G7 summit: Priorities and outcomes

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Hello, and welcome to Chatham House, to our online webinar. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. It’s a delight, it’s an honour, it’s always a pleasure to chair conversations amongst my brilliant colleagues. And never so much as at a moment like this when the world is facing extraordinary challenges, the privilege of talking of talking to people who have a lot to contribute to our understanding, it is really serious.

We’re on the record today and we’re recording, and I say that because when it comes time to asking your questions, you’ll just want to be aware that we are recording, and are likely to show the video. We’re here really to talk about the G7, which has just finished in Germany, as you know. We are also in the midst, of course, of the NATO Summit, and that’s a very significant moment for the world also.

And we were having a bit of a chat before today’s webinar, about how significant the G7 is, and of course, we know that the most, in many ways, the most important and longstanding challenges, certainly on the agenda, there’s a broader question as to, you know, to what extent those are actually dealt with. Let me quickly introduce my panellists and say a few words, before I turn it over to Marianne and then Tim and then Rob.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger is Senior Research Fellow on the US and Americas programme here at Chatham House. She has deep experience and expertise in trade and technology, and the global economy. And I’m sure you’re familiar with her work, and if you’re not, please do read her many publications.

Professor Tim Benton, Tim, in other words, is a Director of the Environment Society Programme, and one of the world’s leading experts on questions of food and food security, or rather perhaps insecurity, as well as the climate environment issues more generally. He’s also just a terrific leader here at Chatham House.

And Rob Yates, who directs our Global Health Programme, has survived and continues to survive the consequences of the pandemic, not only for all of us at Chatham House, but globally, and so has been a tremendous contributor, over many years, even prior to his time at Chatham House.

And I’m Leslie, and I know most of you, so thank you for joining. I guess the thing that I would say before I turn it over to Marianne, to really, sort of, outline what is on the agenda, and where we’ve come, is in some ways, the obvious, that the really big global challenges, whether it’s to do with climate, health, food in particular, and the food insecurity questions that are emanating and have been intensified by the war in Ukraine, and more other longstanding issues in the global economy.

They’re on the agenda of the G7, but of course, the world has been so galvanised and especially the G7 have been so fixated on the short-term and very deep and significant crisis that’s been with us for just over four months now, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have really sort of shifted the attention and, in some ways, made those really important longer-term questions harder to resolve. They were always going to be difficult, but they’re harder perhaps now than they were before, even with COVID. Which I think in the beginning, provided us a moment of thinking that this was a crisis that would really galvanise the world, bring it together, and drive forward positive momentum on the climate front. And it doesn’t feel like that’s where we are today, at all.

The second thing I would add, from the perspective of the US, since I lead our US and Americas work here at Chatham House, is as we all know, it’s hard to imagine a more – a less opportune moment for the United States President to be, you know, leaving the country and trying to lead abroad, it’s both tremendously important, but also if you look back at the United States, whether it’s inflation, and whether it’s the President’s approval ratings, whether it’s the ongoing polarisation and division across the United States, or the devastating decisions that have come out of the Supreme Court, which will drive politics and mobilisation across the United States, in the weeks and months ahead.

I’m referring of course to the reversal of Roe versus Wade. And before that, the shocking and very tragic gun violence and murders that we saw – that we’ve seen across the country, but especially in Texas. So not an easy time to pretend to be leading from the vantage point of values, if the question is about signalling those at home. So, Marianne, let me turn it over to you, to sort of set the stage for you know, what the aspiration was for the G7, and perhaps where it – you know, what’s come out of it.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

Oh, thanks, Leslie. I do think that it’s quite clear what that biggest success was, and it was a clear signal of unity and determination in supporting Ukraine, and I think, just sliding the final communique of, we will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, is quite powerful. That is, obviously, also backed up by budgetary support that the G7 leaders have pledged, totally 29 billion, and humanitarian aid of 2.8 billion. So quite significant and also signalling a long-term commitment to proposing a global reconstruction plan, not the Marshall Plan, but something along those lines. And I think that is really the key achievement of this G7 Summit, to signal this ongoing support for Ukraine, and addressing a range of other issues that are very much related to that.

So the second key focus area is very much around addressing energy security and here, the leaders committed to take action to secure energy security, but also reduce the price surges that we’ve seen and perhaps down the road, one of the most impactful steps could be to do work around price caps. There isn’t much that has actually been achieved on this front, but to kind of signal that G7 leaders want to work on that.

Key question is, can they do it by themselves? Obviously, they need to have the buy-in from the private sector, and also very much non-G7 countries. So work and progress on that front.

Investing in climate has been the third big pillar, but very much I would say side-lined and, kind of, marginalised by those broader discussions around energy security. And the leaders did comes up, in endorsing Germany’s proposal for a climate club, but there isn’t any details to be shared yet, it’s very much, you know, commitment to work towards establishing this club by the end of 2022. But more broadly speaking, there was actually a lot of backsliding on climate, so contradictions on the one hand, energy security on the other hand, done, kind of, yeah, actual no commitment on phasing out fossil fuels, for example, and actually doubling down, to some extent, on investment in gas. Which undermines the long-term commitment to decarbonize.

The fourth big topic, and again, very much related to Russia and Ukraine’s fallout, is food insecurity around the world. Here the leaders launched a Global Alliance on Food Security, and provided 4.5 billion to this end. I’m not quite sure, you know, to what extent that it actually makes a dent in the bucket, because it does not meet targets set out by the UN; falls far short of that. And I would also say there’s other issues that were not tackled.

For example, that critical issue of actually getting grain through the Black Sea, and there is no commitment to actually, you know, move the needle on that front. And last but not least, one kind of outcome of the summit was promoting the partnership for global interest structure and investment. The leaders pledged to mobilise 600 billion over the next five years, to narrow the global investment gap. That is very much more a rebranding and a recycling of an initiative that was launched a year ago, at the G7 Summit in Cornwall, the Build Back Better World initiative. So, it’s yeah, failed to mostly deliver and the question is, will this time be different?

So, overall, I think there were a number of small steps taken to solve multiple and compounding crisis, but really, that key work has just been pushed down the road. And there’s also big, big pieces that we’re missing, I think really what stands out, in terms of big gaps, is there is no effort to really strengthen institutional landscape for global health.

On food security, as I mentioned, not real progress, faced with the worst hunger crisis in a generation, I think the G7 really failed to take any significant action that was needed. On fuel there is any meaningful, or the lack of a meaningful new climate finance commitment, lots of kind of backsliding, as I mentioned. And while there was this focus on the two Fs: fuel and food, a third F, finance, and global debt crisis, was totally ignored.

I think there is really the decision now that is with the G20, to relieve the high indebted countries, anything that is again, whether the G7 did not step up and is leaving the hard work to the G20. I’ll leave it there, thank you.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, Marianne. Let me just add in a couple of sort of footnotes to that, those really terrific comments, before I come to Tim. One is on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which is you know, a rebrand of the Build Back Better World initiative that was announced a year ago, in Cornwall. Of that, I think it’s 600 billion, the US has promised to deliver 200 and the EU 300, but the important thing to note about this is it’s a model that’s intended to mobilise private capital. So, the 220 billion isn’t coming from the US Government, it’s coming from US Government initiatives that put some money out in front, but really are aimed to hit that 200 by bringing in private capital. And that really is, you know, that’s the rub, how does that work, what does that model look like? Is the private – are private investors confident that there’s a reason to invest, is a global climate, the economic climate conducive to mobilising that capital? So, it’s, you know, it’s already a rebrand, it’s got a very specific, kind of, idea behind it, which I think is the right one.

We know that governments’, kind of, capital can’t deliver the amount of capital that’s needed, but can they actually encourage private investors to fill that gap? That’s the big question. That’s something we’re working on here, all of us, on this Zoom at Chatham House, and a big global recovery project, and the first report was out by Cynthia and Theo, who I see on the call, and I would refer you to it.

The second thing I wanted to note, the numbers that you put out at the start were really important, and you know, as you say, you know, sort of, continued commitment to Ukraine. But the numbers that we’re hearing, across the expert community globally, is that Ukraine right now needs between five and $7 billion a month, just to keep it going. So I think, you know, the magnitude of the need, relative to the scale of the commitment, even if it’s delivered on, that gap is already starting as a very, very large one. But with that said, Tim, let me turn it over to you.

Tim Benton

Thank you very much, Leslie, thank you, Marianne. I don’t really have a lot to add. Marianne’s done a fantastic summary. For me, perhaps the most important learning I took away from the G7 Summit was that to be a real leader, you had to stop wearing ties, and that sartorial elegance of the boy’s club really struck me. And so, I’m officially very old-fashioned, ‘cause I’ve got a tie on today.

The G7 Communiqué, fantastic, it’s kind of like an undergraduate essay in a way, it’s got all the important keywords in, millions of them, motherhood and apple pie, but actually, as Marianne said, absolutely misses the point in most of the, kind of, space that it’s trying to judge. It’s got, you know, lovely good wishes, but words are words, and as we’re increasingly finding, particularly in climate change, you know, you can have governments that are pledging this and pledging that, and pledging the other. But unless they deliver, which they tend not to, it all becomes meaningless.

And, you know, I’ll just pick out, ‘cause it’s the kind of specialist area at the moment, the food security issues, as Marianne rightly said, we are in a state of utter global crisis, and we had a fantastic panel on this, at the London Conference last week, which was really quite scary. And to quote David Beasly, “Conditions are now much worse than during the Arab Spring in 2011, and in 2007/2008, when there were food price spikes.”

“At these times, 48 countries were rocked by political unrest, riots and protests. We’ve already seen what’s happening in Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, and Sri Lanka, and that’s just the tip of the iceberg. We have solutions, but we need to act and act fast.” So, as the Director of the FAO’s World Food Programme, the Communiqué says, “We will spare no effort to increase global food and nutrition security, and to protect the most vulnerable, whom the food crisis threatens to hit hardest.”

And then, what do they do? GAFS, the Global Alliance on Food Security, as Marianne said, 4.5 billion broadly pledged, at the time, where the World Food Programme is asking for 22 billion, to fulfil its humanitarian needs. So, the G20 controls 30% of the global economy, something like that, that’s in the G – sorry, the G7, 20 – 30% of the global economy, pledging 20% of what the World Food Programme needs to overt famine. Despite saying, “We will spare no effort,” so I think you know, my take on this is that there’s a lot more that could be done.

You know, clearly there’s a lot of behind the scenes negotiating and working groups, and all sorts of other things, tackling the food crisis, and trying to un-blockade Odessa. At the same time, where Russia is stealing grains and shipping them illegally, in boats with the transponders off, gaining political leverage, making money as much – not as much as from selling fossil fuel to Europe. But there is an awful lot going on, which is negative, and this is a real time and a real need for global leadership, and what we have is warm words and very little action. And I think I’ll leave it there, Leslie.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Great, Tim, thank you. Yes, 31 – the G7 are around 31% of GDP. I mean, the interesting thing to know, and I will draw the NATO reference, and maybe we’ll come to it more in the discussion, but if you look at the sheer relative power of NATO, and measured by the total amount of military spend, compared to the rest, and you compare that to the sheer economic weight of the G7, there’s no doubt that NATO is, you know, in relative terms, more important in its domain than the G7 is in its.

So perhaps, you know, again, it’s sort of a reminder to ourselves of the real meetings of the week, the real consequence, the real significance, as perhaps, and maybe this is just my perspective, but what’s coming out of the NATO Summit. Having said that, the G7 you know, looks to be very ambitious and there’s a legacy here, and there’s also a question of values, right? The G7 aren’t just getting together because of the size of their economies, they’re getting together, because they share, you know, in principle, and it doesn’t always look like that, when you look back, in my case, at the United States, like they share a principle commitment to a certain way of living a certain set of values and a certain way of driving forward economic recovery. But Rob, over to you.

Robert Yates

Thanks very much, Leslie. Well, I’d love to be able to buck the trend and say things have been fantastic, vis-à-vis health and the G7, but that wouldn’t be strictly honest. And I think ,you know, really when you look at what’s been discussed at the G7 this year, with respect to health, I think it really is a good opportunity to sort of look back at, you know, the G7’s performance, through the pandemic. Which has been a big existential threat, where you really would have hoped that the G7 would have stepped up and acted very effectively. But of course, you know, when you think of the first year of the G7, in the pandemic, it was when President Trump was at the helm, and he tried to defund the World Health Organization, so things didn’t start particularly well then. But I think it was really last year where there were really big hopes and expectations that the G7 would get its act together.

There were very clear asks put to the G7, in terms of sharing vaccines, funding ACT aid properly, and ensuring that technology transfers and that would enable countries to make their own vaccines. And this was from the international – sorry, the Independent Review Panel, that had been put together to really advise on what the world should do to tackle the pandemic. But also, you had the major UN agencies all lined up behind this agenda. Unfortunately, though, the G7 has performed spectacularly badly, and basically did nothing on those agendas.

There were, sort of – there were pledges made to provide 870 million doses of vaccines, but a year on now, we can assess how that’s gone, and it hasn’t gone at all well. You know, the UK, for example, has only met 39% of its commitment, and, you know, there has been this woeful lack of vaccinations provided in developing countries. ACT Aid’s about $11 billion short at the moment, and when it’s come to the technology transfers, it has been G7 countries that have been, sort of, blocking attempts to accelerate the transfer of technologies through TRIPS waivers, with the UK in particular, and Switzerland, admittedly, not a G7 country, I think the main obstacles. So, it hasn’t been good at all, and so therefore, when you look at the G7 Communiqué this year, where we understand that, you know, health has barely been discussed at all. But in the very first sentence it starts “We reaffirm our commitment to enabling global access to vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics, and medical goods,” given that track record, you can automatically – you know, who gives that any credibility?

And I think that in the world of global health, better, increasingly developing countries, people just – therefore just dismiss, you know, sort of, what the G7’s saying it’s going to do. And we are hearing that the many developing countries are really, really angry that the G7 has neglected the rest of the world, through this pandemic. And, you know, this has, I think, got big implications, that, you know, for the G7 going forward, because countries are then saying, “Well, why should we collaborate and co-operate when it comes to other issues, around climate change? You’ve let us down in this last crisis. We agree there’s another big crisis coming up, but why should we take you seriously?” But even when it comes to the war in Ukraine, and countries, sort of, saying quite explicitly, why should we support your war in Ukraine, when you haven’t supported us at this time of greatest need?

And I think very significant that South Africa and India, who were leading the call for a TRIPS waiver, haven’t been supportive, in the United Nations to date, of condemnation of Russia. So, it hasn’t been good, and it’s difficult to see, you know, this next year, how that’s going to improve. There may be some expectations though, that next year, Japan, which is very strong on health, and particularly on universal health coverage, I think will step up and things might improve. But it really has been a pretty dismal three years, unfortunately, with respect to the G7 and health.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, Rob. The sun is shining, so that’s some good news, but let’s not worry about that. Tim, I want to come to you on the food security question, you know, we can’t wait three years, we can’t wait for Japan, and this is for many individuals around the world, and remember there’s still Afghanistan and a major food insecurity crisis there. What is the solution? And please don’t limit yourself to the G7, yet does the G7 have a role to play, but what should be the concrete, immediate steps taken to try and, you know, if one of the goals is actually to bring a broader base of countries onside for support for the war in Ukraine, for example, what are the short-term measures that, in your view, should be taken to address the problem of food prices, food insecurity, round some tremendous conversations on this at our London conference just last week, which I hope all of you will watch the recordings of. But Tim, what is your response to that?

Tim Benton

So, there’s probably just about enough grain in the world to feed everybody in the way that they’re used to being fed. The trouble is that there isn’t an excess over demand, and the grain that’s been produced is in different places, than traditionally. But it’s primarily, at this moment, one of price and distribution, in the sense that because the way commodity markets work, like energy markets work, everything is very expensive. So, for the majority of the world, everyone can access food, if they’ve got money. If they haven’t got money, there’s a problem. So part of the issue, I think, is how do we ensure that grain comes out of the Ukraine? And that’s a big diplomatic thing about freeing the ports of Odessa, because they’re being blockaded, as a kind of weapon of war, by Russia. Part of it, I think, is also about ensuring that there is the transport logistics and the insurance for boats that can take grain from other places, where there might be more storage.

Part of is also, for example, changing the existing demand for food. So, a significant amount of global grain goes into biofuels, which typically end up in cars, in the US and in Europe. If we stop using grain for biofuels, that would allow more grain to go on the market, so removing biofuels mandates. China has traditionally elevated food security as very much a national security concern. It has got silos that are stock full of grain, much more grain in silos in China than there is not coming out of Ukraine. So there could be a diplomatic effort with China, to release more grain. But of course, that has politics associated with it. And then the other thing, as I’ve said in various meetings recently, a very small change in the way that we use grain in the rich world, where the bulk of grain goes into animal feed, a very small change in the way we consume animals, would free up lots more grain that could be, in theory, available on global markets.

So, you know, shifting, eating less, 15% less chicken and pork in Europe, would free up the same amount of grain that’s not come out of the Ukraine, or is not coming out of the Ukraine. So, there are lots of things that can be done, but all of them require political leadership, and all of them require money. And, you know, as I flagged in my opening remarks, the fact that the World Food Programme is asking for 22 billion of money, and the rich world can’t even find more than 20% of that at the moment, means that suffering is going to increase in the really challenged parts of the world, from a humanitarian perspective. So there are lots of things, you know, we could give money to WFP, you know, but the measures that have been put in place so far, have largely been marginal, rather than instrumental.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Tim, let me come back to you before I come to Rob and Marianne, and then to those of you in the audience, and please do have your questions ready. I’m going to come back to you on the China question. And, you know, you’ve given us some possible solutions, you’ve given us a great context, you’ve sort of ducked the political question, and I want to push you a little bit on it.

You know, we’ve seen NATO, it looks like, in the strategic concept, China will be named a systemic challenge, NATO – China comes up in the G7. Maybe Marianne could tell us a little bit more about how – what the framing was of, you know, the so-called China challenge, from the G7. You know, a) from your perspective, and b) in terms of what you’re seeing take – what conversations you’re seeing take place, perhaps across expert communities in China, in the United Kingdom, across the rest of the G7 as well. Is there more going on to try and, you know, unlock access, or to get China to participate in this broader question of food insecurity, by getting access to grain? Are there any – is there any movement in this direction, in your view, you know, what kind of, if you don’t mind me asking, what kind of deals do you think should be cut, to make China part of the solution rather than part of the problem? And are people pressing on that, is that a real, live conversation in certain communities, you know, below the radar, of what the rest of us are seeing?

Tim Benton

Well, to answer the second question first, no, I don’t think it is a real-life conversation, but if you think of the challenges that we collectively face, they include climate change, and China is quite an active player in the climate change sphere. And has got more ambitious plans to decarbonise, than almost anywhere else in the world. So, I don’t think it’s impossible to imagine a situation where instead of China being ostracised, it wins political brownie points, by co-operating with the rest of the world, to solve some of the global issues. Now, whether or not that would be acceptable to the West, and the degree to which that would be seen to be a positive solution, as opposed to unacceptable. And I think the starting point is that China is a problem, in all spheres, but yet we do have to co-operate with China, over climate change and the biodiversity loss and a whole range of other things. So, just as in the old cold war, as opposed to the new cold war, you know, we were still co-operating on nuclear disarmament talks, even though everyone was at loggerheads with the East. You know, there is, I think, political space for this to be higher up the agenda than it currently is. But yeah, politically, it’s hugely difficult to imagine.

Leslie Vinjamuri

So, Marianne, what is your kind of take on how China featured in the G7 conversations, as a sort of, is it a background condition, is there explicit language, what is the, sort of, the backdrop that China poses?

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

There’s quite explicit language, and quite a lot of emphasis actually, after 28 pages in a Communiqué, about one page is dedicated to China, which I thought was really interesting, because I thought it was going to take more of a backdrop, but it did not. And building on what Tim’s just said, you know, it starts by focusing on the co-operation with China on shared global challenges, but it’s climate change or biodiversity loss that then quickly gets into the nitty-gritty details, the differences and the concerns around the challenges that China presents. Ranging from, you know, calling on China for the peaceful settlement of disputes, to very much focusing on concrete issues with Hong Kong, South China Sea, you know, Uighurs and domestic labour issues, and human rights concerns, to then, you know, draw the conclusion that China is also very much in a position to press Russia to stop its military aggression and essentially, G7 leaders call on China that they need to take a more active role in yeah, getting Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw troops from Ukraine.

So again, I would say that it’s quite astonishing, that China plays such a prominent role, and that, you know, looking across the diversity of the G7 countries, actually, China is called out specifically. Because in the past, and some practices, particularly in the economic space, Germany, for example, has been quite reluctant to single out China in name, and was more inclined to call out the practices of let’s say, non-market economy practices. So I think this is very much an important step.

It’s also clearly, as you mentioned, linked to the upcoming, or the NATO Summit that is taking place whereas, as you say, you know, China is called out as a systemic challenge for the first time. And again, for the first time, for the NATO Summit, there are other leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, that will be joining. So again, that is against that larger backdrop of China.

Leslie Vinjamuri

I mean, I guess the other thing to note there of course, is that China has already responded to the US moves in the Indo-Pacific, by saying that it looks to them like the United States is trying to form a version of NATO. In the Indo-Pacific, the sort of moves, as you’ve outlined them, at the G7, in NATO, don’t seem like the kind of moves that are going to do anything to bring China onside, if that’s what, you know, Tim might have suggested that is important. I’m very curious if anybody has anything to say about India, the other question – the other country that we’ve been talking about a lot, not least because they didn’t come onboard the UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion or onboard the sanctions, of course. But they’re clearly very important to broader strategic alignments.

But Rob, let me come to you, and I guess in the health side, ask the same sort of question that I asked Tim, which is there’s a lot going on, there are a lot of, you know, shortfalls. But if there was one thing that you think that, you know, the G7 could and should really get behind in the short-term, only one thing, you know, what would it be? And maybe, you know, is the G7 not really the right place, but, you know, what is the one very concrete, very short-term thing that should be delivered, in your view?

Robert Yates

Well, I think that the one good multilateral mechanism that really did some out of the pandemic, you know, was ACT-A and COVAX, it was a good idea, and, you know, exactly what was needed. The problem was, it was, sort of, undermined by countries, and, you know, but basically buying up all the vaccines, and funding it late, and therefore, there were no vaccines left when COVAX started purchasing. So I think to really, you know, demonstrate true commitment to ACT-A and its replacement to fund it properly, and sort of give it sort of greater powers, would be something very important. Because of course, you know, we can’t rule out there being, sort of, new variants coming along, that are going to require, you know, revaccinating pretty quickly, and, you know, it’s just going to be essential that we don’t fall into this mess again, of the vaccine rollout being so inequitable. So, I think, you know, that has, sort of, been, you know, the biggest problem, which I think could be addressed relatively easily, with sort of decent commitments of funding.

But I think, you know, there are major concerns that, you know, that if the G7 didn’t come up with that type of money, during the pandemic, you know, the fact that, you know, there is a perception that, you know, the pandemic is waning, particularly in G7 countries, what is the likelihood of that happening in the near future? And I think a lot of people in the global health world, I think are sort of recognising really, that multilateral health financing is under massive threat. One thinks of other mechanisms, like the global fund trying to organise a big replenishment at the moment. So – and I think, you know, the likelihood of the G7 doing that, is fairly remote, unfortunately, but that’s what they should do.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Good, and very helpful. We have a tremendous audience. I can see your names. I see really great people, like Laurie, Theo, Cynthia, Mary, Trish, Euan and others. So I’d love to get your questions, and others as well. So please, if you put – if you raise your hand, let me come – actually, we’ve got a few questions in the chat here.

Let me come to Georgia Sherry, and I’ll read this one on your behalf, but if others are prepared to ask their question, I’d really love to get your voices, as well as your questions. So, let me start with this. “It’s a really interesting discussion. From the panellists’ comments so far, it seems that the G7 has underwhelmed in many respects, what commitments can we expect to realistically make any impact?” So I’m going to hold that, and actually – and also come to, I assume Sam has a question to ask, since he’s been put on my screen. Sam, can you unmute? Maybe I’m wrong about that one. Okay, good, questions from others. Oh sorry, not you. Sorry, okay. Trish, Mary, Theo and Cynthia, a question from one of you would be tremendous, given that I know you have plenty to contribute to the conversation. And while we’re waiting for one of my colleagues, Georgia, if anybody wants to come and try and answer Georgia’s question, that would be great.

“What commitments can we expect to realistically make any impact?” And those that have already been put out there, which of these do you have the most hope that will actually be realised and have some impact? Tim, do you want to try that question?

Tim Benton

Yeah, I mean, I think there is impact in the sense that the narrative alone creates some space for other countries to engage in the agenda. So that’s kind of intangible, in a sense, but nonetheless, it’s important, you know.

I think the model for the G7 really is to create momentum for the G19 or the G20 or the G77, to kind of drive things ahead. So, we shouldn’t understate the potential for just reaffirming commitments to things like climate change, at a time where energy transitions are really high up the agenda, and energy security matters. And then, almost all of the things that it promises to do will have some degree of impact. It’s just the scale of the impact is not matching the scale of the challenge in any of the dimensions, as far as I can see. You know, I come back to this issue again, if the World Food Programme needs 20 odd billion for humanitarian efforts, and the richest economies can’t give more than 20% of that, then there is something deeply wrong in their model of leadership, if we want to have global co-operative multilateral governance, that works. Because it’s just we’re not doing our fair share, given what we could do, ever.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, and Marianne, you have a two finger and then we’ll come to Trish and then to Euan.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

Just to add to the question, perhaps not necessarily saying it’s a realistic option, but potentially something that could move the needle, is that discussion of the price caps on either oil or gas. The US is pushing, a cap on oil prices and the Italians are more, you know, planning a cap on gas prices.

This is all motivated by concerns that Russia is actually benefiting from high energy prices, despite the restrictions that G7 members have imposed on Russian energy imports. And so the idea that’s currently being discussed and the language in the Communiqué is quite ambiguous, it’s around exploring the feasibility that is again, you know, more around temporary measures.

The idea is that you prohibit services that actually facilitate the transportation of Russian seaborne oil, unless the price is at or below a cap. And you would enforce that by limiting insurance, for example, by limiting financing for importers, unless they adhere to the pricing. And I think that could be a small step, a very concrete, but specific step, to address the dual concerns around making sure the sanctions work, but not necessarily at the expense of hurting our own economies.

At the same time, that is very, very ambitious, and it’s very, very complex, because, you know, it would have to be very much supported by industry and by a range of non-G7 countries. So, I’m not saying that this is going to realistically happen, but there is a real push at momentum to actually implement this, and then enforce it.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Rob, you have a two finger, I think.

Robert Yates

Yeah, just a very quick one, which is a commitment that’s in the Communiqué, that really could make a huge difference, were it sort of done quickly, and much quicker than is anticipated. And that’s to fund the World Health Organization properly. I mean, you know, my goodness, do we need the World Health Organization? And, you know, the fact that, you know, its budget is barely that of a large US hospital, is patently ridiculous, and the commitment at the moment is that assessed contributions will increase, so that, you know, 50% of WHO’s budget will come from a, sort of, formula of assessed contributions. But that’s by 2028/29, I mean, come on, you know, I mean, surely that can be done next year. So that would be one that I think would make a big difference.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, Rob. We’re going to come to Trish.

Trisha de Borchgrave

Sorry, can you hear me?

Robert Yates

Yeah.

Trisha de Borchgrave

I really, really don’t know enough about the role of all those countries that are united through the CPTPP, and I’m just wondering, because as you said, Japan’s going to host it next year, it’s that part of the world where there is a real comprehensive trade agreement between these countries, that are not just G7, they’re very much outside G7. Does anyone know what is going on, in terms of, you know, is it looking different, in terms of the – you know, if you compare it to the G7, sort of, lacklustre approach that we’ve seen on, as you say, global health and food security and fuel, etc.? Do you know enough of what that CPTPP has, what role it plays, in terms of galvanising funding and galvanising, you know, approaches to these massive challenges? I don’t know enough, I’m just asking. Thanks.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

I’m happy to take that on, and I think Leslie is experiencing some difficulties, so let me just take that question on straightaway. And I think, in terms of the CPTPP, there really is no role, in terms of, you know, galvanising support or funding. China has, in fact, expressed interest in joining the CPTPP as well. But I think you’re absolutely right to point at the role that Japan plays, not only in the CPTPP, but other initiatives, in the trade space. And not just in the sense of traditional free trade agreements that are really about lowering curves. The future really is around supply chain resilience, and regulatory co-operation, particularly in the digital space. And on those two areas, I think, Japan could make a real difference.

Japan is also part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a new initiative that the US just launched a couple of weeks ago. And there again, that emphasis on supply chain resilience is something that, you know, is not just in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supply chain fragmentation, but very much comes also out of the pandemic and long-term structural challenges, such as strategic competition with China.

And I think here, if there is co-operation, for example, on an early warning mechanism, that could have a real potential, not just in relation to food security, for example, but also with regards to semi-conductors, for example. So I do think that there is a lot more scope on bringing these different initiatives together, and with the US, a key player in the path of this Indo-Pacific economic framework, in other mechanisms, such as the US new trade and technology counts. Like the G7 is the obvious place to actually bring those initiatives together.

Unfortunately, this is not what we’ve seen at the leaders’ summit just now, but there is again, potential for Japan to hopefully connect the dots next year.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Does anybody else wish to add to that? And we’ve got – we do – okay good, let me come to Sam, I’ll read your question, and Duff, we’ll take those two together, and then we’ll come to Mary, unless somebody else has a question they’d like to speak. Sam asks, “after Sri Lanka and with Pakistan, Nepal and others on the brink, is a sovereign debt crisis imminent, and will this signal any end to the Chinese backed financing, particularly from Belt and Road?”

And Duff says, “While the G7 demonstrated an inclination for big words over bold action, are there any takeaways from the latest meeting, that would convince the rest of the world that the G7 is relevant and consequential?” I guess I would add to that, it’s not only convincing the rest of the world, I think one of the leading G7 members, the United States, it might be important to convince Americans that the G7 is – I mean, you know, sad, but true, that the G7 is relevant and consequential. Any answers to that? Rob, I’ll turn over to you first.

Robert Yates

Yes, well, on the issue is the G7 still sort of consequential and useful? And actually started the session, it was meant to be just for our group, but put in a little piece that Jeff Sachs, the Development Economist report last year, is basically saying “We don’t need the G7 anymore.” So there’s a bit of a, sort of, polemic, we’re basically saying that you know, the G7 is useless. And I must say that, certainly from the health perspective, you know, which I’m sort of looking at, one struggles to disagree with that, you know. And again, you know, there’s been very little sign this year of any change on that score. So yes, I think, and unfortunately, you know, the terrible track record continues. But that isn’t inevitable, and I think to some extent, we had to recognise that the G7 is made up of leaders, and, you know, that maybe it’s this cohort of leaders that’s the problem. And that, you know, where there have been previous crises, when one looks back on, say, the financial crash of 2008/09, where I think a number of G7 leaders really did step up and really, you know, were extremely consequential.

You know, it shows it can be done, and so, you know, maybe, you know, it’s just, you know, the luck of the draw really, that unfortunate these crises that are besetting the world at the moment, we do seem to have major leaders in the G7 who just aren’t really demonstrating political leadership.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Marianne, two finger.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

I think we’ve already, kind of, started to get into this question of how useful the organisation, or not the organisation, the platform is for the G7, kind of, giving its share of GDP, being around a third, 10% of the population. But I think there is an understanding that the G7 can solve the problems on its own, and hence, you know, they have over the past couple of years, invited others as guests: Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa took part this year. And several of the working sessions during the summit, and I think there is again, this inclination to say the actual work happens at a G20 or now more or less G19. But I think it’s also quite interesting to see, or at least in my view, that there is a bit of a transatlantic tension going on right now. The US, I think, is very much doubling down on the G7, despite having said it’s not a premier vehicle for multilateral engagement. And EU leaders seem to me at least, not really wanting to rule out that they sit at the G20 table, with Russian President Vladimir Putin present, when they meet in Indonesia in November. So there is, I think, a dilemma going on, between cementing bonds, you know, with the emerging economies and a broader G20 group. But at the same time, wanting to isolate Russia international.

In terms of, you know, the G7 also as a link form of democracy, I think it’s quite important to highlight that Germany really has taken this quite seriously. They’ve engaged and exchanged with civil society, throughout the Presidency, which goes until the end of the year. But as part of this engagement process, there’s been various engagements with business communities, civil society, labour, think tanks, women and views, and I think that is still quite significant to, you know, not just look at, kind of, democratic principles internationally, but also, you know, democratic engagement domestically.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, Marianne, that was extremely interesting. Mary Dejevsky has asked a similar question, but I’m going to read it again, ‘cause I think you know, it is clearly something that’s on people’s mind, because many of you are asking the question. And Mary has framed it in a classically hard-hitting way, maybe the G7 was sandwiched between two different summits, it was – it looked very male, very privileged, very secluded in a German castle, it looked like a swansong for the bygone age. Once seven richest countries seemed to have claimed a global leadership just because of their wealth, that seems over. And I might add, you know, what we all know, that it comes in the US context, right on the heels of the reversal of Roe versus Wade, which I can tell you, in my lifetime, I never, as a young person, would have imagined. This was drilled in stone, that was what we were taught to believe.

So Biden travelled to the G7, not only as an older White man, but as a White man leading a country where people were massed on the streets, mobilised, protesting, galvanised, where the political upheaval is nothing short of intense. And where many of you may have watched one of the most dramatic hearings of the January 6th Committee took place yesterday. So, the disconnect between the international side of US formulations and what’s happening at home, couldn’t be more intense. But Tim, maybe you have something to say, to Mary’s rather significant question.

Tim Benton

Yeah, well, I mean, I must admit, I have some sympathy with it, in terms of my opening comments about the sartorial essence to be learned from the boys’ club. We had a workshop yesterday on, kind of, change in geopolitics post-Ukraine invasion, the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia. And part of that was a discussion about the failure of multilateral institutions. And I think one of the things that we concluded was that it’s not the institutions that are necessarily failing, it’s the politics that governs those institutions and the domestic politics that selects the leaders and prescribes the leaders from being leaders on an international sphere, you know, largely the polarisation of politics and the populism that’s, kind of, inherent.

So, the G7 could be a much stronger and has been in the past, as G8, multilateral institution, it’s just governments are much more constrained perhaps, than they have been in the past, in being able to do something for the global good, at a time where everybody’s looking inwards, and saying, “Let’s be transactional, let’s only do things that are for our profit,” rather than for the global common good. So, I think there is an element that yes, this is the old-world order, yes, it’s too White, it’s too male, it’s too elite. But it’s also a failure of our domestic politics, to give leaders the latitude to make better decisions rather than insist that they’ll be unelectable if they have ABA budget that’s greater than 0.5% or whatever the domestic politics might be in other places. Over.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Rob, do you have anything to add to that, perhaps?

Robert Yates

Yes, I mean, I think, sort of, one point I was hoping to make, you know, sort of, about this, sort of, disconnect between what’s happening domestically and multilaterally, and, you know, this is perhaps a positive point really, to look forward, and we’ve been a bit, sort of, negative today, I don’t I think, sort of, quite realistic. Is that, I think you know, sort of, while there has been this realisation amongst so many countries, that sort of multilateral solidarity on a number of fronts, be it health reforms or food security, you know, is very disappointing. That this might actually create the opportunity for, sort of, countries to do more radical things domestically. You know, the penny’s dropping, that, you know, that in times of great crisis, the West, well, the G7 isn’t going to sort of ride to the rescue. And in particular, you know, we’re looking at the potential for this – these crises to catalyse a new generation of universal health reforms.

That if you look through history, it actually has been at times of great crises, be those, you know, economic collapse and, you know, that Theo, I think, was asking about sort of debt crises, but also, conflict and, you know, even public health emergencies, have actually created the types of conditions that progressive political leaders have wanted to do really dramatic things. And so, for example, have introduced big bold universal health reforms. I mean, that’s the story of the UK and Japan of course, after the Second World War. So, this is something that we’re tracking, and I think that you have leaders like President Kagame in Rwanda actually saying this now, very publicly, when he was President of the African Union last year, you know, that basically you can’t depend on the West, we are going to have to do this ourselves now. So maybe that in a number of sectors, you know, the focus is going to switch much more towards domestic reforms, domestic financing, and this could be potentially, you know, beneficial in the long run.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you. I’m going to just quickly mention two other questions and then give each of you a closing comment, and you can choose whether to refer, but right at the end, and we need a little bit of optimism in here, but I’m not going to ask you to not be true to your own intelligence and instincts.

Euan Grant says “Can the G7 work collectively with UN bodies, to cut bureaucracy and maximise delivery of grain, vaccines and other things?” Maybe you could say a word on the extent to which that co-ordination is working, Tim? And Theo writes “If long-term infrastructure is key,” but it’s Theo Beal, our Academy Fellow, “if that’s not working, what are the short and medium-term tools that can be leveraged to address the needs of developing countries?”

So with those two questions in mind, in light of the conclusion of the G7, the ongoing need for a global recovery that is at least encouraged, if not lead by some of these countries, the NATO Summit and the way forward, a final remark. Let me start with you, Marianne, and then come to Rob and then to Tim.

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

Right, I think it’s excellent questions and I think that, you know, issue of the partnership for the global infrastructure and investment development is going to be one that stays with us, not just, you know, as part of the summit conclusions, but looking beyond, think the key issue really is, as you’ve mentioned, how to engage the private sector. But I think it’s also very much how to leverage partnerships with multilateral development banks, with development finance institutions, to not only better align efforts, but to also consolidate a pipeline of projects. And I think here, what we really have to see, by the end of the year, concrete proposals for developing an investment platform. And I think the focus should rightly be on sustainable infrastructure.

Let me also say that on the Climate Club issue, this is something that the G7, under Germany’s Presidency, really needs to drive forward, because it is one of those, you know, long-term issues and, you know, the G7 Presidency of Germany continues until the end of the year. So, it’s not just over with the summit, but a lot of work remains to be seen in that space particularly, because we have G7 countries, such as the US, that doesn’t have a domestic price on carbon.

The EU meanwhile has moved forward with its own proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and I do actually think that that is more of a hurdle for this G7 proposal of a Climate Club.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you, Rob.

Robert Yates

Yeah, just going to say that, you know, of course it’s undoubtedly the case that there are these huge investment needs and infrastructure’s going to be extremely important. But of course, one of the big problems is that, you know, these investments take a long time to start and bring benefits, and, you know, the world is in great crises at the moment. So, I think, you know, that it’s going to be very important for progressive political leaders, who will want to keep their countries together, and really want to stay in power to be able to do those big investments, to deliver some quick political wins to their populations. And, you know, this is where I think smart Politicians are going to be looking for things like rapid universal health reforms, and education reforms, and access to social services, and there is a great track record of this happening, you know, that if you look, say, in Latin America now, you know, there’s definitely a sort of a move to the left there. You know, with new democratic governments coming in and really looking to meet the basic needs of their populations. So, I think smart Politicians are going to be looking for the quick wins in the social sectors and access to food and things like that, whilst also getting the resources for the long-term infrastructure.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you. Tim.

Tim Benton

Well, I was thinking of what I could end with, that was slightly upbeat, but I can’t think of anything. So my apologies, everybody. I mean, we’re clearly in a world where the crises are coming at us thick and fast. There is a widespread acknowledgement, including in the Communiqué, that we face many challenges ahead. And part of that challenge is a challenge of leadership, and part of that challenge is a challenge of multilateral co-operation in a world that’s competitive and, you know, transactional and so on. And all I can really say is, I hope we, kind of, come to our senses and we get our political systems right, get our politics right, allow leaders, particularly younger female leaders to take up the reins of power, and fix this world, before it’s too late for all of the youth in the world today. Sorry, over.

Leslie Vinjamuri

That was good, it was inspirational. I mean, I guess perhaps one of the notes to conclude on is that even though at this, sort of, level of high politics, geopolitics, things are challenging, to say the best. At the level of expert communities, working transnationally, at the level of think tanks, research universities, not only across the G7 countries, but across many countries far beyond the G7, and that includes China, the level of knowledge, expertise, ambition and drive, and actually private capital, going into finance research, is important, significant, and certainly, gives me room for optimism. And in the country from which I carry a passport, the attention to science at the highest levels of government, is nothing short of phenomenally higher than it was two years ago at this time. So I think that that is a real bonus, and let’s keep it that way, ‘cause it could get very dark if we don’t.

Thank you for joining us. We were on the record. Please return and if you don’t, have a great summer, but we’re a long time away from that. Thank you so much.

Tim Benton

Thanks all, bye.

Leslie Vinjamuri

Bye.