Operation Decisive Storm: Analysing Four Years of Conflict in Yemen

Farea Al Muslimi

Good. Okay, thank you very much for coming today. My name is Farea Al Muslimi and I’m a specialist at Chatham House. Today we have two exceptional speakers on the anniversary of four years of a foreign military intervention in Yemen, and the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. We have Rafat Al-Akhali, who is the Foreign Minister of Youth and Sport in Yemen, but also, an Associate Fellow at Oxford University right now with the Blavatnik School. And we also have Jane Kinninmont, I have tried that very much, my British didn’t work, who also works with The Elders right now, and was, in the past, also Associate Fellow with the Chatham House, Deputy Head of the Middle East. But thank you very much again for coming, and we will start this panel by probably deep-diving into the domestic situation in Yemen, how has four years changed this country, what is the trends we’re seeing, and then we will go back into Jane to cover a bit more of the region. But if you can also reflect on the domestic complexities, and how this war has changed Yemen in the last four years?

Rafat Al-Akhali

Great, thanks, and thanks to everyone for coming, it’s great to see a lot of familiar faces and…

Farea Al Muslimi

If I may interrupt, the communication just reminding me, this is a livestreamed event and it is on the record.

Rafat Al-Akhali

Okay, good to know, and as Farea said, it is unfortunate that we are now four years, from the start of the conflict in Yemen, and a lot has changed in the country, unfortunately, a lot negatively has changed in the country over the four years. Maybe if I may, maybe just take a very macro view and try to look at some of the trends that we are seeing in different areas of Yemen, and also, in the different sectors. And I think one of the three trends I’d like to speak about, regarding the domestic side, we are seeing in the Houthi controlled areas, I think the major trend that we are seeing is an increasing turn into what we could term like a police state. Houthis, after four years of war, becoming increasingly paranoid, becoming increasingly cracking down on civil society, on freedoms of expression, on any form of what they see as threatening to their efforts. Including, for example, on any peace-building activities, it’s not allowed any activities of international NGOs, including humanitarian and others are very closely scrutinised, monitored, regulated, not allowed, unless they have full control of it. And I think also, a rise in their ideological identification as a movement and in their efforts to spread the ideology as well, we are seeing increasingly, these cultural activities.

That they’re hosting cultural training camps, you know, daily radio speeches, so far the [inaudible – 03:07] Houthi giving religious sermons, weekly gatherings in their main centres, where the [inaudible - 03:10] Houthi gives, you know, video lectures to his followers. So, an increasing and I think only expected after the four years of war to turn back to try and mobilise around both the ideological and the tribal aspects of the movement. And so, they are entrenched further and further into that, and the crackdown is happening and that’s what everyone feels, in the Houthi controlled areas, that’s daily life for them. There’s an increasing life of fear of crackdown and one ideology kind of shaping the narratives there.

On the other side we see in government-controlled areas, what we see is a lot of fragmentation, unfortunately. What we see is a very weak again Central Government, if you could call it central. Very weak leadership from the top, and over the four years only getting worse, and because of that and because of other factors as well, a lot of fragmentation at the governorate level, each governorate going their own way, depending on the different situations, the leadership in that governorate, the kind of resources that they have. Where they fall in their relationship with the coalition partners. But the trend is very clear, each side, each governorate, each sometimes below the governorate level, each district is going a different way. And increasingly, that’s a challenge how to bring back that common sense of one country or one even, at the region level, or at the governorate level and so, that’s another trend that we see over the four years increasingly happening.

The third trend is related, of course, to the humanitarian and economic situation, humanitarian crisis, as we all know, which is the big focus, and I’ll speak a little bit maybe about that later. But the humanitarian situation deteriorating, getting much worse, over the four years, jobs almost disappearing totally, both in the public and private sector. Lots of challenges for getting food into the country and out. The banking sector facing huge challenges there as well. And so, the humanitarian crisis is only getting worse, over the four years, but on the other side, the economic side, which is not getting as much attention as the direct humanitarian crisis. So, the humanitarians are very good at, let’s say, mobilising and it’s easy to identify quickly with the images and then mobilise, you know, more food shipments or more aid. But it’s not resolving the structural issues that we have, you know, in terms of the macro economic factors. With the Central Bank, the currency and all that, and unfortunately, we are not seeing as much focus on resolving those issues and absolutely no leadership internationally on addressing those economic issues. And maybe that’s something we can explore a little bit this humanitarian economic divide. So, that’s the main three trends that we are seeing.

There are another two trends that I would like to focus on and touch on very briefly. One is as it relates to the relationship with the coalition partners, which again, over the four years, we have seen a deterioration, I would say, in that kind of relationship and co-ordination between the two. We are seeing an increasingly, lot of discontent on the ground, among the population, but also among the political elites at the – at some of the activities of the coalition. And the way that the coalition deals in different governorates where they have more control and more importantly, a lot of concern is raised about these different militia groups that are supported under different names, security forces, security belts, elite forces, paid for, trained for and paid much higher salaries than the Yemeni military, let’s say, or the Yemeni public salaries that are afforded. And no clarity over what is the long-term view for that at some point that will stop. What do we do with all this created military organisations and how do we ensure it doesn’t turn against the state or against the general population as well, once the funding stops? So, that is a real issue of concern, we are seeing a lot of friction and increasingly, that friction over the four years between the government and the coalition partners and this lack of clarity over what is their exact relationship? And of course, understandably, I’m sure the weakness that I talked about in the government side, is a big factor into how the coalition is trying to figure out how to do, and how to support this government. And on the other side, there’s a lack of I think other factors as well.

The last trend that I want to touch on is the international efforts on Yemen, and I think we have seen the international attention only focusing through increasingly the humanitarian list. So, a lot of the coverage, international Yemen and a lot of the action is focused on the humanitarian side, which is, of course, needed and appreciated. But very little on the political side, and when we look at the political side, the international community has mostly been looking at the Yemen through the Saudi lens, I would say. It’s mostly through trying to figure out how do we satisfy Saudi or help Saudi achieve its objectives out of this war? But not enough about how do we get Yemen out of this war, regardless of the different interests in the region and internationally. So, we see these blips of attention every now and then, you know, and there’s peace talks, like the ones in Stockholm, for example. But no real mobilisation internationally to end this war.

The two times that we saw these blips of attention, for example, the Kerry Initiative back at end of 2016, when there was actual attention and actual – you know, it made it to the top of the agenda for the Secretary of State of the United States, when we saw a little bit of movement back then and actually an agreement was prepared and signed and everything. Then attention goes somewhere else and the second time was when both Pompeo and Mattis issued their statements late last year. And again, you know a lot of attention, a lot of push ended up in Stockholm and then attention went somewhere else. So, these are kind of big macro trends and we can…

Farea Al Muslimi

Before I talk to Jane, I wanted to follow-up with one question. First is the Stockholm Agreement, which is the most recent thing in the news. Is the glass full or half-full of water, or half-full of blood? What’s happening to that agreement, what’s the possibility of this? And then also, Jane can follow-up on the reginal aspect of this, but can you tell us a bit also, how much of this is a coalition? Is it a UAE Saudi thing or are we being deceptive by saying the coalition? What’s behind it? Who’s the main leader in this relationship between these two actors, mostly? Is it like a concrete new regional order that’s functioning in Yemen? And in relationship with Yemen, or is this, like, another brushed up WhatsApp group? Where do we go there?

Rafat Al-Akhali

I think the Stockholm Agreement was, as we all know, at a very high level. So, I was also fortunate to — or unfortunate to be there in Stockholm. But a lot of the push was to try and get something, you know initially, there was a very low bar of expectations, it was just about as long as they show up and as long as they commit to meet again, in a couple of months. So, that was kind of the bar. And then, as people showed up and everything started building up steam, I think the bar raised too much maybe, and there was now expectations that we can get something around that. I think it was a big achievement that we got the data agreement in place, basically, to at least, you know, save a lot of destruction that would have happened, a lot of losses of life. So, I think putting the brakes on the Hudaydah battle was a good thing, if it was followed up by actually implementing the agreement.

But everything else was at a very high level, only as a sense of, you know, getting the ball rolling. So, if we talk about the ties understanding, it was empty basically, it was just, “Let’s agree to continue talking,” that’s all it said. The agreement, I think, on the exchange of prisoners, that was much more detailed, it was happening already before Stockholm and unfortunately, got tied into that as well. But I think the key out of Stockholm is that we cannot continue to be at the very high level, I think the special envoy and he’s obviously focused on the big framework. But as everyone knows in Yemen, the complexities that are there and the Devil is always in the details and if we’re not willing to go down to the details and figure out some of this, it’s very difficult to happen.

On the second question, probably Jane can add more, but I think it’s very clear, at least when I talk about the coalition, I talk about Saudi and the UAE, I think they have the backing of the other countries that are in the coalition, but they are the main actors right now. Both in the military side and the economic and humanitarian side, and they’re the ones visible in Yemen at least.

Farea Al Muslimi

Jane, what goes through this from a regional point of view, four years ago some thought this was a Sunday thing, somehow recommending that you read the Ottoman, so the Egyptian archive. Clearly, four years’ later, things are not what everyone expected. But what does this also mean from – was it a new regional order? How does the complexities recently between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf countries or some of them play out into Yemen? And most importantly, how much is Yemen is or is not going to be affected by the Iran deal?

But mostly, how does — how did the Gulf if, at all, change or the politics within the Gulf change because of Yemen’s military foreign intervention?

Jane Kinninmont

Well, it’s probably a symptom of the new regional disorder, which shows little sign of abating, sadly. I mean, I hope that there will be more sustained engagement this time with the peace talks, because I think the perception in the West has changed a lot. When the war broke out, it was neglected and marginalised and got very little coverage. And it’s now become an issue in domestic politics, which is very heated in the US and UK because it’s so closely associated with Saudi Arabia, and of course, Saudi Arabia’s a key Western security partner. So, your view of Saudi Arabia is closely linked to your view of this war, and, you know, in the past in the US, Yemen was pretty much only seen through the lens of Al-Qaeda. There was one simplistic way of viewing it, and that’s basically changed to being viewed much more through the Iran/Saudi lens. But I think one important thing to bear in mind is that, you know, this isn’t a conflict that started with Iran or with Saudi Arabia, they’ve really come later to use their role here for larger regional ends.

That’s not to deny Saudi Arabia obviously has quite direct internal security concerns linked to Yemen as its neighbour. But it’s taken on this much greater symbolic importance where you can talk to normal people in the Gulf who say this is where it will be decided who has won between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Which is actually hard to understand, but it’s how a lot of media rhetoric has portrayed this thing. Whereas, what happens in Yemen has a lot more to do with the dynamics on the ground in Yemen and the territory and the local fighting groups, and so on. But I think it’s important to bear in mind that, you know, the roots of this conflict are much more local, and they do have a lot more to do with political economy struggles and frustrated regionalism. As in many countries, you’ve had an elite heavily concentrated in the capital, who have traditionally benefited more from the country’s resources than pretty much anybody else. Grievances in all of Yemen’s regions, not only the South have festered for a long time. But in 2011, you saw the wave of uprisings across the Arab world, and you saw the Yemeni elite start to splinter, and that created an opportunity people thought for some kind of transition and change, which was then spoiled by a coalition of the former President Saleh and the Houthis, the two groups who thought they had the most to lose from the way that the transition was going.

But when we eventually come back to a political process to look at peace through Yemen, it is going to have to address the centrifugal pressures from the different regions. The South is the most obvious one, but also other regions. And the pressures for better governance, because we can see, from many other examples elsewhere, that decentralisation or even independence as a state doesn’t necessarily solve your governance problems, and often, people think they’re all one and the same things. Perhaps we’re about to find that out with Brexit? But – so, there is unfortunately still not yet a political process that is actually addressing these national root causes of the conflict, we haven’t managed to get to that stage yet, which is worrying. And you know, for now, a lot of the question is about to what extent can you try to take this conflict out of the Iran/Saudi regional proxy war?

Or at least encourage those powers to think that they will benefit from being peacemakers more than from sponsors of groups that are involved in the war in different ways. There has been a hopeful sign with Stockholm in that it seems to represent a moment when those regional players thought that their reputations would benefit from supporting the talks. What we don’t know is how deep that commitment goes, clearly there are also arguments in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There are those who think that they still need a decisive military victory, and they need to acquire more territory and some of them think that Stockholm has basically stopped them from having that. And of course, in Iran there’s quite a lot of schadenfreude about the damage that’s been done to Saudi Arabia’s international reputation by this war. That’s sometimes used as a bit of a distraction from Iran’s own complicity in abuses, both in Yemen, but to a much greater extent, in Syria.

But I think because of public opinion NGO campaigning and parliamentary pressure in Britain and the US and even to some extent in France, there has been a moment where, for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, they’ve thought, “This is too much for our reputations.” And especially the UAE, which has a kind of strong reputation to lose. Where Saudi Arabia, to some extent, has been used to criticism for a long time. And for Iran, it’s interesting that you mentioned the nuclear deal, I think the Iranians, or at least those of them who really want to keep engaging with Europe and stay in the Nuclear Agreement, they have found it quite useful to be able to say, “Look, Yemen is a place where we can play a constructive role. The US isn’t talking to us, we weren’t invited to Stockholm, but we will encourage the Houthis to go to the Stockholm talks.”

What needs to happen now is quite concerted pressure on all the players who have influence with any of the groups, and that would include also, Oman with the Houthis and various others, to keep paying attention to the details. Because Stockholm was almost declared as a victory too early, and the Devil was in the details, and even the prisoner exchanges have not really progressed.

Farea Al Muslimi

What would be – if you zoom out, there has been no attention in Yemen, even today we see quite fresh rare interest in Yemen, even from the audience. There is a moment post and before [inaudible – 19:59] that everyone paid attention into Yemen after that moment, similarly. Possibly also because everyone got tired of Syria, but how does this change the dynamics within the UK? Is it less comfortable now, for example, to be an ally of Saudi Arabia? And how do you think if, at all, the Qatari, the risk problem will affect Yemen or any other part of the region? And most importantly, is it safe to make any comparison between the conflict in Yemen and the one in Syria, the one in Libya? Is it a part of a larger disorder or they are very different and we should not look to them the same way, in any way?

Jane Kinninmont

I mean, there are common threads in all these conflicts, because they arise locally from sort of deep problems with governance, and then, you know, questions about whether the state itself will — can survive political transitions away from long-term leaders. And then you see really a region where there’s a missing element, there’s no successful, like, regional organisation that really has the capacity to solve these problems, to mediate, to deploy peacekeepers. And there’s a general sense that the kind of US underwritten security order in the region is changing or crumbling in some way, and countries are competing in a very zero sum way to see who will be the next leader. Rather than trying to find a way to maybe look at some of the regional organisations, in other parts of the world, and develop more capacity to solve those problems.

Farea Al Muslimi

When the Iranians now for the first time say, “We will talk to the Houthis,” as Jane is saying, in the past, the last three years you talk to them about the Houthis and they say, “The Houthis, how do you spell that, who are this group?” Denying extremely that they don’t know them. Now they’re saying, “We will talk to them.” How much is there a command and control between the Iranians and the Houthis? How much there is a myth and the realities in that complex kind of its complicated relationship? Do they really can talk to them, Rafat, can they – like, is it similar relationship between Hezbollah and Tehran or different one?

Rafat Al-Akhali

My own assessment is that it’s a different one. My own assessment is it’s not a command and control view. I think Iran is very smart about overplaying their role and what they can offer, and I think they’ve had the best return on investment in Yemen, you know, whatever they are supporting. And there is a definite support for the Houthis, we can see it and definitely on the media side for sure, and all the Houthi media organisations are based in Beirut and Hezbollah areas, and all the support they received on that I’m sure there is a lot of weapons support and some military experience. But I never sensed that their relationship is that Iran is actually the one who are calling the shots on the Houthis. The Houthis still, I believe, have a long way from being just told do this, or not do that by Iran.

I think Oman and Muscat has much more influence on the Houthis, given what they have provided them so far, a safe haven, let’s say, all the support communication channels. They’re hosting them there and I think that makes a huge difference, and I think – and we’ve seen it with a lot of the release of American hostages, for example, and other foreign hostages in Sana, whenever the Sultan of Oman makes a request, immediately, the Houthis would oblige. So, I think we can see clearly the influence of Oman, and again, it’s not in terms of like commanding, but a very strong relationship and back and forth. But we never see that kind of relationship directly when it comes to Iran.

Farea Al Muslimi

Speaking of Omanis, can you say a bit of the increasing role of Oman, not just between the Houthis and the world, but even within the Israelis going this way, increasing regional player? And within that framework, what can or should other frameworks, other than the UN, try to solve this conflict? Is the UN a lone capital, should we involve the Omani? If so, are we looking for a Yemeni Astana? Are you looking for a [inaudible – 24:21]? What’s the deal, from a regional point of view, but also, what other Gulf counties are up to, Oman, Kuwait? Most importantly, I guess who are the least involved in this conflict?

Jane Kinninmont

Well, Oman has never been in favour of the Gulf intervention in Yemen. They stood apart from it and essentially, they think the way that the war has gone has confirmed their concerns that this would not be the quick and easy victory that some expected. But there’s also a new element for the Omanis. You mentioned the GCC crisis with Qatar, and that has really created a new sense of insecurity in Oman, where people have thought if our friends and brothers in other Gulf states wanted to do something like this to us, for example, over our relationship with Iran, we would not have the resources that Qatar has to withstand it. So, Qatar has basically been able to cope, because it has such massive gas and investment capabilities and Oman has worried, and people will discuss this with you quite openly if you’re visiting from the UK, it has worry that if the US and UK were forced to choose between Saudi and UAE on one side and Oman on the other, that they would not choose Oman.

So, they have a lot of anxieties generally about their security and a lot of questions about what the long-term aims of their neighbours are in Yemen. But they do have that traditional role as – they prefer not to say mediators, but as facilitators. And I think there has been quite a pragmatic attitude for everybody really towards their relations with the Houthis, because it’s better for other Gulf countries that the Houthis have some relationship with Muscat than only a relationship with Tehran. Beyond that I think, you know, Qatar has been – it’s basically shifted from being part of the coalition to airing criticisms of the war every day, because of its rift with Saudi Arabia. But it’s not a country that would have the capacity to really mediate or be trusted in this. And finally, the role of Kuwait is quite important, they hosted the previous round of UN peace talks. They provided logistical assistance to get the Houthis to Stockholm. So, though they are part of the coalition, they’ve also shown a strong interest in finding a political way forward and that could play a continuing role in the future, I think.

Farea Al Muslimi

Yeah, and what’s Oman doing in Mahrah or what it off in Mahrah if you can actually build on that? Are we going to see more active role of Oman there? Are we – is it soon joining the #MeToo movement? You know what’s happening basically with that in Yemen?

Rafat Al-Akhali

Yeah, because I think that’s one of the biggest shifts in Oman policy as well, was that when the red line was crossed, and the red line has been always clear in Al Mahrah. And when you’re here in Saudi it started interfering in Mahrah, creating forces, taking control of the borders and the airport. Oman, I think, over the past at least nine months, has started shifting their stand, as you said. So, up until last year, I would say they tried as much as possible to be that neutral, more neutral player and more facilitator of the process. But I think now they feel more and more they have some skin in the game as well. They feel they are being threatened by this advancement to Al Mahrah and I think we are seeing a change in their approach to the Yemeni file at least, let alone the regional changes that are happening. So, I think Mahrah is going to be critical in how Oman continues their role in Yemen.

Farea Al Muslimi

Aren’t you worried we are running out for brokers in the region? Suddenly, everyone is slowly becoming more part of the problem, how does that impact not just Yemen, but overall, Libya and Syria, does that worry you?

Jane Kinninmont

Absolutely, it’s a massive, massive problem that the region really needs some countries that can be neutral and leaders who see leadership as making peace and building states and that doesn’t seem to be the dominant trend. And some of the leaders that are still looked to as potential mediators, like the Emir of Kuwait or the Sultan of Oman who obviously are of the generation of grandparents.

Farea Al Muslimi

Great, thank you very much. I will open it for questions. Please introduce yourself. Say something beyond Member House, or Chatham House Member, unless you are ashamed of your affiliation. And you also can ask question online or search events on the hashtag, please use that. But say your name and where you work from, you can have your hand up if you have any question? [Pause] No questions?

Rafat Al-Akhali

We did such a good job in answering all their questions.

Farea Al Muslimi

No, it seems they are part of sketchy affiliations and no-one wants to say who they are. No, wait for the microphone, please?

James

I’m James, and I was actually a student using the library and saw the title of the talk and thought it was quite interesting. So, one of — I’ve just looked at the map of the Yemeni conflict and one of the big patches of land appears to be occupied by Al-Qaeda, and isn’t actually a phrase that came up far too much in this discussion. Could you explain a bit more about that?

Farea Al Muslimi

Yeah, what’s Al-Qaeda up to in Yemen, Rafat?

Rafat Al-Akhali

I think you know more about that because you’ve done a lot of work and research on Al-Qaeda. But I think — I mean, at some point again, this is one of the trends that they did have, at the beginning of the war, a lot of control over some governorates, including Hadhramut and in different places. Right now, at least from what I see, but you know much more, they don’t control wide areas of Yemen or entire governorates or significant areas of Yemen. But their presence is still there and as Jane mentioned, that is still one of the main lenses that Yemen is seeing, especially from defence side in the US and the UK and elsewhere. But I think you know much more about Al-Qaeda than I do?

Farea Al Muslimi

No, I think on Al-Qaeda there is two different ways you need to think of, or not think of. First is within the civil war, within the regional war there is a thriving of armed groups. If you have a gun you basically have more power, and Al-Qaeda falls under that category. The second thing you need to think of when thinking of Al-Qaeda is, as an organisation, it is weaker than any other time in its life, because normal is ability to function as a national organisation with one structure, with one command and control. At the same time, it’s a group that has gained most resources from money, from guns, from sectarian increasing radicalisation. But also, spends the least, it’s not in war with anyone, so far. It’s the big winner more or less of this war because it has invested, and it hasn’t used any of that. It picks and choose its battles, that’s also contrary to what ISIS is.

ISIS, in Yemen, is very ambitious, but it’s not going to go further, because it doesn’t have a local – not local roots, but I would say from ISIS, for example, every single leader in Yemen is a foreigner. Al-Qaeda have never, ever imposed a leader on a local society, unless he’s from the local society. So, there is this quite, I think, terrifying decentralisation, and this goes back all the way to Osama Bin Laden school ten years ago, where he used to tell Al-Qaeda in Yemen, he has this policy in which Gregory Johnsen categorises as centralisation of decision, decentralisation of implementation. Meaning, he would tell the leader in Yemen, “I want a bombing, where, when, how is your job? You decide that based on your own calculations of the reality on the ground.” And that continues to happen, in many frameworks and, in many ways, at the moment and again, it’s a war, so if you have a gun, you will have more rule and that applies to Al-Qaeda. But let me – do you think the UN can solve this conflict alone, by the way?

Jane Kinninmont

I mean, there are loads of efforts at local levels to have ceasefires, understandings, bridge gaps among communities and ultimately, that’s going to be key to whether there’s a sustainable piece. I think the UN has got more of a role to play than in some places in the region, because at least the Security Council is fairly united around wanting to move towards peace and address the humanitarian situation. So, it’s not like Syria, where part of the reason that the Astana Process has worked, has been because the US – the UN has been paralysed by those Russia/US divisions. But, at the same time, the UN is operating, you know, very much at the level of states and in the case of the Houthis, of course not a state, but a group that’s in multifactual control of the capital. And Yemen’s a country where the government in the capital has always had only limited rule over the rest of the country.

I think there’s a huge amount of interest in what kind of tribal conflicts, resolution mechanisms can do at a local level. And then questions about like how much do those operate today and how much do they get taken seriously by younger people, and what kind of effect do they have on women, etc.? But it’s — I mean, every effort has got some role to play here.

Farea Al Muslimi

How much is Yemen worth, and it’s a bit of a question, but I think it’s important, how much of it is local and how much of it is regional or a proxy? In another word, tomorrow the outside decides to back off and we don’t need Jane in the next panel, you know, how much of that conflict will remain, or how much it will not remain? Can you tell us a bit about that?

Rafat Al-Akhali

I think it’s still a lot – there are two tracks to resolving, I think, the Yemeni conflict. One track is fully local, and I’ll talk maybe a little bit about that, and the other track is resolving the issue between the Houthis and Saudi. And without reaching an agreement of some sort, that satisfies Saudi that there will not be threats out of Yemen in their backyard, that the Houthis are not going act as an Iranian proxy in their backyard, that they’re not going to be targeted by ballistic missiles and their borders will be protected, that – only the Houthis can guarantee that. Nobody else; the government cannot guarantee it, and I think the Saudis know that. They know that the only protector that they will ultimately rely on, on their borders and everything, is going to be the Houthis, if it continues. So, without a deal that ends this Houthi/Saudi and I think it’s unfortunately, a deal that if we don’t reach it, has a very long horizon, because it’s between Mohammed bin Salman/Abdullah [inaudible – 35:29], both of them 35-years-old. They have at least another 50 years to go, if they continue at that. So, if they don’t reach an agreement – and I think maybe beyond the kind of the formal processes, the peace agreements, all that, it really comes down to two things: realpolitik-wise.

Mohammed bin Salman/Abdullah [inaudible - 35:49] reaching an agreement, either Abdullah [inaudible – 35:54] agrees to bend the knee and go to Mohammed bin Salman and agree to guarantee the borders, fully shift the things. Or Mohammed bin Salman agrees to change his position, that’s what King Faisal did back in the 60s, from a supporter of one side to a convenor of peace and calls all Yemenis and says, “Okay, Saudi is now going to be the chaperone champion of peace in Yemen and you all come to us.” One of them changes their position or some external actor is able and it’s not going to be there, is able to negotiate something like that. That’s on the one side. On the other side, the real question comes down to three groups, two on the stage one and the third in the stage two.

The two groups are the Houthis and Islah. Are we able to get Houthis and Islah agreement? Is the way out of war brokering a Houthi/Islah agreement? Which it doesn’t seem the region of Saudi anyway is specifically are willing to entertain that one. But locally, if we want to reach peace in this big war that is happening right now, the big war within Yemen, if the Houthis and Islah don’t reach agreement, then the only alternative option, again very crude and not processed or whatever, the only alternative option is creating a new power, which is what I think everyone has been trying to do and failed so far. But creating a new power that can take over, you know, and I think UAE and Saudi have been looking actively for the Haftar or someone who can, kind of, bring everything together. It’s going to have to be a military leader of some sort, or the FCC or whoever. But that is not there today in Yemen.

So, we have Houthis or Islah, either they reach agreement, some power sharing arrangement, some trust between them, and Yemen settles, based on that. Or they don’t and a third power comes in and is fully supporting and is able – a leader emerges who is able to bring all the other forces together and crack down on the Houthis and Islah. If those two options are not there, I think the conflict will continue. The third, which I refer to as stage two, is the Southern issue and the Southern powers that are being created and promoted right now, and they are still fragmented, they’re still not as strong ideologically as Islah and Houthis, not as organised and with a clear command and structure, command structure there. But if an agreement is not reached with them, and if they continue to receive the support that they do, peace will not be there. I think these are the two tracks that are needed to get to peace in Yemen.

Farea Al Muslimi

It’s interesting how, for 45 minutes we’ve been speaking or 40 minutes, and none of us have mentioned the President Hadi. And I want you to think of the question, which is the elephant in the room, but no one dares to ask it is, what if Hadi dies? Is that another U-turn in Yemen’s conflict? But before that I want to ask Jane a psychological question almost is, how much of this is MBS own war? How much of this has been a gamble and how much of this has been part of kind of empowering or disempowering him, within Saudi at all? Is that an aspect we should be thinking of when you think of conflict resolution on Yemen?

Jane Kinninmont

I think the war has been very, very closely associated with him, both in Saudi Arabia and internationally. Some Saudi officials will tell you that that’s unfair or not true, or the plans were drawn up before. But regardless of that, the perception is very much that this is a war spearheaded by a young man, who has a very strong interest in making Saudi Arabia a credible military power. And has also, simultaneously, embarked on quite a big programme of reform and modernisation in the army. But it’s very difficult to do that at the same time as fighting a war, and the two things haven’t necessarily gone well together. But this is part of the issue, and I think, you know, quietly within Saudi Arabia, within the establishment, there has been criticism of the war from the outset. Many said this wouldn’t be a quick war, and they feel proven right. But it does mean that as in so many conflicts, there is a big element of face-saving.

And the assumption basically among most of the allies of Saudi Arabia is that the Saudi leadership is looking for a face-saving way out, as long as that is a compromise that addresses their real local security needs, and their security concerns that have multiplied since the start of the war with the Houthis getting missile capability. But also, mean, some formula that means that they do not look as though they were chased away by a group that Iran would be extremely supportive of and kind of trumpeting, as a blow against Saudi Arabia. So, that is the assumption that many international countries are working on, that Saudi Arabia does want a way out and needs help. But I do also have a question about whether that is definitely true and whether the Saudi leadership does see Yemen as essentially, a failure that needs to be wrapped up. Or whether, from their point of view, they think things would have been worse if we didn’t go in and because we are reforming our army, over time we will get better at this?

Farea Al Muslimi

Before I give you the chance, I wanted to see if anyone else in the room has a question, please? Anyone else just raise your hand?

Jamie Pleydell-Bouverie

Thank you very much. My name is Jamie Pleydell-Bouverie, I’m with Crisis Action. I wanted to ask about international actors outside the regions. So, what we’ve just got into is this idea that Saudi Arabia, at least is the main coalition partner needs both, sort of, carrots and sticks to push it in the right direction. For thinking about the UK, for example, or the US, and Penholders on the Security Council for the UK, arms, continuing to sell arms. I mean, what do you think are the opportunities for international actors outside the region?

Farea Al Muslimi

And I’ll take one more question from the lady behind? Anyone else has a question?

Ashraya

Hello, Ashraya from DFID. My question is related to Southern inclusion in the political process and the stage two that Rafat referred to. There is increasing calls to include them as part of the wider peace process, but there is the complexity in the fact that there’s internal fragmentation in the South and no group or entity that represents all the different groups. So, the question is, when should the South be engaged and how?

Farea Al Muslimi

And I’ll take one last one from here?

James Spencer

If you go back to the beginning of the…

Farea Al Muslimi

And your name?

James Spencer

Sorry?

Farea Al Muslimi

Your name?

James Spencer

James Spencer. If you go back to the beginning of the conflict, there was very little talk of Iran at all. It was all about the Houthis replacing the Hadi Government. One potential explanation for that is that it was the Saudi’s objecting to their effectively client state government being taken over by what was then effectively, one of the factions within the Arab Spring. If that is the case, Iran nominally getting out of where it probably isn’t very deeply in, isn’t going to solve the problem. Can you suggest what will solve that problem?

Farea Al Muslimi

If I start with you Rafat, and then we can go back to Jane?

Rafat Al-Akhali

Maybe I’ll take, first, the question on when should the South be included, and I think it’s — I don’t know if anyone has the answer for the South or not, but the assumption of the design of the peace process, so far, has been that we would first start by stopping military actors who are actively fighting, reaching a peace agreement there and then opening up for a transitional period where all the other factions can come together. And there’s the South, but even within the South, as you know, Hadhramut has their own thing. But there’s also increasingly, you know, Ma’rib and Taizé and wherever, not happy with the status quo. But the idea it seems that there is envisioned a transitional period similar to 2012 to 2014, where kind of maybe a revisiting of the NDC outcomes, a revisiting of the current status and agreeing on that. So, that’s how it is, at least until now, envisioned. The assumption there was as well that we need to get to a quick resolution of this war, and therefore, we don’t want to widen the circle.

But it’s been taken four years so far and it seems it’s not ending any time soon, so I guess it’s a valid question of whether we should, since we have taken our time anyways, get started on that process of figuring out what the new arrangement is that will satisfy everyone? And I know there’s a lot of efforts both on track two level and other levels, but I think that question is still unresolved. And I can totally see if they are included today on the table, when the discussions is about, you know, reaching, for example, a ceasefire or stopping the current war, where they don’t have much to add to that conversation, because their conversation is a different part of figuring out the position of the South within the future of Yemen. So, it’s a very – I don’t know if there’s an answer or not, but it doesn’t seem the current process is getting anywhere. So, I think it’s up for revisiting that question.

Farea Al Muslimi

Again, I know they never die from Algeria to Lebanon, but again, the question what if Hadi dies, and then I give it to Jane? Where do we go, seriously that’s a big question, we have an entire Security Council resolution under one man, or under his name, what is the structure we’re going to have after that? That’s just another reason I can think, but what might happen?

Rafat Al-Akhali

I think there’s been a lot of discussions on the government side under the title of reforming the legitimacy, as they call it, and it was trying to aim at reordering the house and actually, you know, bringing back the political parties, reviving the Parliament. A lot of discussions around what to do there specifically to address such a scenario, or in general, to revive the leadership on the government side. They’re not getting anywhere with that discussion, and all efforts to get there has failed so far and I think, so it continues to be the choke point of what happens. I mean, theoretically, if Hadi passes away, then we have the Vice President, Ali Mohsen, so we are in safe hands. But nobody knows what happens, and so – and I think that’s one of the biggest concerns as well, from what I sense, from the coalition as well, is what does this government look like that we are supporting and are we supporting a person, or are we supporting a wide…?

Farea Al Muslimi

And I think that was one of the biggest sins of the diplomacy in Yemen since 2011, which is centring entire processes around one person. You don’t even give a chance to him falling in the bathroom and dying and that you entirely put the entire process safety around one thing or one man, which is dangerous, but Jane, please.

Jane Kinninmont

Also, in the case of Hadi, you know, he was essentially appointed and then validated by a referendum where he was the only option. For a transitional process, he was supposed to be in power for a year until elections would be held. So, the positive side of that is that he’s not somebody who’s trying to come in as a President for life. But the negative side of that is that he does have a certain insecurity about his own position, and if peace is reached and the previous, kind of, transition ideas were returned to, he would be one of the people who would stand to lose, ‘cause his position is temporary. So, that’s a concern.

On James’ question, I think it’s a very good and important one that, you know, even if we imagined that all the issues between Saudi and Iran were sort of resolved overnight or disappeared, Saudi Arabia would still have massive security concerns relating to Yemen, massively increase as a result of the war, because of their involvement there, the level of civilian casualties, and so forth. There are, you know, many people who will grow up hating their neighbour and that in a country where the border is hard to police and it’s awash with small arms. So, I think your point about some kind of Saudi Houthidio is a very important one, and it seems that there are at least some relative pragmatists, in the Houthi side, who are also aware that if they are to have any chance of staying in power, you know, they’ll need to have some kind of arrangement with their big neighbour. And that importantly, Iran is not going to bail Yemen out financially. But whether those people actually win the day is another question.

On the UK, US and other international players, they are vital, because the coalition, bluntly, it can’t sustain the military intervention, without continued support from its Western partners. As yet, the Gulf coalition doesn’t have the capability to do it without them, and they might say, you know, ten/20 years down the line we’ll be doing this with support for China or Russia, but that’s not a current option, either militarily or politically. So, the – and I think, you know, Stockholm is an example where we’ve seen international pressure coming through Western Parliaments actually having some effect. And then we get back to the question of how is that sustained for the amount of time that is needed to get that agreement working and build something that’s larger and more political and more inclusive?

Rafat Al-Akhali

If I may, I think the key question that we need the answer to, and I don’t know if we’ll get the answer to, is what is the objectives of, or the ultimate goal or the best-case scenario that Saudi and UAE can get in Yemen in the next, let’s say, 20 years? And are they both on the same page on those objectives? And I see three options, and if anyone can answer this question of where do they fall on these three options? Because the first option is a strong and stable Yemen, with Houthis and Islah a significant part of that Yemen. That’s the first option. The second option is a strong and stable Yemen, with no place for Houthis and eventually, no place for Islah, which is what Islah has always worried about, that they’re next on the list if this war ends.

Farea Al Muslimi

Islah is the Muslim brother?

Rafat Al-Akhali

Yes. The third option, is controlled chaos, and is that the best-case scenario that Saudi and UAE aiming for, settling for, can only have in Yemen, in the absence of the first two options? Which is leave it as this mess, divide, fragment, chaos, but chaos to a level that we can control, and keep it at that for the next 20 years until we figure out what happens. If we get clarity on where the objective is, and whether both of them are on the same page, I think that’s a critical question.

Farea Al Muslimi

Yeah, because you speak of UAE and Saudi as if there is not even any spelling difference between MBZ and MBS, and that’s quite interesting to watch as a friend, but I do also want to add the point on the Iran question is, contrary to Iran to the Saudis, Yemen is not a foreign policy, Yemen is a national security, is a domestic issue. Even the file is in the hands of the Ministry of Interior. It’s not in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it’s not in the hands of any other agency, this is a domestic affair, and that changes the way how we should look into Saudi’s look into Yemen at the moment.

Any more questions from the ground? Yes, ma’am, please, yeah. Anyone else?

Kira Bett

Kira Bett, a Member of Chatham House. I would like to ask you, what’s the position of Israel in the conflict?

Farea Al Muslimi

Any other questions? Yes, please?

Joseph Garboni

Joseph Garboni, a Member of Chatham House. After Stockholm and after [inaudible – 52:29], kind of, there was big optimism that things are moving and the war is about to end, and then slowly but surely it’s gone back, back, back, back, and now negotiations are about opening a street somewhere or completely forgotten about the war. Any comments why?

Farea Al Muslimi

So, if you want to take on the one on Israel?

Jane Kinninmont

So, Israel has got limited, kind of, direct strategic interest in Yemen, but something that’s been absolutely key for Israel and particularly for Prime Minister Netanyahu has been to publicly emphasis his newfound, but still kind of unacknowledged relations with the Gulf countries. And you know, you’ve seen increasingly, US and Netanyahu’s visit to Oman, but you’ve seen Israeli officials appearing publicly in Abu Dhabi, you’ve seen this controversial leaking of videos from the Warsaw Conference that showed Israelis and Gulf officials very much on the same page about Iran. And so, you know, Netanyahu, who’s been keen really to underline Israel’s support for the security objectives of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. And when the Houthis have, sort of, threatened shipping in the Bab-el-Mandeb, Netanyahu did publicly hint that if there were more serious attempts to disrupt shipping, this was an area where Israel could potentially become involved, which is something quite new. So, I think really for Israel it’s not that much to do with the, kind of, local factors in Yemen, but trying to encourage the perception that there’s a close linkage of interests between Israel and the Gulf capitals.

Farea Al Muslimi

And that there is one united enemy, which is Iran for the Gulf and Israel, that’s the more important I think also in the long-term. Something, a question on Stockholm?

Farea Al Muslimi

Yeah, and I think – I mean, back to what I mentioned earlier, we see these blips of interest, the only sustained interest we see is on the humanitarian file, where there is a lot of attention there. But unfortunately, Yemen is not on the top of the agenda, and that’s what I was mentioning to Jane as well, earlier before the session, with the ‘international community’, is not in a hurry to end this war in Yemen at all. The only time again we see the blips is through the lens of Saudi. So, as you said, you know, Jamal Khashoggi, whether positively or negatively whenever Saudi is in the picture, and that’s when the interest is there.

But on the war specifically and ending the conflict, very little interest there at the very highest level I’m talking, and a lot of the day-to-day work is happening, but the highest level of actually having that decision, the war has to stop and ending it is not there yet, I think.

Jane Kinninmont

I want to pick up on something that you said about the different scenarios for Yemen and sort of where does the Gulf stand? I’m not sure the Gulf states have entirely a clear picture of where they think they definitely can get to. But, you know, on one side, there’s obviously going to be a lot of lot of anxieties about future security threats from Yemen, which will make them have an interest in governments that can control that, but also, probably not want a government that would be very strong and have a really powerful army. Just in case, you know, in the way that you still see Iran, not sure it really wants a very strong Iraq or a very powerful Iraqi army, for much different historical reasons that we see. But something that, you know, maybe can be built on, is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE also have got an interest in Yemen that can be more prosperous, and it’s interesting that, you know, when we look at it in the Western media, it’s very much through the lens of a war ravaged country that is starving, and that has, for a long time, been one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, and has basically, no resources. But, clearly, the UAE in particular sees something about Yemen which is prosperous, which is somewhere that can rise again as a centre for trade and link up with, kind of, budding economies in the Horn of Africa, the huge market in Ethiopia, and all of these places, and that might be something to work with.

Rafat Al-Akhali

Yeah, which is why I think I emphasised a strong and stable Yemen, because if we talk about the Houthis, and that’s not a vision they will accept, not the vision of I think many people as well, will not accept that a vision of Yemen as a follower, as a subservient of UAE or any other sides. With no military with no whatever, and will just – you know, as long as we’re prosperous, we’re okay. That’s not a vision that clicks with many of the Yemenis and on the political scene, definitely not with the Houthis. Which is why I think one option is a strong and stable Yemen where the Houthis and Islah are inevitably part of it. Or the other option is controlled chaos or a strong and stable Yemen where the Houthis are not there, because they will not accept this and Islah probably as well, and many others. So, finding some alternative power that can accept that.

Farea Al Muslimi

We have less than two minutes, but I want to ask you a last question Rafat, this policy which is five year or eight years, whatever, of five years of national war or civil war, four years of regional intervention, eight years of Arab Spring, which was mostly led by youth, what’s left there for youths? Only economies and the frontlines, only jobs is there, there are no heroes — or heroes who actually don’t – other than those who carry guns, what’s left for a generation, which is more than 70% of the country under the age of 30? And just for the sake of context also, Rafat was Foreign Minister of Youth in Yemen. We, his friends, joke that he should have a book called 70 Days in Power, because that’s how long his government has stayed, and that was the last kind of semi-Yemeni Government in Yemen. But yeah, what’s – in one – in less than one minute if you can tell us something?

Rafat Al-Akhali

I think youth are the most concern right now, ‘cause as you said, it’s bleak and if we don’t continue to ignite that flame of hope, that there’s something better coming, what they are seeing right now is only options to take a weapon and join one of the groups here on terror and fight with them, because otherwise, you wait in your home and you’ll be killed by either starvation, or by a rocket from one of the groups. So, I think that should be a priority. So far, as you said, it’s not there. We – young people don’t have something to aspire to, don’t have a hope and heroes to look up to and if that doesn’t change soon, I think we’re just going for many more years of war, unfortunately.

Farea Al Muslimi

On that depressing note, thank you very much everyone. Thank you for being here today and thanks very much to our speakers who joined us here, thank you [applause].