Dr Lina Khatib
Good evening. Thank you very much for joining us here for this very timely event on the Implications of the Killing of Qassem Soleimani for the Middle East. For those of you who don’t know me, my name is Lina Khatib. I’m the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House, and it’s a pleasure to introduce four colleagues, who will join me for what I’m sure will be a very vivid discussion tonight that is also, by the way, being livestreamed. So, if someone you know can’t be here and wants to be here, tell them to watch us online. The event is obviously on the record, as well. Please feel free to tweet, quote us, do the usual, but keep your phones on silent.
We’re going to have a discussion that spans implications for Iran, US foreign policy, as well as Iraq. We’re going to start with my colleague, Lindsay Newman, who’s a Senior Research Fellow with the US and Americas Programme here at Chatham House, followed by remarks from my colleague, Dr Sanam Vakil, who is the Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme and leads our work on Iran and the Gulf. Followed with Professor Toby Dodge, who’s an Associate Fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, and also, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. And last, but not least, my colleague, Dr Renad Mansour, Senior Research Fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, and he directs our Iraq Initiative, which is a major project on Iraq that we’ve been running for more than a year now and that is ongoing.
So, without further ado, I think we’re going to jump straight into considering that the United States is the one who took the decision to kill Soleimani. How does this relate to the United States’ policy towards Iran, and what do we learn from this killing?
Dr Lindsay Newman
Thank you, Lina, and thank you all for coming. So, I’m going to focus my time on making, really, four points. The first is to provide some broad framing of US foreign policy under Donald Trump. The second is to look specifically at Trump’s policy vis-à-vis Iran and the killing of Qassem Soleimani. Third, I will offer some thoughts on US pol – where US policy is likely to go vis-à-vis Iran, and finally, I just want to highlight a couple of points around what this means for the US and the upcoming November elections in the US.
So, first, Donald Trump’s foreign policy generally, is guided by an America first principle, as we all know. It’s really about emphasising strength at home over engagement abroad, but what this means in practice is that Trump’s policy is really transactional. So, Trump and his administration look for engagements abroad where there’s obvious direct benefit that’s going to flow to the US, to his domestic audience, and really to his base. And this is why he tends to prefer bilateral engagements, like bilateral trade deals, so US-South Korea, US-Japan, and even bilateral aggressions like US-North Korea, US-China, and in this case, US-Iran, over multilateral aggressions and engagements, because it’s not entirely clear where the benefit in a multilateral engagement goes with a zero-sum, sort of, framework. So, it’s worth highlighting that this is different from President Barrack Obama’s multilateral – cautious multilateralism. He really had a ‘never go it alone’ approach, and Trump is very comfortable taking unilateral and decisive action.
We know this most prominently with his overreliance, a reliance on executive actions, like sanctions and tariffs, and, of course, he prefers that, really, over diplomatic routes and protracted military engagements. So, what does this all mean for Iran and for the killing of Qassem Soleimani? Well, this takes me to my second point. Trump has been clear, since he was candidate Trump, about his views around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran Nuclear Deal. He has – he views it as a bad deal, in which too much money flew – went to Iran and not much came back in return. Secretary – Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin was here this weekend, and he really reiterated this view. So, Trump’s plan was always to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, which he did in May 2018. And to be clear, what Trump wants is a New Deal and a non-nuclear Iran, and we can debate how feasible this is and how different this is as an objective from where President Barack Obama started, when he started the JCPOA negotiations. But it’s worth underlining and repeating again, what Trump wants is a New Deal and to ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. And he certainly does have and he has had members of his administration, of course most notably former National Security Advisor John Bolton, who will prefer – were looking for regime change or regime collapse. But another massively destabilised country in the Middle East is not in the US best interest, it’s not in Trump’s best interest, and I tend to think that Trump knows that.
What he wants is a new JCPOA with his name on it, similar to the noon after the USMCA, which he actually signed today. For a New Deal to be possible, Trump – the US policy towards Iran really continues to be guided by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statements in his May 2018 speech, with the 12 demands, where he said that for a new nuclear deal to be advanced, Iran would need to curb its uranium enrichments, put limitations on its ballistic missile programme, curb its regional destabilising activity, stop backing terrorist activity, etc. And of course, we all know the final piece of the puzzle is a US commitment to apply maximum pressure on Iran to get it to comply with these demands and drive it back to the negotiating table. This maximum pressure campaign is really a – essentially, a protracted sanctions play by Trump, and in my view, I would argue that it has not clearly advanced his – either of his objectives of a new nuclear deal or a non-nuclear Iran.
Within this context and in direct response to the killing of an American contractor in Iraq and protests and the storming of the US Embassy in Baghdad, we all know now that Trump took the decision to kill Qassem Soleimani, really to remove Qassem Soleimani from the equation. We also all likely all know that Trump took this decision from a panoply. He was offered a menu of options, including a lot – several that were much less disruptive, but he took the decision to kill Qassem Soleimani, which is very consistent with this unilateral America first approach to foreign policy generally, and his maximum pressure campaign on Iran in particular.
So, where does US policy go from here? Well, despite initial fears that we were on the brink of the next World War, or at least a direct conflict between the two sides, with the benefit of some hindsight, it appears that the Trump administration, its intentions was twofold. Really to demonstrate an overwhelming military capability and a willingness to make game-changing, strategic, we’ll call it, action, and the targeted intention outcome was for Iran to de-escalate, which the Trump administration thinks it has done. And we know this, because on January 8th in the speech, Donald Trump said that Iran appeared to be standing down.
So, going forward, the bottom line for the Trump administration is that, in their view, maximum pressure is working. Steve Mnuchin again reiterated that this weekend at Chatham House, and so we should expect to see more sanctions, not less of them. This means more sanctions directly on Iran and its proxies, as well as entities operating and trading with Iran, similar to the sanctions we just saw imposed on firms out of Dubai, Hong Kong and China that were imposed last week.
Now, finally, just a few words on what all of this means for the US and the upcoming US 2020 elections in November. Conventional wisdom tells us that foreign policy tends not to matter all that much for US elections. But we appear to be seeing a bit of a shift in that. We know at least with the Trump administration, America first approach always means that an eye is kept on how actions abroad affect the domestic audience. US foreign policy towards Iran and the Middle East in general now appears to be posed to be a critical, a central issue for the upcoming 2020 elections. To President Donald Trump, the decision to kill Qassem Soleimani really represents a campaign promise kept, a campaign promise kept to confront Iran’s aggression. It also means that on the campaign trail we’re going to expect to see him saying that he has overseen a national security policy, a new national security policy on Iran that began with the withdrawal from the US JCPOA, all the way through to the killing of Qassem Soleimani.
Given almost certain continued covert and proxy efforts by Iran to counter US interests in the region, I’m going to be watching for Democratic candidates to say that US – the US policy, Trump’s policy makes the US interests and the US less safe, not more safe. We’re already seeing the re-escalation of protests at the US Embassy in Baghdad amidst mortar attacks, and there’s this very open question around the future of US military presence in Iraq, a key Iranian objective. Democratic candidates also need to be explicit about what they see how they’re going to manage US tensions with Iran, from a military, strategic and diplomatic perspective. And when I last checked, only Vice President – former Vice President Joe Biden has an explicit policy on his website right now about how he plans to deal with Iran.
Finally, in any event, it’s hard for me to see how the Trump administration and Iran return to the negotiating table ahead of November. We need to have – we would just need this, and my baseline case remains, that we need to have clarity on the next US administration, before any new movement – any real movement on a deal.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you so much. So, from implications for the US to implications for Iran itself.
Dr Sanim Vakil
Okay, thank you very much, Lina, and it’s a pleasure to be here with you tonight. I have a hard task to lay out before you, because there is so much to discuss, and in order to go forward or to the discuss implications, I think it’s just important to quickly look backwards to see where we’ve come from. And this current stalemate between Tehran and Washington really originates, obviously, from the Trump withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and Iran’s shift in posture in May 2019, where it began a more confrontational approach to push back against maximum pressure, and we analysts refer to that as Iran’s maximum resistance strategy. And this strategy was designed to obtain as much leverage as possible to try and alter the Trump position, vis-à-vis Iran, and to perhaps gain some leverage if and when Iran should come back to the negotiating table, with the Trump administration or with another American administration.
And in this ratcheting up of tensions on Iran’s side, we have seen, since May 2019, Iran begin incremental breaches in the JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, and it is now in its fifth breach of the Nuclear Agreement, and the deal is in peril. And I think that many European countries and the United States really think the deal is, you know, practically only alive, in theory at this point, with Iran moving forward in its nuclear programme. At the same time, we have seen escalatory behaviour sponsored by Iran in the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf last summer, with the seizing of tankers, for example, and the downing of a US drone and indirect sponsored Iranian activity, from proxies affiliated and sponsored by Iran around the region.
At the same time, we also saw the September 14th very brazen attacks on Saudi oil facilities as well, and, you know, it’s important to consider that the escalation has been building for months on end, and January 3rd did not come out of the blue. And in all of these escalatory events, there was no American response, there was no military response, no move to establish deterrents, and in many cases, I was surprised myself, waiting for what that American response would be. So, January 3rd, I think, is that turning point moment where the Trump administration calculated, after the events in Baghdad that Iran is pushing this envelope one degree too far and it was time to establish deterrents. The question is, has it established deterrents? And, of course, in the days and weeks that followed, there was a lot of speculation, a lot of anxiety as to how things were going to unfold, and no, we did not end up in World War III, but sadly, I should tell you, that this is not over. Because Iran remem – remains under maximum pressure, sanctions continue to trickle out of the Trump administration, they believe that maximum pressure is working, and it might be working to constrain the Iranian economy, which is of course in a recession, it – we are have – and have indeed, seen protests on the streets of Tehran in last November that were quite brutally cracked down.
We have also seen examples of Iranian mismanagement after the killing of Qassem Soleimani, when the Ukrainian airliner was tragically brought down, and there was denial and obfuscation from that event as well, followed by protests on Tehranian streets by a different cohort of Iranians. So, there’s been a lot that should be interpreted, digested, and it’s, I think, unfortunate that Washington, from these events, is taking away that the Iranian Government is planning on coming to the table or conceding. I actually believe that the reverse is happening, and let me explain to you why.
A few reasons. First of all, there are some domestic implications to the killing of Qassem Soleimani. Of course, he was an important military figure. He was a symbolic figure, for many people in Iran, because the government very much promoted his image as someone who fought against ISIS and protected Iran from ISIS. And so, while he was very much despised, in many Arab countries around the world, and perhaps rightly so, within Iran he was very much supported. And so, these conflicting narratives have to be appreciated and understood in the local context. And Qassem Soleimani was also appreciated inside Iran because he was not political, he was not factional, he didn’t get involved in anything administrative, and so he represented a, sort of, national narrative of Iran, under containment in a region, etc. But the domestic implication here is that the JCPOA is fragile, the economic consequences of maximum pressure are hurting in Iran, and what we are seeing now is that the political space for debate specifically around Iranian pragmatist and reformist politicians is narrowing. They have less ability to manoeuvre, and, you know, many people in the US administration don’t support this narrative of factionalism, don’t think it matters, but there are cleavages that do matter in Iran, and we’re going to see how they matter in the coming months and weeks.
Actually, Iran is going to have parliamentary elections in February, and it is widely expected that the hardliners are going to win outright. Of course, they’re vetted in advance, and we know that reformers have been already rejected quite widely. So, we know that this is going to be a very conservative parliament, but that’s going to, of course, have implications for political debate, but ultimately, really important for local issues. But it does change the tenor of the conversation, and it does allow the political establishment to be dominated by Conservatives, and that matters, because Conservatives have a different worldview in Iran, and maybe less interested in engagement and less interested in international negotiations, more about resistance and standing up to the United States and more about escalation, actually.
So, today, on January 29th, it might appear that Iran’s a bit more constrained in the region, but there is a long-term probably strategic pushback that is coming from the Conservative security-oriented establishment that will come and we will see playout in the coming months of this year, designed to challenge the Trump administration’s perception that maximum pressure is working, to also go back to the strategy of obtaining leverage. And how are they going to do that? They’re going to use their playbook, and their playbook is you – going back to plausible deniability, relying on their proxy relationships on the one hand, but also, of course, opening the aperture and perhaps transferring their own economic pain and their own instability onto their neighbours. So, that means they will continue to threaten or even perhaps, eventually, renew some sort of direct, I think, engagement with maybe some of their Gulf neighbours that have supported the maximum pressure campaign. And the more Iran, I think under this Conservative political space, feels constrained, the more they’re going to pass on the pressure to the region. So, I think that that should be very much on our minds, and it’s something that we should be watching and be very concerned about.
Additionally, this is a long year. It’s only January 29th, and to me, it already feels like it’s September, but the Iranian Government has to survive until November 3rd. We all have to survive until November 3rd to see what the outcome of the US election is going to be, and so, how they’ll react has to be incremental and managed throughout this year. They, on the one hand, want to see what is going to happen, as Lindsay said, on November 3rd, if Trump is going to be re-elected, and that’s going to be part of their calculation in how to engage, how to obtain leverage, how to manage their situation going forward, and at the same time we have the, sort of, slow-going crisis with the JCPOA.
The European signatories of the deal, the E3, have escalated the issue of Iran’s breaches, in a process called a dispute resolution mechanism, which is designed hopefully, to bring the parties back to the table to try and encourage or pressure Iran’s compliance in exchange, perhaps, for something. The European strategy is to prolong this process, and also, prolong this process to November 3rd. So, we are in a waiting game, we are in a stalemate, but it’s a very dangerous one. So, we might be back here again for another one of these conversations, probably in the next few months, but from Tehran’s perspective, unfortunately, their response to the killing of Soleimani and the attack on the base in Iraq was not it. It was something more – inevitably, something more is coming.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, well, on that positive note, let’s move to more positive implications for the political system in Iraq, Toby, or maybe not?
Professor Toby Dodge
I think we have short and long-term consequences of what happened on the evening in the 2nd/3rd of December. Firstly, there was obviously a nationalist backlash that was exploited by the very people who up until that date had been on the backfoot, the pro-Iranian forces in parliament and on the streets. We saw the parliament, although not core, at an – subject to a huge intimidation campaign, a vote to expel Americans on the 5th of Jan– American troops on the 5th of January. Trump responded, we’re talking about sanctions on Iraq as well as Iran, and then Prime Mini – the acting Prime Minister, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, called Secretary of State Pompeo on the 9th of January saying, “Can you send a team to negotiate?” and he said, “No,” and then we have Jim Jeffries, a senior figure, working on the Middle Eastern State Department saying, “Yeah, sure we can negotiate, but it’s not only troops, it’ll be money and everything else,” but that’s a short-term consequence.
I think the much longer-term consequence, and I think where damage may have been done to Iraqi politics, to understand that we have to go back to the 1st of October, and as everyone knows, from the 1st of October onwards, there had been a massive set of incredibly powerful demonstrations. First in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, then across the whole of southern Iraq, down to Basra, where young people, up to a million young people have come onto the streets of Iraq repeatedly, and what were they doing? They were demanding the shrinking of the power of the very groups empowered again by the US strikes on the assassination of Soleimani, and a chap that Renad will talk about, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
So, this is the great problem, that from the first of October onwards, you had the most important protest movement, the largest mass movement in Iraq since 2003, and those young people firstly came onto the streets to protest against the lack of hope for the future, their lack of jobs, their lack of progress, but that quickly expanded into a very targeted and astute critique of the post-2003 political system in Iraq that has generated systemically, politically protected corruption. And from that stage, the demonstrations went on to develop a series of demands, both short-term and long-term, that if granted, would revolutionise Iraq, would revolutionise the political system.
Firstly, they demanded the resignation of the government. As the government stepped up violence against them they, got their first wish, when Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, had to – was forced to resign because of reactions to the use of violence. Now, they’ve demanded the complete reform of the electoral laws, to try and break up the dominance of the old post-2003 political parties, a lot of them Shia Islamist parties, dominating Iraq, and they’ve demanded a sweeping reform, sending corrupt Politicians to prison. I think this – and they’ve refused to get off the streets. There have been mass demonstrations, 2009/2010, and especially 2015, but they were bought off by a promise, empty promises of reform, the use of violence and the use of propaganda.
These young people, nearly 600 now, killed by state forces, have refused to go home. They’re still on the streets tonight in Baghdad and across the South. It’s that challenge, which is – which has the most potential for positive movement, and what worries me, it’s that challenge that has, to some extent, been undermined by these attacks, because it’s allowed the forces that are being challenged by those demonstrations, pro-Iranian parties, parties to the status quo, to rally and hide where they’re most comfortable, behind the decent drapery of nationalism. So, I think that’s the destructive outcome of the instant gratification of Trump’s assassination of Soleimani and Mohandes. It has done what – exactly the opposite you would have thought a US President would have wanted to achieve in Iraq.
Firstly, it’s rallied a section of public opinion against the continued US presence, but much, much more importantly, it’s allowed for the status quo powers, the pro-Iranian powers in Iraq to challenge their greatest fear. A popular mobilisation in the name of a secular nationalism that undermines the ideological justification of the post-2003 system, highlights its corruption, and has set out a manifesto for sweeping away that corruption, that sectarianism, and the elite that were empowered after 2003.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you so much. Well, obviously, you’ve mentioned two very important forces in Iraq, who are the elites in power, as well as, of course, the people on the street, and that leaves the Iran-allied armed groups and political parties in the country. Renad, where do they stand?
Dr Renad Mansour
Thank you, Lina. I think there’s something that I have been looking at, which is this debate immediately after the attack. There emerged this debate of whether this was a good decision, and you have proponents who actually think this was a good decision, because they say not only did you get rid of, you know, a senior Iranian General, but the US was waning in influence in Iraq, and because of that this is almost like a shock to that system, and as was said, a gamechanger.
And then there’s the other side of the debate, which is what Toby has kind of outlined, which is to say, this is another mission accomplished moment. America has militarily struck in Iraq, not thinking about the day after, not thinking about what comes in the long-term. So, in the short-term, if you count it, America looks like it’s won another battle, but I think the bigger argument is, has it won the war, right? And to answer that question, I think we need to look at where Iran is in all of this. As Toby said, at – right before this attack, Iran was on the backfoot in Iraq. These protests that erupted in the South and in Baghdad, were Shia mai – predominantly Shia, although it wasn’t sect-defined, Shia Iraqis, protesting not just against the political system, but Iran itself, saying, “We want Iran out of our country.” And so, Iran was on the backfoot.
Iran usually relies on the Iraqi political leadership. Qassem Soleimani was known to be able to bring everyone together, working with networks, and he was unable to. The parliament was dysfunctional. The Prime Minister had resigned and there was an inability of these groups to come together to pick someone else. So, Iran was failing both at the street politics, but also, at the national politics, and because of that, as Toby suggested, having to perhaps resort to more coercive and violent means to deal with this massive threat. So, then the attack happens, and Iran is presented with an opportunity. All of a sudden, there is an attempt to change the narrative from reform to undermine what these protestors have been arguing about and to say, “Actually, the biggest threat in Iraq remains the US,” and this argument has never gone away. Those same forces have for years, been trying to with – have US troops withdraw from Iraq, but everyone, in the last few, years would say, “What do you mean? The US doesn’t really have an influence? Like, it’s not a big deal, alright?” and many Iraqis would say Iran is the bigger, sort of, occupying power now, many of the protestors would say that.
So, this presented an opportunity to bring back anti-Americanism, and Iran turned to probably the King of anti-Americanism in post-2003 Iraq, and that is Muqtada al-Sadr, right? Sadr, the Head of the Mahdi Army had fought against the Americans for a long time, and he was currently living in Iran. And so, there are two things that happened, I think, you know, in the last few – in the last week that begin to question and undermine that narrative. So, in Iraq, since 2003, at times of crises, Iran is able to bring together the political elite, especially the Shia elite, around this external threat of the US. So, Muqtada al-Sadr promised a million-man march last Friday, right? His people were calling it the second 1920’s revolution, referring to the 1920 revolution, when the Shia South revolted against the British rule. They got maybe 150/200,000 protestors at max. So, this was clearly an indication that the same Sadr, who was able to bring all these people together under anti-Americanism, is not really able to do so anymore. These protests that Toby talked about have pierced right through that ethno-sectarian logic that has defined Iraq since 2003, and I think that’s clear.
Then something else happens that evening. Sadr demands that his supporters, because keep in mind that Muqtada in 2016, had supported the protest movements, tells his supporters to leave the streets, and they refuse. And I spoke to one of them, and the – he told me, he said, “Why would – we’ve been here for four months, with all these protesters protesting. Why would we leave our brothers because he’s telling us? We still have issues, we still want reform.” So, the point of all this is to say that Muqtada al-Sadr and the other leadership in Iraq have been less able to use anti-Americanism in a way, the idea and concept, to gain legitimacy. Now, what that suggests, sadly, is that if they can’t rely on that then they’ll have to use different means to get their way. And I think what you’re seeing and what you continue to see is the use of violence, by different groups, to bring down these protests, which as Toby say, represent the greatest existential threat to that post-2003 political system.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you so much. I have questions, but I’m also mindful of the time, so I’m going to go straight to the audience, ‘cause there’s so many of you here tonight. If you don’t mind, please introduce yourself before you ask the question, especially if you are a Chatham House Member. Tell us what else you do in life, if anything, and please, because there’s so many of you and I’m expecting a lot of question, keep your questions short. No comments, no speeches, otherwise, I will cut you off. So, we’re going to start with – I’m being honest, start with Nazenin in the middle. Just wait for the microphone, please. Remember, we are being livestreamed. In the middle there.
Nazenin Ansari
Hello, good evening, and thank you very much for a most thought-provoking session. My question is, in….
Dr Lina Khatib
Stop, introduce yourself.
Nazenin Ansari
Oh, my name is Nazenin. I’m sorry, I’m a Member of Chatham House, and I also am the Editor of online publications, Kayhan Life and Kayhan London, Iranian-British journals. So, my question is to Sanam, and I wanted to ask you, Sanam, how do you explain this divergence of views about those, such as yourself and others, experts, who believe that still, there is a chance that there is a genuine competition between Reformists and Conservatives or Pragmatists in Iran, and those on the streets, who’ve been on the streets not only in one month of 2019, but since December 2017. And those experts, yes in Washington, but the people in Iran on the streets saying that there is no difference, whether it’s Reformists or Conservative. It’s just the same old Islamic Republic and a theocracy. Thank you.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you. I’m going to take a couple more questions. I think there was one on this side, yes.
Ina Rollo
Thank you very much. To Renad and Toby, maybe.
Dr Lina Khatib
Introduce yourself.
Ina Rollo
Ina Rollo from King’s College London, Research Fellow. My question is regarding to Sadr, now you mentioned that he has been very successful in navigating the mood, but how much do you think he’s currently risking in alienating his own base by posing, for example, like, with leaders like Akram al-Kaabi and, sort of, like, reviving his [inaudible – 32:47]. Thank you.
Dr Lina Khatib
Great, there was a question at the very back there.
Casey Dwyer
Hey, Casey Dwyer, I’m a Member of Chatham House, Macro-Strategist for a hedge fund outside of Chatham House, and thanks for coming tonight. My question concerns Iran’s economy. The IMF reported that the balance of payments for Iran is going to result in a currency crisis, and the United States Government reported I think it was that their access to their available capital was only half of what the IMF has reported. So, I guess, question to the group is, when does this come to a head, and is it this year?
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you so much. So, we’ve got Iran’s economy, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Reformist-Conservative dichotomy. Let’s start with you, Sanam, two questions on Iran.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Okay, I’ll take the economy first. You know, it’s very hard, I think, to make predictions about the sustainability of Iran’s economy, really because the Iranian Government is not being as transparent about its fiscal health, its exports, its reserves, because it is portraying this crisis as economic warfare. So, you can judge the analysis, you can judge the numbers, and I have a hard time squaring those numbers and that analysis with what I hear from people also in Iran, and I hear everything. I hear everything’s fine. I hear the restaurants are full. I hear the government is spending money beautifying the parks, and I hear that people are struggling to find medicine and having a hard time buying food and that inflation is high.
So, I can’t make predictions, because I don’t go back to Iran and I don’t have access to the data, so it’s very hard to know. But what I can tell you is that I don’t believe that the Islamic Republic will come to the negotiating table, solely based on inflation or GDP or employment numbers, because the Islamic Republic is an autocratic state and it has coercive power, and we’ve seen that coercive power on display repeatedly, over the past decades. They will come to the table, if they come to the table, when they come to the table, I do believe they will come to the table, let me say that, when they feel that they are in a position domestically and regionally to do so. When it is in their interest to come to the table, and I think that right now they feel that they are far away from the floor and they are far away from a Venezuela scenario. And I think that they have demonstrated that they can handle a Venezuela scenario, and they look around at all of the different scenarios out there that the Trump administration has tried, whether it’s negotiations with North Korea, whether it’s the relationship with Venezuela, even the ongoing US, you know, relationship with Cuba, and I think that they’re – the jury is still out on whether they feel that they can come to the table with this guy.
There are some people in the country that make the argument that this is the President to make the deal with, because it is all about just putting Trump in front of the JCPOA. But, at the same time, there is a question of ideology, and the Supreme Leader is really – there’s one thing he has been, you know, committed to as Supreme Leader for 30 years, and that’s been anti-American sentiment and seeking to see the US reduced, diminished, particularly in the Middle East. So, you know, I can’t say more than that on that issue.
Then, to Nazenin’s question, you know, and this is a difficult one, and not one that I can even attempt to unpack in a minute here. I think, you know, the Iranian system is an authoritarian system and it has a stronger informal unelected system of governance than it does an elected system of governance. But yet, in a 40-year period, whether it’s been coerced or whether it has been voluntary, and we have seen examples and signs of both, people have come out to vote and have helped determine and surprise us at the election box. And, you know, this is what makes the study of Iran quite interesting because it is not predictable, and that it continues to surprise us.
Iran, yes, is a theocracy, but the dynamics in Iranian society are very much changing, and to reduce it solely to the views of an Iranian diaspora, like myself, I will put myself in there, I haven’t been back for ten years, would be unjust to understand what is happening inside Iran. The views of the younger generation have changed. There are people that come out to protest on economic reasons. There are people that have come out to protest on political reasons, but there is a reason why the Islamic Republic has been resilient for 40 years, and the problem is that it is a coercive state, but it is a state that has been also equally successful at preventing the emergence of indigenous leadership. And also, at the same time, I think the problem also, rests in the diaspora that overly politicises everything that happens in Iran and doesn’t allow for Iranian indigenous voices to come out and express the dichotomy of views and the contradictions and often competing narratives that exist in Iran. Iran is not a monolith, it’s not a homogenous place, it is a complex place, where people can like Soleimani and hate the Islamic Republic.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you. Well, we’re going to move to Renad, the question on Muqtada al-Sadr now.
Dr Renad Mansour
It’s funny, because my colleagues, who work in the US, often complain that they have to, sort of, speak for Trump, and it’s so hard to speak for someone unpredictable, and I was like, “We have to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr, who is known to be a chameleon, who one day, you know, will do the anti-American thing and one day will do the anti-Iran thing.” And I think it’s important, when you understand the, sort of, Sadrist movement to view it as a movement and not a political party, and so not that – it’s not an organisation, we have a very clear command structure, although he is the head of that movement, and that movement – I mean, Ben Robin, who works on this, and I will publish something soon on, you know, what Muqtada wants, because that’s what everyone is interested now, vis-à-vis what’s happened. He’s clearly tried to make a play, especially – we talk about Qassem Soleimani, but the killing of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is massive for Iraqi politics.
He was very much seen as one of the main architects of what was going to happen and, sort of, vis-à-vis the response, and not just protests, but the political elite. And so there’s a space there and Sadr was the first to, kind of, really come out and try and fill that vacuum, and by going to some of his former enemies, including those that are part of the al-Hajj de Shamil, as you mentioned in that. So, I would say the Sadrist movement, you can split it up into three groups, and Ben and I wrote about this. One are the, sort of – you can call them – I mean, obviously, the militia, as you mentioned, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, so the armed group. The other group would be the clerics, so there’s a religious side to it, and the final group is this, sort of, political and civic, sort of, civil society angle to the Sadrist Movement, which is really the one on the streets.
Now, these three groups rarely interact with each other, but they’re all guided by this, sort of, principle of Sadr, and especially his father, Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr. What’s clearly happening now is a part of the political and civic movement that was part of the Sadrist Movement is no longer willing to, you know, respond or obey the orders, if they believe something is not to them, right? And so that’s why I mentioned with the whole anti-Americanism, Muqtada is no longer able to just sway them one way or another, and there’s a big debate of whether he able was, because he was also someone who – I think it was you who said this, has the an – what’s your anthropologist thing?
Professor Toby Dodge
Oh God, I’ll say it in a minute, don’t steal it.
Dr Renad Mansour
Unfortunately, I won’t steal it, although it’s pretty good and he’ll say it. But to conclude, I think look at where Muqtada has been, since October in Iran, and various theories why he’s there. Partly, he was at risk in Iraq. His movement, sort of, he was losing that grip on power, but also, he’s looking to, some people would say, gain religious credential. So, he’s clearly feeling that he needs to be in Iran, and so this was an opportunity to come back, and again, if you view it as a movement and not as a political party, what you’ll see is, it’s very fragmented and Muqtada then, will have to make certain compromises to be able to take over this. But again, the point still remains, I think this is really the first time since 2003 that the political leadership in Iraq is so fragmented that not one leader, from Maliki to Sadr to some of the Hashid to others, feel that they actually have control over the process.
Dr Lina Khatib
Yes?
Professor Toby Dodge
Thank you, he’s setting up the – anyway. So, what I used to say, and luckily someone’s remembered it, is that…
Dr Renad Mansour
I almost remembered it.
Professor Toby Dodge
…Sadr has a very – had, I think, a very big pair of anthropological ears, and he would listen and carefully track the opinion of his core support base. And he was incredibly good at both networking them and keeping with them, and that – you – and so, you see in Sadr, or you used to see in Sadr, that sometimes contradictory ideological trends of urban, working class, quite often young men. And so you saw him go from a, kind of, rallying anti-American nationalism, claiming unitary brotherhood between Sunni and Shia through, and let’s be frank about this, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, one of – being one of the key forces driving the Civil War forward in Iraq, and then demobilising the Jaysh al-Mahdi and moving into a reformist protest movement, and during that time he had comparative, relative autonomy from Iran. The Iranians penetrated Jaysh al-Mahdi, split it into competing factions, and only once or twice, and the crucial moment was in 2010, went against his own supporters. He backed Nouri al-Maliki getting a second term, and then he issued a statement, which is basically saying, “I’m really sorry, but you don’t understand the pressure I am being placed in.” And it comes to today, as Renad was saying. He has – he runs a danger of splitting his movement or breaking his legitimacy because he’s clearly swimming against the tide of his base and of public opinion, and if you look at a lot of the – and people, especially initially who were shot and murdered in Tahrir Square, they came from Sadr’s city, his base within Baghdad. So, why did he do that? And I think Renad’s touched on it. Two things. One, he came under immense pressure from Tehran, where – and where he was resident, because he believed he’s safer under Iranian protection in Tehran than he would – in Qom, in Iran, than he would be in Baghdad. But two, it’s a power play. I think during the protest movement, but especially with the rise of the Hashd ash-Sha’bi after 2014, the Sadrist Movement, especially its military wing, has become weak. So, what he was trying to do was step into the space vacated by the assassination and the murder of Mohandes, who was the great Hashid centraliser. But in doing that he’s taken a huge gamble, because I don’t think the Iranians will let him grow much stronger, and he has betrayed or at least confused and fractured his support base across Baghdad and southern Iraq.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you. Well, we’re going to move to a next round of questions. I’m going to also take three. We’re going to start with you, sir. Just wait for the microphone.
Hooman
Hello, my name is Hooman. I’m a Researcher in International Security at the University of Sussex. Actually, I have two questions, and I…
Dr Lina Khatib
One question, we only have time.
Hooman
Okay. So, I’m Iranian.
Dr Renad Mansour
A lot of questions.
Hooman
Yeah. I was just wondering, that – don’t you think that killing the General Soleimani’s related to the peace deal of Mr Trump, which happened just two days ago? Because as far as we know, the only country, which is supporting Palestine in the Middle East, I mean, the government, the people, everyone is…
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, yeah, thank you.
Hooman
…yeah, is Iran. So, don’t you think it’s related to the peace deal with the Israel?
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thanks a lot. We’ve got – you had a question at the front here, if you could just also wait for the microphone, please.
Hilde Raap
Thank you. Hilde, I’m a Member at Chatham House, and I run the Centre for International Peacebuilding, and I’m, sort of, picking up an undercurrent in all your presentations, and thank you for them, which is like the shifting of tectonic plates between an ideologically-driven agenda, and what I would want to term not so much nationalism as a kind of patriotism, where people will say, “We don’t like what he’s doing, but he’s one of us,” and I think that is breaking through a, kind of, pragmatic, identifying within your own borders for a positive political change agenda, and I just wonder whether this is something that resonates with you? Thank you.
Dr Lina Khatib
Thank you. Okay, we have lots of hands, but we have to go to the back, very back. Yes.
Domenic Carratu
Thank you. Domenic Carratu, Member of Chatham House and a Banker for my living. Again, thank you very much for the presentation. To keep it brief, America’s, you know, America first, pulling out of the Middle East, trying to do deals on the way through, but the Iranians aren’t just going to kowtow and just give in tomorrow, so with all that. If you were the Iranians, wouldn’t you look to somewhere like Russia, maybe, as an ally, a partner to change its tectonic plates, like Syria did?
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you. Lindsay, we’re going to start with you.
Dr Lindsay Newman
Sure, please, let’s. Well, I’ll take the peace deal question, and I could touch on the patriotism question. You know, the – I take your point. For me, the peace deal, which of course, was released after a long stalled, long awaited process yesterday, for me, the timing reflects more on domestic dynamics for both Israel and the US than it does anything specific to Iran and Qassem Soleimani. Bibi, obviously, was indicted yesterday, and is under a lot of domestic pressures, going up against his – I think his third or fourth election, and he’s now going to use, sort of, mapping that came out of the peace deal, to go forward with annexation of the West Bank further. So, there’s that dynamic, and then of course, at home it is a campaign promise kept for Donald Trump to release a peace plan. So, for me, the peace plan is less to do with Qassem Soleimani than it does with domestic dynamics, for both Israel and the US.
I take your point as well. I mean, I think it’s an expedient foreign policy, I think, in that sense. You know, I often say that there are – Trump is not ideological about many things, and I think it is more of an America first expediency, a patriotism. I like your point.
Dr Lina Khatib
Is there going to be a pivot to Russia?
Dr Sanim Vakil
Well, Russia and Iran have had a chequered, but longstanding history that I think many countries have been trying to peel back in different ways, whether it’s in Syria or, you know, pragmatic co-operation in Central Asia. I think this is a relationship that, of course, has deepened particularly during times of strain with – or this containment period that is now back, and the Russians are definitely helping the Iranians, and I think that the hard-line security establishment finds comfort in its relationship with Russia’s own hard-line security establishment as well. So, there’s a natural gravity there that I think, you know, Putin has, you know, made easy headway in the Middle East, not just because of Trump, also because of Obama, and it’s important to call out President Obama for that. I know everybody misses him, but we do have to acknowledge he didn’t cross a red line, and this resulted in a growing Iranian influence and growing Russian influence. So, the Russians have diversified relations all around, and how they manage that is really quite interesting, but the relationship with Iran is not one that is easily resolvable. It’s very compartmentalised and I think it will continue to be so, going forward.
Just on the tectonic plates quickly, I mean, nationalism has always been a strong facet of Iranian identity that seemingly, I think, many Middle Eastern countries have forgotten, and as it, you know, been – was wrapped up in Islamic ideology, and as that Islamic ideology is waning in Iran, and it is waning in Iran, you just might not see it or hear it, but it’s happening, and it’s probably going to come. As there’s leadership transition in the Islamic Republic, that nationalism will be even stronger, and unfortunately, I think, the bad news is for the United States or for many regional countries, who think that things will change should Iran, you know, remove the Islamic from the Republic. That national impulse is always going to be there. It was be – it was there under the Shah, and it’s going to stay there.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, right, I’m going to move to the final round, unless you have something very quick to say on that?
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, very quick. Something important across the region on this question is the generational shift that’s happening. So, in Iraq especially, over two – like, I think over two-thirds of the population is under 25. And so, when these elite come back and try and use the anti-American or even the Saddam Hussein card to try and – it’s not working, because all they know is the current leaders they have. And I think across the region, what you see in Lebanon and elsewhere, are these youth, these kids coming out and saying that, “We’re not sectarian, we’ve never been sectarian.” This whole idea, the genie that has been let out the bottle in 2003, does not exist, and I think that trend will continue with the generational shift in the countries.
Dr Lina Khatib
Right, we don’t have much time. I want to say thank you for keeping your questions short so far. Keep doing that, and to my panellists, they’ve done better than you, keep your answers short. So, final round. Yes.
Mike Stevens
Thank you. Mike Stevens, I’m an Independent Researcher. So, just one question, switching to an almost advisory look at the problem, how – what could be done or what should be done, in order to get the protest movement in Iraq back to that positive place it was and repair the damage that has been done, if we agree that damage has been done to it? Thank you.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you, and yes, just wait for the microphone. Very front row.
Dina Ramadan
Dina Ramadan, Oxford Centre for Islamic Study. My question – I’m a Member of the house, my question is to Lindsay. Lindsay, I’m little bit confused about the American positions toward the killing of Soleimani. As far as I know, he is a terrorist, like Baghdadi. He killed a lot of people and everything. So, why one should celebrate the killing of Baghdadi, while be sceptical or denounce the killing of Soleimani? This is one. Another one, what are the implication for their own Syrian file?
Dr Lina Khatib
Oh, okay. Well, we’re going to have one more question from you, yeah, second – third row from the back. Yes, you, yeah.
Wilson
Thank you very much. Wilson [inaudible – 53:40], Freelance Journalist. My question is regarding the killing of Qassem Soleimani. Right after his death, defenders said, “Well, he had a very important role in the fight against ISIS,” but did he have an important role, actually? What do you assess was exactly his role in that war?
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you so much. Right, quickfire – thick wire – fire answers, starting with you again, Lindsay.
Dr Lindsay Newman
I think it’s important that we distinguish between the American population and the Trump administration and Trump himself. In their view, in the Trump administration’s view, there was – initially they, you know, they suggested that there was this imminent threat of an attack on US assets and interests. Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, then, sort of, slipped and said, you know, regardless of what was coming he was, you know, a threat to the US in the past. So, I think it’s important to distinguish between – I don’t – you know, between the US, which is a vast, diverse country, and the Trump administration and their objectives.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, great. So, would you like to take the what should reinvigorate the protests and get it back on track, yeah, Toby?
Professor Toby Dodge
Yeah, thanks for that [pause].
Dr Renad Mansour
Your time’s up.
Professor Toby Dodge
Thank you. The protest movement, it’s a massive watershed moment in post-2003 Iraq, and it’s a revolt against the system setup after the Anglo-American invasion. So, not only does Washington, although probably doesn’t recognise it, have responsibility, and London does, I think the international community threw the United Nations. Now, the United Nations’ Special – their Secretary General Special Representative in Baghdad has been comparatively vocal, and after a few missteps, I think, has supported the demonstration, but I think where the international community come in is through mediation. The demonstrators quite rightly feel isolated, feel persecuted, subject of ma – intense violent suppression. The international community has to – could come in and mediate between the powers that be and the demonstrators and try and find a way forward, because the gap is so huge that the sense of hatred from some in the ruling elite versus a sense of understandable deep mistrust by the demonstrators, somehow a compromise needs to be moved forward, and internationally, both governments and the UN, haven’t been as active and as forward leaning as they could be.
Dr Renad Mansour
Can I answer the question on President Soleimani and his role? So, in 2014, when ISIS took over one-third of Iraq, the Turks left, the Americans weren’t there, and most Iraqi Politicians, whether they were Shia or Kurdish or Sunnis, turned to Qassem Soleimani and to Iran. And even, you know, the KDP admitted in August 2014 that if it was not for Iran, ISIS could have taken over Erbil, and many in Baghdad think that could’ve happened in the South. So, what his role was, was to bring together these networks of relationships that Iran has, because unlike the US, which is very transactional with who they deal with in Iraq, Iran has long-term networks and relationships with all these actors that are not based on ethno-sectarian lines often, although sometimes they are. So, his role was very much in bringing together, let’s say, as the state crumbled, as the Iraqi army crumbled, bringing together different militias, to help support and stop some of these other cities from taking – being taken over by ISIS.
Dr Lina Khatib
Can I ask you, where is ISIS now, as a result of his disappearance from the scene?
Dr Renad Mansour
So, I mean, people are looking at this. So, obviously, the bigger question is, what happens if the US leave, because ISIS, there are still a few thousand ISIS, sort of, underground in parts of Iraq, particularly in areas where you have tensions between different armed groups that have defeated ISIS, and now they’re fighting each other, in different ways, of parts of Iraq. So, the biggest concern, I think, is it’s not just the US leaving, but what happens to NATO and other European missions that are there, both diplomatically and, sort of, militarily, because a lot of them rely on the US for cover. And that’s important in Baghdad and Iraq, the US will be there, and because of that I think it’s safe to say that most Iraqis and also many parts of the Iranian regime, would not want Iraq to either become, sort of, a pariah state, sanctioned, or fall again to ISIS, because, like, an – unlike any other countries where Iran had so much influence, Iraq is on its border, and I think 2014 was a wakeup call for Iran that the stability of Iraq, it can’t be too strong but it cannot be too weak.
Dr Lina Khatib
Okay, thank you. A final note from me, since you mentioned it, on Syria, and since the panel is called Implications for the Middle East. As you can see, we kind of gave you the answer here. Iran loom – Iraq looms large. For me, I don’t think that the killing of Soleimani is going to have huge repercussions in Syria. I think Iraq is where it’s at, and as you can see, the repercussions are mostly political, rather than military. I think Iran, in my view, is going to be forced to prioritise its engagement in the region. I think Iraq will always matter, for all the reasons outlined just now. Syria is a bit more, I think, transactional compared to how Iraq is for Iran right now. Hezbollah remains very important, and I see a reinvigoration of Lebanese-Iraqi dynamics, somehow bypassing Syria, perhaps rolling back Iran’s hands-on involvement in Syria to something resembling pre-2011. So, not disappearing, not giving up, not leaving, but changing the way Iran operates through its proxies and allies inside Syria.
On that note, thank you so much for joining us tonight. Sorry to all those who couldn’t ask questions, but hopefully, we’ll do some more, and join me in thanking the panel [applause].
