’s catching on, I think there’s a broader recognition of the threat, and I think this is where we’ll see the power of our free and open societies, as we unleash really our fourth estate and civil society groups, as well as academia.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I’m just going to keep rolling forward ‘cause there’s so many good points here. Luke Simpson, I think, asks a very interesting question that says here, “It strikes me that Western societies are losing faith in many of the freedoms that you have described as our strength.” And he talks in particular about the young becoming disillusioned with economic liberalism, Black and other minority ethnic groups feeling that individualism has bolstered oppression and, you know, you mentioned freedom of expression. I think the amount of disinformation that’s out there, and the way that young people are just losing faith in the very agents and pillars of free and open societies, “How can we get our own house in order,” asks Luke Simpson, and I’m asking too? What’s your sense of this? That we may lose the next young generation, not be as committed to the institutions that you described here?
General H. R. McMaster
Gosh, I agree, what an important insight. I write about this in the conclusion of Battlegrounds, and it’s been very much on my mind, so the book has been largely about strategic competence, improving our ability to compete. But, at the end, I argue that we need to restore our confidence, our confidence in who we are, our confidence in our democratic principles and institutions and processes, and in our common identities, right? Our common identities as Americans, for me, but then also, our common identity of those who value our free and open democratic societies and principles and institutions. And I quote Richard Rorty in this – in that chapter, and he made the observation that pride is to nations as self-respect is to individuals, and a necessary component of self for self-improvement. And I think that we have to be conscious and consciously restore our pride in who we are, right?
So, look at the interpretation of the US election that we just had, right? You’d think democracy is over, man. I was hosted by my friend [inaudible – 53:40] and the lead into his programme compared America to Weimar Germany. And I was like, “What? How are you? Come on now, right?” I mean, look at the facts. I mean, unprecedented numbers of Americans voted. Okay, we’re divided, alright? If we weren’t divided, we’d be a one-party system, you know, and that doesn’t look too good for me as something to emulate, you know? There was this idea that we would identify, you know, by race and by – then by – therefore by political party. But large numbers of minorities voted for both parties, right? And so, you know, we had this contested election. We had a President who seemed determined to reduce our confidence in our democratic process and our vote. And, you know, we even overcame that through showing the strength of our legal system, and the adjudicative process that intended these, you know, these specious legal claims of voter fraud, and so forth.
So, you know, I feel confident. I want others to catch the wave, you know, and be more confident. But I think what we should do is take a hard look at civics education, and how we teach history. And, Robin, you know, are we going to oversimply here? And, you know, I’m an Historian, and I don’t mean to offend fellow Historians. I usually only offend Political Scientists. But I think that the academy has been captured in large measure by the new left interpretation of history to the point where, in many universities, it’s become an orthodoxy, and a singular interpretation. And I’m going to oversimply, but it’s essentially that all of the ills of the world parted in 1945 are due to colonialism. All the ills of the world after 1945 are due to capitalism and imperialism. And so, there’s a tendency to teach our young people that, hey, we’re the problem now, and therefore, we need to have a more humble approach to the world, without recognising that this interpretation of history is profoundly arrogant because it doesn’t give others any kind of degree of agency or authorship over their own fates.
And so, I think that we need to restore our confidence in America in the principles in our – of our revolution, right? That sovereignty lies neither with King nor parliament, but with the people, the idea of unalienable rights in our Declaration of Independence and in our Bill of Rights. But, of course, you know, not base this on a contrived happy view of history; to recognise that we didn’t remove the greatest blight on our history until almost 100 years after the revolution, and that, of course, is slavery. But we did, we did emancipate four million of our fellow Americans in our most destructive war in history. And, of course, we have disappointments of Reconstruction, and I could go on about it, right? But I think we should recognise the flaws in our democracies, but have more confidence, right, and pride in who we are. You know, we do as – and that’s why I quoted Mr Wang at the end. At the end, you know, he said, “Hey, we have a say in how we’re governed. Let’s celebrate that.”
And, you know, Robin, you mentioned this, well, I’m sorry to go on about this, but the information environment is very important in this connection. I think we’re being driven further and further apart from each other, in large measure because of a lack of authoritative sources of information. In the United States now, if you lean one way politically, you watch one cable news station. If you lean the other way, you watch one or two others. Social media, based on the algorithm, is designed to make more profit. I write about this in Battlegrounds. People know this now obviously, you know, is that they show content that pulls us apart from one another. And, of course, this creates opportunities for our enemies, like the Russians, right, and Vladimir Putin, whose theory of victory is not for Russia to regain its power, so it can – Russia can compete with us on its own terms economically and otherwise, but to drag all of us down, so Vladimir Putin is the last man standing in Europe. You know, so I think that we have to be cognizant of that, make ourselves better, and come together.
The argument I make in the book is that we need Chatham House, as you do routinely, and others to bring people together for meaningful, respectful, civil discussions of the problems that we’re facing, and to try to begin with what we can agree on at the outset of these conversations, ‘cause we can get a lot done, if we just do that, and then we can talk about what we disagree on. But I think we all have a role in bringing our citizens together, and reversing this polarisation that is quite evident, I think, in the United States and in Europe.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Right, we’re coming close to the hour. I’ve warned General McMaster we might go five minutes over. If you’re comfortable, if you’ve got the time, General, maybe we could just take an extra five minutes, so if people can bear with us ‘cause there’s so many good questions, and I’d like to try and get a few more of them, and I apologise for not being able to get to all of them. I just wanted to mention one here from Hamil Saleh, which was an interesting question. “Do you think America First has actually emboldened authoritarianism, and what is its position towards championing democracy in developing countries? Has there been a loss of that wave or that moment?” Now, you might say this is strategic narcissism, but I’ll let you decide if that’s the way to answer this question or not. But, looking from the outside, and we’ve seen this obviously in Europe as well, there’s been a sense that in certain European countries that are flouting the normal norms of rule of law, they seem to be the ones that are often most popular in the Trump White House. So, to what extent do you think, not just in Europe, but in other parts of the world, authoritarians are starting 2021 feeling more emboldened than they did maybe in 2017 or 16?
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah, I think there’s a case to be made for that. I think it’s, you know, the term ‘America First’, I mean, it was an own goal in many ways, right, because it was reminiscent of American, you know, isolationism, some might even say, you know, Nazi sympathisers in the 1930s, right? But it reflected, I think, a frustration today that is in some ways analogous to the Great Depression era in the United States. Doubts about people’s economic future, and concerns about inequality of opportunity, you know, those tend to also breed scepticism about international engagement, right, and a loss of confidence, you know, confidence in our free-market economic system, in our democratic principles and institutions. So, I mean, we ought to take this seriously, and I think that, you know, we ought to go back to America, you know, as, kind of, the city on the hill, right? It’s not our job to go around the world and to, you know, to force, you know, Jeffersonian democracy on countries around the world.
Hey, but for those countries who want to help themselves, right, for those citizens who want to strengthen democratic principles and institutions and processes, what I write about in Battlegrounds is, you know, that’s not just an exercise in altruism to do that. It’s the best way of advancing our interests, especially when we’re faced with authoritarian regimes that are promoting their model, right? So, you know, I think that then communicating that to the American people and to others. You know, under America First and, sort of, this whatever economic nationalism, whatever that is, I mean, there were some foot shots in implementation of the competitive approach to China, right? So, for example, I never saw how steel and aluminium tariffs on our allies help get to Chinese, you know, over-capacity, over-production, and dumping, right? I mean, okay, and so, I mean, there were some…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Exactly.
General H. R. McMaster
…wrongs to be corrected. But I think overall, we ought to be confident in the approach that we need to take together across the Free World, right, so…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Let me see. Let me – thank you very much. Let me see. I’m sorry to have to be rushing you now at the end. I’m conscious of your time as much as ours. Let me see if I can get two more questions on – I’m usefully pulling off questions from our members here that I wanted to make sure we got to. Giulio Gubert, who’s a student at the Italian Institute for International Politics Studies, asks a very important question. “In a time of global recession, is it realistic that the states most dependent on the Chinese economy would sacrifice their short-term economic interests to pursue long-term democratic values?” I’d written down to myself here, “Let’s remember that there may be a very large non-aligned movement this time round.” And the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership signing that brought China with Australia and Japan and South Korea and all the ASEAN allies altogether economically seems to, right, to be the example of Giulio Gubert’s question. What are we going to do about this economic interest versus strategic ideologic competition?
General H. R. McMaster
Well, you know, I think we just – countries should act in their interests, right, and interests of their citizens. And, you know what, a complete decoupling from the Chinese economy’s unrealistic. But I think there ought to be, sort of, almost an economic Hippocratic Oath, right? Like, don’t do any harm. And the three ways you can do harm, I think, through doing business with China or accepting Chinese investments are in three ways. First of all, you don’t want to aid and abet the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to repress freedom of their citizens, right, to build concentration camps, to put in place, you know, the artificial intelligence capabilities associated with the social credit system, and perfecting the surveillance state, okay? Don’t do that.
The second thing is, we ought to not aid and abet the People’s Liberation Army’s efforts to gain a differential advantage over our militaries, in what has been the largest peacetime build-up in history. An 800% build – increase in their defence budget since the mid-90s, right? And they’re using that to intimidate countries across Indo-Pacific region, and to create servile relationships that allow them to create exclusionary areas of primacy that limit our economic discourse, as well as our relationships, and the sovereignty of those countries. So, don’t do that. And the third is, I wouldn’t compromise the long-term viability of your companies, and the jobs of your workers, based on the lure of short-term profits.
Okay, now, I mean, that’s easier said than done. But I think, I mean, every company, every country’s got to – has to make their own assessments in that connection. But don’t be your own worst enemy, I would just say. And, you know, look at Australia’s example, right? I mean, Australia became dependent on access to the Chinese market. What did China do? It employed economic coercion. Look at South Korea’s example in connection with the deployment of missile defences to South Korea, and how China used coercive power to punish the South Korean people and its economy. So, I would say just know what you’re signing up for.
Hey, if you give the Chinese Communist Party access to your communications grid, do you really expect them to treat your citizens better than they treat their own people? I think that’s unrealistic, right? So, yeah, I just think, you know, making the case clearly, and we’re not – I mean, the United States shouldn’t ask anybody to choose, right? And, as I mentioned, it’s a choice between, you know, sovereignty and servitude, you know, and I think we just have to recognise that. And this is why, Robin, as you mentioned, your civil society and investigative journalism and, you know, it’s – this has to be a problem that we all work on together, not just governments, but actually, all free peoples have to be engaged in this competition.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
You’ve actually answered another ques – in your answer, those three, kind of, don’t do harm list, checklist, actually answered Zitian Harper’s question, which was specifically, “How could the UK strike that right balance?” In a way, I think you answered Zitian’s question with your comment there. And I’m sorry I’m not going to get to everyone’s questions, but we’re already five past, so I’m going to ask you a last question, which is actually the first one to have gone up on the board, from Dina Mufti, and I thought it would fit well in at the end. What do you – and especially for Chatham House, which was associated with the English School of International Relations, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull and so on, who emphasised a lot the importance of international law, in the context of an otherwise anarchic world, if I can go the whole hog there.
And I’m just wondering where do you think international law fits into your model of this renewed, unalienable rights world? And if you don’t mind pinging you a little bit, you became known obviously back in 2017, shortly after you took over for the op-ed you co-wrote with Gary Cohn, you’ll remember, in The Wall Street Journal, saying this – people remember the statement there, “There’s no international community.” I think there was a phrase, if I remember rightly, along those lines. Maybe that’s different from international law, in your mind. But what…?
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Does international law fit in part of the answer for the 21st Century in achieving what – the kind of world you’re trying to achieve…
General H. R. McMaster
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…and for all of us?
General H. R. McMaster
Absolutely it does. But, of course, Robin, there’s going to be a tension, as you’ve seen in Europe quite dramatically, between, you know, membership to international organisations and adherence to international law and national sovereignty. And I think if you’re in a democratic country, you don’t want to undermine the sovereignty of your own citizens, right? It ought to be your citizens who have a say, the primary say, in how they’re governed. So, I think that international law, norms, customs, organisations that help set standards that are important to economic discourse, that are important to maintaining peace and security, hey, I’m all for it. But democratic countries ought to have really the right to either join or not join.
So, for example, you know, the United States, you know, hasn’t joined into international protocols and arrangements associated with the law of the sea, but we adhere to them, right? China, you know, and others, I mean, sign up to these agreements, and then actively undermine them, right, or join the organisations, and try to turn them against their purpose. So, I think, really, we ought to focus on what is the effect we want to achieve, you know, in terms of a better future for generations to come, in terms of prosperity? And, I mean, the mission of Chatham House, you know, how do you achieve the mission of Chatham House, and use international law, international organisations appropriately to do it?
And just, Robin, quickly, what I wanted to say is, you know, it was in this – in the heady days of the 1990s when terms like ‘global governance’ really gained, you know, wide acceptance. And, you know, I’m sorry, but it’s self-delusional. I mean, China, you know, China and Russia are not waiting around, you know, to be led by us in certain directions, right? They’re competing actively against us. So, I think acknowledging that fact is very important, right, to protecting our free and open societies and our free-market economic systems, you know, from those who want to do harm to us and to our future. And so, that’s not to mean that it shouldn’t be, you know, something to strive for. But we can’t base our strategies and our policies on aspirations, right? We have to base it on reality.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Look, thank you very much for that, and I think that last point reminds me, yeah, I wrote an article for International Affairs for the journal published by Chatham House back in end of 2018 where I talked about us as think tanks as well have probably over-invested in globalisation in let’s call them the aggregate gains that were there available for the world, rather than thinking about the disaggregation of winners and losers within our own societies, and I think this is what you’re pointing to. There’s been that loss of legitimacy or consent amongst many citizens in the West for some of the big institutional innovations that were made on their – in their name by governments on behalf of their citizens, without getting that full permission. I think the way you’ve put it at the end there about are there governments signing up to global governance are texts, without necessarily signing up to the practice or the values, and obviously, the UN Human Rights Council probably comes up pretty high up on that list. I know it’s been called out by you and by others in the past.
What I’m saying is here apologies to our members whose questions I did not get to, as you could see, General McMaster, we had a huge number coming in to your – provoked and stimulated by your remarks. Thank you for taking so many of them and compressing so much good stuff into so little time. Great to have had you be part of this Centenary Lecture Series. Thanks for asking the big questions. Thank you for situating, if I may say on our behalf, Chatham House inside that conversation. We feel an obligation, I might say, even a commitment to try to do the right thing at this very important time in history, and we really appreciate the way that you’ve shared your thoughts and your ideas about the best steps to take forward on this road.
Let me remind our members there’s a LinkedIn conversation. For those of you who didn’t have a chance maybe to get your question answered, or to pick up on some of the points that General McMaster raised, head in there, and some of my colleagues will be moderating that conversation. For the meantime, I know we can’t stand up and can’t do any applause, if you see what I’m saying, directly, well, from our rooms that you can hear, but thank you very much, HR, for joining us. Look forward to keeping in touch, and to continuing the dialogue with you over the coming years. Thank you very much for sharing your time and your thoughts.
General H. R. McMaster
Thanks, Robin, happy anniversary.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thanks so much. All the very best.
General H. R. McMaster
Thanks.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, folks, for joining us as well. All the best, bye, bye.
