Dr Neil Quilliam
Good evening, I’m Neil Quilliam. I’m a Senior Research Fellow here at the Middle East, North Africa Programme at Chatham House and I’m delighted to invite you to today’s events, and I’m particularly happy and excited that it’s on Jordan. We very rarely have the opportunity to really talk about Jordan, so it’s a great opportunity and also, very fortuitous that we have our colleague, Curtis Ryan in town. Who’s here, speaking at a conference, and has just, as you’ll know, published his book, Jordan and the Arab Uprisings, which is on sale over there, and it’s a fabulous read. I should say and we’ll be, sort of, dipping into that and I’m delighted, as well, to be joined by our new friend to Chatham House, Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali. We’re going to sort of – I’m going to ask my colleagues to, sort of, take to the podium very shortly and speak for 12 minutes each.
The meeting will be on the record, throughout. If you could either turn down, turn off or put your phones to silent, that will be much appreciated. Given that we’re on the record, if you feel like tweeting, please do use CH – #CHEvents and do so. Before we sort of kick-off, I’ll just say a few words about Curtis. It’s always really nice to see him here in London. We met up in Oman a few years ago, which was great, and you took part in one of our workshops, so we always like to catch-up. He joined the Department of Government in Justice Studies at Appalachian State University in 2002. He received his BA in History and Political Science from Drew University and his MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I didn’t know this about you before, but you served as a Fulbright Scholar at the Centre for Strategic Studies in Jordan, so that’s a great thing, and you were named Peace Scholar by the United States Institute of Peace, on two separate occasions. So, delighted that you can be with us, Curtis. We look forward to hearing from you and Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali, it’s great that you’re with us on the stage. I should say that Noor is here in her own capacity this evening and will be speaking as part of, sort of, Jordanian youth and bringing her own perspective and views on things. She is, as you would’ve noticed from her title, a Hashemite. She’s a career Diplomat, currently serving as First Secretary Digital Diplomat at the Embassy and is, in fact, it’s the first posting of its kind in the Arab world.
Before coming to London, Noor established and headed the Digital Presence Unit at the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has previously worked in the Private Office of the Foreign Minister. Since 2010 and throughout her career, she has kept a very strong media presence and if any of you follow her, you’ll know that she’s exceptionally active and really, sort of, at the forefront of that and openly voices her personal opinions, particularly on Twitter and other social media platforms. Anyway, that’s enough of me sort of wittering on.
Curtis, not to be too conspiratorial, and I followed the tweets and the Twitter conversations with you and your publication of your book, the most recent events seemed to coincide fortuitously or un-fortuitously as it may be, and I think you’re going to talk to the main points contained in your book, but reading the final chapter, as people like me do, we read the introduction and we try and skip through the book to get to the end. You sort of talk about protests and the likelihood of protests, sort of, returning. Primarily, driven by, sort of, austerity measures or economic factors and certainly, that seems to have, sort of, coincided with the publication of your book and what we’ve just seen. If I could ask you just to take the podium, give us 12 minutes, perhaps 13 minutes. If you could just talk us through a little bit about the research that you’ve put into your book.
I read, very enviously, that you have made ten research trips, as part of the process and as a, sort of, Chatham House Scholar, I would love to make ten research trips, but I want to know how you did it? You can tell me afterwards. Please, if you take the stage. Thank you.
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
15 minutes. Well, first of all, thank you all for coming. It’s nice to see this many people at an event about Jordan. Some of us are obsessed with all things Jordanian and think it’s inherently fascinating, but other people don’t get that. I don’t know why. So, I wanted to tell you just a little bit about the book, not so much, some of the main arguments and substance, but what the whole point was because as a Political Scientist, as I was telling Neil before we gathered here this evening, there tends to be a lot of pressure to, sort of, pick one angle. To dive deep into the one angle and then give me one or two theoretical perspectives, what are you testing? And then move on from there. And I really was pushing back at that general idea because I wasn’t picking a theory, I wasn’t testing a theory. I wasn’t just picking one angle. I really had just a much more basic question, which was really along the lines of what happened, exactly?
In 2011 and beyond, since we had this massive set of eruptions and uprisings and revolts and protests all over the region, seeing, in some cases, more dramatic change in a few months than we had seen arguably, in a few decades in places like Egypt and Libya and, to some extent, Yemen and so on, it’s part of the story, but part of the story is also, countries like the Hashemite Kingdom, which remind us, I think, of what I was trying to get at, which is to move beyond binaries. That we tend to look at the really explosive flashpoints understandably, in the media and so on, but that – as we do that, we end up with these binaries of stable, unstable and revolution and counter-revolution and other issues like civil wars and coos, etc., but most of the region for all the turmoil and all the change, wasn’t experiencing any of those things, and Jordan was one of those.
So, that’s actually what I wanted to explore. How did Jordan roll through the Arab Spring? Did it survive? Did it just get through? What does it mean for post-Arab uprising? So, the entire theme of the book was to lay out a number of key issues, multiple different themes and explore every single one of them before 2011. What was the context here before what happened, in effect, in that sort of high point, 2011 through 2013/14 and then follow-up of what does it mean for Jordan and Jordanian politics for the future? What does it tell us about the politics? And since the idea was to come up with almost, a kind of analytical handbook, if you will, that the topics themselves, range across a number of different areas. One of which is just the events of the Arab Spring, Jordan version.
What is the Jordanian version of the Arab Spring? And then, beyond that, getting into some more enduring themes that have been the subjects of political debates, arguments, struggles in Jordan, really, for decades, but what did it mean before, during and after? In categories like questions of reform. In categories like elections and electoral systems, especially since Jordan has had a different electoral system for every Parliamentary election, it has always turned into a huge debating point of what kind of system do we have? Is this representative? Is this better than the last one? And all these struggles over what the outcome should actually be? And that also brings me to another point.
That the other, sort of, choice I would say politically, analytically, is very often are we looking at the state and the regime or are we looking at, sort of, a grassroots society up, both of which are entirely fair ways to look at political life, but I really felt like trying to explain Jordanian politics and what was going on. I couldn’t pick one of those, right? So given the choice between state and society, my answer was, well both, right? And or Government and Opposition? Well both, actually, and this, in some ways, explains why, during the ten research trips that started a few days before the first protests, which were in December of 2010, it explains, on the one-hand, why it took so long to finish the book. If I had chopped this down into more manageable parts, frankly, I would’ve been done a while ago, and I did toy with the idea of just focusing on that kind of core Arab Spring period. Roughly speaking, 2011 to 2013 and stopping there and having the book, the entire book as analysis of this historical episode, but I’m really glad that didn’t work out. For various life reasons, it didn’t work out, and because 2014 was a dramatic set of changes all of its own. I mean, Daesh or ISIS really emerged, taking over Mosul that summer and was, worth remembering, pushing on the Jordanian border and messing with the Jordanian border, getting into firefights with Border Guards and so on, and that changed the dynamics. Suddenly, we have a whole other set of issues going on.
The Syrian War had gotten into an endemic struggle at that point and it really didn’t look like that’s where this was going to go, just two years earlier and finally, I’m really glad I didn’t end early, because I would’ve written a book that didn’t mention refugees, right? And there’s actually no coherent way to discuss Jordan, Jordanian politics right now without, at least at some point, mentioning the refugee issue, since so very many Syrian refugees have crossed the border, desperately trying to get out of the horrors of the Syrian War and many have fled in every direction but, certainly, a very large number fled into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. And that, too, has had social and economic and political implications.
So, the book, at any rate, talks about all of these things, even identity politics, which is always the most difficult thing to write about, and part the idea then, and I’ll, kind of, pull this back to your original question which is, okay, well, what about the nature of it? How to go about this, because people in my field do statistical studies, they do all kinds of different methodologies, all of which are fine, but this was very qualitative field research. So, it really necessitated going back and going back and going back and talking to as many people as possible, and what I usually tell people is, my philosophy of what makes them more coherent, to picture a more comprehensive, more inclusive and ultimately, more accurate picture, is to go as far left and as far right ideologically, as I can possibly manage, and as high up in the upper echelons, as I can possibly get, and as low, in terms of level of empowerment or wealth or political power, and so on.
So what that means, in practical terms, is the list of interviewees for the book became a bit out of – well, became out of hand, actually, I suppose, got out of hand. The thank yous were very difficult to write. In some ways, I think that was the most difficult part of the book. Oddly enough, was, “Okay, what do I say now?” Actually, because I was able to speak with King Abdullah the II. I was able to talk to countless activists in the new Hirak Movement, new at the time, Hirak Movement, and both new and older positions, so lots of youth movements all over the country, some of the old left political parties and Pan-Arabist political parties. Members of the Islamist movements, there’s more than one in Jordan, but at any rate, various versions of the Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Royalists, people in the Royal Hashemite Court, Members of Parliament, lots of Journalists, and lots of political figures and dissidents, and so on. So, as a practical manner, by the way, that meant sometimes the actual day of fieldwork was always a little bizarre, right, because interviews just occur when they occur and people say yes, when they say yes, and there were very oftentimes when whoever I was talking to would be less than pleased at who I was about to talk to next, so just – and that was just a juxtaposition of the schedule was sometimes really weird. But it turned out, I think, to be helpful and to be much more comprehensive and I think, I hope, that the book gives you a good picture of where Jordan has been.
How it basically rolled through the Arab Spring with great difficulty, both at home and abroad, and where it is actually going and if you – you’re here so, I know you know something about Jordanian politics, that you know the list of challenges has never exactly been short, but in the context of 2011 onward, I would say even that list, which is always fairly dramatic for such a small country, had gone into almost hyperdrive and so, we have now culminated that, I would say, in the last couple of weeks’ events and it is, in fact, coincidental the book was released on the day of the first protests ,over the austerity measures and the tax hikes, and things like that. Totally coincidental. I had nothing to do with that, but I did refer to this before, in the book, that the most likely trigger mechanism, for further protests, would be austerity measures. That that’s something that really gets at most people, of many different walks of life, actually.
There’s some common cause of complaint, let’s say, and that might be trigger mechanisms and that seems to be one of them and now, Jordan is embarking on yet another change with the new Government, a new Cabinet, a new set of challenges, and some very old challenges as well, and I hope, at least, contextually, that there’s a set up for that, and I know we’re going to discuss most of these things much further. So, I want to just give that as an intro and then I will see where we want to go, in terms of the Q&A, after Noor.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, Curtis. Yeah, I mean, you sort of very much kind of set the scene there, and some of the phrases I picked out of your book. I mean, these are sort of phrases, probably, for people that have been looking at Jordan for some time, sort of, you know, revolving doors, pendulum swinging, Cabinet changes, new Governments, I mean, all of these things, sort of, seem to be a familiar part of the landscape. So, it will be really good to, sort of, maybe dig into that a little bit deeper at the Q&A and, sort of, see what that means.
Noor, if you could give us your full 12 minutes. Thank you very much.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Thanks, Chair. [Mother tongue – 15:14]. Translation, may the peace, mercy blessings of Allah be with you. [Mother tongue – 15:25]. Translation, if anybody has anything in their pockets, give it. Meaning, if you have something to add, do so. I thought I’d start with that as that’s how most of our team briefings with Jordan’s Ambassador, Omar Nahar, in London starts. It extends from the Jordanian Hashemite nesh, a concept and specifically a word that you study on Jordan could benefit from including and using to explore the dynamics of our society. Nesh simply means approach your path, but in Arabic and in Jordan it evolved to become a short-term, signalling the spirit of openness to inward reflection and outside counsel. We always appreciate whatever thoughts and ideas people have for Jordan. I know of no people today that aren’t questioning the direction their Government is taking or in light of developments and technology, for example, where the society as a whole is heading. The whole world for many, right now, feel like it’s at the brink of either something great or something greatly horrible, depending on who you talk to.
In Jordan, we’re doing the best we can. If anyone has advice on how to do it better again, give it. Chatham House has been doing just that for the larger international community year-after-year, offering a space, be it on the record or under Chatham House Rule, for exactly that purpose and we, in Jordan, appreciate that and value our friendship with this remarkable institution. A friendship that is strengthened through the friendships of people, fabulous people like Robin and Neil, who I personally have to thank for their constant pursuit of understanding of the other, free of the usual divide, associated by the words.
Neil, your dedication to what you do is truly aspirational and crucial in these times. Thank you for having me speak today. I would also like to personally thank Curtis, who might not be aware of a nickname we gave him, in one of my circles in Amman years ago. The nickname started because I kept missing meeting him at events and social gatherings, but still got asked if I met him or not? I, of course, followed his work for years and always noted that one of the key features of his books and articles is his insistence on documenting two sides of all issues he covers and so, the nickname [mother tongue – 17:41] was given to him and amrikiin, of course, mean the American and [mother tongue – 17:47], loosely translated, means a person who documents.
Curtis, I appreciate your interest in Jordan, the time you spent there and your dedication to better understand our nation. I also appreciate the effort it takes to document so much of recent Jordanian history through your eyes, and that’s the point, really. We hope that in this day and age, facts are protected. Few actually work in ensuring that, in the purest of ways, because while it takes a whole lot of goodwill to produce works of political science, the fact remains, recording modern history, in our region, is still an ongoing endeavour that requires careful study of the context. I find that just like with Real Estates’ emphasis on location, speaking of the Middle East, should always take into account context. Context is the essential building block to the understanding, not only due to regional geopolitics, but indeed, due to religion, language and a shared history.
It is reasonable to say that the interests in the region was never devout of ulterior motives and that was informed by insufficient knowledge. Even when it came to Arabic-speaking experts, much of the foreign analysis of the region entailed shortcomings that hindered through understanding of the region’s culture and hence, its people. The Imperial’s design on the Middle East in the 19th Century by the European powers of the day, combined with super-efficient and scant information about the region and its peoples, were responsible for developments like the British-French, Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Arabs of the region were left to the effects of the agreement, afflicting and shaping our yesterdays and todays and jeopardising our tomorrows.
Language is important in this context. The terms used to describe and analyse historical and current developments, in our region, often feeds into some of the information that is intentionally or unintentionally applied to it. Such language often goes unaddressed and ends up influencing developments within our countries themselves, by becoming part of public discourse and memory. Phrases such as Allahu Akbar, Sharia law and words like Fatwa and Jihad are widely misunderstood, misused and interpreted in negative contexts by Westerners looking at our part of the world. By contrast, common phrases and words and languages, such as French or even Latin, are on a completely different level for many reasons. Their common phrases are understood in the correct context and do not offend, unless they’re meant to.
Moreover, some Writers and academics fall into the trap of using words just because they’re widely used in certain circles. They rarely provide the reader with the origin of the usage and the evolution of usage across time and borders. Certain words and phrases that have entered the mainstream standard lexicon, can have different connotations from one Arab country to another. For example, many in Jordan use certain ways such as [mother tongue – 20:28] used by some during the so-called Arab Spring and reference in Curtis’ book, as being recent additions to our discourse and argue that using them only helped spread the poison of polarisation, currently ailing much of the West and part of our neighbourhoods. Other relevant language and phrases used are unique to Jordan are phrases such Transjordan, used by the British during the Mandate or East Bank and West Bank, following the 1948 establishment of Israel and distinctions such as Jordanian-Jordanian and Palestinian-Jordanian are super-imposed labels that are belayed by realities on the ground. This goes to the heart of the identity politics issue that Curtis raises.
Notwithstanding the temporary and regrettable violence that engulfed Jordan in 1970, Jordan is a country and the Hashemites, as a ruling establishment, have always worked to avoid contributing negatively to the numbers game that Israel plays. Some Israelis have gone as far as suggesting that the Palestinian problem can be resolved at Jordan’s expense, conveniently getting rid of the Palestinian right of return and gradually evicting more Palestinians from their native land.
What occurred in Jordan in 1970 was not a civil war, as Curtis says. The conflict was not between sectors of society at large. Nor did the violence last for more than a few weeks. Jordanian’s Palestinian origin continue to be full citizens, with equal rights and responsibilities, and it was not until 1989, when Palestinian citizens of the West Bank were no longer considered Jordanian citizens. That last development was aimed at consolidating the PLO’s role as representative of the Palestinians under occupation and to give it a free-hand in negotiating a just solution to the Palestinian problem.
Younger Jordanians, who make up the majority of the population, are more interested in forging common pathways forward than in perpetuating a Palestinian – a Jordanian-Palestinian divide that grew out of incidents that they are too young to have experienced. Palestinians, even young ones, remain focused on asserting their Palestinian identity, not in a position to their Jordanian identity, but to ensure that Israel does not get away with removing them or their parents and grandparents, from their original homeland. This is the position that the Jordanian ruling establishment understands, endorses and sympathises and it’s keen to ensure that Palestinians do not lose historic rights to Palestine.
Labels are useful in figuring, aiding us understand society and the elements that are comprised – comprise it, but in application, they aren’t neutral. Let’s sound a few labels relevant to Jordan that we hear way too often: pro-democracy activists, self-proclaimed loyalists, conservative dinosaur, progressive [inaudible – 22:52] youth. Although those can be used to describe a wide-range of people from different countries, then others are used, as they are in DR. Ryan’s book, Jordan and the Arab Uprising, to explain the sustainability of Jordan as a country and not why its people behave as they do, and the historical complexities surrounding Jordan.
DR. Ryan refers to regime’s survival in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring. The phrase is problematic at more than one level. The negative connotation associated with the word ‘regime’, in the book, is not hinted at, but explicitly claimed. Moreover, the term ‘survival’ is also problematic. The survival of Jordan’s ruling establishment is constantly questioned by outsiders more so than domestically, way before the so-called Arab Spring. Continued reference to the possibility of regime survival in Jordan, in the current context, is not only redundant, but more recently, for the younger generation, the mere notion has turned to from a question to a running joke, claiming that what’s surely going to survive and outlive many is that notion itself.
Curtis attributes the lack of reform to a state-sponsored stagnation and I quote, “A combination of state strategies, including recurrent reform efforts, divided opposition movements, and extensive international support.” I find that the state-sponsored stagnation, regarding the foreign reference, is instead, the natural by-product of the involvement of a number of developments inside Jordan and outside it, caused by regional dynamics, and a spill-over rather than a state strategy, as there is a difference between reacting and adjusting to circumstances and simply being complacent. Secondly, it’s easy to blame the system, but in a small country, you were bound to be faced with the ultimate truth that you, your family, your neighbourhood and larger community are the system and it feeds on you as much as you feed off it. That is what creates a unique shared responsibility and collective consciousness that historically, fed into the Jordanian Hashemite nesh, a joint path, people and leadership.
There is more to the story than political science labels. It is simply a story of people who realised, a long time ago, that before there were Muslims, there were Christians and before that Jews. This fed into the Jordanian nesh, empowered to look at what people say about it and counter-cause it with who they are. People with a positive outcome. The Jordanian nesh remains still as once defined His Majesty the Late King Hussain [mother tongue – 25:06], the human being is the most precious asset. It is the nesh that is carried forward by His Majesty King Abdullah II, who is set to achieve his vision of sustainable development, economic growth and social welfare, guided by Islam’s noble principles of justice, peace, harmony, social cohesion and social tolerance. They are the basis for Jordan’s reality and its future.
Jordanians, at the very heart of their community, are connected to one another through their values, regardless of their religion. That also lights the way for his Majesty’s vision for the region and the world that guarantees Jordan’s resilience and national unity. Thank you [applause].
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, Noor. You managed to pack in a heck of a lot in 12 minutes and clearly, you know, you’ve read the book page-by-page, word-by-word, so that’s great and very, very much appreciated. Again, there’s a lot in there that you can – that we can question and pick at and I think the lesson on language is absolutely right and absolutely critical, and I know that you’re part of a – I’d say part of a generation, certainly that colleagues and I at Chatham House are sort of engaging with, which are very much, sort of, challenging a lot of the language that Political Scientists, such as myself and Ryan and colleagues, use and I think it’s a very important, sort of – I think it’s a very important new approach. Anyway…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Okay, thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
…so we’ll flick back to you. Ryan, if I could just ask you to maybe elaborate a little bit more on the book. You talk about sort of three, I don’t know how we call them, three sort of principal factors that shape and define policy and that’s the domestic, the regional and the international. Could you just maybe shed a little bit of light on that before we sort of go over to Q&A?
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Well, I think there’s another maybe conventional way of looking at any country in its domestic politics is to focus entirely internally, and I don’t think it’s possible really, to look at Jordanian politics as a – domestic politics as entirely domestic, given the size of the country and frankly, the neighbourhood and especially now. That’s why I think the constraints are particularly high at the moment, but even if they weren’t, neighbouring with the Jordan River, giving the country its name, you know to the West of the country and therefore being deeply connected, one way or another, to Israel and Palestine and the ongoing issue of the Palestinian people, with Syria to the North and Iraq to the North East and Saudi Arabia to the South, even if there weren’t wars, this would still be important. But also, I think, because the country is not blessed with the kinds of economic resources that, say, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and so on, can use and work from. Doesn’t have oil and natural gas in these quantities as phosphates and so on. So it’s led to a different – a development of a different type of country, so that Foreign Policy, I would argue, is essential to making it work really, and maintaining stable alliances and maintaining foreign aid.
King Abdullah, every time he comes to London and to Washington DC and so on, is also very big on – not just the aid issue, but on trade and investment and etc. So, very mindful of the international connections and so, it strikes me as almost remarkable how many international, regional connections there are and therefore, I think to kind of get and how the internal politics works, I think we have to look at the other layers as well and see how they overlap, and how the international affects the domestic, and how the domestic affects the international, and look at all three of those layers, really, at once, ideally.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Excellent, thank you. Noor, could I ask you to talk about the protests that we saw about a month ago? Just give us a flavour of – I mean, we read the press, of course, and we followed that very, very closely. Maybe give us the flavour of what was driving them, where they were attending and I mean, are we likely to see a sort of revival of the protests, any time soon?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
There’s twofolds to that question, I think. There’s one that assumes that I could, for example, speak of the youth and of their mind and what they’re thinking, but I tend not to – I try not to fall in that trap and rather think how I’ve viewed it, if I was there in Amman, ‘cause I was, this year, in London and I noticed something. There was a distinction and there was expectations, but there was an understanding of the realities and that was immediate from day one, or actually, from night one because they were going after a [inaudible – 30:01] ‘cause it was during Ramadan and they immediately, the youth again, put out a flyer, but it was big because they were taking it out with them, and it had points of what they expected and what they wanted. And they did not allow anybody, from the old opposition, you know, with different groups to hijack that or change the conversation.
They were clear, and I have to wear the digital Diplomat cap here and say, I thought it was interesting because it felt that the, you know, when – this generation’s very tapped into the matrix, if you will, and when we talk about the internet and we talk about digital tech, you immediately feel that the solutions need to be immediate, you know. You can no longer wait for Uber, five minutes, you want it now, and that’s sort of the reaction that was also felt on the street. They wanted immediate reactions from the Government and responses, but also, not shocking to the system or shocking to the region and shocking to the nesh that we were speaking of it.
There was a common language. That, for me, more than anything, was very striking and that’s why I was very passionate about what I was saying because it all fell into the same [inaudible – 31:22] and interestingly enough, if I may just expand on that, even today, I noticed when the Prime Minister, the new Prime Minister, Omar Razzaz tweeted and thanked the youth for sending him good wishes and sending questions and sending – reporting things to him directly, “Do you know that your Minister’s doing this or this?” They were involved with him and he thanked them and he used the phrase [mother tongue – 31:51] and I was reading what people said about that and it didn’t mean that it was new as in it’s changing the old ways, it just meant that the word nesh itself, we said it’s a process. So, there’s a – it’s evolving together and there was a common language in that they both used the word nesh was the reason why I wanted to start with it and end with is. So, yeah.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
You’re welcome.
Dr Neil Quilliam
So, we’ll open this now to questions. If you could – thank you very much. There’s a gentleman down here. If we could have the microphone. If you could give your name, your affiliation, and if you’re a Member of Chatham House and have another affiliation, if you could share that with us as well that would be much appreciated, and short and sharp questions, ‘cause we’ve only got 30 minutes.
Robert Gardiner
Robert Gardiner, Chatham House, very interested in the Middle East. Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, can you comment on the relationships that Jordan has with those three countries, please?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
I think that’s for DR. Ryan.
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Well, I would say that this could take us a couple of hours, actually, first of all, ‘cause those are sort of tough ones. But I think the preface to my comment about that would be that Jordanian foreign policy in general, I think, has tried to steer a kind of balance between major, regional contenders and sometimes global ones as well. But traditionally, and this has been an on again, off again if you think over many, many decades, but over the last few decades, Jordan has tended to have a fairly solid relationship with Saudi Arabia. I think it’s been – there is a kind of noticeable shift and doesn’t – I don’t think – I think it was a temporary one, over this past year or so, that I don’t think was connected to the current Ruler of Saudi Arabia, but to his would-be successor, Mohammed bin Salman, and I think it was represented in some ways, it was certainly the point of discussion across all of Jordan and the media and social media and so on, of was Jordan paying a price, in effect, for taking a strong stand on the US Embassy relocation in Jerusalem, and so on? And this alternative deal of the century that may or may not be offered and did that affect its aid relations, not only with Saudi Arabia, but with the GCC, the Gulf Co-operation Council more broadly, since Saudi Arabia does see itself as the leading player, if you want that alliance?
On the Iran issue, and I – so, I think the Israel relationship has – they have had a functioning Peace Treaty since 1994. I wouldn’t say it’s a particular warm Peace Treaty. I would say it’s functional. It’s certainly not warm between societies, and so on. There’s been an anti-normalisation campaign with grassroots and professional associations, and so on, for a really long time, but it doesn’t affect the Treaty, it still just holds, right? And there’s been a lot of co-operation, for example, between the two intelligence services, between the Untied States and Jordan, between the United States and Israel, but I do think it’s – there’s a question mark, at the moment, of where that relationship is now, and I think it has – I don’t think they’ll – its location is determined, actually by Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or Amman or Tehran. I think it, unfortunately, is probably Washington that I think the wildcard is, what is the Trump administration doing and does it actually have the same relationship with its ally Jordan, as previous administrations have? And then the other one, I guess, would be Iran, which has not been – that’s been a very difficult relationship, but it’s not been overtly hostile either, and to me, that’s kind of a marker of Jordanian foreign policy and Jordanian alliance structures, even with countries that are not allies, that are not intermit, alignment partners, and so on. There has been an attempt to keep the lines of communication open, to maintain diplomatic relations, in one way or another, whether it’s official representation or not and make it basically, work.
But, at the moment, I think it’s difficult to manoeuvre between Saudi Arabia and Iran struggling with each other across the region and what many people think of as a, kind of, new cold war, regional cold war. Or, for that matter, the Netanyahu administration in particular in Israel, which has had, I think, a very difficult relationship with Jordan, and I would say almost entirely from that side of the border, from Netanyahu’s administration. It has been tough for Jordan to have to deal with over and over again.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. I was worried that you were going to go on all night there. Question at the back, please, thank you.
Dr Lina Khatib
Hi, I’m Lina Khatib. I’m Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. A question about Jordan’s economy. I saw that recently, Jordan has suspended the free trade agreement with Turkey because of unfair competition. Can someone comment on the economic situation in Jordan now as, you know, as focusing – well, through focusing on foreign trade, basically. What are the plans for Jordan in that regard right now? I understand some of the protests were driven by economic, kind of, drivers, so how is Jordan planning to increase, perhaps, foreign direct investment and deal with issues like free trade agreements that perhaps should be rethought? Thanks.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
I think that’s the million-dollar question, Lina, and just today, actually, it was announced that during the – for next week, basically, a lot of these economic concerns are going to get addressed, because as you said, it’s the trigger. It’s what people are focused on, whether it’s in relation to just corruption or economy, pure economy, in a sense. So, it is the question of the day, and I think it’s better to wait and see what the new Government has in store, in my opinion. I don’t know if Doctor, you have something else to comment on that?
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Well, I would say in terms of the economic issues, I think there’s a huge difference between, say, the trade issues and the fiscal issues, and so on. I mean, because the foreign aid issue is vital to make the budget function, and so on. But trade, I mean, part of it is, you know, Jordan has made its own decisions, for sure, but I think it’s been more impacted on trade by other countries’ decisions. I mean, the borders opening and closing and opening and closing, now we usually think of it with Syria, but for a long time there, it was with Iraq and that was changing the Jordanian economy dramatically, not just in the obvious sense, goods coming and good going, but even all the industries who depend on all those goods. I mean, overland trucking is a huge industry in Jordan that has been just repeatedly pummelled by other people’s fires, if you will. But the million-dollar question, I agree with you, is probably the more fiscal one, the budgetary one. So, this new Government of Dr Omar Razzaz has, before it just a staggeringly large challenge and I don’t think there’s any chance they can just fix everything all at once because the region has changed, the country has changed. The challenges are huge, there’s a massive refugee population inside the country, the Syrian War doesn’t look like it’s ending, so they’re not going to be able to go home any time soon.
So, he – it’s not an enviable task, I guess, but I think his reputation, if it’s fair to say that, is as – I mean, he’s not somebody who’s had multiple Cabinet posts, up to this point, or has been former Prime Minister, right, but he was with The World Bank and some people hate that idea and some people love that. I mean, you know, in Jordan there’s an instant division, you know, “Is that a good or bad thing?” But also – but he is an Economist as well and he knows the data there, and he did have, I would say, some success with the various initiatives that he was leading. So, he’s got kind of a track record. He’s neither completely new nor completely – I don’t know if – you couldn’t say new or old guard, right, he’s sort of hmmm. Yeah, and so, but it’s tough and I think the tough of this portfolio will be economics, just really large.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Can I just ask you to unpack this label thing, old guard, new guard, how do we, sort of – how should we reconceptualise that or how should we view that? And again, I mean, it’s sort of – I’m sort of…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Yeah, yeah. Can I connect it also, to the digital aspect as well?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Yeah.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
There’s something that I read today, early this morning, and I connected it to all of this, actually. I took note of it. It’s interesting. The premise is that what’s bad offline is bad online. So, that’s a rule of thumb basically and, you know, because how the internet works, you know, you feel protected, you feel if you don’t put your real name, or even if it doesn’t work that way you feel that, you know, nobody knows who you are, so you could say whatever you want and it could be vicious, in a sense. So, the issue of labelling and labels sorry, and being so polarising was exacerbated online and you felt it, and that’s also, one of the aspects that I found throughout, you know, if you’re online, if you’re on Twitter and you just, you pick whatever trending hashtag of the day, whatever city you’re in, you’re going to see, it could be talking about, you know, this colour and the divide is scary, and this is where we’re going. So, I relate this to the topic in two things.
I do not know if everybody’s following up with – there’s the UK MP Damian Collins, today he spoke of the UK Election Laws and in a world, he said, “Increasingly dominated by big tech media,” and he stressed the urgency by quoting the electoral regulator saying, “UK democracy under threat and reform is urgent.” The reason why he said that is that because he felt the conversation online was so polarised, people were having – finding it easy to character assassinate anybody, or just feel safe if they hide behind a label then that gives them instant power, for example. So, the reason why this is alarming for me, personally, is that in so many different groups and around me, we find this sort of, not only destructive, but certain labels are passé in a sense because we’re all a combination of so many different things. If, today, we stop and say, “I’m a Royalist. I’m a Conservative. I’m, you know,” you know, whatever it is. It shouldn’t define me and it shouldn’t just box my view of everything. So, that is the issue of labelling. It’s becoming dangerous with the digital tech media right now.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, yeah. I mean, I think, as with our own online presence as Analysts or part of the community of Analysts, I mean, the field is so polarised that one can either be, sort of, put in that camp or put in that camp or else one doesn’t necessarily sit in either of those camp. I have a question here, please, thank you very much.
William Libby
William Libby, Control Risks. As somebody who’s, sort of, spent a long time in the Middle East and looked at Jordan from the outside for a long, long time and visited it as a tourist, but never lived there, I wonder if you could say is there anything different? Because this seems like a familiar story in Jordan. There is – Jordan has always managed, whether it was King Hussein or King Abdullah, always managed to balance all the issues, you know, living in a tough neighbourhood, an economy that’s always in trouble, and varying levels of aid from Gulf countries, varying problems going on, but just always survives, manages to sack the Prime Minister every so often, so that that’s an outlet. And I do wonder how often you can sack a Prime Minister and it’ll work, but it seems to work continually in Jordan.
Is there anything different happening and does the dynamic change, and I’ll ask both of you? Does social media, as a process, ‘cause it worked in other countries, is there anything different about Jordan at the moment or do we just look forward to another 20 years of them managing? Another 40 years of them managing and a few more Prime Ministers going? But, essentially, I’m always amazed at the resilience of Jordan, when other countries kind of, you know, just fall by the wayside. So, I’m just looking if there is anything you’ve observed, whether there’s anything different at the moment that I should be worried about?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. I’m going to ask Curtis to speak first and then I’ll come to you, Noor. Curtis, in your book you talk about, sort of, you know, the extremes and then sort of muddling through, almost, and then you talk about Prime Ministers effectively kind of being a buffer. So, I guess to the heart of that question is…
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Well, I think even, you know, Prime Ministers have come and gone sometimes with frequency, but then we have, sort of, stretches where it levels out a little bit, so I – and I think we have to look at both and so, yeah, part of the book was actually looking at that uptake of protests. I mean, there was a point where there were protests every Friday, like clockwork for a couple of years, 2011/2012 and in that period, there were five Prime Ministers, five Governments. So, there was much discussion, there were Jordanian cartoonists drawing a revolving door, and so on, and the humour factor’s important here actually, because I think people associate it with other countries, but Jordanian politics and protestors and cartoonists, there’s a great level of humour that you may not be aware of that is worth looking at. And we saw it in the last couple of weeks in protests, in both sides, and we’re both security forces and protestors, but we also had stretches there where a Prime Minister lasted for four solid years, Abdullah Ensour, and a Parliament did as well, and so on.
So, there was a kind of high point of protests and maybe revolving door and then a bit of stability, and I think the factor that stands out to me a little bit is, and I see this as both continuity and change, I’m interested in both, but is there was a certain amount of restraint, in more than one direction that Jordan as a state didn’t respond to, even 2011 and 2012, to the Arab uprisings in any way, the way other regimes, Governments, administrations in the region actually did, as somebody’s quoted in the book and saying, you know, we didn’t have snipers here. We didn’t have the Army rolling through with tanks in Tahrir Square, and so on. Not the Jordanian version and so we saw that in 2011/2012 as a different approach and I think a certain level of restraint of protestors, especially once the Syrian War got so horribly out of hand. There were just completely overt, open discussions among protestors of how far is too far? What shall we push for? Shall we pull back? Shall we have a certain amount of restraint? And I think we saw it in the last couple of weeks too, and I thought it was really interesting to see both the security forces and protestors interacting with each other and sometimes negotiating on the spot, and some of that – and I don’t want to completely sugar-coat this, there were some rough moments in the protest ‘cause, you know, they’re protests and there were some people, who were arrested and so on, but most of them were peaceful protests in both directions. Unlike many other places, there was not any death toll associated with the protests and we actually saw a lot of self-restraint on the part of – in fact, I think, Noor referred to it. That bringing the sign, so people couldn’t miss what it was actually about and we saw multiple versions of that, reproducing itself and sometimes being tweeted out, sometimes on Facebook, sometimes as a giant billboard.
What we did not see was partisanship in the protests. We didn’t see the – which we had seen in earlier protests. We didn’t see Left or Nationalists or Pan-Arabists or Islamist parties or organisations bringing their banners with them, and I mean that literally. They didn’t bring that kind of identification, so they left out the labels, that the remaining label was Jordanian, which got a response, I think, from the Gendarmerie, the Darak. There were even viral videos that oddly enough, were from the protestors, but they were videoing the Commander of the Security Forces, talking to his forces before engaging with the protestors and saying, you know, “We’re all – we’re related and remember that as we go.” And then I think it settled into a kind of pattern, in a fairly good way, where you could get the protests in, made your point, it was huge, or just sort of colossal and yet, remarkably peaceful and stable. So, there’s a little change and continuity there.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Before I bring Noor in, does that mean that Jordan’s an exceptional case? I know you sort of look at that as well, I mean, in the region, is it the exception?
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Yeah, that’s a tough thing to answer. It depends on how you use that word, see words. Words again. If – I mean, I think it’s an exceptional place, but I don’t think it’s an exception to say any regional dynamics in particular and I mean, I don’t – I wouldn’t rule out anything that could happen down the road. But I think it’s exceptional, in terms of a lot of what’s actually happened, but I don’t think it’s exceptional in the sense that it’s, say, exempt from regional occurrence and trends.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Immediately I thought, when you were asking that question, sir, of – when you used the phrase ‘muddle through’ as well. So, I’m glad you touched upon that because every time it was used in the book, I used to think, “But what about muddled through without meddling,” and it’s interesting. It’s a play on words, but because you can’t expect something new, if the circumstances are the same. So, the region hasn’t changed, it’s getting worse, so the fact that we’re – I touched upon the whole issue of survival, the language of it. The usage of the word ‘regime’ and all of that connotation, but again to say, “Is it different? What’s new now?” When the region is still the same and worse, it’s kind of interesting. Do you know what I mean? And it’s kind of unfair to put that on Jordan, but not ask the region and ask the other players what they’re doing different.
William Libby
Well, I think it’s just exciting. I think Jordan is quite exceptional and this region in that sense. The question is a positive one…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Of course, of course.
William Libby
…[inaudible – 51:34] on Jordan that – and I hope you don’t…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
I can feel it.
William Libby
I hope the answer is that it merely is a model of meddling/muddling through, I don’t know which was the [inaudible – 51:45].
Dr Neil Quilliam
Could we have a question over here, please? Thank you. Sorry, Amira could you just wait for the microphone. Thank you.
Amira
Thank you. My voice is loud enough though, but I say this as a very proud Jordanian and…
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sorry, could you introduce yourself?
Amira
Of course, Amira, and I’m actually, as you can tell, from a very different industry, but I’m here because a) I’m working on a Mentorship Programme in Jordan, but I say this as a proud Jordanian and not blindly patriotic, but because I’m very proud of how much Jordan has accomplished, whilst being pulled and pushed from all different areas constantly, and what Noor touched upon is true. In a sense of, if you can do it better, tell me how? You know, seldom would people know that the late King Hussein used to go incognito to public hospitals to make sure that people that can’t afford public care are cared for in the right way. He used to go in taxicabs and ask the Driver “Are you happy with the Government? What would you change?” I don’t know many Rulers and I say Ruler because it’s a Monarchy. I don’t know many Rulers that would do that and his son, King Abdullah the II, does the same.
So, sir, sorry, I missed your name, but I think that – and this is my humble opinion, the reason that Jordan has, not survived, and I’m not a big fan of the word, but I think the difference in Jordan is that the people love their country. They genuinely love their country and they do understand that these are the circumstances that we live under and so, when it is a protest, it’s a protest not saying, you know, get rid of the King or get rid of the Monarchy or, you know, change the PM, but it’s more, we actually need – we need, you know, help me. But it’s not really a protest of change and you’re corrupt because, you know, I’m half Turkish and I have other things to say, on the other side, but in Jordan, it’s truly, you know, how can you help me? How can we open dialogue that can change the circumstances, given the current circumstances? So, it wasn’t really a question, it was a comment.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, thank you very much for your contribution. Curtis, can we just tackle this – this has come up now, this term ‘regime survival’? I know it’s a political science term and it’s one that we use and we test, but given the sort of focus on that term, could we maybe just address that, or…?
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
I think the term is based on Executives that aren’t elected. So, that one of the reasons – I mean, ‘cause we talk about political survival of adminis – we usually say something like administrations for democratic countries, right, or Government in the UK, administration in the US, which all, more or less, mean the same thing, but we also, in many other places, have – we’re usually asking, are they going to survive the next election? And then, how long are their term limits? Whatever. So, I think the survival terminology developed, as far as I could tell in the field, over unelected Executives, whether it was Presidents or Kings, or whatever title, and it’s also an editorial issue.
I mean, I think that titles are sometimes voices upon people. I mean, I thought there were various versions of this and anyone who’s ever written anything, say, an online article or whatever, now you should know, you almost have – you usually have no control over the title and it’s sometimes quite alarming what people come up with and – so, I mean, I wrote one on Jordan getting into the UN Security Council and the next thing I knew the title, which I had not written was, Jordan’s Excellent Adventure, referring to Bill and Ted’s Excellent Adventure, and so on, and I thought, “Wait, what?” You know, so it was just there, but in this one, I think, anyway, that that’s what it’s referring to, so there has been anyway, a standing literature and so, it’s in some ways responding to that. But quite honestly, I wanted to get beyond that because I really didn’t want to get bogged down in the literature itself over that. I wanted to get as mired in all things Jordanian as possible, not into the public side debate, really.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, great, thank you very much. Yes, please, we have a question over here. Thank you.
Michael Burton
Michael Burton, Member of the Institute, in the Foreign Office years ago, used to deal with the Middle East and, in more recent years, I’ve taken a number of cultural tours to Jordan. We saw in the paper today, I think, Prince William going around Jerash with Crown Prince Hussein and he looked a bit lonely. I wondered whether – how is the tourism industry doing in Jordan in these troubled times? Are people still going there or is it too dangerous? Are they frightened? And if they’re not, you know, what’s that doing for the economy?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
There was, just two hours ago, again, I get a lot of my news from Twitter, so just driving to here, there was a boom in the tourism economy, but actually, I would like to know, ‘cause the ten visits that you visited were during the tumultuous times, basically, let’s say that. So, did you feel unsafe during even that? If I may follow-up with your question, actually.
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
No, the people were always – and that’s a question my closest relatives always ask me that. They still don’t get what I do but, no, so, yeah those ten visits were for the book, they weren’t my ten visits ever ‘cause my first…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Yes, yes of course.
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
And my first visit was…
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
89.
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
…was 89, yeah, right which was after another set of protests. So, it was over that, and no, I didn’t ever feel personally unsafe, and I think that’s why the tourism industry – and it has taken some blows, yeah, but it’s actually come back in a way that it was a little surprising, I think, even to the Ministry of Tourism and they hoped for it. But I would say, in general, more European tourists than from North America, but that’s the norm anyway, but I think that has been a sign of resilience actually, that even with all that’s going on around the country that there has been an uptake in tourism is a sign of something, anyway, that’s important.
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
Yeah, definitely, yeah.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. We have time for one last question. Yes, please. Over at the back, thank you.
Adeeb
Hi there, Adeeb, a Chatham House Member. Thank you everyone for being here tonight, I appreciate it. A question for Noor. How do you see, and it’s a follow-on from someone earlier, how do you see the digital movement making a difference to the face of politics in Jordan? I mean, you recent – there was recently a launch of the Civil Coalition Group, which has attracted quite a few young members. Do you see people demanding a more inclusive democracy, over the next few years, and how will that play out?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
I like that question. I like it because you’re making me think of a few things. It’s interesting, in our part of the world, the Twitter is more – for example, specifically Twitter again, is used more as a political platform, rather than, you know, following Made in Chelsea or following do you know, arts and food and whatnot, and I think that’s just a reflection of, again, the situation on the ground and the context of the region again. So, the digital prospects of all of this won’t be something different or new or present – it will present different challenges that are also, you know, what’s bad offline is bad online, the same kind of thing, but what’s important, I think, is for the international community. It’s not only just about Jordan. For us to stop and think what’s next when it comes to that? We do not want to fall in pitfalls of, you know, different nations that have fell into, without naming any names, and we need to know which way we want to go. Is it something we want to be a gateway for, you know, understanding the other, being respectful, transparency, being able to ask a Government official directly what they’re doing? Where the money’s going?
Is it going to be a political café, sort of thing? Where do we want to take this? Those are the questions that we need to ask. There’s security concerns as well. It’s an ongoing debate that needs to take place, but what’s interesting, I find is that in our part of the region, for so many different reasons again, it’s a reflection of the offline.
Adeeb
Thank you for that. Don’t you think it’s less about international community and more about what the people of Jordan want?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
So, that’s two things, but basically, what I meant with that, the nesh that I was talking about is being open to, you know, listening to others. So, in that – that’s how I related those two things.
Adeeb
One final question, and when you say, “Listening to others,” do you believe that grassroots organisations, whether they’re politically oriented in Jordan, have free speech and true liberty to say what they want?
Alsharifeh Noor Bint Ali
I think so.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much for your third and final question. No, that’s fine. That was fine. That was flowing very, very nicely. I pride myself on being a very good timekeeper and we’ve just got to 7 o’clock. So, we’ll draw this meeting to a close. If you could join me in thanking our two great speakers. Thank you very much indeed [applause].
