Bobo Lo
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends and colleagues. My name is Bobo Lo and I have the honour and pleasure to moderate what I think will be a most interesting and stimulating discussion on a highly topical issue, namely Western attitudes and policies towards Russia.
Now, to discuss the subject we have an excellent and diverse panel. On my immediate left is Sir Rodric Braithwaite, formerly British Ambassador to Soviet Union and then Russia, and the Author of many books, including, most recently, Armageddon and Paranoia: the Nuclear Confrontation Since 1945. To his left is Aglaya Snetkov, a Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, at London University and Co-Editor of the Russian Analytical Digest. To Aglaya’s left is Domitilla Sagramoso, Lecturer at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. And finally, we have Edward Lucas, previously a Senior Editor at The Economist, Author of The New Cold War and now Senior Vice President at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington.
Ladies and gentlemen, Western policy towards Russia today represents, in my view, a most confusing picture, rife with contradictions. We have the most pro-Kremlin US President in history and yet, US-Russia relations are worse than at any time since the mid-1980s. Europeans are thoroughly divided on Russia, with a number of countries openly sympathetic towards the Kremlin or lukewarm in their opposition. And yet, EU sanctions against Moscow remain firmly in place and NATO is more cohesive and assertive than it has been in years.
Many in the West see Russia as an, essentially, malign actor, yet, there is a growing trend asserting that it is not Russia, but rather China, that poses the bigger threat to the so-called Liberal World Order, or rule- based international system. And they call for a pragmatic accommodation with the Kremlin to meet this existential challenge.
So, the question I want to put to our panellists and also to you in the audience is, where the West goes from here in its approach towards Russia? I would like us to focus less on how we got here, who, or what is to blame for the current crisis in Russia-West relations. I really want us to focus on what are the main challenges today and how should we go about addressing them? So, to set the ball rolling, I’ll ask you, Rodric, to deliver some remarks, please.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Thank you, Bobo. I’m going to – I hope it fits in with what Bobo said. I’m going to start with a couple of quotes to set the scene, or rather, the extremes of the argument. One is a piece that was in The Times on the 3rd of May and The Times said, on the 3rd of May, “When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, few could’ve anticipated that the main threat to national security,” and they meant British national security, “nearly 30 years later, would come from another hostile regime in the Kremlin.” And the other quote, or rather, adjectives from an article, is from something that Ed Lucas wrote in The Times on the 8th of February. And he said, and I agree with him, not The Times, he said, “Most commentary about Russia,” I’m just picking out words he used, “is simplistic, proposterally alarmist – preposterously alarmist, marked by clichés, caricatures and hysteria.” So, that’s the – now, the tone of the debate that we’ve all been having for the last, I suppose, probably since, roughly speaking, 2003, the arrest of Khodorkovsky, perhaps 2005, I think has been characterised by an excess of emotion, a great deal of indignation at the actions of Russia. The igni – indignation is perfectly understandable. In my view, it clouds judgment and it’s useless as an analytical tool.
And on that point, I’m going to talk about what Edward calls, other people also, whataboutery. It’s, you know, you crit – an American criticises the Russian and the Russian says, “What about the Negros in the Southern states?” Well, those sort of comparisons, I think, are useful. I think they are an analytical tool. It’s not a question of moral equivalents, which is – one example said, and you can say it’s a form of a met assessment that Andy Marshall talked about, you balance these things against one another and see where it nets out. A fact, and it’s a fact that since 1945, the West has interfered in more foreign elections, overthrown more foreign Governments, invaded more foreign Governments and killed a lot more foreigners than the Russians have ever done. Now, y0u can think what you like about that. It is a fact. You have to balance it against our moral indignation about what the Russians get up to. The point really is, in my view, that Russian activities are reprehensible, but actually, they’re not all that unusual. That’s the sort of thing that people do. I’ll come back to the question of where that leaves us, as far as policy conc – is concerned.
But I’m going to talk about the threat, what the – briefly. What is the treat? Well, it – various aspects of that. First of all, the – at the most optimistic estimate, Russian defence spending is about a quarter of that of the USA. It’s about a third that of China. It’s two thirds that of India. Those comparisons – that’s a PPP rate, so it’s probably the best comparison. Hybrid warfare? Well, the Russians didn’t invent it, we – it was invented years ago. Probably find it in [inaudible – 06:37], they are good at it, but they’re certainly no better at it than we are. We have perfectly competent, as we’ve shown recently, defences against cyberattack and ways of finding out what bad people have been up to. Now, the Russians, if I were a Balt or a Pole, I would see a direct, possibly existential threat, to me, to my country. I think that’s perfectly understandable. Why do we bother about it? We’ve fought only two wars against the Russians in our history and each time it was ‘cause we had invaded Russia. So, what are we going on about?
What are the Russian’s assets? Well, their size, it’s a huge country. They’re people, they’re resilient people and ingenious. They have sophisticated armed forces, they do, nuclear weapons, not to forget, but they have huge weaknesses, a small population economy. So, my strong view is, we should not – you’ll tell me if I’m going on too long, we shouldn’t underestimate them, of course we shouldn’t, but we shouldn’t overestimate them, either. The overestimation of Soviet force, Soviet political stability, Soviet economic prowess was one of the great mistakes that the Cold – our Cold War Analysts made.
Now, how much time we got?
Bobo Lo
About a minute.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Okay, very quick, policy, it’s what you wanted to look at. I call – I think you need to be realistic, not indignant. So, I think that our reactions to Ukraine and Skripal were perfectly sensible ones and probably near the limit of what we were actually capable of doing. We were not going to ever be able to push the Russians out of Crimea or East Ukraine, so we strengthened NATO and our allies, at least. We develop it and are developing our cyber capacity and importantly, I think we have – it’s turned out that we’re not prepared to make unsustainable commitments to potential allies, the Ukraine again, because if we did, we’d betray them. We – as we betrayed the Poles, as we betrayed the Balts. We shouldn’t take on. Oh, look, Russians are cross about that, so what did they expect? I shall omit one bit, but I shall just say one thing, Mark Galeotti’s just written a book, We Should Talk About Putin, and one of the things he says is, “The more we talk up the Russians, the more power we give Putin.” And he advises us to laugh at them instead, as the Russians themselves do, for example, over the Salisbury affair. If you look on the internet at the Russian jokes, they’re hilarious.
Thank you.
Bobo Lo
Rodric, I just wanted to follow-up a couple of things here. If whataboutery or whataboutism is legitimate in some way, do we just say, well, look, the past is – yeah, we just forget what they do. We call it the, sort of, value neutral, both sides were in the wrong and therefore, we need to, sort of, just be pragmatic. We need to crack on, or – and the second issue related to that is, are you saying that, really, they’re not a threat, so why are we so obsessed by them?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I’d say much more subtle things than either of those things. I mean, you know, of course, there’s a values issue and, of course, I’m glad that I was in the West, rather than the East, during the Cold War and that the end of the Cold War came out the way it did. I’ve got absolutely no doubt about that. I have no doubt where I’d prefer to live. I’d actually prefer to live here, rather than America, but if I had to choose between America and Russia, I’ve no doubt, and I love Russia very much, but I know where I’d want to live. So, that’s the first point.
Your second point was?
Bobo Lo
Is Russia a threat?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Well, I…
Bobo Lo
I mean, if you’re saying it’s over – we’re overestimating the threat, should we just, basically, say, look, it’s not a threat. It might be a rogue, but it’s…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
No.
Bobo Lo
…not a threat?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I don’t think it’s a rogue. I think it is a threat and what I mean by that is, I said if you’re in Eastern Europe, of course, it’s a direct threat of an old fashioned kind, and I had a long argument with one of Yeltsin’s Political Advisors about a NATO enlargement in 1995. And he said, “Why are you enlarging? We’re not going to invade Poland.” And I said, “I don’t think you are going to invade Poland, but the Poles don’t know that,” and that’s actually very important. And that’s what all the trouble with NATO and the Russians, a lot of the trouble with NATO and the Russians is partly due to the fact that we try to pretend that NATO wasn’t an alliance selected against Russia. Why did the East Europeans want to join NATO? That’s its reasons for existence. Going into Iraq turned out not to be a very good function for NATO. So – sorry, I’m going to give someone else a try.
Bobo Lo
No, no, it’s brilliant. No, thank you. Aglaya? [Applause] You can speak from there, or you can come up to the – whatever you prefer.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
Thank you very much and thank you very much for starting off the discussion, Rodric, ‘cause I think that was very interesting, and I think my take on it is similar, but I guess slightly extends it, that I think that there are a number of issues, if you, sort of, take the title of the talk more literally, in terms of Russia watching, that there has been so much – such a lively debate, so much discussion about Russia and there has been so many pieces written that, you know, I used to study an obscure subject and it has just risen and risen up the agenda. And even when I started doing this many years ago, I absolutely did not expect Russia to be constantly in the headlines.
And I think that there has been – a lot of people have conc – have talked about the concern that there has been so much hyperbole and so much multifaceted debate, but actually, trying to figure out that question and having a reasonable debate is very difficult and that you are very quickly, side and position, within a particular camp. And actually, trying – so, some people, I would say, have positioned themselves and made a career out of wanting to, sort of, kick out the headlines, some have tried to position themselves as more reasonable, kind of, talking heads. But I think that is – that, sort of – a topic of Russia is no longer a discussion of – a simple discussion of foreign policy, it has become more than that. And I think that’s one thing that I think we need to keep in mind, when talking about Russia and the West. And I think in that sense, there is also – and that’s something that I would say has changed, since Ukraine, specifically, also since 2016, is that it used to be a simple discussion on foreign policy. And to some extent, you could have, I would argue, much more of agreement, let’s say, within EU, but even within – between the EU and the US about Russia.
Now, you could be positive and you could argue that in the early 2000s, it was much more of a cordial relationship, or you could be much more negative and we have Munich. But it was something that was happening out there, and we could think about norms or principles, or reactions to crises, and there was a – some sort of a Western position. But I think that what has changed, in the last – since Ukraine and since Skripal and since US elections, is the extent to which has now become a conversation about Russia is a conversation about ourselves and about domestic policy. And this has exploded the subject and made it much more complex and therefore, discussions about how to get unity between NAT – within NATO on Russia, is precisely that problem, is that NATO members themselves, within themselves, have very different positions and you have very different groups. And I – because I edit a – an online – a week – a bi-weekly publication in Russia that is edited by colleagues from the US, the UK, Switzerland and Germany, I ask them what they think about Russia and the West, in each of their countries. And, for example, my German colleagues very much said, you know, “It used to be easy. There was the left and there was the right and we knew which, politically, which way all the experts and the answer to this question went,” and by now it is so split. The CDU is split, the Socialists are split, the Greens are a little bit less so and I think that – what Russia, therefore, makes us think about is what our own red lines, domestically, what are the red lines in terms of foreign policy? How do we react to questions on Facebook? How do we react? So, they explode these questions that we never considered that would have anything to do with Russia, because Russia used to be Russia and NATO, or Russia and energy and those were the topics. And that makes it very complex, because all of a sudden, it makes it about yes, what do we think about our own information security? And those are, sort of, cutting edge questions that we don’t know ourselves.
But so, to finish up, I think what it also reminds us is that we no longer live in a world of the Cold War, we know that. But the difference is that whereas before, foreign powers used to be a question of, as I said, foreign policy, by now it’s domestic. It is about what do we do with China, within our domestic realm, what we do with Russia, within our domestic world – realm? Do we do business? Do we allow technology coming in? And that makes it interesting, but it also makes it much more complex.
Bobo Lo
So, are you saying that our dealings with Russia, really, in a sense, is holding a mirror to ourselves? Because what I was going to ask you is also, are we, in a way, using Russia and not just Russia, China and certain non-Western countries, as a, kind of, easy option to evade responsibility for our own failings in the West? I mean, we talk a lot about rules-based international order and yet, others would say, well, hold on, what rules-based international order? You break it every day of the week. So, what is your reaction to that? I mean, oh, well, do we use Russia as an excuse, basically?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
So, I think I would answer that with say – with – in two ways. So, I think, on the one hand, we definitely use it as a scapegoat. And enough people have criticised the discussion around Brexit and Russia, and I will not get into this debate, but one could argue, and I think that has definitely been utilised and it has become a symbol for something else. I think that in the US, often, it becomes a symbol for a party political discussion.
But I think the other element, and I think in that sense the metaphor of a mirror is useful, is that they actually show us things that we haven’t thought about, like – such as cybersecurity, right? It’s not about where the Russians use it, right, but who else can use it? Which we don’t know the answer. What are the limits of our own rules? Like, who do we want to include and exclude? So, they – I think the interesting thing of using Russia is also the thinking piece and yeah, and I would.
Bobo Lo
Domi, let’s bring you in at this stage. Do you – oh.
Domitilla Sagramoso
Thank you, Bobo. Thank you and good evening to everyone. Two years ago, I participated in an intelligence square debate, where I made a case in favour of bringing Russia in from the cold. And after two years of additional, very thorough, research on Russia’s actions in what we call the near abroad and the far abroad, I’m still of the view that despite, or maybe because of, Russia’s behaviour, very assertively in many areas, we still need to engage in some kind of very firm, and I underline the word ‘firm’, dialogue with Russia on issues, which are of key relevance to us. So, I’m still very much of the view that we should not isolate Russia, but we should just try to find a way of a meaningful dialogue on issues, which are of very much importance. And those range, of course, from arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, international terrorism, climate change and, of course, issues of regional security, many of which cannot be resolved without Russia’s participation and thinking about issues of non-proliferation, and then thinking about Iran, North Korea, to a certain extent. And, of course, when we think about European security, it cannot be – issues related to enhancing European security, cannot be resolved without taking Russia into account and, of course, the problems around Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, potential, sort of, additional hybrid warfare in the Baltic States, meddling in elections in Europe, support for right wing parties, efforts on undermining European security. In a way, they all refer to Russia. So, I think Russia is, as always, sort of, part and parcel of our security discourse.
I think we have, in our understanding of our relations with Russia, you know, we’ve really moved away from – we’ve long passed this phase of, sort of, integrating Russia into the West. Efforts are developing a strategic partnership have also – have failed and led nowhere and I think now we find ourselves in this situation when we are much more handling Russia in the way of, sort of, damage limitation. Trying to minimise the impact of Russia’s actions with other clear strategic framework of how, or how to handle Russia and what to do about Russia. There is a lot of emphasis on, sort of, strategic patience. I’m of the view that this static position can sometimes be very dangerous, because it can, sort of, cement our disagreements. So, my emphasis, again, is on trying to engage with Russia in a, sort of, meaningful and selective dialogue on issues, which are of great relevance and where we really can move forward.
I’m certainly not in favour of, sort of, cutting bargains, sort of, Venezuela versus Ukraine. I think that is extremely dangerous. I’m very much in favour of upholding very clearly our red lines, in terms of principles and values, but also, in terms of what refers to our security and prosperity. Efforts to undermine NATO, to undermine the European Union, I think really go to the core of our national interests and I, when I say our, I’m thinking of Europe generally.
I think that the dialogue must really involve trying to find solutions to issues, which are of great relevance today and when I think about arms control, in particular, with the INF Treaty, countries are being pulled off, the CFE Treaty as well, problems with the New START Treaty being – expiring soon, I think it’s very important to find common ground and also, to develop some kind of confidence building measures along the borders of Russia and the Western NATO, in order to avoid some kind of accidental confrontation. I think the dangers of escalation are very strong and when you talk about people in Russia, they are very worried. We seem to ignore their worries and I think that will be to our peril.
So, should we, fundamentally, change our approach? No, I’m not really talking about that. I think we generally should stay firm, and I agree with Rodric, in many of our decisions that we have taken. I think under a different set of circumstances, I would’ve argued in favour of a much broader sort of discussion on European and international security issues, of the kind we conducted in the 1970s, when we engaged in a very, sort of, effective dialogue with the Soviet Union around the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, which led to Helsinki final act, I think, today. That is difficult to achieve, not necessarily because of what is happening in Russia, but what is happening in the West and the lack of strong American leadership. In the United States, we have a leader who doesn’t really support and enhance multilateral negotiations and doesn’t really value global institutions. So, I think it’s very hard now to find the kind of co-operation and dialogue that we would hope would have developed. I’m of the view, generally, that you cannot build European security, excluding Russia, so, in some way, we need to find a way around it.
So, if I have a few minutes to conclude?
Bobo Lo
No, and you’re – I want to ask you a question there. You talk about the need to engage with Russia. Yet, what does engagement mean? When people talk about Russia’s legitimate interests, what are those legitimate interests? Because, for a lot of people, when they hear ‘engagement’, it’s just another soft word for a kind of appeasement, give the Russians what they want, when they want. How do you respond to criticisms like that?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I’m not talking about appeasement. I think that…
Bobo Lo
No, no, but…
Domitilla Sagramoso
…negotiations doesn’t neces – does not necessarily mean handing in. I think sitting down, finding agreements on arms control, that’s…
Bobo Lo
But if you can’t find agreements, what – you’re just saying you need to the dialogue first?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think you have to sit down and start the dialogue. At the moment we don’t even have a dialogue and I think that we need to understand what the issues are of concern to Russia and I think that every country, and not just Russia, has legitimate interest in the countries around it…
Bobo Lo
And what does…
Domitilla Sagramoso
…to ensure…
Bobo Lo
…that mean? What does legitimate mean for you?
Domitilla Sagramoso
Interests that make sure that the country doesn’t suffer, for example, from a blockade in trade, that it doesn’t feel that its own security is being undermined, that it doesn’t feel that it is under threat from its neighbours. So, I think that – I mean, I think we should not demonise this idea of legitimate interests.
Bobo Lo
Okay, fair enough, alright.
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think we should think about them, in terms that every single country has them and so…
Bobo Lo
This seems a perfect moment to bring Edward in, at this stage [applause].
Edward Lucas
Well, thanks very much, indeed, Bobo, though I was crossing off points that I wanted to make, ‘cause you were making them as well. I need to apologise in advance that I’m going to have to leave a little bit early, for another meeting. So, I’m not running away from the discussion, whichever way it goes. But I always see it – I think we have to – look, my first point is we have to start here from a position of humility, ‘cause we, the Western Russian watchers, have largely got this wrong. We were warned, back in the 1990s, that there was a problem developing, both domestically and in Russian foreign policy and we didn’t listen. We didn’t – not only didn’t listen, we patronised and belittled the people from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and, indeed, Russia itself, who warned us about this, so we don’t have a great record.
Instead, we’ve had a series of wake-up calls. It started off, perhaps, with the wake-up call of energy. I remember back in the early noughties being laughed at in the German Economics Ministry when I said, “We need to worry about our gas dependency on Russia.” They said, “Are you really saying seriously, Mr Lucas, that Russia might use gas as a political weapon?” We know how that ended up. And there’ve been many more wake-up calls. There was the military wake-up call, which we had with the Ladoga and Zapad exercise in 2009, which really scared us, and the result is we’ve made changes to natives contingency plans as a result. We’ve had the cyber wake-up call. We’ve had the wake-up call over so-called fake news and disinformation. Again, people used to laugh at the idea that Russia would be able to conduct information operations in the West. Nobody’s laughing now. We’ve had Salisbury, and before that Litvinenko, so people no longer people it’s amusing and fanciful, the idea that Russia might try and physically eliminate exponents in the West. And now, as the European elections are coming up, we are seeing the effects of Russian political warfare within our Western political systems. We have comp – parties, such as Mr Salvini’s party in Italy, the AFD, many parties in other countries, which have alarming links to Russia, links that have been cultivated over the years. And in this country, Russia is now a Tier I national security threat. That would’ve seemed absolutely laughable a few years ago. But I think we could – it’d be fair to say that we are now, more or less, awake.
But as Rodric rightly pointed out, Russia’s still weak. If you take the Nordic-Baltic nine, five Nordics, three Baltics, and Poland, they spend more on defence than Russia does. So, clearly, this is not a contest of means, it’s a contest of willpower and co-ordination, and that’s where Russia has the edge. Russia’s willing to accept economic pain and we’re not. It’s prepared to take risks, we’re not. It’s prepared to lie about what it does, and that’s why it gets places.
I’m in favour of indignation. I think indignation is very important. Change happens when people are scared and when they’re angry, also sometimes happens when they’re – where they’re greedy. I would say, in our case, it should also happen because we’re feeling a bit ashamed. Ukrainians have died in their thousands, as a result, partly, of Western mistakes. You know, we promised, in the Budapest Memorandum, that if Ukraine gave up its lethal weapons, it would not be subject to economic coorcion – coercion and its borders would be sovereign. That paper was – that promise was not worth the paper it wasn’t written on, and we are partly responsible for that, as are the other signatories, not least Russia. So, I think a bit of emotion is important to concentrate our minds, but when we concentrate them, we should be – I think, obviously, there’s a complete strawman here. There is no shortage of dialogue with Russia. If the Russians want to talk, there’s umpteen mechanisms. They tend to walk away from these mechanisms; they’re there. The problem is not of lack of dialogue with Russia. It’s a lack of willingness, I think, on the Russian side, to accept that other countries have legitimate interests as well.
But the main target of our indignation, ire, shame and everything else, should, indeed, be our own weaknesses and chiefly dirty money, and this is the biggest weakness of the Putin regime. When they steal money from the Russian people at home, they don’t keep it there. They launder it in offshore and onshore financial centres and the biggest of those onshore financial centres is here in the City of London, and we’ve done pathetically little to deal with that. We had a lot of promises from David Cameron and very little action, but there’s a long, long to-do list and we’ve done only a few things on that. But we should also worry about technology as well and the way in which our social media and other platforms can be used against us.
A final point, because I’m sure you’re dying to ask me a question…
Bobo Lo
I am, keep it short.
Edward Lucas
…is that I think we should get away from this idea – the whataboutery is interesting, but yet, Ukraine did not breach the rules-based international order. They are a victim of a breach in that. This is partly about our own security, and here we can weigh up our own shortcomings and so on. But it’s mostly importantly about the security of our allies. They are the ones who are, literally, in the firing line. If we believe in international alliances and international solidarity, then it is to the Ukrainians, the Balts and the others that we owe our first duty of maintaining their security.
Bobo Lo
Thank you very much, Ed. When you say ‘indignation’, what worries me is that indignation or whining has become a policy, a surrogate policy, an excuse for doing, essentially, nothing very much and that perhaps one of the problems that we have, in our relations with Russia, is we don’t really know what we want from them and we don’t know – we don’t really go in hard in pursuing our goals. Maybe because we just don’t know what they are in the first place. So, a lot of Western policy perhaps suffers from, well, frankly, being all very half-hearted. What do you think?
Edward Lucas
Well, I agree. I think – and there was – I think someone was photographed walking into Downing Street when sanctions were, for the umpteenth time, under discussion, with a bit of paper, which said, “But this mustn’t affect the City.” And, you know, we’re all in favour of tough talking and we’re not in favour of doing things that involve difficult, painful, trade-offs and decisions.
Bobo Lo
Yes, and…
Edward Lucas
And if we were to say that foreign dirty money is not welcome in the City of London, our economy, you know, this ghastly phrase, UK Plc, would take a hit and I think we should take that hit. I think we should be saying to the Austrians and the Lichtensteiners and the Luxembourgers and, actually, to Delaware and Montana and all these other jurisdictions, if you don’t say who owns the companies that are registered in your jurisdiction, their business is not welcome here. We could say you can’t buy a flat in London. You can’t sell a flat in London. You can’t rent a flat in London. Perhaps even you can’t own a flat in London and we could do that. The other countries have done things like that. We could do it too, we just don’t want to, ‘cause we’re lazy and greedy.
Bobo Lo
Fair point. I’m going to now open it out to the audience. Two rules here, please. Could you please give your name and affiliation? And the second rule’s almost more important than the first, which is no multipart questions or interventions. You’ve got one shot at the title. Sir?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
The Russian Embassy is going to…
Bobo Lo
Yes, you, sir?
Noel Hadjimichael
Okay, no microphone, excellent.
Bobo Lo
Oh, no, a microphone is on its way here, just here, and third row here.
Noel Hadjimichael
And thank you very much. I won’t use the parade ground voice. Noel Hadjimichael, I’m member of the Institute and yes, another Australian in country. Panel, Russian social and maybe soft power, are they more courageous, are they more corrosive and are they more committed than we are? Do they do British counsel more arrogantly and more effectively?
Bobo Lo
Okay, hold that thought. You, sir, over there, about first row in the second bunch.
Euan Grant
Thank you very much. Euan Grant, Former Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst and a survivor, just, of European Commission shenanigans in addressing the threats against Ukraine. My question is mainly for Ms Sagramoso, but for all of you, you mentioned about Russ – the need to take account of Russian public opinion and its fears about the West, real – that they have concerns about what they see as risks from the West. You did say that. Have you – have we ever – have any of the panel ever asked the Russian public about what they think about rich Russians having all their money and assets in the West, because if we’re so bad, it does beg the question why that money is here?
Bobo Lo
Right, sir?
Charles Spencer
Charles Spencer, and no affiliation to speak of. Am I naïve to be indignant about the very concept of the near abroad? These countries are sovereign, they are UN members, and three of them are even members of NATO.
Bobo Lo
Okay, nice and brisk. Sir, just on this.
Roger Hamilton-Martin
Roger Hamilton-Martin, I’m a Freelance Journalist. Given the current state of the polls, we may be in for a Corbyn Government within – in the near future. What do the panel think we could anticipate, you know, from that Government, with respect to Russia, and, you know, his foreign policy? And would that be good, what that be bad, what should we anticipate?
Bobo Lo
Gentleman at the back, yeah.
James McLeod
Thank you. James McLeod, Member of the Institute and not an expert at all on Russia. A word that has hardly been mentioned is Putin. How much is – are we talking about Putin and how much are we talking about around his policies and aspirations, and how much are we talking about Russia as a country?
Bobo Lo
Okay, right, so, I’m going to take the first round. So, we have Russian soft power, have you asked the Russian public about their risks – that the risk the West poses? You’ve got the near abroad, how appropriate is that term? What a Corbyn Russian foreign poli – what a Corbyn policy would be on Russia, and Putin or Russia? Who’d like to get the ball – Rodric, please?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Well, they’re all – they’re a lot of very interesting – guilt and indignation, I mean, of course, you need emotions to get things done. I was talking about indignation as an analytical tool, which it’s not. Dialogue, there is a lot of dialogue going on. I mean, look at the way the Americans and the Russians don’t shoot one another’s aeroplanes down in Syria. But it’s below the – all sorts of questions, but specific ones, Russian soft power, everybody loves Russian culture. It’s never been much use to the Russians as a political tool and still isn’t. And they spend a lot of money on it. I think the whole Facebook stuff, the whole Russian influence on election and stuff, it’s overdone. They may devote a lot of money to it. How effective it is, we don’t really know. I suspect it’s not very effective.
A Corbyn Government, anybody who thinks they can predict anything about British politics at the moment, I would be very interested to hear.
Putin, I think that’s a point I would like to have brought up. Putin is, of course, all sorts of things. He’s a very cunning Politician. He’s intelligent. He has a rather cold sense of humour. Whether you like him or not is, sort of, irrelevant, because that’s not what foreign leaders are there for. He’s given the Russians what they want. I, of course, don’t presume to know what the Russians want, but all the polls show that he’s given them what they want. And that’s – what else should a leader do? As for the future of Putin, I mean, Putin’s going to die, he’s going to leave office and he will go by one means or another. I’m not prepared to predict the future of that. But I do think that we focus on Putin too much. Putin is not Russia, whatever his sycophants say. A lot of what we – problems we’re having with Russia now, we would’ve had if Putin had never been born, in my view.
Bobo Lo
Yeah, yeah, Aglaya, why don’t you…
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
So…
Bobo Lo
…pick…?
Aglaya Snetkov
…I will not, obviously, answer all of them. I’ll just…
Bobo Lo
Please.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
…pick a couple. I think in terms of Russian soft power, I mean, I think I would say that Russia does have some soft power and I think that there used to be an assumption that only the West does have it. And that’s, I mean, patronising and naïve, I’m sorry, and somewhat racist, the assumption that no-one outside the West should have soft power. Of course they do. But there doesn’t – but – and this idea of categorisation of who’s got more is a bit childish, because there’s an assumption there’s a winner and a loser. But I would follow what Mark Galeotti’s been talking about increasingly, which is what – his term, not mine, which is dark power, and I think that’s something the Russians are really good at. Excellent, because they are – they love to be the villain and they like to sell themselves as a villain. They get others who are attracted to them as this villain and I think that is – that – I think that’s the power they really do have.
I think when it – I think the only thing I would say, in terms of the Putin in Russia, to follow, I completely agree with what Rodric said. I think to follow-up, the difficulty, to some extent, in this whole Putin versus Russia, and I, yeah, I guess I speak as a Russian, but also, as an Analyst, which is in terms of the political class, it’s just been such a long time.
[General agreement]
I mean, I’m, like – it’s just – it’s a dec – it’s bas – it’s two decades, right, more or less, of a regime. We have no idea what a different regime would be, and I’m not saying that this would be better or worse, it’s just been so long.
Bobo Lo
That’s a valid point, most enlightening.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
I mean, not to be flippant, you know, it’s a bit like Ars – when Arsène Wenger left Arsenal, right?
Bobo Lo
That bad?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
No, but it was that long and therefore, it’s very hard to predict. So, when people say that it – Russia would be a much better country without Putin, or much worse country, I would argue that we have very little knowledge.
Bobo Lo
Sure, sure, okay. Domi?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I’m of the view that it would be different if there was another leader and I think that often, the [inaudible – 39:34] is, sort of, pushed aside as being irrelevant. But if you look at the nuances, they were there. There were changes in policy approaches. So, I think – I’m of the view that it would be different and I’m of the view that Putin does have a project, regarding the so-called near abroad. I’m not saying I agree. I’m just saying that’s the way that the Russians talk about their neighbours.
I think I was maybe not clear enough as saying that our engagement with Russia should be really very much clearly upholding our principles and our values and our liberal system. In no way would I argue in favour of a, sort of, hounding in and making bargains. I think I reinforced that.
Bobo Lo
Sure, that’s fine. Domi, you say project, what do you mean project? What is his project, if he has a project?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think his project is, and he talks very much about this as well, Russia and the former Soviet space as a common civilizational space, where we’d share a common humanistic and economic and legal reality. So, I mean, it – part of his Eurasian project and – is really an effort to, I wouldn’t call it, sort of, restore the USSR, but certainly rebuild an area where Russia is predominant. And his emphasis, also, I think, globally, is very much on the emphasis on state sovereignty over, sort of, pooling of sovereignty, as we have in the European Union. So, within Eastern Europe, he’s very much following, actually, an idea that was first developed, to a certain extent, by Gleb Pavlovsky, when he talks about [mother tongue], so the European…
Bobo Lo
Europe’s – okay.
Domitilla Sagramoso
…East, this alternative view of an alternative Europe to the European Union. And I think he is trying to portray himself as the leader of a Conservative movement in Europe and he has very strong allies. So, I think that he has a project. How strong and effective his soft power or dark power is, I think is debatable, but I think it is there. There is an attempt.
And to the question regarding public opinion, I mean, I haven’t really argued for or against public opinion. I don’t have – I haven’t look specifically at that. I know that there is generally, at least in terms of foreign policy, strong support for Putin. I think today, with the economic realities, the situation is different. It’s like we have Putin, but we are not very happy, but we have Putin, so…
Bobo Lo
Okay, Domi. Ed?
Edward Lucas
Near abroad is a revolting term and we should put it in the same category as Lebensraum, and I – it’s not – it should not be used. Russian soft power, interesting question. I think the project is bogus and it’s extremely counterproductive. The Russ – Putin has turned Ukraine, which was perhaps the most friendly country towards Russia, into a country that no longer wants to have canonical ties between its church and the Russian Orthodox Church. It’s a stunning defeat and as with many things that Putin has done, they’ve looked, they’re tactically clever and strategically stupid. Russia is a cultural superpower and it’s tragic to me that this regime doesn’t actually exploit that and use it, which it could to make the country’s reputation better.
The Russian public opinion is extre – and when I asked Navalny about this when he was in London, I said, “People say you’re anti-Western.” He said, “Of course I’m anti-Western. It’s in the West that the regime loots all the – invests all the money that it loots from the people of Russia. If you stop acting as receivers of stolen goods,” he didn’t quite use that phrase, “then we’ll be very happy to be pro-Western.” But we’ve destroyed a lot of our soft power in Russia by our complicity with the kleptocracy and are willing to be their Bankers.
I don’t think we should over-personalise Putin. These problems predate Putin, as I said at the beginning, and they’ll continue afterwards. There’s a fundamental problem about Russia’s relationship with its neighbours and whether it wants to be a post-Imperial country and there’s a fundamental problem about the way Russia is run, and the relation between wealth and money and the Secret Services in Russia. And so long as you have those problems, it doesn’t matter whether Putin or Medvedev or whoever else is on top.
And finally, I would just say that this is the longest period of stability in rising living standards in Russian history, and it’s not surprising that many Russians, after the 1990s, breathe a sigh of relief and say, “We may not think this is brilliant, but it’s certainly better than it used to be.” That doesn’t mean that the regime couldn’t change very quickly, if there was a shock, and I would be cautious about predicting stability.
Bobo Lo
Yeah, okay. Lady in the third row here.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Can I correct myself on one point?
Bobo Lo
Yeah, sure, please.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I just want to correct myself on the soft power point, because, actually, Aglaya was right, I was being too narrow. The way the rest of the world – we are very introverted, we Westerners. The way the non-West world looks at Russia is very different. A lot of the things we care about, they don’t care about and a lot of the things that Russia projects, they find interesting. So, I think that was an important point you made.
Bobo Lo
Okay, great. Lady.
Claudia Hamill
Claudia Hamill, Member of Chatham House. Panel has talked a lot about ‘we’ and ‘us’ and ‘our’. I’d like you to define whom you mean by we, us and our, are we talking about Europe, the UK, England, Scotland, who are we talking about, NATO?
Bobo Lo
Great question. Gentleman far left there and right in the front row, right at the end. Hmmm hmm.
Domenic Carratu
Thank you, Domenic Carratu, Member of Chatham House, a non-money laundering Banker, just to be clear. On that theme, are we best to look at Russia through the prism of the Cold War, or as a massive state?
Bobo Lo
Okay, lady in the middle row there, can you just raise your hand, there? Sorry, yeah, sorry.
Member
Hi, a student college at King’s College London, a master’s student. I was going to ask, what are the panel’s predictions for 2024, when Putin finishes his Presidential term? Do you envisage something similar to the situation in Kazakhstan, where Nazarbayev has – is still holding the reins of power, but – after leaving the Presidency? What do – what are the predictions there and how should the West respond to that, in the next few years?
Bobo Lo
Gentleman in the third row, here.
Chris
Chris. My name’s Chris, another student from King’s College. My question is that, well, basically, I think with Russia and with the Soviet Union and the West, it’s always been a case of the security dilemma, whereby trying to make ourselves more secure, we actually make a bigger threat when what originally was there. I think of, like, the arms race, where, by increasing our military spending to bankrupt the Soviet Union, you create, like, a huge military threat. Are we still doing that, in any other situations, with contemporary Russia, like by our intervention, are we actually making ourselves less secure, making a problem?
Bobo Lo
And gentleman in the middle row, there.
Member
Thank you, Chatham House Member. Do – does the brazenness and openness of GRU active measures betray almost a willingness to get caught by the West?
Bobo Lo
Excellent. Alright, so, the questions are, who are we, asked our mafia state? Putin’s succession, or maybe, sort of, Putin is Deng Xiaoping or Lee Kuan Yew. Security dilemma and GRU brazenness. Let’s start with you, Edward.
Edward Lucas
The ‘we’ is really tricky, because there are lots of different we’s. There’s the we, the European Union, which is economic security. There’s we, NATO, which is military security. There’s we, the countries that run the world financial system, that’s a different category. So, I think you have – just have to choose whichever we you find most appropriate for the problem in hand.
I love this question about Cold War when it fits together with yours. I think that there’s a difference. Well, in Cold War we are facing a peer adversary. The Soviet Empire was, basically, roughly the same size as ours. Secondly, there was a very clear hermetic divide. You didn’t have Soviet companies listing on the London Stock Exchange and putting members of the House of Lords on their boards. You had Armand Hammer and that was pretty much it. So, we are now dealing, and this is true in spades with China, with a country, which is both hostile and deeply integrated into, particularly in Russia’s case, into our financial system, in China’s case, into everything, and that makes it a lot more difficult.
I don’t think that this idea of the arms race is particularly relevant, because we are not trying to build up our forces and despite what Russian propaganda says, there is – NATO has no aggressive forces on the Russian border. We have 1,000 British troops in Estonia. We have very small deployments in Latvia, Lithuania, the – and Poland, which are really there as tripwire forces. This is like what we had with West Berlin during the Cold War, just to make sure that enough people from enough countries get killed if Russia invades that they think twice about doing it. So, I don’t think that’s really a helpful thing, and I’d be very adverse to taking seriously these kind of manufactured Russian hysterics, where the Russians say, “We need to talk about demilitarising the countries on our borders,” which it means you take away your tripwire forces and we’ll move our forces a little bit further back inside Russia. And that would be a lethal mistake and would be sacrificing the security interest of those countries.
Bobo Lo
Domi.
Domitilla Sagramoso
Well, I’m also of the view that Russia tends to give a very strong value, or tended, at least, strong value to arms control agreements. And if you look at the history of the CFE Treaty, they generally, of course, there were problems with the bases in Moldova and in Georgia, I mean, they generally really tried to abide by them to ensure that NATO would abide as well. So, I’m of the view that there is a lot of room there to negotiate effective arms controls agreements, and I’m of the view that they are very relevant and I’m talking not only about strategic weapons, intermediate nuclear weapons, but also, conventional forces in Europe. I think that they are really at the basis of our security structure, and I’m not arguing in favour of, you know, unilateral disarmament, not at all. I’m talking about negotiations where we see that we also advance our own interests. So, I strongly argue in favour of those, and I think that it’s very important, also, to understand to understand the perception, because from the Russian point of view, there is a perception that they are, in some way, engaged, almost, in a conflict with the West, whether we like it or not. And how we respond, you know, is important and to just ignore it as something that is out of hand and exaggerated, you know, ends up finding ourselves in the kind of situation we found ourselves with Ukraine in 2014.
So, I do think that the real problem is that what lies at heart is a security dilemma, and the fact that after the end of the Cold War, we really couldn’t find a system of European security which, in some way, included Russia. And I know we are not allowed to talk about why we are what – where we are, but I think that’s part of the problem and, you know, the solution must include, in some way, an arrangement where Russia feels it’s not being left to one side, because it’s not…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I’m sorry, can I ask you, what’s the OAC?
Domitilla Sagramoso
The OAC is not necessarily a security arrangement, which guarantees the security of all countries. At the moment it’s more of an instrument of conflict management.
Bobo Lo
So, Domi, are you asking for a, sort of, you know, a revival of the Medvedev new…
Domitilla Sagramoso
Yeah.
Bobo Lo
…European security…
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think that…
Bobo Lo
…architecture that died a death ten years ago?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think we could’ve sat down and talked about it. I’m not saying we should have agreed. I think talking doesn’t mean agreed, you know, it’s a big, big difference, you know. We can settle down, talk and see where our problems and how we can resolve them, because I think the reality in which we find ourselves today is not ideal. So, obviously, something went wrong.
Bobo Lo
But isn’t part of the problem is, we understand each other’s positions, we just fundamentally disagree. The problem is not really one of perception. It’s just that we have divergent policies, divergent interests. Isn’t that the problem?
Domitilla Sagramoso
And that is part of the problem and we had those during the Cold War and we still could manage to reach agreement of fundamental problems on arms control, for example, on…
Bobo Lo
Fair enough, it’s a good point.
Domitilla Sagramoso
…border, recognition of borders. Again, I’m in no way arguing in favour of recognising the annexation of Crimea, or the contrary.
Bobo Lo
No, no, no, no.
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think this is why it is so important and I think that to have an aversion to sit down and talk, when we did that with a much more aggressive adversary, during the Cold War…
Bobo Lo
It’s a fair point.
Domitilla Sagramoso
…it’s my point that we could sit down and start a dialogue, a con – a real conversation about, you know, how we want to organise European security, so that everybody, not just Russia, everybody feels safe.
Bobo Lo
That’s a fair point. Aglaya?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
So, I think to – I think the question on the who are we is important, and I have been living in Switzerland for the last ten years, and I’m very mindful of the difference between the ‘we’ being Bern, for me, or being London. And I, since, I guess Brexit has taken place, I very – every time I come to Chatham House, but also elsewhere, I would always ask, sort of, “But what’s the London position?” And people would – like, talking about Russia and the West, was like, “We.” And I’m like, “Okay, I got the ‘we’, but what is the London position?” I think there are multiple we’s and I think it is – by now we need – and not to label capitals, but I think, actually, there is – it is now important to now talk about Berlin, Paris, Bern, as the mediator. And I think it is crucial that London works out its own position and not hide behind the we, because…
Bobo Lo
Fair point.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
…that’s the position of the UK, out of the EU. So, I think on that I would absolutely – I think in terms of the Cold War Mafia state, I mean, I would argue that to some extent, particularly within Europe, Russia is a regional problem and therefore, it’s absolutely not like the Cold War. But I think, also, we have to keep in mind that, ultimately, Russia, on a regional scale, is a difficult actor, but I think we have to take away, to some extent, the specialness that it’s either one or it’s the other, or you know. Yeah, it’s a difficult regional player…
Bobo Lo
Interesting, interesting.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
…and we have to deal with them. They’re not going away. They are not what we’d like them to be, but there are many other regions where, frankly, and I’m not going to label India and Pakistan or other regional issues, where, frankly, people deal with it and yes, it’s a difficult partner, that’s what it is.
I think in terms of the 2024 predictions, my prediction on that is that I guess this is the five years before the election that we’re going to start talking and making predictions. And last time round that’s – we had two or three years or everyone predicting and I guess we’re back into the space where – because at the moment it’s very hard to tell.
Bobo Lo
Okay. Rodric?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Well, the – everybody’s made the point about ‘we’. Of course, one of the things that the British have a problem with is that they no longer know who they are and now, this is a serious point, and I think the point…
Bobo Lo
Yeah, it’s a…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…about London…
Bobo Lo
…people…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…you know, Brexit is driven by the English, it’s not driven by the British, and I think you have to keep these…
Bobo Lo
Well, I’m sure…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I always reach for my gun when I hear three words: we, strategy or legitimate. There’s always something behind those words, which is stupid.
I want to talk about two other things, first of all the security point. The idea of a European security conference was first put forward by the Russians, in my personal experience, in the 60s. I think it was put forward before that. It’s a perennial Russian position and it’s – if you’re Russian, it’s perfectly understandable. If you’re not Russian, you get involved very quickly in the attempts that we made in the 90s to bring Russia into NATO, without giving them a veto. The fact is, that because of the size of the countries involved and the military power of the countries involved, you only want one big power in an alliance. You know, you bring the other in and you’re shot to pieces and – well, I think I’m all in favour of dialogue and the things that Domitilla was talking about, but there are some things that, actually, are not going to work, and I think that’s one of them.
On the GRU, well, I spent, also, a certain amount of my career dealing with the KGB, but not the GRU. The KGB, we used to negotiate about their ceilings in London and we had – you know, there were actually quite interesting talks in the dark world going on about that. The GRU always managed to keep itself out of them. The GRU never signed up to an agreement that they put a ceiling on their people in London. One of the great things, from my point of view, about the Skripal affair, was the first time the street – the GRU had been driven out into the open and were humiliated. It couldn’t have happened to a nicer bunch of people, in my opinion.
Bobo Lo
Alright, final round of questions. Lady in the – over there, just wave your arm around. Yeah, okay.
Christine Michael-Arjack
Hi, Christine Michael-Arjack. I’m not American, despite my accent, so that doesn’t colour my question. But, well, Mr Lucas mentioned that Poland, Eastern European states, were quite right about things that London was wrong about. And insofar as Russia as a European problem, a local problem, shouldn’t ‘we’, whether that’s London, Switzerland or Europe as a whole, do a better job of listening to the enfant terrible on the Eastern border, i.e. Poland, when it comes to Russia?
Bobo Lo
Okay, lady at the back there, just stick your arm up. Good.
Benita
So, hi, Benita, Russia Analyst. Benita, Russia Analyst. My question is, basically, you’ve just said ‘we’, this magic we again, and Russia understand one another’s positions, but to what extent do you think that’s actually accurate, because it seems to me that there’s a lot of – a lack of understanding in the West about what Russia is and what Russia wants? And we, kind of, perpetuate these stereotypes, a lot of ‘em quite crass and derived from the Cold War, about what Russia actually prioritises.
Bobo Lo
Okay. The gentleman there, just in the front row, here.
Robert Gardiner
Robert Gardiner, Chatham House. We’ve spent all this time talking about what we see as we look at Russia. What do you think Russia sees when they look at us?
Bobo Lo
Great question, yeah. Right, gentleman there, please.
Walter Langreth
Walter Langreth, Chatham House Member. It’s a NATO specific question and it’s a bit of a counterfactual, but if NATO had not promised Georgia and Ukraine eventual membership at Bucharest in 2008, would have – what would’ve happened differently?
Bobo Lo
Oh, a great question. Gentleman there, the same row.
Joseph Gariboni
Okay, Joseph Gariboni, Member of Chatham House. In 2012, during the election campaign, during the debate between Obama and Romney, Romney talked about Russia as being a strategic rival, or something, and Obama laughed at him and all the media agreed and suddenly, two/three years later it was like, “That was the enemy.” What happened?
Bobo Lo
Yeah, gosh. I’m going to slip in a couple more questions, so if you’ve got – anyone else? Yes, sir, just over here.
Geoff Nunn
Hello, Geoff Nunn, Ministry of Defence. The panel, early on in the discussion, mentioned the word ‘paranoia’ and I think a good example of Russia’s potential paranoia is their opposition to NATO’s ballistic missile defence system. I wondered the panel’s view on how much that paranoia has influenced their foreign and military development policies?
Bobo Lo
Gosh. Right, okay, so we have Eastern European perspectives, do we really understand what Russia is? How do the Russians see us? Russia as a strategic rival, and defence policy. So, Ed has gone and that’s unfortunate. Why don’t you start, Rodric?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Okay, well, I think on the question of listening, I mean, one of the things, looking back on my career, was how seldom I listened, rather than spoke. I always talked too much and I didn’t listen enough and you do listen – actually, if you listen, you can hear useful things about what the Poles think, but also about the Russians think about Pole or Ukraine. What those people think of one another, it’s actually very interesting and elided from most of the discussion.
We didn’t – I listened to Pol – I’d lived in Poland, people didn’t listen. Partly, I think one has to understand the thing about the 90s was that we all were in a state of euphoria and hope that somehow or other we’d stepped out of history. I think that’s not – wasn’t an ignoble position, but, you know, we all – and the Russians, everybody realised that, actually, the same old problems were there, in a slightly different guise. So, I think it’s not true that we didn’t know anything about Russia and that the Poles did. We all did, but we lived in different parts of Europe. The Poles felt differently about it from what we felt. That’s the next point.
On the question of – well, it goes together, what have we got here? On the question of, basically, what we think of one another, paranoia, I strongly believe that both sides suffer from paranoia. The Russians certainly do, but we do, too and that’s, of course, the history of the Cold War and it’s the history now. The Russians are afraid of us. One of the things, which I think was an important change in the Cold War, was Reagan’s realisation, in the winter of 1983 to four, he wrote in his diary, “The Russians turn out to be terrified of us. I don’t know why, ‘cause we’re not going to attack them.” Well, it’s the same answer I gave to Yeltsin’s Advisor, of course we knew we weren’t going to attack them, the Russians didn’t know that, and vice versa. And so, we constructed this architecture, which, to some extent, still operates, sort of, mutual deterrents. When Russia was falling apart, Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Advisor said to me, “The only reason you’re going to take us seriously in future, ‘cause we’ve got nuclear weapons.” He was a Liberal and a very good man, but he was right, actually. Russia may not have a very powerful military force, by most standards, but it has got the strategic nuclear force, which is rather efficient. So have we, so we’re both, rightly, paranoid about that.
Bobo Lo
Hmmm, great. Aglaya?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
So, I – a couple of points. So, I think when it comes to listening to Eastern Europe, to follow-up from what Rodric said again, I follow it, like, I think the other point to add is, and I think this is where, in terms of red lines and being more honest about what we want, to start, it’s not that we don’t listen, right? It’s just not on the agenda and to some extent, and because I’m not a Politician, you know, let’s be honest about it, right? It’s not that people don’t know that there are cert – there are concerns in certain capitals in Eastern Europe. The question is, is it – how high is it on the agenda? Is there, basically, sufficient political will to do something about it, if it’s costly or actually has to be debated or whatever? Which is fine, that’s politics, politics is politics, which is why a crisis happens and often, we are crisis reactive. That isn’t because we didn’t predict, it’s just we didn’t care. That’s fair enough, but – and I also understand that Politicians can’t say that, but I’m not sure that it’s that people don’t know. There is enough going on between capitals.
I think that – and I’m going to try and put the questions of understanding Russia, West, what they look at us, and this is very much coming from – as a Russian, sorry. I think it’s – so, I was always surprise – so, I think that something I think is important to understand, from the Western point of view, I would say, is that the level of double think, I would argue, there is at the level of the regime. Insofar as, on the one hand, this is the question of paranoia and being anti-Western, whilst, and this is having lived in London in Zurich, whilst, you know, being very happy to shop in Zurich and send your children to the West. So, I think there is a level where we – so that the – and from a point of view of Russian public, they are well aware of that. And I think because this doesn’t take place the other way round as much, when it comes to the West versus the Russians, I think we often, kind of, well, not – it’s not forget, but we don’t think of that. But I think what is sad is I would argue the Russian public is currently quite paranoid about the West, actually. I would say probably more, to some extent, than the leadership, who are, you know, sojourning in the West, whereas the ordinary Russians can’t afford it anymore.
Bobo Lo
Yes, I was wondering, I mean, you – I can see where you’re going with the Russian public attitudes, the apprehensions about the West, but sometimes, when I look at Russian leaders, they look at, particularly European leaders, and they think you’re weak, you’re decadent, Europe is clapped out, it’s a good holiday camp, but it’s really – it’s nothing special. There’s no threat here. You know, you guys are venal and corrupt and we have nothing to fear from you. What do you think?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
I think, from your point, so I think if you’re talking about Europe, that’s absolutely correct. It’s a nice pension destination for when they retire, but yes, ultimately, it’s about the US and, ultimately, the Russians are well aware that the West is on the way down and the person you listened to or interested in, is the Americans and then you think about China. Europe is important as a trade.
Bobo Lo
So, not China first? But China has – in a sense, is starting to set the standard for the Kremlin elite, or do you think that’s overstretching things here?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
To some extent and this is quite – I would almost wish for the Russians to take China, if not more seriously, but actually, sort of – but no, I think the Russians continue to be more obsessed with the West than it’s potentially healthy for them to be so.
Bobo Lo
Alright, Domi?
Domitilla Sagramoso
Yes, I mean, going back to the question of paranoia, when you speak to Russians, sort of, on a regular basis, you know, to commentators, I mean, they really are very worried about a potential confrontation and an escalation. I remember, when there was a potential clash in Syria after the whole chemical weapons issue. So, there is a general concern that there could be some kind of accidental escalation. That is why I put a lot of emphasis on the need to reduce tension, because I constantly get the perception that these, you know, regional conflicts, be it Syria, be it Venezuela, be it Eastern Europe, could escalate. And I think that is very much ingrained and it’s driving a lot of the thinking and it is very much pumped by the media in Russia, by television. A lot of the TV programmes, they emphasise this risk and they give a lot of space to the new kind of weaponry arsenal that the Russians are building. So, I think that this is something that that is why it puts so much emphasis on the need to avoid any kind of accidental escalation.
And I think it’s – the question of China is a very interesting one, and there is one question we haven’t really discussed in detail and we probably have no time, but that is, obviously, the impact of sanctions and to what extent are they working? And from my research, you know, it is showing that, on the one hand, many oligarchs are coming much closer to the Kremlin, so the individual targeted sanctions are not separating oligarchs from the Kremlin, but at the same time, they’re becoming a lot more reliant on support from the Kremlin. So, there is a growing process of nationalisation of industry, as a result of sanctions. And secondly, it is pushing, you know, the Russian economy, to a certain extent, towards Asia, to obtain Asian investment. So, increasingly, there is a growing reliance on China, Korea, even Japan, I was told. It’s becoming an important investor, circumventing part of the sanctions. So, sanctions, I’m of the view they’re working in the slow, long run, but in the short run, they are producing this particular dynamic whereby the Russian economy is increasingly in state hands and is moving towards China.
Bobo Lo
But did Western policies have an option?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I don’t think we had an option.
Bobo Lo
You know, if you’re a policymaker, you – there’s immense moral and political pressure…
Domitilla Sagramoso
Yes, I…
Bobo Lo
…for you to introduce sanctions. So, you can’t – you don’t really have the luxury. You may think sanctions may not necessarily change Russian policies.
Domitilla Sagramoso
I don’t think we have…
Bobo Lo
But what option do you have?
Domitilla Sagramoso
…we had an option. I don’t think we had an option, and I’m not of the view of ra – you know, of increasing sanctions and, you know, the conversations I have with Russians is that they’re extremely worried about the new potential DASKA sanctions, you know, DAKSA, the ones that could come in, you know, against individuals in the Kremlin and their families. And, I mean, and it is gone now, but I think it’s very interesting to look at the RUSAL case, where we see, for example, when, you know, sanctions against a particular industry, or company, in a very strong sector of the Russian economy, like aluminium, was going to affect sectors of the global economy and so, they were pushed back. So, it shows that we are eager to do something about Russia. We are paying the price, in certain sectors, the European economies have suffered from the counter sanctions, but are we ready to go really far, to the point where they really make an – a more immediate impact?
Bobo Lo
Alright, which leads nicely to my concluding question to the three of you, what – as we look forward, what is your one concrete recommendation for Western policy, if you had to suggest one critical step? I want it to be a relatively specific one, so I want it to, not just to be dialogue or engagement, I – but pick something. Domi, why don’t you kick off?
Domitilla Sagramoso
Oh, can I pick two?
Bobo Lo
Please, okay, special dispensation.
Domitilla Sagramoso
I think, more generally, we really should work to uphold the international liberal order and the rule of law internationally and to put an emphasis on moving away from power politics and realism, towards, you know, an emphasis on the rule of law internationally and that includes, as I say, working immediately hard on issues of international security and that includes arms control.
Bobo Lo
And your specific recommendation?
Domitilla Sagramoso
To work on negotiations on that and to keep…
Bobo Lo
Arms control, you mean?
Domitilla Sagramoso
Yeah, I mean, there are a variety of issues, but I think this is one where if we stay where we are on what I would call, you know, military and cyber deterrents and sanctions, if we keep those in place, we – you know, which I am in favour of, of keeping our policies in line and then, sort of, try to engage on issues of emergency arms control at the moment.
Bobo Lo
So, should we – so, we start off by extending the start agreement by five years, until 2026, is that a…?
Domitilla Sagramoso
I mean, that could be a…
Bobo Lo
That would work?
Domitilla Sagramoso
…good start.
Bobo Lo
Okay, Aglaya?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
So, I guess my numb – well, I would say that my recommendation to London would be to work out the London line and I would be very…
Bobo Lo
Okay, but…
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
The London position and what it is.
Bobo Lo
On what?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
On its policy towards Russia and I would be very interest – I think…
Bobo Lo
Specific?
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
I think…
Bobo Lo
Pick something.
Dr Aglaya Snetkov
…lit – no, I mean, I think I would literally say that, actually, there needs – need to be real – a realisation that basically, like Home Alone, what is it that they think? In terms of recommendations, I think from the London point of view, they have to be very aware of this duality between wealth coming into London versus impact, in terms of foreign policy, and I know it’s unrealistic, but…
Bobo Lo
Okay, no, that’s a very fair point. Rodric, take it away.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Well, I told you I wouldn’t necessarily follow your instructions. I, first of all, I want to say how much I – how important I think the point that Aglaya made about the way Politicians take decisions. Politicians can cope with one and a half problems at a time. They’re like Gerald Ford, they can’t chew gum and walk along a chalk line and that’s because we know, because we’re not stupid, what’s going to happen in five years’ time, but what we actually have to deal with is what’s going to happen tomorrow and that, I think Scholars often lose sight of, and commentators. It’s very hard to deal with things that you know are going to happen, because you’ve got other things that you’re doing and I think that’s part of the problem, the first thing.
The second thing, I’m sorry, but we didn’t have time that we didn’t factor in China, ‘cause I do think that what is happening in the world today is affecting the position for all of us and that is the rise…
Bobo Lo
I agree.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…the irresistible rise of China. It’s no good Trump saying we’re going to stop all that stuff. That’s just ridiculous, and we haven’t sufficiently factored that. We’re getting paranoid about China too, and I…
Bobo Lo
Yeah, we are.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…also disagree with paranoia. We never answered the question about ballistic missiles…
Bobo Lo
No.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…the ABM systems. Can I just…
Bobo Lo
Yes, go on.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…quickly say that?
Bobo Lo
Just very quickly.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I mean, I think that the Russian fear of the West’s position on ballistic missile defence is not irrational. I think that you can say it’s exaggerated, but that’s for the Russians to judge, because they regard it as a threat and you can – we tend to say, the MoD tends to say, that the Russians are faking it and it’s not really a threat. We know it’s not a threat.
Bobo Lo
So, you just – do you just trash…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
No, of course…
Bobo Lo
…the…?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…you don’t.
Bobo Lo
So, what do you do?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
No, we – well, this is another thing that…
Bobo Lo
Revive the INF for…?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
This is – firstly, we certainly don’t scrap INF, but that’s over. You don’t scrap the ABM Treaty, that’s over and done with. You could talk, and this is where I’d agree with Domitilla, I think the whole arms control, if you want me to make a specific recommendation…
Bobo Lo
Yeah, yes, please.
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…it would be to do what we can and I think do what we’re going to have to do, which is revive some version of the arms control dialogue, because the dangers are still there for both sides.
Bobo Lo
Are we talking dialogue or trialogue, because there’s…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
Oh, well…
Bobo Lo
…a lot of talk about…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
…the…
Bobo Lo
…multilateralising…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
I think…
Bobo Lo
…disarmament negotiations…
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
You know, I…
Bobo Lo
…involving the Chinese?
Sir Rodric Braithwaite
There is and that’s, I think, where the complications come in, because the point about the Cold War, which has been made many times, is that it was rather simple and it was – there was two superpowers and there were people who tugged their forelock behind them, on both sides, for a variety of reasons. So, it was a simple – you could have a dialogue and the Americans and the Russians did have a dialogue on those, I think, for all of us, supremely important things. I do not see how you can organise a trialogue. There will come a point when the Chinese can match the Russian and American strategic arsenal and at that point everybody will have to find out some way of constructing a dialogue. I think it’s too soon.
Bobo Lo
Okay, fair enough. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, one of the beauties about this subject is that it’s just going to run on and on and on. So, we look forward to seeing you, perhaps for next year’s Russia debate, but in the meantime, I’d like you to join me in thanking our wonderful panellists [applause], Sir Rodric Braithwaite, Aglaya Snetkov, Domitilla Sagramoso and Edward Lucas.
