Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Chatham House, to a Chatham House members’ event on the militarization of the Black Sea After the Annexation of Crimea. My name is Orysia Lutsevych and I manage Ukraine Programme here at Chatham House, which is the only country dedicated programme that looks what happens in Ukraine domestically and, of course, with the wider European security architecture.
I would like to note, this event is on the record, but also, it is livestreamed online and so, the recording will be available after the event. And I would like to also encourage you to tweet with the hashtag #CHEvents and we will share the information wider in the – on the web. Could you please switch off your mobile phones, as a part of housekeeping, not to disturb your neighbours and the speakers on the panel.
It’s been five years since the annexation of Crimea and Chatham House has focused on the issue, since Ukraine was set up and even before. Immediately after the annexation, we’ve looked at the human impact, very much the human rights, deterioration on the Peninsula and today, we are talking about the security and militarization, frankly, not because the human rights have improved, or we’ve had any kind of improvement in this direction. We still have a lot of struggle with the NGOs working, especially with the legal aid, and I would like to specifically highlight the Solidarity Group, that has trouble working, providing legal aid. We have the detention of almost 21 people in Crimea, who refuse to serve in the Russian Military. The only Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is avail – that is serving in – on the Peninsula is under threat of closure and Crimean Tatar Representative Board, whom actually was announced the terrorist organisation and extremist body and is banned in the Peninsula. So, all those issue remaining very urgent.
But today, we are talking about security implications of the annexation and the increasing military presence of the Russian Federation on the ground. I mean, frankly, the coastal line of the Black Sea is 2.5,000 miles and Russia controls legally, only 10% of the Black Sea coastline. But what kind of situation on the ground is after the annexation of Crimea, where Russia is pushing all the legal boundaries by deploying a multi-layered air and naval and coastal defence system? This is what we’re going to discuss today and I have really distinguished panel today. On my left is Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi, who is the Deputy Head of the Defence Intelligence for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. He is a career military, has been with the Ukrainian military or the Ministry of Defence since 2000 and in 2014, he has been promoted and appointed the Deputy Head of Military Intelligence. And next to him is James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy of NATO. Welcome, both of you. We will start with Colonel, giving us an overview of the situation on the ground, so that we can move on, discussing the wider implications of what is happening the Black Sea. Please.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Right, thank you.
James Appathurai
I’m not leaving. I’m just getting my book.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Oh, it’s wonderful. First of all, I am very glad to be here. Why, it’s very important for us, for our country, for our organisation, in defence intelligence of Ukraine, to give you the information concerning the militarization of the Black Sea, and not only Black Sea, Black Sea region at all. Why? Because I called my short presentation concerning the Russian Militarization of Black Sea is a New Threat to European Security. Is it true or not? I think true.
And why? And I will try to give you some quick and some facts concerning the development of situation in military sphere is Crimea Peninsula in Black Sea after their annexation of our Peninsula and by Russian forces. Today, really, Russian Federation created the joint taskforces in Crimea Peninsula that includes all components: air component, naval component, land component, special forces component. And one of the threats, not only for us, is the threat for the countries of the region, it’s missile and rockets, troops and units of Russian Federation in occupied Crimea Peninsula. In this slide, you can see there build-up of military presence in Crimea Peninsula after the annexation, after the occupation of this territory.
What does want Russian Federation in Crimea Peninsula? First of all, to return to a previous time, to the time of Soviet era, with number of troops, with the influence of Russia Federation, not only in Black Sea region, with influence in Mediterranean Sea and, of course, to support with military forces, the external policy of Russian Federation, not only in Black Sea region, in Europe, in Mediterranean Sea and in other region in the world. It’s very been a zone of traditional interest of Russian Federation or the Former Soviet Union in the world.
And one moment, I want to say concerning, first of all, the quality and quantity the new equipment in Crimea Peninsula. If you see in slide, they increase number of combat aircraft from 22 to 122. Concerning submarines with Kalibr system and other equipment, missile and brigade with Bal and Bastion system that can destroy targets, not only at sea, the targets in your land targets, strategic target, in the territory of Ukraine, Moldova, Turkey, Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria, and members of NATO, and that is why is a threat for Ukraine or Moldova, only, and Georgia, not. It’s a stress for all countries of Black Sea region.
Today, we absorbed a new equipment, a new munition, a new approach of Russia Federation, concerning their military strategy in Black Sea, in Peninsula Sea. In this slide, you can see the role of Black Sea in all picture, and security picture, or I think offensive efforts of Russian Federation in the European zone. There are zones from Artic zone to Black Sea and next to cedar territory, and Russian Federation established a new zone, A2/AD zone, in Baltic Sea, in Black Sea, in Crimea Peninsula, with new weapons. For example, Kalibr systems, Iskander systems, in the territory of Southern Military District and the possibility of deployment these systems, huge working systems, in the territory of Crimea Peninsula, with combat range more than 500km. Yes, it is threat for all military objects, for all military facilities and civilian facilities in the territory of Black Sea countries.
It’s very interesting issue concerning the freedom of navigation in Azov Sea and Black Sea. After the creation of joint taskforces, the Crimea Peninsula, Russian Federation has opportunity, capacity, capability, to block the Azov Sea, to control all navigation in the Northern part of Black Sea, to control all navigation in the Azov Sea and, of course, to influence of – on economic situation, social situation, in some region of Ukraine, through blocking the movement of cargo ships from Black Sea to our ports, for example, at Berdyansk and Mariupol, to stop any kind of cargo, any kind of ships, from Ukraine, from Georgia, from – and other countries, in the Azov Sea for checking, for control, for stopping and, of course, it’s a threat, as economic threat for our country.
Russian Federation has enough forces for control the situation in Azov Sea. They created specific instructions, the procedures for control the navigation through the Kerch Strait, under the Kerch Bridge, a new bridge between Russian Federation and occupied territory of Crimea Peninsula, and, of course, control all movement in the aquatory of Azov Sea. Every day Russian Federation, to stop some number of ships or cargo for inspection for changing for another, maybe, another procedures concerning, not only security, concerning the pressure on the owners of cargo companies, concerning the pressure on our enterprises in the territory of Ukraine and, of course, to disrupt the work of these enterprises in our territory.
What can be the next step of Russian Federation? It’s really one of the threat for Ukraine, it shows a step concerning blockade of our activity and navigation and all kind activity in Northern part of Black Sea region. In this slide, you can see where drill and platform that Russian Federation captured during the annexation of Crimea Peninsula. Today, Russia very often, very – every day uses this platform for, for example, for reconnaissance for monitoring situation in Black Sea region, especially in Northern part of Black Sea. Next one, there we absorbed, we fixed the combat activity of ships, boats, aircraft, of Black Sea, in this territory, especially concerning the combat training, combat and the leave exercises in this region and, of course, close the area, closing the area, for such training in the centre part of Black Sea, the territory near the Crimea Peninsula and the territory in Northern part of Black Sea.
What is the threat for us for navigation of another countries in this region? It’s blocking such activity, all countries in this region. One of the challenge for Ukrainian naval, for the NATO naval group in Black Sea region, it’s possible military accident, during the exercises, during the military activity, both side, Russian side, NATO side, Ukrainian side. It’s possible provoking some maybe military conflict. That is why, when we say concerning the militarization on the Black Sea, we say, why would they increase the number of assets, combat ships, combat aircraft and other means of war, and what is the threat? Possible provocation, possible accident and after that, we can have some military conflict. It’s a threat, it’s a real threat and, of course, for Ukraine side, the threat’s a blockade of our Custom, blockade of our activity and blockade our activity as defenders from aggression of Russian Federation against our country.
It is why we need to understanding, first of all, and of course, we need good co-operation and good support from our partners and from our neighbouring countries in Black Sea region. Why? Because the security of region it’s common deal, it’s common, maybe it’s common work of all countries of Black Sea region.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
It almost looks like Russia is building 1,000 Kaliningrad region, you know, in the Black Sea, with a serious build-up of capabilities in the Peninsula, and it’s not only hypothetical. You know, I didn’t mention, in the introduction, something that you all read in the media, the Azov Sea military aggression of the Russian Phase B naval vessels on three Ukrainian boats and 24 Ukrainian sailors are currently in jail in Moscow and their detention has been extended, I think, ‘til the 24th of April, which is, interestingly enough, right after Presidential elections in Ukraine. So, you could see how the different levers that Russia has to influence domestic situation on the ground.
But I’d like to go to James now, to hear how NATO assesses the threat and what are, on your side, policy and military responses to the situation in the Black Sea, please.
James Appathurai
So, thank you very much. Thank you for the invitation to be here and thank you, Colonel, because I can remove one third of my presentation, ‘cause that was perfectly well done, from our point of view.
Orysia Lutsevych
So, obviously, your intelligence is similar.
James Appathurai
Yeah. Let me maybe come at this or complement what you said and put it into a broader perspective, from a NATO point of view, and then get down to what NATO’s doing about it. Very quickly to say I think it’s also important not to see what’s happening in Crimea in isolation. Russia’s interference in this region, I think most substantially, in recent years, began in Georgia and, you know, our Georgian friends are really very good at not saying I told you so, but they did say, “If there isn’t a strong reaction from the international community after 2008, you don’t know what’s going to happen next.” And, in fact, they mentioned Crimea at the time. So, I think it’s important to put the Russian activities into context. Clearly, Crimea was a gamechanger. One of the reasons it was a gamechanger, aside from all the reasons that the Colonel laid out, is, I think for many NATO allies, I give you my personal opinion, what Crimea did was then illustrate that there was a pattern of Russian activity. And Georgia then, again, was seen as part of this pattern and I think that’s one of the reasons why the international community’s response has been so sustained. This is not an isolated event. Crimea made it clear it was not an isolated event, in the context of other regional moves by Russia.
I think it’s also important to recognise that Crimea gives Russia a stronger platform to project force and political influence far beyond Ukraine and even beyond the Black Sea. It is using this enhanced military capability to project force into the Eastern Mediterranean, into the Middle East and potentially, elsewhere. And, of course, the deployment of assets in Syria, we see that now, the use of military force in Syria, it’s, sort of, almost permanent naval patrols in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is all part of the construct. And, though this isn’t directly related, it is somewhat related, I think it’s important for all of us to have a look at the way in which the Russian military presence is spreading. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Egypt, negotiations with Haftar in Libya and you have seen press reports, at least, of Russian military activity inside of Libya, there is a string now of Russian military presence, which extends far beyond Russia. Crimea is an essential part of that and that has political and military implications for all of us, which I think we shouldn’t ignore.
So, that’s the, sort of, broader context. I think NATO’s approach to this has had, in essence, four tracks. One is to keep up the political pressure, and, by the way, to strongly support the EU and our individual allies keeping up the economic pressure. So, sanctions are crucial. Political unity and support for Ukraine is crucial. I think many would say that was what was missing, after the events in Georgia, and now we cannot back down and Russia has to understand there’s a cost. And actually, I’ve been quite gratified to see how, despite all the various political positions in the EU and in NATO, with regard to Russia more broadly, sanctions have stuck, our political unity has stuck, but we just put out a statement in the last couple of days, again on the anniversary of Crimea. So, you know, and the Ambassadors were saying at NATO headquarters, when we were discussing it last week, “We have to put this statement out to make it clear that we don’t forget. It is not off the agenda.” And so, keeping Ukraine on the agenda, on the media agenda, on the political agenda, is crucial. It cannot drift away. So, that’s, sort of, track one.
The second is to beef up the actual defences of allies, ‘cause as the Colonel said, this doesn’t just affect Ukraine, it affects our ability to defend allies and so, the allies have taken a number of decisions and are implementing those decisions, to ensure that allies are better defended. So, what does that mean? Oh, we have taken what we call assurance measures, in the air, with airborne warning control, with military patrol aircraft, with naval forces, special forces, training and education, in particular, for example, in Romania. Romania is hosting a much more substantial ground presence for NATO. We have put in place tailored measures for Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean, involving, again, airborne warning and control aircraft, patrol, port visits, exercises. We are also, and have increased and continue to maintain a level, of visits by our standing naval forces, so naval formations into the Black Sea, in accordance with all the necessary arrangements. We have a long list of exercises that will be held in the Black Sea, NATO and allied exercises. But this is done, obviously, for military reasons, but also, for political and demonstrative reasons. So, that’s what NATO, as NATO, is doing. It’s also the case that individual allies are deploying into the region more, to Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey, to make the point that we are capable and will remain capable of reinforcing.
Second track is to increase the NATO presence in the Black Sea itself, to make it clear that we will maintain our freedom of movement and if that requires adaptations to our capabilities, we will implement them. And that includes naval visits, it includes maritime patrol aircraft, it includes frigates and other combat ships and that’s NATO doing it and it’s NATO allies doing it, and the UK, for example, has deployed capacities there. The US Donald Cook has, just these days, there and not for the first time. So, that’s the second track is to ensure our freedom of movement and I can assure that, of course, our Military Commanders are looking very carefully at these anti-access area denial bubbles, these layered missile systems and – that you mentioned, to ensure that we have the capabilities we need to be able to reinforce allies and move in the Black Sea.
The third track is providing concrete support to our partners. They need it and we want them to have it, and let me mention, in particular, of course, Georgia and Ukraine. So, we actually have quite well developed packages of co-operation with both countries and my division, sort of, oversees those in NATO, so we have a strong foundation now to do more and so, we will do more. That includes, for example, with regard to Georgia, we will hold a NATO exercise in Georgia. We do that on a, pretty much an annual basis. That’ll come quite soon. Again, to make the point, a lot of bilateral port calls, a lot of capacity building, including for the Coastguard in Georgia, and possible future steps to help them to have better awareness of what’s going on in the region.
In the case of Ukraine, and the Colonel will know this very well, we actually have quite a substantial package of support. For example, helping Ukraine with its intelligence services, so it better knows what’s going on. Second, to improve the naval capabilities, which were decimated when Crimea was lost, because, of course, most of it was based there and so was a lot of the defence industry. Helping also to restructure and helping Ukraine to restructure its Naval Academy, which had to move from Sevastopol to Odessa, so we’re helping with, sort of, the long-term reform of the institutions. We have something called the Comprehensive Assistance Package. It’s got 40 measures in it. Many of these are applicable to Black Sea security. So, we are investing and investing more and, in fact, there’s discussions underway now, but upgraded further those practical areas of co-operation.
Final point I would make and then we can – I’ll stop, is I think we all have to settle in for a prolonged period where the Black Sea region will be unstable, where Russia will have a very heavy military presence. This is core to Russia’s political agenda, as the Colonel pointed out. Seeing them – and I talked briefly to Journalists this morning and they were saying, “Well, you know, when is Russia going to leave? Is that, you know, in the next period?” I don’t think so. So, NATO – you know, the Black Sea for NATO was not a high priority area ten years ago. It seemed stable, the allies were taking care of security there, we were very focused, in recent years, on the Baltic Sea region, for reasons which you understand. But now the Black Sea is firmly on the NATO agenda, in a way that it has never been in my time at NATO. We have a Foreign Ministers’ meeting coming up in a couple of weeks and this will be a prominent topic, with a package of concrete steps that we can take. So, for NATO, the Black Sea, I think, will be on the agenda, and high on the agenda, for the coming years.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you very much, James. I mean, it’s clearly that it’s good news to hear that you are taking it very seriously. But on Ukrainian side, NATO also is taking very seriously, because just recently, Ukrainian Parliament voted a constitutional change where NATO and EU membership are listed as policy priorities and acquiring membership and close integration with both organisation is key. I’m sure we can discuss some of it and how NATO could respond to that such aspirations from the audience. But I would like to open now the floor and could you please raise your hand, introduce yourself, if possible beyond just a Chatham House Member, because all of you are, in a way, Chatham House members. So, if you could please give us a little bit more detail who you are and if you have a question that is addressed directly to one of the speakers, it will be easy and maybe we can take more questions. Please, Robert, there.
Robert Brinkley
Thanks. Robert Brinkley and Member of Chatham House and the Ukraine Forum here. It’s a question for Colonel Skibitskyi. There’s been speculation that Russia might try to drive through, in a military sense, from Donbass to Crimea, along the Northern Coast of the Sea of Azov. Do you think that is a realistic option for Russia?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Yeah.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, we’ll take one-by-one and then, please.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
And thank you for your questions. Yes, it’s really threat for our country. Why? Because – and from 2014, Russian Federation tried to create the corridor, a bridge from the territory of Russia Federation to Crimea Peninsula and that is why, concerning the activity of Russian Federation in the Azov Sea, in Black Sea, especially Marine brigade of Russian Federation and other combat ships of Russian Federation in Black Sea. And every year Russian Forces, during their exercises, conducted some special training concerning their amphibious operations, concerning their capture, some territory in the coastal of Azov Sea. That is why we, during the period of 2017/2018, we improve our capability of our Armed Forces in this area. We – why? Because we understand the capacity capability of Russian Federation and the possible large scale operations against Ukraine, and not for – not only from the land direction from the Russian Federation, from the sea too, from Azov Sea, from the Azov Sea, and from the Black Sea.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you. Euan, here, please. Wait for the microphone, please.
Euan Grant
Thank you, yeah. Euan Grant, Chatham House Member, but also, Former Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst, who’s worked on EU missions in Kiev and Odessa, including just before and just after the Maidan. My question is primarily for the Colonel, but it is for both of you, and I do notice on the point about the Black Sea going up in priority and quite serious here that in recent years, Clive Cussler, who’s rich enough to write about anything he wants to and always includes naval and maritime technologies in his plots, has written a whole series set in the Black Sea, not a coincidence.
Colonel, is there any indication that the very important point you made about the oil facilities West of the Peninsula and the exercises is having an impact on maritime insurance rates into Odessa and Illichivsk and Nikolaev? Because I think that’s one, very much, that Western Governments should be talking to Lloyds of London in the insurance industry about. And do you, both gentleman, believe that there are opportunities for the EU collectively, which is always a bit uneasy about military and security matters, to recognise assistance Ukraine has given on military and naval technologies, in economic assistance to Ukraine, as well as security and military? Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay. James, do you want to start or not?
James Appathurai
No.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Okay. Yes, it’s a really – okay, where we think about the possible threat for Ukraine, not only military threat from Russian Federation, we can – we must say, concerning the – our transportation system, gas and oil system. And we must think, concerning the pressure for – economic pressure from Russia Federation to our country. It’s one sphere of our responsibility for defence intelligence of Ukraine, but in new conflict, in hybrid war, in hybrid conflict, from the territory of Russian Federation, it’s our obligation too. That is why we monitor in all situation concerning, for example, military-industrial complex in Russian Federation, concerning new weapons and new systems in the territory of Crimea Peninsula and, of course, using these forces uses with equipment in the territory or Syria. Why? Because we understand one days these weapons can return back to Ukraine, against Ukraine, and that is why it’s one of our priority of intelligence of Ukraine, concerning this issue. Thank you.
James Appathurai
It’s always a little bit risky for a NATO staff member to comment on what the EU should be recognising, so I won’t do that, but…
Orysia Lutsevych
It’s okay, in London you can do that.
James Appathurai
Yeah, yeah, in a few weeks that’ll be safe here, maybe. But what I would say is this, the challenge we have is, on the one hand, on the part of the international community to co-ordinate properly the kind of support that we’re providing, so it’s not duplicative, so that it goes to where it should go, but also, so that each organisation, in the case of organisations, focuses on what it’s good at. The Ukrainian security system, in its larger sense, is, at the same time, fighting a war and at the other same time, undergoing a profound reform process, which is essential for the long-term security of the country. That’s quite clear, but, you know, the common expression of building a plane while flying it I think is really what they’re facing and so, you know, there are multiple tracks.
Individual NATO allies, and that’s what I can speak to, are certainly more directly engaged in, sort of, providing and supporting when it comes to hard military capability, and my own country is one of those. NATO is more focused on the reform aspects, but again, military and security reform. But I would stretch that to its – in a larger sense. One of the areas in which we’re quite engaged with the Ukrainian Government is on transparency and the fight against corruption in the defence sector. There’s huge amounts of money. It’s, obviously, a priority for the Government to show that it – to its population that it is fighting corruption, but also, it’s a priority for the intelligence and defence services to make sure that the money that goes into defence actually translates into actual capabilities when they need them and doesn’t just disappear into bank accounts elsewhere.
So, you know, I’m dancing a little bit around your question, but just to say there’s so much going on. I don’t know what the EU should engage in, but when it comes to actually delivering hard naval capabilities, I think it’s more NATO allies that are doing that, but NATO’s behind that, trying to help the whole system deliver effective capability.
Orysia Lutsevych
Just to push you a little bit further, James, because we’ve just released our principles and key policy areas for Western engagement with Ukraine, after 2019 elections, which was the taskforce of independent experts that looked at, regardless who wins the seat on the administration in April, and the West should remain engaged. And one of the ideas that, you know, was voiced at the brainstorming, that perhaps NATO should consider opening the Enhanced Opportunities Programme for Ukraine, which is right now, not in place. What are the complications on the way to this programme, from the side of the Alliance?
James Appathurai
So, the Ukrainian Government has, in the past, said that it would like to be an enhanced opportunities partner and technically, there are, sort of, certain things you need to do to participate in this process, but it is also a little bit of a political decision. I think, to a certain extent, that’s been overtaken by events, by the new decisions that they want to actually go straight for membership. So, we’ll see whether that’s still something that’s brought to the table. My own feeling is these are political frameworks, but the truth is that when we look at, actually, what we do with Ukraine, it is as deep and as profound and as broad as our co-operation with any other partner, except potentially, Georgia, but really, it’s very close. We’re talking about massive amounts of money. We have a big office there. Our colleagues work with every ministry. Programmes of co-operation, we’re helping with even areas such as soldiers that have been wounded, to provide rehabilitation. So, my feeling is, you know, this is something for the political people to decide. But in terms of practicality, we say with Georgia they have all necessary tools for a reform. My feeling is, in the case of Ukraine, we have what we need to do to actually get on with the concrete work.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you very much. Gentleman here? Wait, one second, for the microphone.
Andre
Hello, my name is Andre. I’m from the National Institute for African Studies and I’m a Writer, and I have two questions. First is for van Colonel Skibitskyi and second is for James. So, regarding the capture of 24 sailors at the Kerch Strait, please could you update us on the actual agenda that the Ukrainian Government is pursuing, in order to release the sailors? And for James, we have increased information that we are joining NATO, from President Poroshenko. Please could you comment how realistic is that? I wouldn’t like to hear an optimistic opinion from you. I would really like to hear a realistic one, because we are hearing a lot, yes, of course, yes, of course, of course, but I would like to hear actual. Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, we’ll take one more question and then come back to the panel. Yeah, the gentleman over there, yes.
John Warren
Thank you. John Warren, Chatham House Member. I wonder if you could enlighten, over the last ten years, how has public opinion of the people who live in Crimea changed towards Ukraine or Russia?
Orysia Lutsevych
Uh-huh, okay. Okay and let’s now go back on the sailors, what’s Ukraine Government strategies for release, and then on membership?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Thank you very much for your question. We – first of all, concerning the Ministry of Defence of our country, Government, we work very closely with all bodies, with Government bodies in Ukraine, especially for releasing our prisoners of war. It’s our Marine. And next one, we work very close together with our partners, with the NATO countries, with the international organisation, first of all, to recognise the aggressive action of Russian Federation against, not only against these ships, combat ships, against Ukraine, open aggression and of course, one tool, or one means, of such work, is strategic communication, as today. Believe me, I am Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, but it’s strategic communication with society, with open communication concerning the threats, challenges, and of course, what we’re doing for improve our security, for improve our capability, increase our capability, as possible future member of NATO.
James Appathurai
On the membership question, I think there’s three parts to the answer. One is the political foundation and you know it. NATO allies took a decision in Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine could, would, become NATO members, if they still wanted to, and Ukraine has gone through a range of views on that subject. The Ukrainian Parliament has made a decision and NATO’s principle, which you know, is that any European democracy has the right to apply. So, that’s the policy foundation and therefore, there’s no, no there.
The second part is that the country has to be ready for membership, has to meet the standards of NATO, and, you know, here, I think, there’s a long road still to follow. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. The Ukrainian Government is, you know, committed to reform and previous Governments have been committed to reform, but there’s a huge amount to do before we can even talk about meeting the NATO standards. So, you know, I don’t think it’s for tomorrow, even on that basis.
And then there’s the third consideration, which is NATO has to be ready politically and, you know, the allies have demonstrated that they are committed to the open door, and including when Russia doesn’t like it, most recently now with North Macedonia, just recently with Montenegro, our consistent commitment to Georgia, publicly stated again and again, and presence in Georgia, even though the Russian’s don’t like it. So, I think, you know, the NATO commitment to this is easily demonstrated, but there are larger geopolitical issues here, also for Ukraine, and we have to make sure that this process contributes and that’s in the NATO Charter. It has to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and so, you know, we’d have to think through, very carefully, how to do this. The priority now is the security of Ukraine and reforming Ukraine and we’re trying to help with both of those.
Orysia Lutsevych
Do we have any reliable information, public opinion, in Crimea, first of all?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
It’s…
Orysia Lutsevych
And the emphasis is on reliable.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
It’s…
Orysia Lutsevych
Do we really know?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Yeah, it’s very short comment concerning the answer. It’s very difficult to understand what is the situation in Crimea Peninsula today. Why? Because, first of all, it’s closed zone, it’s a really closed zone. It’s naval base for Russian Federation. That is why it’s some public opinion or social situation in Crimea Peninsula depend on the economic situation in Crimea, depend on some places in Crimea Peninsula, for example, military zone, in one case, next one concerning the region with the Tatar population. Why? Because one of the challenge for Tatar population, Crimea Tatar pollution is the pressure on Russian Federation. And, in many cases, the Tatar population remember the previous experience, the experience of Second World War. And, of course, they’re – and the pressure of Russian Federation in populations that support Ukraine, that support the activity of NATO, Western countries in the Black Sea and, of course, we need understand the huge propaganda and information campaign of Russian Federation in Crimea Peninsula, concerning the discreditation of Ukrainian authority, concerning the discreditation of Western countries, in eyes of local population of Crimea Peninsula.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you. Oh, one there, then here.
Duncan Allan
Thank you. I’m Duncan Allan, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House. My question is to both speakers. Colonel Skibitskyi referred to the risk of military accident arising from the militarization of the Black Sea. What concrete mechanisms are in place to mitigate that risk and what more, in your opinion, should be done to reduce it still further?
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay and we’ll take one more, I think, whoever’s closer, yeah.
Alya Shandra
Alya Shandra…
Orysia Lutsevych
One second, one second, one second, yeah.
Alya Shandra
Alya Shandra, EuroMaidan Press Media, Outlook Ukraine. I have a question for Mr Appathurai. After the Azov Sea incident, one of the ideas that were discussed to send a signal to Russia and to improve the situation was to send a NATO warship into the Azov Sea, and it has been talked over, but still not implemented. I would want to hear your opinion on whether this is possible in the future? Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, so incidents and protocols, well, yeah.
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
Okay, concerning the incident, we had many incident in air and in the sea, for example, shooting our Antonov 26 aircraft in Northern part of Black Sea. What is the mechanism? I think only one, the demilitarisation of Crimea and Black Sea from Russian side. Why? Because every year, and according to the plan of Russian Federation, Russian Federation will build up the military presence and the number of weapons, in the Crimea Peninsula. I show in slide this number, and first of all, some equipments will increase in twice or more during the short period of time, to the middle of 2020. It’s not assessment. I think we’re – it’s true, demilitarisation and of course, a very nice co-operation, co-ordination, our efforts, all Baltic, all Black Sea countries, during the military exercises, during the military activity on only simple activity in Black Sea.
James Appathurai
Yeah, have to say my responsibilities don’t include having an opinion on whether we should be sending a ship into the Sea of Azov, but I have heard the discussion. What I think you will see and are seeing is an increased engagement and physical presence of allies and of NATO in strategically important areas. For example, Odessa, where, quite recently, we had a Commander of our lan – Naval Command was there, along with Kurt Volker, from the United States, with a port visit. So, we’re trying to do our best to make it clear that we will continue to have free – naval freedom of movement, including when it comes to the Black Sea, but of course, there’s a delicate political discussion to be had, which is why it continues to be discussed about how they do that.
Orysia Lutsevych
Anything you would like to comment on the NATO side on the wording, accidents in the Black Sea?
James Appathurai
Yeah, well, I – it’s directly related, isn’t it? You know, we have a track of dialogue with Russia and we want it to be substantial, and one of the main issues that we’re trying to address is having better military-to-military linkages to avoid unexpected esc – or unwanted escalation, to manage incidents, because our forces are closer together than they have been and more active than they have been for, you know, decades now. So, the two top, you know, General Gerasimov and our Supreme Allied Commander, our top General, they talk to each other and individual NATO countries have, in some cases, you know, the hotline with the Russians as well and can manage incidents in that way. But I actually share the concern and I think we share the concern in NATO headquarters, that it’s not enough, that there is a risk of incidents, of unintended escalation and we would like more in the way of military-to-military linkages with Russia.
Orysia Lutsevych
Interesting enough, recently, after the annexation of Crimea, there was a lot of hypothetical thinking about risk in the Baltics, about the Article 5, it looks like now that risk is moving, in a way, towards the Black Sea, there. The escalation is possible and precautions have to be in place. I’ve seen a couple of hands. Yes, please, here and then there.
Nadia Hashmi
Thank you very much and Nadia Hashmi, Ukraine Team in the Foreign Office. My question is, as we enter a period of Presidential and then Parliamentary elections, I wonder if either of the speakers thought that this was a chance to, maybe for the Colonel initially, to refresh and reinvigorate the reform process, or do you think the challenge is that because of the next period, those might slow down and engagement with international partners might wane? And similar question to you, particularly on the second…
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, we…
Nadia Hashmi
…issue on engagement.
Orysia Lutsevych
We’ll take a second one and then we’ll come back to elections. Yes, please.
Robert Moreland
Robert Moreland. I’ve been to Ukraine as an election observer and on behalf of the European Commission and I’m a former Member of the European Parliament. Can I ask, presumably, Crimea comes at a cost to Russia and I’ve got in the back of my mind, of course, what happened with Afghanistan, although I know it’s really very different. But given the sanctions, etc., if I was sitting in Moscow or St Petersburg, would I not be watching the cost of all this? It must come at a very big cost and must limit their activities.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay, so implications on elections on co-operation and reforms domestically, how do you feel it, as an external observer? Maybe then we’ll come to Colonel later, from being in the midst of it.
James Appathurai
My experience, from being at NATO for a long time, but even from before in Ottawa, was in every country, and I’m sure you’re experiencing the same, during an electoral process, of course, the level of engagement with international partners diminishes, because the political focus is elsewhere. So, I think we see a little bit of that right now and actually, we’re not surprised by it and we’re, kind of, waiting to get through it. Even as we discuss possible new measures, I think it hasn’t stalled, not at all, but there’s less of it. But we expect it to pick up immediately after the elections.
I would mention the cost issue just briefly, and I don’t mean the financial cost and I don’t mean the military cost, but the, I think the political cost is, actually, something that’s worth noting and that is, and you can speak to this better than me, I think, but, you know, the split in the Church was a huge political blow for the Mos – the Kremlin ambitions to portray a greater Russia. And I think, actually, people – and you’re all experts, so you know about it, but it wasn’t just a religious schism. It was clearly a political step and it has long-term implications for this grand project and I think, in fact, that the pro-Western orientation of the majority of Ukraine now, towards the EU and towards NATO, including now Parliamentary decisions, again, is a major blow to this, sort of, world view of projecting political influence to a greater community. It’s also the case that every country around Russia, even countries that are [inaudible – 51:24] partners or allies with Russia, now look with extreme concern. They don’t trust Russia anymore, because they’re worried that this can happen to them and are inching to find at least the maximum amount of political space they can. So, I think there has been a long-term political cost, at least to the geopolitical agenda that had been promoted and is still promoted, from the Kremlin.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, maybe Colonel would have more appetite on raising the cost for Russians and if you have any ideas how this could be done?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
And before this I want to say concerning the Presidential election and Parliament election here, in our country. First of all, way I understand, Ukraine today has a clear direction, a clear way to NATO co-operation with NATO states and so, in – for us, for example, for military defence, for intelligence services, the intelligence community of our country, we started our reform process after the beginning of aggression of Russian Federation against Ukraine. Today, we work together with our partners concerning the information, concerning the support, co-ordination our efforts and, of course, we try to increase our capability, including personal training, including procedures of NATO, then we, today, use in our everyday job.
Concerning the cost of Russian Federation and, of course, I must admit concerning the effect of international sanctions on Russian Federation, on military industrial complex of – in military enterprises of Russian Federation. It’s for our assessment, it’s – yes, there is influence on Russia Federation, but Russia Federation has some priorities in, first of all, in creation of new group and forces, a new division, new armies, in some regions of Russian Federation, especially in the West and in the farthen [means farthest] West direction for Russian Federation.
Next one, concerning their programme of equipment. In Crimea Peninsula, for example, according to plan in 2014, Russian Federation declared that Russia wanted to have six submarine with Kalibr missiles in Black Sea. What is the picture now here? Six submarine and other equipment in Crimea Peninsula under the plan. Why? Because of the probability, it’s a higher cost for Russian Federation, but believe me, we are monitoring all exercises of snap inspections, snap exercises, some combat training of Armed Forces of Russian Federation. One of their signal from – with the – from this intelligence data, preparation of Russian Federation for the large international conflict. What does it mean for, I think, for international conflict for Russia? Maybe original war, yeah. And by the way, concerning the programme of training and combat exercise of Black Sea in this year, in 2019, one of the main goal, the preparation and the readiness of Black Sea for engagement in international conflict in zone – in operational zone of Black Sea. What is the operational zone of Black Sea, Black Sea, the Azov Sea and Mediterranean? It’s signal for us, for international society, concerning the preparation of Russian Federation for warfare.
Orysia Lutsevych
And just, also, to clarify, after the loss of the Black Sea base for Ukraine, how is Ukraine planning strategically to develop its coastal defences, and including Naval Forces?
Colonel Vadym Skibitskyi
It’s – today, it’s one of our priority of rebuilding of our naval, for naval bases in, first of all, in the Black Sea, in Odessa and Kherson and, of course, in the Azov Sea, in Mariupol. Why? Because it’s – we need this for our defence, for our security and, of course, with support of our partners, with the NATO partners, with our friends in our Black Sea region.
Orysia Lutsevych
Okay. Well, I think, ladies and gentlemen, we’ll be wrapping up the meeting here. Unfortunately, we’re coming to 2 o’clock, so really sorry for those who couldn’t ask their questions. But I would like to ask you to thank, with a round of applause, to our speakers today [applause]. And thank you very much.
