Iona Allan
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this Members’ Question Time event. My name is Iona Allan, and I’m the Assistant Editor of The World Today magazine, which is Chatham House’s quarterly international affairs magazine, which as members you should already be very familiar with, I hope.
I’m delighted to be joined online by Dr Haid Haid, who is a Syrian Columnist and a Consulting Fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House. And we’re here today to discuss this critical moment of transition for Syria, as the country emerges from 14 years of civil war, and grapples with the challenge of building a more representative system of government and averting cycles of deepening sectarian violence.
We’ll be discussing this, of course, within the context of the momentous changes that Syria has experienced over the last four and five months, from the rapid and unexpected overthrow of the Assad regime in December last year, led by HTS and their coalition of rebel forces, to the emergence of the country’s transitional President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his ongoing efforts to unify Syria’s armed factions, bring a devastated economy back from the brink and secure both pli – public trust and international backing.
Haid’s research focuses on the serious political transition, and he’s recently returned from a trip to the country earlier this month. So he’s extremely well placed to lead this discussion, and to try and give a sense of what the feelings and expectations of ordinary Syrians are on the ground today. Soon I’ll be passing the floor over to Haid, who will give a brief overview and opening remarks to this discussion. Then we’ll be moving onto a Q&A section of the event. Some of you have already submitted your questions in advance, so thank you very much for those. And the rest of you, you will be welcome to, or you have the chance to submit questions live during the section – during this Q&A section, and so there will be a Q&A box popping up at the bottom of your Zoom feed, so you’re welcome to type the questions into that. We’ll try to get to as many of them as possible during the, kind of, short event we have at lunchtime today.
There will also be the possibility and a chance to participate in a poll at the end of the event, so please do stick around for that, and make sure you’re listening. Finally, just to note, the event is on the record and is being recorded. So, you’re very welcome to tweet your reactions and reflections during the discussion on X, using the #CH_Events, with the handle, @Chatham House. So, with that housekeeping out the way and brief introduction, I’m going to pass the floor over to Haid for a quick opening remarks. Over to you, Haid.
Dr Haid Haid
Thank you. I want to keep it short, but – so I’ll quickly share some of the observations I’ve noticed or witnessed during my recent trips to Syria, and then, as you mentioned, continue the discussion later on, to focus more on recent events that are happening in the country right now.
I think it’s fair to say that the transition in Syria started, as you said, quickly, but because of that many people had really high hopes. The level of violence witnessed during the ousting of the Assad regime was quite minimal. There has been some positive statements and promises from al-Sharaa, who then became the Interim President of Syria. There has been quite a surprising, but well-placed, sort of, international and regional engagement with that group, and the administration in Syria, despite its problematic history.
And because of all of those issues, I think people were quite optimistic that the transition will be – will move fast, and then things will improve immediately and dramatically, which I think was a mistake on the side of the people who did not manage expect – their expectation, but mostly on the side of the transitional, or at the time the caretaker government, that also added to those expectations. And people felt that they will actually be able to see immediate changes that will allow them to restore – or services, be able to have better access to job opportunities, and all of that.
Now, if you look at – if we’re going to break it down to three or four main things to help give a better picture of what has happened over the past few months, maybe it’s good to start with the political transition, as it has been the main, sort of, foundation that impacted many other issues that happened throughout the past few months.
From the beginning, al-Sharaa has been trying to gain legitimacy by following by the book, sort of, procedures. Establish a national dialogue, establish a committee for that, then establish a committee for a constitutional declaration, gathered the rebel groups that fought alongside al-Sharaa personally, and then they gave him the title of being the “Interim President” there. And though some people have received those, sort of, measures positively, others did not, and I think the reasons are easy to point out why that was not the case.
When it comes to the national dialogue that the whole process was done in almost two weeks. So there was not enough time for people to discuss the issues they wanted to discuss. Many people did not even have a chance to be invited to those discussions. Those that were invited were invited last minute, and at the end of it the f – basically the final statement that happened after seemed as if it was prewritten, so it did not really link much or build much on the discussion that took place there.
Similar with the constitutional declaration, it happened quite quickly and it gave a lot of authorities to al-Sharaa as an Interim President, and gave him that position basically for five years, which is the time of the transitional period. So, because of that, many people did not feel that it was the right time to move – it was the right move to do because of the concerns they had about how one person will be able to manage the whole country, and for all the authorities to be concentrated in one – in his own hands.
Now, the security situation started quite calm and positive, and then in March it escalated quite quickly. In coastal areas, I think most of the people are aware of what happened. There were different ambushes that targeted general security, aligned with the transitional government, then that led to a big offensive to eliminate the fighters who contributed to that, which in turn led to mass violations against civilians in that area.
Now, that led to many concerns, not only among the communities that were directly impacted, but also other minorities, like Druze in Suwayda, like Kurdish-led Self-Administration in North East Syria, but others as well who are basically concerned about the rights of their own fellow citizens in this country and the protection they themselves will not – whether they will be able to be protected by the state or not.
Now, the other issue here is basically related to the efforts to reintegrate all the armed forces in Syria under one umbrella. Right after the declaration of basically that of appointing Assad as – sorry, Sharaa, as an Interim President, most of the forces agreed, theoretically, to operate under one umbrella. However, those efforts did not really materialise, or at least stayed ink on paper and did not – were not implemented on the ground, and this is one of the reasons for why we saw the valuations before and we are seeing what’s happening in Jaramana and in Sahnaya, which are two district areas in coastal – in rural Damascus, and we’ll come back to that.
I think the economic situation is quite important to also shed some light on. The economy was in a very bad situation when the regime fell. Despite that, Assad also took almost all of the foreign currency and gold with him when he basically left. So, that meant that there was a lack of cash and lack of liquidity, which impacted the way the transitional government and caretaker government before has been able to manage the areas and under its control. They have limited the ability of people to access their savings and money in their bank accounts. They have also fired and dismissed thousands of Civil Servants, for different reasons, financial burden was one of them. And they have not been able to provide services, at least to the level that they promise, or even to improve it to what it used to be before under the control of the regime.
And because of all of those issues, people became, sort of, more resentful, more scared, and more concerned. So, you have the security situation not going well, you have people fearing for their safety, and then you have people that are suffering to really make ends meet, and the political situation, their inclusion, participation in the governance has not met their expectations. So, as a result of all of that, we are reaching a point where it’s very, very important to really see how the government will, sort of, address those issues in the upcoming few weeks, because that will really determine the future of the country for decades to come. I’ll stop here.
Iona Allan
Thank you very much, Haid, that was a very comprehensive overview of the – I mean, the competing challenges that the transitional government are dealing with at the moment, in the sense of this being a, kind of, make or break point in the transition in Syria’s political transition.
I’m going to turn first of all to a question we had pre-submitted from the audience, and this is going to look more directly at the at the issue of security. And you mentioned in the beginning, you know, in December and in January, during the takeover and the fall of the Assad regime, there was quite minimal val – minimal violence, so there was at least some level of restraint shown. This has obviously changed quite dramatically in recent months, and you mentioned resurgence of violence in regions like Latakia and recently, in the last few days, outside Damascus, as well.
So, the question we have from one of our audience members is, “What is the new leadership’s strategy to actually responding to this violence, to building trust within communities, who are still feeling marginalised and threatened?” So, is there act – is a strategy, and if so, is it working, and why not?
Dr Haid Haid
Well, there are measures. I don’t know if they are a strategy, as in combined together, but they are different measures that were taken by the Interim President directly, and those are related to, a) the coastal areas, the violations that took place there. For the first time, you have a Syrian President who actually acknowledges the violations committed against civilians by forces, some of which are aligned with his own administration. So, that was a big, sort of, change from the years that preceded that in Syria before, where there is always denial.
Now, the – also, al-Sharaa establish a fact-finding mission in order to investigate what happened there, identify the perpetrators, and then hold them accountable. He also established a committee to work on peacebuilding among different communities and, at least on paper, the aim is to understand what the concerns are and what the key issues that are fuelling tension between different communities, and then come up with a plan in order to address them.
Finally, the – al-Sharaa has been entering in negotiations with two different, sort of, majorit – minority communities, one, in Druze of Suwayda, which is basically in Southern Syria, which Damascus does not have much authority over, for now at least. And then North East Syria, which is not – and you have a Kurdish ma – led administration there, and negotiations are ongoing with regard to how to integrate and bring back those two regions under – to fall under the umbrella of Damascus, and negotiations are taking place. So, on paper, those different measures should at least address some of those issues.
However, if you look at the investigation that is being conducted, it was initially supposed to – the committee was supposed to submit a report in four weeks. The first four weeks deadline was over a week ago, and then they asked for an extension, and – which is not a bad thing because everything would require more time for them to actually do proper job than just do – tick box and then move on, because that will lead to more harm than good. But it’s one of the things that we have to wait to see how they will actually approach. Whether the final report will really admit the consequence, will admit the violations and deal with the consequences, hold people accountable, make that in a trans – do that in transparent way, and will that actually address the concerns of the – not only the communities that were impacted in the coastal areas, but others. Because what happened there, as I mentioned, impacted others in Suwayda, and in – even in North East Syria, which complicated the negotiations that were taking place.
And now what’s happening in rural Damascus is making the situation even worse, because one of the key issues is basically asking those communities or administrations or regions to basically hand over their weapons, and they’re saying that “The only protection we have is the weapons we currently carry.” And because the current authorities have, in a way or another, not been able to really protect them from whatever individuals they say, whether those are affiliated with them or not, but they feel threatened. So, the ability to deal with that will really determine to what extent the current administration – al-Sharaa personally, will be able to address the concerns of those communities, but, as of now, has not worked yet.
Iona Allan
Thank you, Haid, and I wonder if we could turn now to, I mean, a related question. This is from Lola – submitted on the chat by Lola Highlander, to look a bit more broadly about the question of “transitional justice,” and you mentioned it there briefly, and you mentioned about how to deal with the violence committed in the last few weeks and months. But if we can turn also to talk about the atrocities and the violations committed in the 14 years of civil war, including accusations against some members of the current transitional government, who are implicated in some of those atrocities. “How important is the question of transitional justice?” This is what Lola is asking, and, “How – is it going to be managed in a way that actually holds perpetrators of terror and violence to account? And how – what role does this play in the, kind of, broader political transition?”
Dr Haid Haid
It’s a major issue that has not been addressed, let’s start with that. Throughout most of my conversations that basically I had with different people and different communities in Syria, it almost always was brought up, in a way or another, whether directly, or basically talking about lack of issues to – or efforts to address past violations, admit them, and then deal with the big, sort of, consequence, about basically how to move beyond that, re-heal – for allow the communities to re-heal themselves.
And I think one of the things that could be said with certainty is that there has not been much effort on that front, and for that, al-Sharaa personally and the transitional authorities have been criticised widely, mostly locally, and by local – by Syrians, for not being able to stop – to shed clarity on why that is the case, why they are not being transparent, and what their plans are towards this issue. Because as I said, it’s being demanded by almost every single person I’ve talked to.
Iona Allan
And…
Dr Haid Haid
Now…
Iona Allan
…it – and just to ask, it was mentioned in – so al-Sharaa, I believe – and the issue of transitional justice was mentioned during the national dialogue that you referred to, has there been any fol – but it was mentioned in a very vague and non-committal way, has there been any follow up since – in that, kind of, that declaration doing – during the national dialogue?
Dr Haid Haid
They just – the – and it’s not only the national dialogue, but the constitutional declaration, both of them, sort of, indicated commitment to addressing and work on this issue. And I think that constitutional declaration talked about establishing some, sort of, “transitional – a commission for transitional justice.” However, that has not been implemented, and one of the questions is why that is the case?
And I think if you look at the recent violations and the recent escalation that we have witnessed in several areas, not only in the coastal areas, but, for example, in Homs, Hama and other areas where there has been a high level of revenge attacks, if you look at the root causes of that violence, part of it, or mai – big part of it, is related to the feeling that communities feel that justice has not been served and they have to take matters into their own hands. So, now, how could that be addressed right now? I think that the easiest first step would be to create process and a commission that will at least show people that work has started on this issue, which is what we have not seen yet.
Then, once that is done, or in preparation for that to happen, you also need to ensure that that commission is independent, has credibility, has access to people, has the authority to actually conduct its work freely and independently, and has the resources to do that, which is also another issue that we need to keep in mind when addressing those issues. And the last bit will be also to make sure that the judicial system in Syria is – has the capacity to also do its part when needed, when holding or referring the perpetrators that are being identified or accused of committing violations to local courts, or whatever courts that will be established to address this issue.
Iona Allan
Thank you, Haid. Okay, let’s turn now and look directly – looking directly at al-Sharaa himself, and we have a question from Ian Smiles – Smales, apologies, asking, “Does al-Sharaa have a political vision?” So, we know, I mean, there have been, you know, a lot of accusations about al-Sharaa – or suggestions of al-Sharaa’s, like, shrewd political style and shrewd political PR campaign and his evolution from a, you know, reformed jihadist into a slick leader. I wonder if you could comment a bit on whether he himself has a political vision and if that’s evolved, at all? Particularly given, you know, in the last few years from his governance and control over Idlib in the North West to this more centralised control, is there a political vision underpinning that?
Dr Haid Haid
Well, I think it’s a very difficult question to answer, because the vision al-Sharaa had before for Idlib, and for what he wanted to, sort of, achieve in Syria, has at least changed based on the statements he has been sharing since December, since being able to overthrow the Assad and take over power. Before, throughout the 13 or 14 years, he was talking about building a Sunni state of some sort, establishing Sharia, and all of that. But those statements changed almost completely, talking about “inclusive governance, protecting minorities, allowing everyone to participate.” Now, the question is, which version is his vision? Because you cannot have two visions that are completely – that completely contradict one another.
And as of now, I think it’s difficult to really decide because, on the one hand, he, as I mentioned, has been talking about making promises that at least theoretically address most of the concerns and meet most of the expectations that Syrians had, when it come – have, when it comes to basically having the freedom, the ability to just be politically engaged, be active, not to be worried about every single word they say, when they even – when they are in private company, and all of that. And some of that has been implemented, to be honest, like, if you go to Damascus, not only Damascus, other areas, the people are – feel free to talk and discuss, and even criticise al-Sharaa and the new administration publicly, and they have not been, sort of, detained or harassed because of that.
However, when you look at the way most of the political, sort of, steps have been implemented, they have been implemented in a way that still concentrate all the powers in the hand of al-Sharaa personally. And if you look at the way he manages the situation, most of the decisions, despite having been Prime Minister before in the interim government, sort of, phase before, or the caretaker government phase before, he was the one making all the decisions and the people have not kept that a secret. People are criticising that he is basically a control freak, he’s basically micromanaging everyone, everything.
So, it’s – the final vision I think is that verdict on that is still yet to come, but at least as of now, based on what we’re seeing, the main, sort of, data we have is that things are changing. Some of those things are changing in a positive way, and the final, sort of, product is not out yet, so – which means that things are fluid and people, Syrians in particular, but external actors, the international community, will be able to hopefully also contribute positively to that change and shape Syria, and in a way that will meet the expectations of its citizens.
Iona Allan
Thank you, and, I mean, a huge part of that reputation and the success of serious political transition in this, you know, in this, kind of, new phase of the transition is about military integration. And the next question we have is from Ben Horton, about the – how that process of military integration with the various armed factions in Syria, he’s asking specifically, “What arrangement do you think the new government will reach with Kurdish groups, and how might Turkey’s involvement affect this?” I know there have been some talk over – or at least there been some preliminary deals with the SDF and with Druze groups in the South, so if you could give also just – not just about the Kurdish groups, but just give a broader, kind of, insight into the state of military integration at the moment.
Dr Haid Haid
So, let’s start with what’s happening in Syria in general, and then zoom into those two specific, because they are not exactly, sort of, sim – they are quite distinct from the rest of the groups I will talk about at the beginning. And now, on paper, almost all the groups that are outside those two regions, Suwayda and North East Syria, agreed to merge and operate under the control of the – or under the umbrella of the Defence Ministry. However, in practice, nothing much happened. They still maintain their control over their areas, they con – they maintain their own structures, they follow their, sort of, existing commands from their existing leaders. And al-Sharaa has been, sort of, tolerating that because he knows that if he pushes too hard too quickly, that might lead to what we are witnessing, and what we’re witnessing is basically mostly in regions that are mostly, I don’t know, with – that are filled by non-Sunnis, but then, if that happened, then it will be – the fight will be among Sunni groups, as well, because those are the majority.
Because of that, he has been, sort of, “Okay, I will allow this to happen and deal with that at a later stage.” So, pacifying the situation, making sure the situation is stable has been his, sort of, main priority. Now, is that working? It was not – it did not really work, because every now and then, whatever happens, those – the lack of control, or Damascus’ lack of control over those groups, is not only not – does not only become clear, but the impact of that lack of control becomes more evident, and that is basically contributing directly to what we are seeing, the violations, and making people concerned, but also leading to more violence. So, is it the right approach? I don’t know. It’s something that needs more, sort of, studying, but it’s clearly not working. How al-Sharaa will address that, I think it’s – it remains to be seen. But on – like, at least for as of now, that merger is just theoretical and on paper.
Now, when it comes to North East Syria, the negotiations focus on two main issues. One of them is related to the governance model that the groups are pushing for, which is some, sort of, decentralised governance model that would allow them to maintain at least administrative control over their regions, and it’s something that they share with others, it’s not only them, you have the same in Suwayda. And al-Sharaa has been refusing that because he is going for a centralised model, that would allow him to maintain control over all the areas across the country, which basically aligns more with his management style. Now, the – that is the main conflict, decentralising of – decentralisation versus centralisation.
The other issue is related to the integration of SD – Syrian Democratic Forces into the Defence Ministry. And the main issue here is that they – the Self-Administration and the SDF, they are saying that, “We are willing to operate under the umbrella of the Defence Ministry, but we remain our structure as groups, so we were integrated as groups rather than individuals, and we will maintain control over our areas. So, we will report to Damascus, but we will continue to manage our areas directly.”
The same – which is basically what Druze in Suwayda are asking for, it’s exactly the same. They’re saying, “We will allow people from the area to manage the security as well as the military situation, but – they report to you, but you don’t send people who are not from the area to the area,” and this has been – those two issues have been the, sort of, sticking point. How will they be able to find a a common ground? I think this is the biggest question, because it seems that if they continue to, sort of – pushing for this zero sum approach or position, then I think it will be difficult to find a common ground. Whether they will be able to find it or not, again, it remains to be seen, but, as of now, it’s – all the talks have been, sort of, stuck in the same, sort of, phase and position.
Iona Allan
You think – you’d overall assess that the prospects of reaching meaningful power sharing at the moment are still low?
Dr Haid Haid
They’re still low, however, there is a commitment from both sides, whether we’re talking about the North East Syria Self-Administration, or even Druze in Suwayda, that keeping – basically, avoiding confrontation is the only way forward. So, not reaching the agreement does not automatically lead to confrontation, but it does not solve the problem. So, for how long both parties will be able to tolerate that limbo state is remain – is unknown, as of now.
Iona Allan
Thank you, Haid. So, let’s turn now to an important question we got submitted before the event, and this asks what role – well, it asks about the “role of regional powers,” so not just Turkey, but also Iran and Russia, and what role they’re playing behind the scenes in shaping Syria’s new government’s policies. And so, I mean, the question is really, to what extent is al-Sharaa courting Russia and Turkey? And we also have a question on the chat, submitted by Patricia Lo – Patricia Rodgers, which I’m going to group together, as well, and she’s also asking about “Syria and what role Syria is playing in” – sorry, “Israel,” we’re talking about Syria, “what role Israel is playing in Syria’s transition at the moment, and if there’s any dialogue between the transitional government in Syria and Israel, as far as you know?”
Dr Haid Haid
Okay. So, when it comes to the first part of the question, I think out of the three countries mentioned, only Turkey is really playing a direct role in influencing the policies of the transitional government in Syria. I’ll come back to that in a second. For Iran, there is no direct communication whatsoever, and Iran has been trying to reestablish contact, or establish diplomatic contact, but Damascus has been refusing that, so there’s nothing happening on that front. Damascus actually accusing Iran of being behind supporting that coastal violence that took place in March, and behind other issues that we will not get into here, but, because of that, there is no communication whatsoever between Iran and al-Sharaa or Damascus.
For Russia, although Russia played a big part in supporting Assad throughout the conflict, the – al-Sharaa’s position towards Russia has been quite different to the way he approached, or has been approaching Iran. There, there’s, like, zero communication whatsoever, here he’s more willing to discuss how to reach an agreement that will allow the two countries to co-operate. You have the military bases in Syria, they’re still – the forces are still allowed to operate there, discussions are, and negotiations are, still ongoing, as to what shape that co-operation would look like in the future, but, as of now, it seems that there’s a determination from both sides to find a way to continue to co-operate. However, Russia does not have that, sort of, authority over al-Sharaa.
Now, for Turkey, Turkey has been trying to do so many things. They have been trying to sign agreements to have a big role in training the security as well as military forces. They want to have an econ – some, sort of, economic agreement that will allow them to establish a free trade, sort of, area, or treaty for goods to flow both ways without paying any fees or taxes. Then you have Turkey also trying to support the transitional government directly by providing some, sort of, technical support, but also diplomatically, as well.
Now, when it comes to Israel, the – Israel has indirectly impacted the situation quite dramatically in Syria, because they – right after the fall of the regime in December, Israel started attacking all the military bases and neutralised all the strategic, sort of, defence systems, as well as air, sort of, arsenal, they – that the region capacity – the reg – that Damascus has. They also then invaded Syria and occupied parts of Syria. Now, they have been saying that, “We want Syria to be decentralised, or at least to be divided.” They are saying that, “We will not allow military forces from Damascus to go onto the Southern, sort of – to Southern Syria, which is to establish a demilitarised region there. There has been reports today of Israeli air strike hitting a group in order – as a warning shot, to prevent attacks against Druze community or Druze residents in Sahnaya. So, Israel has been trying to play a role, but that role is not direct, and that role is basically mostly limited to ensuring the safety of their basically frontlines with Syria.
In my own view, is I think the role Israel has been playing has been destructive, and instead of basically taking the position that al-Sharaa from the beginning has been communicating, which is basically “We mean no harm to anyone in the region, we are just focusing on Syria,” and they did not pose any direct threat to Israel. Despite all of that, and despite the possibility of establishing potentially either direct or indirect channels to, sort of, at least pacify that area and improve ties with their neighbouring countries, they decided to go for a more aggressive position that might backfire at a later stage.
Iona Allan
Thank you very much, Haid. You certainly paint a picture of a very evolving and complex set of regional interests at play within this whole transition, as well. We are unfortunately out of time for our Q&A section of the event and there are some fantastic questions, which we didn’t get around to discussing, including on the impact of sanctions and the role of foreign fighters, there’s a lot we didn’t get to speak about unfortunately. We are now actually going to conduct a quick audience poll. So, there should be a poll popping up on your screens in a couple of minutes. You can either vote “Yes” or “No” on the screen, and then we will look at the results together, and I’ll pass back to Haid for a few final remarks, and then we will wrap up [pause].
There we go. So, I’ll just read it out, “Do” – so, the poll, the question, “Yes,” “No,” or “Undecided,” is, “Do you believe Syria is on a path of – to lasting stability under Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership? Yes, no or undecided.” So, you can cast your votes now [pause].
Okay, well, while gathering re – the results of the quiz, I’m going to pass back to Haid to give – I mean, we spoke about – and we’ve spoke about the multiple challenges, the pressures facing Syria’s new leadership and the Syrian people over the next few months. I would like to ask you to give three of your top takeaways from this discussion, and if you could also look ahead, particularly to the months a – the mon – the next few weeks and months ahead, and point us to any moments that we should really be looking out for, moments to assess the, kind of, progress made or the moments we should be really paying attention to. Thank you, Haid.
Dr Haid Haid
Sure. I think we did not really get much chance to talk about the – to talk about sanctions and how they’re impacting the – not only the transitional period in Syria, but the serious recovery and ability to really not only govern itself, but be able to take back people, Syrian refugees, IDPs, allow them to go back, and establish a better future for its residents. And I think this is why it’s one of the key issues to keep an eye on the US’ position and policies towards Syria, and whether they will remove sanctions or not.
We have seen other governments lifting or easing sanctions, but without the US’s, sort of, decision to remove their own sanctions, all of the other, sort of, steps are insignificant and will not really have a direct impact. And without that it’ll be difficult to imagine that Syria will actually be able to stand on its own feet, and be able to actually stabilise its territories and provide a prosperous future for its citizens.
The second one is the negotiations that are happening with North East Syria, as well as Druze community, because the decisions that will – if there is any, sort of, deal or agreement, the – that those decisions and the measures taken will not be only limited to those two regions, will also change the way the country is governed and run. And that potentially could play a positive role if a deal is reached, otherwise, it will push the country in completely different direction, and the outcome of that will not be good for anyone.
The last one is basically how the government is, sort of – how the government functions and its ability to really address the different issues we talked about. And for that, one of the key issues here, for sure, removing sanctions and all of that is key, but I think changing the mentality that al-Sharaa has currently and allowing the new transitional government that was appointed recently to have the authority to actually operate freely and make – materialise the promises made in the initial speeches they made, will be crucial. Without those things, I think it will be – if – so, if the outcome of those key issues I mentioned is positive, then I would say Syria will be on the right track. If not, then I’ll say potent – possibly not, and I think most of the people here have said “Undecided,” and I’m definitely in that category, because we are still at the critical, sort of, point and things could go still either way.
Iona Allan
So, a lot hanging in the balance there. Thank you very much, Haid. The results from their poll are in, and as you alluded to, most people, 41% attending were undecided about the future and lasting stability of Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa. We have 33% saying, “No,” they do not believe the path to lasting stability will be under his leadership, and then we have a minority of 27% saying “Yes,” think positively about that. I think that really does reflect what you’re seeing, how despite with modest protest – modest progress made in the last few months, the road to recovery and to [inaudible – 44:29] in Syria is going to be long and hard.
Thank you very much, Haid, for joining us. I think that was a fantastic discussion about an incredibly important subject at this very important juncture. I want to also thank the audience for joining and for your fantastic questions submitted, both before and during the chat. And I’m going to wrap up there, say thank you. Also, I’m going to plug The World Today magazine. We have a next issue, the summer issue, coming out in June, just next month. So, please look out for that, and please join us again for another Member’s Question Time soon. Thank you very much.
Dr Haid Haid
Thank you.
