Sir Simon Fraser GCMG
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I hope the mics are working, I think they are. I’m Simon Fraser, I’m the Chair of the Council at Chatham House, and it’s my pleasure this evening to briefly introduce this event, which is the 2025 Director’s Lecture, which Bronwen, our Director, is going to deliver this evening. I want to welcome all the distinguished guests and members here in Chatham House and, also, the many people who are joining us online around the world. I’d also like to introduce James Harding, who’s going to chair the event. James is the Founder and Editor of Tortoise Media, and was previously a Director of BBC News, and the Editor of The Times. And when Bronwen has delivered her lecture, James will then ask some questions to her and then mediate some questions from the floor.
Bronwen is the person who actually, herself, introduced this series of lectures, and this is her third lecture as Director, and she has chosen this year as her title, “The Pursuit of Order in a Contested World.” And as we look forward next week to the inauguration of President Trump, amid a quite bewildering sequence of international events, in a context where many of the accepted norms of international behaviour are being challenged, including by those people to whom traditionally, we have looked to uphold those norms, I think you will agree that that is a highly apposite subject for the – for her lecture.
A couple of very quick housekeeping points to me, before I hand over to Bronwen. First of all, to say this event is held on the record and it is being livestreamed. Please feel free to tweet using the #CH_Events handle. And when you are asking questions to James, if you’re in the room, please raise your hand and a microphone will be delivered to you. Please introduce yourself, please ask a question, don’t make a statement, and online, if you want to ask a question, please use the Q&A box at the bottom of your Zoom screen, and they will be picked up – your questions will be picked up from there. Final point, there will be a drinks reception taking place immediately following the event, to which you are invited.
So, with those few points, Bronwen, I’d like to pass the podium to you to deliver the 2025 Director’s Lecture [pause].
Bronwen Maddox
Simon, thank you very much indeed, and everyone, thank you very much indeed, for coming. James was saying to me as we were coming down, “Oh, did this ruin Christmas, writing this?” And I said, “No, because the world changes often, I tend to write this shortly before delivering it.” But that was even more the case this year. As I was writing this last week, I didn’t really expect that I was going to have to refer to Greenland and Panama as contested territories, along with the more obvious Ukraine and Taiwan.
Some things endure, though, and if you look up in the hall as you go out, I’m not encouraging you to leave right yet, but when you do, inscribed on the ceiling are the founding statements of Chatham House. And they talk about the “pursuit of the rule of law over the rule of force,” they talk about “building mutual understanding between nations.” And Chatham House, as you know, was founded in the ashes of the First World War, on the margins of the Paris Peace Conference, with the aim of bringing intelligent thought to bear on avoiding the calamities that the world might otherwise inflict on itself, and that is still our mission today. The world is witnessing more wars and a fraying of international law of the institutions and of economic stability, and that jeopardises the prosperity that has flowed to so much of the world since the Second World War. And it could lead to worse conflict, it could lead, even, to the catastrophe of war between the US and China.
So, the pursuit of agreement on some kind of future order is essential, and I’m going to set out here some priorities for countries who share that goal. They begin with re-acknowledging the value of the UN Charter, 80 years old this June, as well as international law on sovereignty, war, the sea and on arms control, many of the things that flowed from that charter. The extent of support for key economic institutions, including the IMF. And that acknowledgment, and even better, advocacy for the benefit of agreement, is a basis for the pursuit of new pacts on the environment and tech, on space, all those things the world does now need to agree on.
This is not nostalgia for the heyday of the United Nations. I’m not suggesting that trying to salvage the US-led multilateralism of the post-Second World War era is credible. There is too much of a contest between the US and China, along with Russia and Iran, and this isn’t, either, a call for the US to act as the world’s Policeman. It doesn’t want to, as its President Elect keeps telling us, and much of the world doesn’t want that, either. But it is a call to those who regard international agreement as important, to argue for its value and to try to preserve and extend it. It is a pitch to the new Trump administration, even if the President Elect and his appointees do not exactly use these terms. It is a pitch, too, to China. President Xi Jinping does defend international order in his speeches and, of course, China has prospered greatly from it, although China notably ignores those rules when it chooses, particularly laws of the sea, of internat – of intellectual property, of sovereignty.
Even more, though, what I’m setting out here is an appeal to countries that are not superpowers to use the chance that is here now to exert more influence. The new multilateralism needs a really confident group of countries to argue for it and to lead it, and of course, that applies to the US’ traditional allies, UK, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, among others. For the Starmer Government, there is a real opportunity to work on these emerging agreements, behind the scenes, and to support the value of international law. For countries of the Global South, and particularly ones do not – that do not have authoritarian governments, such as Brazil and Indonesia, there is also a chance for them to influence these emerging rules and alliances. And that is – the reason this is a chance is because the US and China each want their support, and it’s also because many countries do not want either the US or China to dominate. Global South countries do need, though, to be realistic about what the richer world might pay to help them and to be consistent in their own standards, not just to lambast others for their failings.
So, let me say – make a few points first about the problems that flow from the contest we are seeing over global governance. One Ambassador from the Middle East said to me of the times we’re in, “It’s something like the Cold War, in that on every question, countries line up on one of two sides, but unlike the Cold War, it’s different countries on each side each time.” Now, not everything is broken, and much still works of agreements made in the last century. Phone calls are placed across borders, planes take off and land at foreign airports. The World Trade Organization settles many disputes, still, even though the US has stymied the appeals process. The World Health Organization is still helping eliminate diseases, even though its role in the pandemic was contested and criticised.
But the UN Security Council, the world’s prime forum to make and enforce agreement on peace and security is jammed by the vetoes of the US, China and Russia. And those divisions extend to other parts of the 1945 Charter, a text which may have been shaped by the US, but was originally backed by 50 countries, including the Republic of China, back then, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India and the USSR, and has more than 160 signed up to it now. They include the principle of sovereignty and legitimacy of the International Court of Justice, the main judicial body of the UN, which settles disputes between nations.
And the biggest current conflicts in the world reflect the unravelling of international agreement, as well as causing devastation for people there. If you take Ukraine, where Russia shattered principles of sovereignty by its invasion, an invasion which China has increasingly openly backed, in the Middle East, the conflict between Israel and Hamas raises questions about the enforceability of laws of war. Sudan, a cauldron of immense suffering, where at least 11 million people are displaced. It shows the failure of Security Council sanctions, as well as diplomacy. The United Arab Emirates, Iran, Libya, Egypt, Russia, are all in there, drawn by a desire for regional influence, as well as gold.
This new disorder is all the greater because the US and its allies are hardly united in upholding existing values in institutions. Trump and his team are exuberantly transitional, saying to Europe and NATO, Japan and South Korea, “We’ll defend you if you pay us,” and Trump’s remark about buying Greenland from Denmark and taking the Panama Canal by force shocked allies, and very likely delighted Moscow and Beijing for its exultant lack of interest in principles. For its part, Europe struggles to impose its principles on members, never mind recommend these to the world. The Hungarian Foreign Minister sat on this platform last year and said that “Hungary would change Europe, rather than let Europe change Hungary.” And the UK is struggling, like many democracies, to get people to pay for the services, including national defence, that they have taken for granted.
China’s choice about the part it plays will have huge influence on future order. It’s been for some time guided by President Xi’s conviction that “The East is rising and the West declining,” although given the strength of the US economy, and the weaknesses of China’s own, that may be a miscalculation, but in any case, that vision has guided its courtship of the Global South. And it has had some success in establishing the BRICS as a club that countries want to join, as Indonesia has just done, but it hasn’t yet got the BRICS to create an alternative to the dollar, as it would dearly like. And while its rhetoric has been to offer an alternative to what it calls ‘Western colonialism’, Western countries could get better at retorting that China sometimes practises a new form of colonialism, not only in the treatment of its own internal minorities, but in the terms on which it extracts resources from other countries. As I said in my lecture last year, the West does need to address better the accusations of double standards against it, but it should not be shy of pointing out hypocrisy on the other side, too.
So, what should be done? Well, in this high stakes contest, there are some institutions and principles that countries should try to preserve if they want international order to be stable. The first, they should reaffirm their agreement of key parts of the UN Charter. International law evolves as sedimentary layers, treaties and protocols, and is generally not binding unless countries consent, and many reject the human rights’ provisions. But increasingly, even core parts of the Charter are contested, including the principle of sovereignty and some of the principles that lead to the laws of war and of the sea.
And the terms on which countries now look to resolve current conflicts could help, could help advance this pursuit of order, or they could make it worse. In Ukraine, Trump would make a considerable contribution if he helped end a conflict that has brought hundreds of thousands of casualties on each side, but if he jettison’s principle in pursuit of a deal, he will undermine stability. For all his claims, he has not been a great foreign dealmaker. He did broker the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Muslim states, but those ignored Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. His first term deal with the Taliban casually sacrificed the stability and human rights that the US had advanced in Afghanistan, his talks with daw – North Korea did nothing to reduce the threat of its nuclear weapons.
So, the minimum that needs to emerge over Ukraine is that a deal guarantees that country’s ability to thrive, free from Russian threat and Europe’s ability too, and that can only be done by the US, whether explicitly or helping Ukraine build up its own weapons. The US should also not force Ukraine to accept that Russia’s occupation of its sovereign territory is legal, even if it is indefinite.
In the Middle East, the US could advance peace by pursuing normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, but both the Trump team and the Israel Government show no interest in the Saudi condition of a commitment to a state for the Palestinians. Trump could, though, undermine the chance of regional agreement, let alone wider support, by supporting Israel if it retains control of Gaza and takes over more of the West Bank. That raises the question of how any of these can be enforced. Europe and the UK are better placed than the US to argue for the role of the International Court of Justice, while acknowledging that this role will never be without controversy. Supporting the Court’s legitimacy is part of the UK Government’s argument, it seems, in handing sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, after an ICJ advisory opinion.
Following that, a focus on the basics, if you like. Countries should renew their focus on arms’ control. Nuclear proliferation comes top of the list, because of the catastrophe it can bring. The US and China need to decide whether they will systematically try to stop it, but others can put pressure on them to do so. If the US’ security to South Korea and Japan is not credible, then those countries will ask whether they need their own. China is said to have been helpful at discouraging President Putin from talking about the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but not really at all in diminishing the North Korean threat, or so far, the Iranian one.
Let me say something briefly on the Security Council itself, because when you start to talk about international order, people assume that that is where you are going. And, in the past, proposals for reform of ‘Chairs and Shares’, as the jargon has it, have been futile, although the case for reform is well-known. Reform is still immensely unlikely, but the demand from the Global South for more representation is now unanswerable, so is the argument that there should be a new limit on the veto powers of the permanent five members, the US, China, Russia, France and the UK. And the UK is well placed to help move this debate forwards about what could be done to include or represent the voices of other countries, better than in the past, as one of the permanent members. US and China want to court the Global South, this is one test of whether they will make good on it.
After these basics of international law and security, the priority should be economic institutions. They’ve held up in this disorder fairly well, but Trump’s tariffs threaten global trade. The hope must be that even if purely out of desire of in – avoid inflation in the US, he focuses only on points of real threat to the US from China. The way the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership has been revived as the Japan-led CPTPP is a model, though, for how middle powers can begin to pull new agreements together, even when the superpowers are unwilling or uninterested. Beyond that, the world needs the International Monetary Fund to remain a universal institution, to preserve global economic and financial stability, and this means trying extremely hard to resolve the standoff between the US and China over voting weights. Probably this will demand a compromise from the US, but one that might be traded for what it wants elsewhere.
I’ve been talking so far about preserving existing order and institutions. Progress here would then help construct new agreements in other areas. Indeed, some Diplomats are explicit that one might be traded for the other. One said to me, from one of the world’s poorer countries, “We’ll care about Ukraine if you help us with climate finance.”
On the environment, the key climate change, plastics, biodiversity, oceans treaties, they all need work, but as the UK shows, many richer countries are highly indebted and reaching the limits of their citizens’ willingness to pay tax. They’re not going to come up with the step change in public finance that is needed in the developing world, so they and the recipients need to use better the funds already available, and there is a lot of scope for improvement here, something that Chatham House works on. While poorer countries are right to push for more help, they also need to get realistic about where efforts on international co-operation are best spent. Preaching to richer countries about their responsibility for climate change might have the moral force behind it, but it does not generate more funds. They may want to push more on China to help, as indeed it might.
On tech, regulation should respect the creative effect of these technologies, resoundingly visible now in medicine. It should aim to find the right bargain between tech companies, their users and the countries in which they operate, rather than being a, kind of, endless prescription, ‘thou shalt not’. Tech companies do need to pay more tax, fees for the use of intellectual property too. They should accept constraints on their monopoly power, at least regional ones. That is a principle that has undermined competition policy and growth for decades. On their responsibility for truth of information, responsibility for harm, there is no easy answer, but they would be wise to respect the differences that exist between countries in their taste for regulation.
The US and China have undeniably most influence on the future order of the world, or the lack of it. But others have a new opportunity, partly because the US and China want their support and partly because many don’t want the US or China to dominate. Those smaller countries, though, well, smaller than the US and China, do, though, need to organise to make the best of it. Including using regional co-operation to negotiation as blocs, say through the African Union, ASEAN or Mercosur, but they need realism too. Richer countries will not give much more aid than their electorates currently support, and currenchy – countries challenging the West over double standards do need to show consistency themselves. Turkey’s Finance Minister told a Chatham House audience last year, “This country is very keen on upholding laws of trade, but ignores sanctions against Russia because it wants to.” South Africa has taken Israel to the ICC, the International Criminal Court, but complained that under the Court’s rulings, Putin was not allowed to visit South Africa.
In all this, there is a real opportunity for the UK, although it’s not helped by the competing priorities of its foreign policy and lack of money. The Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, has coined the term ‘progressive realism’ for his policies, “taking the world as it is,” as he said in a Foreign Office speech last week, “but pursuing progressive goals.” Yet, the government, as you may have noticed, wants economic growth, and the conclusions of a report which David Lammy commissioned on that point, on how foreign people could engender economic growth, the conclusions are inescapable, focus on the US, EU, and China. And that’s very much what we said at Chatham House in our report before the UK election.
Those trade goals are hard to square with each other, let alone with progressive realism, and in trying to square them, the hardest choice for the UK is going to be how much to diverge from the US. Trump may well demand tariffs or other action against China that jars with the warm words that Chancellor Rachel Reeves uttered in Beijing this weekend. He will also, no doubt, look scornfully on the UK’s pledge to set out a clear path to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence as barely half of what he is demanding. Progressive policies, including the Chagos Islands handover, support for court action against Israel, a drive for net zero, they all represent further divergence from Trump, who also can determine much of that elusive trade growth for the UK.
All the same, there should be a way through, with adroit footwork. The UK has a golden chance this year to play a leading role in European security given the pressure for resolution in Ukraine and the political upheaval in France and Germany. David Lammy has made clear his commitment to the Commonwealth, to the challenges in West Africa and the Sahel, to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, all areas that do not immediately conflict with trade goals and represent paths to exploring agreements between groups of countries. UK has a real chance to be one of the clearest and loudest voices, arguing for co-operation, for new agreements, for the rule of law.
In this, Chatham House has a clear role to play, as this untidy world evolves. That’s why we’re setting up this month our Centre for Global Governance on – Global Governance and Security, headed by Dr Samir Puri, Author, Academic and former UK Civil Servant, who joins us today. The Centre brings together our work on security, digital society, international law, health, as well as global governance overall. We are positioning ourselves at the point where the world is making these new decisions. And partly we do that through convening private conversations about these sticking points, particularly in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America. It’s also through testing out proposals, in speeches, in debates, this is one, and it is through our deeper research making a case for the way through these deadlocks.
I’m really indebted to our much strengthened Economics Team for analysing the costs of our proposals and speculating on who might pay in the world, and to our also much strengthened country programmes, always one of the historic strengths of Chatham House, for their judgment on how we can get those proposals to become real.
So, in conclusion, we are facing a multipolar world. Power is distributed untidily among blocs and regions. If stable, that could serve people well, probably much better than rising conflict between the US and China. But countries do need to organise themselves to salvage the best of the past and create new agreements for the prosperity and order of the future. We are looking at a lot of disruption, disruption that a second Trump presidency will bring, the authoritarian wave sweeping the world. But those changes are creating a space in which new agreements can develop, and those who want order should seize this chance to help shape the rules and institutions of the future, ensuring that many countries have a role in agreeing them. This is not a defence of the West, it’s a project for the world. Thank you.
James Harding
[Pause] Bronwen, thank you, and as you said at the beginning…
Bronwen Maddox
Can you move your laptop so I can put down the water?
James Harding
Yes, there.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you.
James Harding
There’s so much moving in the world. Even by end of this lecture…
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, I think…
James Harding
…I wouldn’t be surprised there’s more to discuss. I’m going to put a few questions to Bronwen and then I’m going to come to as many people as possible before the end of the hour. So, if you’ve got thoughts or questions, please do catch my eye and I’ll come to you in about, sort of, ten minutes time.
As I was listening to you, I was struck by the fact that at the start of 2024, when everyone was talking about “the year of democracy,” you stood up here and gave what was quite an alarming lecture on double standards. Here we are at the start of 2025, and so many people have got their head in their hands and yet, you stand up and say, actually, there’s an optimist argument for reaffirmation of the UN Charter, reform of the P5. Putting aside David Lammy’s progressive realism, how realistic do you think that position is now?
Bronwen Maddox
In terms of – we were talking upstairs about what I was thinking when I was writing this. And I wanted very much to make a defence of order and of the attempts to salvage and improve that order, without sounding naïve about it, because idealism about it can lead you to burn up years of your life writing about reform of the UN Security Council, to take just one. Some of those, I think, you know, are really not going to be reinvented, and I was talking with Samir Puri earlier about this, and he said, “Well, you don’t want to get to something like reaffirming marriage vows that can get you into all kinds of trouble.” And in the case of the UN, you know, just simply an impossibility.
But you can get to some, kind of, I think, re-acknowledgement of the value of this international order which has underpinned prosperity for so many countries, and stability for so many countries, for a long period of time. And I think either doing it by conflicts – by trying to resolve conflicts as they are presenting themselves, the resolution of Ukraine and so on, or trying to look back at some of those principles captured in the economic institutions, and so on, and saying – and countries saying explicitly, “Look, these are of value.”
James Harding
Let’s talk about the resolution of Ukraine for a moment. What do you think are the terms of a settlement that the UK could advocate for?
Bronwen Maddox
I think the UK should take the position that it has and continues to take, which is not to rush to talk about a settlement, at all. To say that this invasion has been an affront to laws of sovereignty, to the stability of Europe. This is an attack on a country which was thriving itself, and that we must continue to defend that. I’m not sure I would advise the UK to wade into, you know, the terms of it. But…
James Harding
But I…
Bronwen Maddox
…I was arguing before of say – you know, this is going to be led by the US, because in my view, only the US can provide the guarantee of security to Ukraine that would allow that country to, even without even giving up some territory, or surrendering that for the moment to Russia, allow that country to thrive and have a future, free from threat from Russia. And only the US can do that, so I think…
James Harding
I…
Bronwen Maddox
…that – you know, that is where the argument…
James Harding
But the reason…
Bronwen Maddox
…starts.
James Harding
…I was – because I was intrigued by something you said about the fact that President Trump would be able to do something meaningful if he could come to a settlement, or resolve the situation in Ukraine, but that any such settlement might accept a, if you like, a change in the borders that we indefinite but not legal.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
James Harding
And I thought that was an interesting formula, you know, not legal but indefinite. That does sound like…
Bronwen Maddox
So, you don’t say…
James Harding
…you know, beginnings of terms.
Bronwen Maddox
…that Russia has sovereignty over the territory it has captured, and I think that would be a mistake.
James Harding
But you…
Bronwen Maddox
But…
James Harding
…do accept that they’re there.
Bronwen Maddox
You accept that they’re there, then you freeze it, and you give Ukraine an emphatic security guarantee, for a start. You then can talk about whether it becomes a member of EU or NATO, but to me, the absolute fundamental is that it has a security guarantee. So, wherever this conflict is frozen, if the US manages to agree that, it protects Ukraine’s ability to act as a country where – and bring its people back, and so on.
James Harding
So, a frozen border with US military guarantees on the Ukrainian side?
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
James Harding
Right. Can I ask you just, you know…
Bronwen Maddox
I’m not saying that’s what I would most love to see, but it – we are in a very realistic hardnosed world at the moment, if not a gloomy one…
James Harding
So…
Bronwen Maddox
…and so, I think, you know, that is probably where this is going.
James Harding
So, can I ask you just about that, if you like, kind of, meeting the world as it is, it’s true that we, sort of – some people laughed, I did when you kicked off by saying, “Look, I didn’t expect to have to, sort of, include…
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
James Harding
…Greenland and Panama in this speech when I first sat down to write it,” but actually, listening to you, I found myself thinking, actually, isn’t that exactly what we need to confront? That there is a realistic possibility that the world is not going to be set in the next ten years by reaffirmation of the UN Charter or the P5. It’s going to be set by the US saying, “Look, we need to have some territorial deal on Panama and Greenland,” Russia saying, “We want some kind of territorial deal on Ukraine,” China saying something similar on the South China Sea and Taiwan. And these great states are going to impose a meaningful expansionism in the early 21st century.
Bronwen Maddox
They may be able to do that, they may choose to do that and be able to do that, but there are quite a lot of forces I think discouraging them from going a long way down that. The US is acting at the moment, or Trump is acting at the moment, as if the US would never need other allies, but it will, almost certainly, for its own security, for pursuit of its own aims, quite possibly for its own economic stability. The great vulnerability of the Trump 2, it seems to me, is on the economic side. American politics has not been generating people who are – or Presidents anyway, who are doing much about the deficit, but it – and inflation, sit there as real potential constraints on what he is doing. He needs other countries’ support in many ways. It just has not perhaps dawned on him yet.
And China would not go to so much effort to put together the BRICS if it didn’t feel it wanted those countries supporting it. I’m really conscious of how much of a battle there still is for this, even – either way, okay, we’re on from a year of elections, by the way, even Russia and other countries have phoney elections, but they have them. They want the – to show that they appear to have the support of that, and I think something is true of the same in international support. Countries do not want to be acting entirely unilaterally, and China has been very assiduous in courting that demonstrations of support.
James Harding
So, can we take, like, a few practical examples? You had this nice phrase about ‘middle powers’, and the ‘new multilateralism’. So, if you’re a middle power, and you’re thinking about how do you effect some, kind of, agreements around tech, or space, or the environment, how you foresee that actually working?
Bronwen Maddox
Most easily, regional, and you can see it happening there. You might not like or approve of what the EU has done on data and tech, but it has moved to have its own rules. Japan, as I was saying, has pushed ahead with the CPTPP. This is a trade partnership, and “coalitions of the willing,” if you like, to resurrect that old phrase, but coalitions of the sympathetic is what I more think of it. And I’m really conscious in gatherings of Middle Eastern countries at the moment, very much the new Middle East. 20 years ago I went to the Doha Forum, it was in Iraq, it was just after the Iraq invasion. It was Americans in lots of military fatigues, talking about their great new base in Qatar. Now it is the new Middle East talking to Africa, talking to Asia, a few Europeans, a few Americans.
James Harding
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
It’s not what – they’re looking at their own deals, and that – their – and their own solutions to their own problems. Not with spectacular success in the awful case of Sudan, where you’ve got countries wading in on both sides, but that is where a more effective solution will come from. So, regionally first, but then, kind of, regionally plus.
James Harding
Hmmm. So, can I ask you just about progressive realism for a moment, not the, sort of, catchphrase, but the ideas underpinning it? There’s been – we were talking about this upstairs, there’s been this, sort of, argument, if you like, articulated between John Bew, on the one hand, and Phillipe Sands on the other, former National Security Adviser and a International Human Rights Lawyer. And the argument being, if you like, John Bew saying, “Look, we have to meet the world where it is, and the world is really governed by muscle, and we have to make the most of the muscle we have and the muscle of our allies.” And Phillipe Sands’ argument, you know, this is also paraphrased, being, “Look, we have to be a nation of cul – of principle and lead by example.”
Bronwen Maddox
This is particularly in the context of the Chagos Islands.
James Harding
Chagos, but…
Bronwen Maddox
But…
James Harding
…the rule of law…
Bronwen Maddox
…beyond that, yeah.
James Harding
…International…
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
James Harding
…Criminal Court…
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
James Harding
…etc., what do you think is Britain’s role? Do you think that this formula, progressive realism, is able to be, in fact, either of those things?
Bronwen Maddox
Foreign policy is always messy, I’m always pretty realistic…
James Harding
It’s pretty – that’s – yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…when you get down to it, and those who try and cast it in a very idealistic mould tend to trip up. And it was an obvious hazard when David Lammy created that phrase. Well, it was an obvious joining together of two things he would like to be and were they going to fit together, and, you know, uncomfortably, in some cases, is the answer. He gave his speech last week at the Foreign Office to try to argue that progressive realism was holding together very well. I think the immediate tension, as I said, is with the trade goals, the hard – the very realistic demands that trade partners have, and even on those, trying to pick – the UK trying to pick its way to its own best advantage, through close relations with the EU. But those will conflict on their own with relations with the US, very likely, and relations with the US will absolutely conflict with relations with China.
I wondered whether Rachel Reeves visit was in the wrong order, that even a month later might have given her more flexibility of how to position the UK between the US and China.
James Harding
Hmmm.
Bronwen Maddox
But it was planned a long time ago, even possibly before the US election. So, that is just dealing with the competing bits of realism, if you like, and then you put the progressive bit on top. And I think it is most useful to this government, in terms of setting – and I’m trying to be generous here, because I think it is a problematic concept, but it is one they really want to get to work. And I think it can inspire what they’re doing, it can inspire the tone in which they approach other countries. And so they can say – I think they’ve handled the Chagos – I think they’re broadly right in what they’ve done over Chagos, but handled it very badly, but they could have said, “Well, this is why we are doing this.
James Harding
Hmmm.
Bronwen Maddox
We respect this advisory opinion, and the weight of opinion that came out in the International Court of Justice, and this is why we’re doing this over the Chagos, so this is the best deal we think we can get. This is why – what we intend relations with the Commonwealth to be,” and so on. I think they could use it more to explain their motivation.
James Harding
Can I ask you one final thing before I just open it up? And it’s – it is, I suppose I can stand back, and not being someone who practises foreign policy, understand how incredibly difficult it is to make progress in the Middle East, or on Ukraine. The one that I find hardest to understand is Sudan and whether or not the –people talk, you know, David Miliband’s talked about the ‘age of impunity’, and often that’s credited to, kind of, just the wilfulness of tyrants. Sudan, it seems to me, is a lack of will on the part of the West and the world, and what that tells you about the proposition that you’re making here, trying to find order in a contested world.
Bronwen Maddox
Oh, here, you’ll allow me to be more pessimistic than my speech, because I – you know, this started – I mean, obviously, it has long, long roots, but it started, essentially, as a contest between two military leaders.
James Harding
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
And from that has burst out beyond Sudan, into this calamity that is affecting the whole region and absolutely migration to Europe and all of this. But you don’t have countries wading in on either side to support one side or the other. And those are not lining up with Western and anti-Western sides, but you have Russia in there, and Iran has been in there for a year, and the UAE has come in – deal with the – after the gold that Sudan used to broker out through Dubai, the gold that the Wagner Group used to be getting. It is such a tableau of self-interest, and countries playing for bits of regional industry and gateway to Africa, that it departs from any of these, kind of, visions of international order.
All the same, I think you do have countries in there that see both the threat to the region, but also see the potential for the Middle East of a closer relationship with Africa. The – that if the Middle East can sort itself out, how much it can help itself and help Africa, help African countries, and Saudi Arabia I think, is one of – I’m not rushing to anoint one country or another as heroes in this, ‘cause there really aren’t any. But in terms of countries working to try to stabilise things, is there, the UK and the US have been trying to do quite a lot, but to essentially no effect, so far.
James Harding
Right, let me see if I can get as many questions and views. I’m going to take some and I’m going to also take some, ‘cause there are people on Zoom, Bronwen, so I’ll come to you. Sir, there’s a gentleman here with a tie on, and forgive me, would you just introduce yourself? Thank you.
Ibrahim Aziz
Thank you very much, Ibrahim Aziz. We heard about Middle East, thank you very much, but my question is, do you think the future of the Middle East without resolving the Kurdish issue, con – Kurdish conflict, will be stable or not? Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
Do you want me to do them one at a time? I’m in your hands.
James Harding
Do – yeah, do one at a time, and then when we run out of time, we’ll do a whole bunch altogether.
Bronwen Maddox
If you leave a conflict like that in the Middle – nothing settles down if there isn’t resolution of these ones, but it can be – I think progress can still be made, without resolution, this singularly difficult question. The fall of the Assad regime has at least opened up a chance to talk more directly about how that is to be resolved. We are extremely aware of that at Chatham House, we’ve been doing a lot on it this week, mainly in private.
Can it – it is a bitter conflict. I’m going to say to you with no dismissiveness, it is though, quite contained, you know, in part of the region. So, could the whole region reach stability without it? Yes, but it would be better to be able to find some way forward through that, but we’re – there are – look, I’m – as I am saying that, I’m aware – and not – including from the emails we’ve got this week in hosting various events, of the bitterness on both sides.
James Harding
Can I – Bronwen, can I just ask one question?
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
James Harding
Carl Wright, who is the Chair of the European Local Partnerships and Twinning Group asked the question, “You did not really say much about UK-EU relations, and would you agree that UK economic growth and business confidence would be greatly strengthened by negotiating much closer economic links?” It goes on, but what do you think is the agenda on that?
Bronwen Maddox
I think the UK’s in a bit of a tangle over it. It wants growth, the potential for growth is sitting right there. Okay, the EU is not growing very fast, but improvement in relations with the EU would improve UK growth. I’m surprised at the things that the UK has got hung up on, particularly the movement of people under 30, which I think costly for the UK, but should be manageable, including politically. So, I’m surprised and I’m worried that the UK is going to lose the chance for closer relations with the EU, just because time is moving on, France and Germany do not have a vision of what their government is going to be, and the time is just moving by. So, I agree with the thrust of it.
James Harding
There’s a gentleman at the back there had his hand up right at the beginning, Sir, thank you.
Bernard Herman
Bernard Herman, a member of Chatham House. Allegedly President Xi of China has asked his military to be ready to attack Taiwan by force by 2027. What does – in the event of this occurring, what would be the fate of the 1979 Taiwan Defence Act in Congress if the Americans do not honour it?
James Harding
Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
The word ‘allegedly’ is doing a bit of work in that sentence, but yeah, we all know that there are resonant anniversary reasons why China might have that kind of date in its mind. I think China will push and push on Taiwan and make Taiwan’s life very difficult, but not do anything emphatic militarily, unless it feels it can get away with it, and I don’t think it could be that confident at this point. There may come a point, but I don’t think we’re there yet.
In terms of the US response, this is one that wherever Congress is, is going to be led by the President’s decision. We’ve just had a President who said, many times, “We will defend Taiwan,” and one who’s now given a bit of room for doubt over that, but it really is unclear, and the lack of clarity is, in itself, a bit of a deterrent. I think, you know, this is one of the huge questions about Trump, not just about what he chooses to do, but what he reflects about whether America wants engagement in foreign wars. On that he’s been consistent, “No new wars in my – on my first term, none in my second,” is what he’s been trying to say. I would be – I – sorry, you were…
James Harding
Well, I was…
Bronwen Maddox
…going to say…
James Harding
…going to ask, if I might…
Bronwen Maddox
Go on.
James Harding
…is a – it is a related question, because Anita Punwani has asked this question, which is, “Can global governance really be effective?” The reason I’m asking is it seems to, kind of, follow on from the question of whether or not the US…
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
James Harding
…will respect its own legal commitments.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
James Harding
Is, “Can global governance really be effective in the context of global politics, focused on protecting short-term national economic and security interests?” And I was thinking about this, Bronwen, also in the context of what we’re seeing in terms of European politics and a nationalism within European politics, that seems more reluctant to gain – to engage in the, kind of, internationalist agenda and world view that you’ve espoused here.
Bronwen Maddox
Is your question about, though, about countries becoming more nationalistic…
James Harding
It means…
Bronwen Maddox
…or about them…
James Harding
It means that – so, whether or not it’s…
Bronwen Maddox
..for – yeah.
James Harding
…whether or not it’s the US, you know, honouring its commitments in terms of Taiwanese independence, or it’s Europe, you know, standing alongside the US in providing military guarantees for Ukrainian territory, what happens in the context of a global politics, particularly a Western politics, that is, you know, becoming more, if you like, nationalist?
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm. That is the vision of the world then retreating from these things, even countries’ own legal commitments that they have made in the past. I’m not sure we’re there, though. I – and I’m really conscious of how some of the reluctance to get involved is being expressed partly as cost, at the moment. Also, voters’ reluctance to lose people, lose Soldiers in foreign wars. But I don’t think we’re at a comprehensive retreat, either in European countries or, in fact, in the US, and I don’t think we’re there in the UK, either. I’ve been really struck over Ukraine, a country on the other side of Europe from the UK, how the UK has been at the forefront, through a whole series of Prime Ministers, in saying, “We’re going to back Ukraine.” For – yes, perhaps for our own sake, but we’re not as directly affected as Poland or those closer to Ukraine, out of principle, and that people in Britain have absolutely supported that and taken many, many Ukrainians into their homes.
James Harding
So, there’s a gentleman there with glasses, then we’ll come to you, sir, with the beard, yeah.
Privida Sadi
Pravida Sadi, Chatham House member. What does the states and institutions do about idealistic, unelected billionaires like Elon Musk and their, sort of, desire to disrupt things?
Bronwen Maddox
This is a superb question, because you throw into this whole picture, never mind 80 years of United Nations and stuff, you throw in a handful of exceedingly wealthy people, whose own interests may not at all resemble whatever you want to call the global good, and they start talking about jailing Keir Starmer or whatever their thought of the week is. It is a problem, I’m not going to say unprecedented, because there have been immensely wealthy people, proportionately, in the world’s history, but it is presenting a peculiar problem for their ability to reach across countries, to determine national policy, even in the case of the US. But their money does come from somewhere, it rests on the companies that they have built, and the question is as much about those companies, even more about those companies and the treatment of those companies, as about those individuals, high colour as they are.
And I think, you know, it is one of the most interesting questions at the moment. William Hague has called it “the battle of our times,” never mind these wars that will come and maybe go, but this battle between the tech companies and governments, plural, is the most difficult. So, I think – and I think it is one of the new ones that world governments really has to think about, and by world governments, I mean countries in groups, sympathetic groups, thinking what do we do about this? Whether it is through competition policy, whether it is through attempts to get at the content, but it is about the companies themselves, as opposed to the Musk, that he’ll have a…
James Harding
Can I ask just one question about that? Is – one of the things that’s been striking in the past couple of weeks is the creeping realisation that the Elon Musk phenomenon that obsesses you in your own country is happening in a bunch of other countries at the same time, and you can’t quite see it. You know, you begin to realise what’s happening in Germany or in France, or Austria, etc. What’s the role of Chatham House in this, because it’s a difficult one in that it’s not government and governments as much as politics, and it’s national politics replicating internationally? And I mean…
Bronwen Maddox
We…
James Harding
…I mean, Musk and Weidel holding a…
Bronwen Maddox
…we do politics, and we do politic – and relations between all kinds of things, not just government to government. The difficult quality, it seems to me, is that it – you are trying to deal with these individuals and try to anticipate what these individuals might do, and try to pin them down, but it’s not just them. I mean, one of the peculiar qualities, it seems to me, of the times we’re in, is that the world’s future is hanging on the decisions of so many individuals…
James Harding
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…of which Trump is one, Putin is another, President Xi is another, Kim Jong Un is another, and they have a peculiar ability at the moment to affect the course of history.
James Harding
That’s extraordinary, isn’t it? There was a gentleman here with a beard, sir, yes, please.
Member
As a retired here Lawyer myself, I would like to ask the question about the international courts’ orders. If the courts’ orders are not implemented, what is the point of having them, and does then – the question arises, United Nation Charter should be reformed?
James Harding
Oh, is this particularly in regard to Netanyahu, or…
Member
Generally.
Bronwen Maddox
Courts, generally.
James Harding
…or Putin – all of them, yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
The cour…
Member
Well, many court orders are…
Bronwen Maddox
So…
Member
…not implemented.
Bronwen Maddox
…it’s a good…
James Harding
I see.
Bronwen Maddox
…really good question and this is what David Miliband has been raising, the ques – the general question of impunity in The Times, but this is an old question. I mean, the International Court of Justice is baked into the foundations of the UN, it is the prime judicial body of that, but only by assent of countries. If they don’t want to be bound by it – and that was always the case, and international law of all kinds is broadly by assent. I think it still has, if you take the ICJ, enormous value, in that countries do bring disputes to it and those disputes are settled. Is there anything that can be done if a country absolutely refuses? Well, under the UN Charter, no. We saw that way back with the US and Nicaragua, and the Court ruled against the US and it went to the Security Council, where the US vetoed it, and so on. But they still have a shaming value and they still have a formal value in being able to be a point of discussion or dispute between countries who agree.
I think the ICC is different, it’s much newer, always more controversial, to pick out individuals on the surface of the planet and say, “We’re going after that person, or that person.” And then with this problematic coda, that, “Well, we won’t” – the ICC won’t go after them if that country – if that – has an ability to prosecute that person, which is where we get into the Netanyahu discussion. But these courts, I think, are – well, they can easily be politicised, but they still have a value as a place that disputes can be brought, and even if they can’t resolve them all, or enforce all of them, that is not nothing.
James Harding
Can I just – one related point, is that Dina Mufti here, asks about the Middle East, and she asks, “In relation to the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports on Israel and the case that those organisations have made that Israel is carrying out ethnic cleansing, or genocide, within Palestinian territories, what can Chatham House tangibly do to help Palestinians,” in her phrase, “to end this catastrophe?”
Bronwen Maddox
I’m not going to joke by saying, come to our many events and discussions on it. It’s not a joking matter, at all. You’ve got a lot packed in there. Ine, there is a legal point about essentially can Israel, at this point, and Hamas, but most of those people are dead now, can Israel be held to account for what – for its actions in Gaza which have led to, I think at the moment, more than 46,000 are dead, and the devastation that we’ve seen? And I think that, you know, supporting examination of some of those points in an international court is absolutely one way forward on that, of Israel’s actions there.
On the wider questions, humanitarian law, in general, is one of the parts of international law that is most contested, and it is not where one should expect the most agreement, or ability to be bound. But there are still lots of points about the way Israel has acted that I think can be treated quite conventionally and examined on that. What can Chatham House do? We can raise those arguments, and those legal arguments, as well, and also, raise potential solutions to it, of which we do think there are some, but the politics at the moment is pretty stuck between the region and the solutions.
James Harding
There’s a question right over here, and I’ll come to you in a second.
Birgit Maass
Thanks very much.
James Harding
Then we’ll come to you, Sir.
Birgit Maass
Birgit Maass, I work for Deutsche Welle, the broadcaster. I want to ask you about the climate crisis. It seems that Scientists are getting increasingly nervous, and what could be coming down the line could be actually, almost apocalyptic. And I was wondering if you think that institutions like yours and other international institutions take this into account enough, or is it because there are so many other crises around the world, are people taking their eye off the ball and allowing it, also, to slide into a matter that’s – yeah, a culture war issue, rather than something that…
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Birgit Maass
…everyone and really, every institution around the world should take into account and work on?
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you for asking that. No, the – our Environment Team is our biggest team, and I think the devastation that that can bring eclipses many of these other things, and is longer lasting and is harder to grapple with the effects of, and the diplomacy needed to get action against it is harder than almost any of these other things. I still am struck – I’m not going to sound remarkably optimistic about climate change. It is moving much faster than I think much of the world had expected, but I still am struck by the seriousness that governments now take it with, compared to about seven years ago. And this is a point Bill Gates made on this stage, where I agree with him very much on that, that they’re coming slowly, but they are coming to the point, agreements are emerging.
Yes, they disappoint pretty well everyone, and the money disappoints pretty well everyone, but I’m still actually astonished, in a good way, that those agreements are coming out, including agreements on finance. Including money coming from richer cou – countries which are richer per head in their GDP than much of the world, but very indebted and right up against their own politics, as I was describing. So, I wouldn’t be complacent for a second about the effects of what is coming, and one hopes that brings more – even more urgency to it, but I think there is more seriousness and a bit more money than there was.
James Harding
There’s a – just up here, and then I’m going to come to you, sir, ‘cause I said I would, and then we’ll finish up. Thank you.
Wen-Wen Lindroth
Thank you, Wen-Wen Lindroth, I work for GIC, the sovereign wealth fund of Singapore. My question is about economics and security. A lot of the policies being adopted on tariffs and immigration resemble those put in place in the 1930s. So, just wondering, in your own analysis and projections, what’s the risk of an outcome that we had after those policies were adopted in the 30s, both in terms of economic and security instability? Could it get worse from here?
Bronwen Maddox
Are you particularly asking about economics, in terms of the consequences of them, or more about the lead up to a world war?
Wen-Wen Lindroth
Both, since they are related.
Bronwen Maddox
Right, there is no question that the things – some – we’re seeing, the nationalism, the retreat from globalisation, is damaging to prosperity, the prosperity that has helped lift many countries out of poverty and has made a lot of problems easier to solve, and that is really, I think, regrettable. It doesn’t feel that it has that apocalyptic quality to it yet. It seems a set of rather anxious governments in the democratic world trying to respond to their voters, worried about migration and so on. Really remarkable, sort of, commonality of problems there.
Some of the reactions, the economic reactions, are damaging. Trump’s tariffs, I think, almost uniquely so, but he may be held back from the damage that he’d do to himself, never mind others. We have to see where it gets to, but I don’t – the tone doesn’t feel to me like the 1930s, in people’s fears of other countries, and the tone of all of this discussion of international order doesn’t feel to me like the brink of real catastrophe. I would locate that in other things and including in climate.
James Harding
Go to the gentleman with the glasses the last question. Thank you so much, sir.
Domenic Carratu
Thank you, Domenic Carratu, member of Chatham House. Thank you for your upbeat comments, but it seems, again, with the discussion, it’s not entirely sure it would go that way, between let’s say, oh, your just – I’ll carve up between Russia, America and China, and a more world order. In which case, you’re a middle power, wouldn’t you actually start getting nuclear weapons? In which case, is there not a risk of a nuclear war in the next ten years, or use of nuclear weapons in the…
Bronwen Maddox
I didn’t…
Domenic Carratu
…next ten years?
Bronwen Maddox
…completely catch the whole of your question.
James Harding
Is there a greater risk of nuclear proliferation because the world is…
Bronwen Maddox
Alright, yeah.
James Harding
…in a dangerous place, and middle powers…
Bronwen Maddox
Yes.
James Harding
…choose to get…
Bronwen Maddox
Yes.
James Harding
…nuclear power?
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, and I think there is a real chance to influence this and try and slow this down, in the next few years, but if that doesn’t happen, there is an enormous risk that you have another half dozen countries or so that have nuclear weapons. There is a debate happening very actively in South Korea at the moment. Japan, recently, with a Prime Minister who came from Hiroshima, who gave passionate stories on, “Can we remind the world about how bad this is?” Beginning to say, “Oh no, are we going to have the same debate?” and obviously very live in the Middle East and indeed, that is part of the discussion where – between the – Saudi Arabia and the US, “Will you protect us enough with a defence umbrella that we never need to look that way?”
So, it is very live. I think this is exactly though the kind of area where proliferation could be discouraged, and we do have a chance to do that. And I think China, as I said, this is again allegedly, using your word from the corner, has been helpful in talking President Putin down from the constant references, as it seemed at one point, to using nuclear weapons and normalising it in that sense. But it is very, very hard to control what individuals with nuclear weapons do, particularly one individual in North Korea.
James Harding
Bronwen, I’ve always thought it must be amazing to work here. You must get to learn a lot and understand things better. 2025, what do you want to try and learn more about and understand better?
Bronwen Maddox
Lots and lots and lots of things, and I’m going to Nigeria in March, and I – really looking forward to that culmination of part of our work on corruption and what incites people not to be corrupt. But I really want us, collectively as a team, and it is a terrific team here, to take this thinking about the order in the world and who gets to set it, or if there is no order, to take that forward. Because it is – I think, you know, many countries have a chance to influence things, we do as well, and I think that is where the discussion is at the moment, and that’s what I would like to do.
James Harding
Well, thank you very much. There is a brisk trade in the moment at shrill pessimism. It is very nice to start the year with some constructive optimism. Ladies and gentlemen, Bronwen Maddox.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you very much.
