Peter Betts
Okay, well, good evening, everyone. It’s great to be here and great to see so many people here. I’m Peter Betts. I was, for many years, a Civil Servant, working for the last ten years, Director of international Climate and Energy in Department of Business and Energy and I’m now an Associate Fellow, among other things, at Chatham House.
We’ve got a great panel, so – and they’re going to speak in, sort of, order, as they go away from me. So, next – first up will be Doug MacMartin, who’s a Senior Research Associate at Cornell University, and a Research Professor for Computing and Mathematical Sciences at Caltech. Then we’ve got Anna Maria Kleymeyer, who’s Legal Counsel at the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development Goals. And finally, we’ve got Janos Pasztor, who I’m sure many of you will be – is familiar to many of you, has had a long and distinguished career at the UN and elsewhere, and he’s now the Executive Director at the Carnegie Climate Governan – Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative.
So, this event tonight is being hosted in partnership with the Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative. The event is on the record and is being livestreamed. The event will be followed by a reception, so at the end of this, we all troop upstairs for a drink. I gather, I’m unfamiliar with all this new technology, but people can comment via Twitter, using, I think that’s a #CHEvents. Please – I’ll ask just, could everyone please put their phones on silent mode, including me, and please note that Chatham House staff will be in the room, normally standing at the back or on the sides, in order to assist in the event of an emergency or technical difficulty.
So, I think that’s all I’m – I’ve been told I have to say, before we start. So, I guess, without further ado, we’ll go to the speakers and I think, first, Doug, you’re going to talk us through, a little bit, some of the science and the engineering around solar engineering.
Professor Douglas MacMartin
Thank you. So, I’m going to do an impossible task of trying to introduce geoengineering a little bit and put it in context in about six or seven minutes. So, this is, basically, approaches that would cool the planet directly by reflecting some sunlight back to space. And if you get absolutely nothing else, the most important single message is that this is not a replacement for cutting carbon emissions. We still have to reduce our carbon emissions to zero. The challenge is that it’s no longer – I’d say it’s no longer possible. It’s certainly no longer very likely that we are going to be able to avoid significant climate impacts, purely by reducing our emissions. So, just for context, the Paris Agreement set an aspirational goal of 1½° warming and the commitments to mitigation made in that agreement put us more on track for about 3° of warming. The other thing, just in terms of broad context, is because CO2 has a long lifetime in the atmosphere, getting our emissions to zero doesn’t stop climate change. That, simply, stops it from getting worse.
So, there’s two additional tools that, at least, need to be part of the conversation. One is that there’s a number of approaches that could pull CO2 directly out of the atmosphere. That’s not the focus tonight, but there’s a number of such ideas. The challenge with those is that we don’t yet have any approach that is sufficiently scalable to matter and not extraordinarily expensive and without any local impacts. We’ve got any two of those three, but not all three. So, that leaves us in a situation where we, at least, need to acknowledge the possibility that we could be facing a significant and prolonged overshoot of 0ur temperature targets and that’s where there’s at least a plausible role for talking about this solar geoengineering.
So, there’s two broad ideas that are encompassed in that. The one that we understand the best is if you put aerosols into the stratosphere, so small reflective droplets or particles, much, much higher than commercial aircraft fly, the atmosphere is relatively stable and so – up there and so, if you put material there, it stays there for a period of time and reflects sunlight. We know with certainty that that would cool the planet, both from basic physics, and less energy coming in, and because the motivation for that comes from mimicking what happens after a large volcanic eruption. So, the last big eruption was Mount Pinatubo in 1991, put about 30 megatons of sulphate in the stratosphere and cooled the planet the following year by something of order of ½° Celsius, or a little less. So, the idea there would be to do that deliberately, probably with aircraft. No aircraft exist today that could do that, but it doesn’t look like it is fundamentally difficult, if somebody wanted to develop – design and develop that.
The other approach that’s, sort of, on the table is marine cloud brightening, basically, spray saltwater into boundary layer clouds off the ocean. The – under the right conditions, that’s likely to make the clouds brighter and more reflective. That’s, unfortunately, also the most uncertain part of climate science and so, we’re less confident in whether or not that actually works in a meaningful sense, or not.
Just want to make sure I say all the things that need to be said. So, yeah, the 10,000 foot view, we do not, today, have enough research on either of these ideas to know, with certainty, whether or not it would reduce climate risk. We know we would be able to reduce the global temperature, but it does not affect the climate the same way as reducing CO2 emissions, and so, it is, at least plausible that it would reduce climate risks for most people, but there are some physical climate challenges. So, it might affect precipitation patterns differently. If you use stratospheric aerosols, it affects ozone concentrations, for example. And the biggest challenges, in some sense, really come from the governance side of things. So, if you were to do this, it affects everybody on the planet, how do you decide how confident do you need to be? How do you make sure this isn’t taken as an excuse not to mitigate? If you don’t mitigate and try to use this, you’re, basically, left with more and more and more forcing, that you then have to sustain practically forever.
The final comments that I want to make is, we need to be thinking about governance for deployment. We also need to be thinking about governance for the research process. So, right now, everything we know comes from running climate models. Those are calibrated, to some extent, on things like observations after Pinatubo. But if we want to be in a position where we can support an informed decision, we are eventually going to need to do some outdoor experimentation. That does not mean, you know, large scale stuff that would actually affect the climate. The – as an example, Harvard has proposed this experiment where they would launch a balloon into the stratosphere and release, I think it’s tens of kilograms of material. And the purpose of that would be to validate some of the chemical reaction processes and then, there’s a similar experiment that’s proposed for marine cloud brightening.
So, I will wrap up my allotted time there. Just to bring us – and save more time for questions, ‘cause I didn’t – I, sort of, gave you the thumbnail sketch of everything, just to really bring it back to why we’re talking about this in the first place. You would not take chemotherapy drugs just for fun, you would not sit in your car and set off your airbags just for fun. There are, clearly, serious challenges with solar geoengineering, but they only make sense to face in context with the challenges from climate change itself.
Peter Betts
That was terrific, Doug, and also, very clear and to time. So, good job on a very complex subject. So…
Professor Douglas MacMartin
Yeah, I’ve probably missed about my – so, just ask questions afterwards.
Peter Betts
Yeah, well, we’re going to – that – I mean, your concision means we’re going to have time for questions, which is great, so Anna.
Anna Maria Kleymeyer
Great, thank you. Thanks and thanks, Doug, for taking the hard part of the panel. Just a small point of clarification, I do work for the institute mentioned and I also work directly as an Advisor for a number of developing countries, and I do a lot of capacity building work for United Nations Environment. And so, I work pretty much in every region of the world, with developing countries directly, doing training on lots of aspects of climate change. So, that’s, I think, part of why I was invited to be here today, ‘cause of the work that I’ve been doing with developing countries for about 15 years.
So, I’ve been asked to address some of the risks and potential benefits and to look at the relationship between this potential technology, the use of geoengineering and the imperative of moving towards Sustainable Development Goals by developing countries, by all countries. And so, I’m going to do my best, in a few minutes of time.
So, a few years ago, I think 2016, the average atmospheric concentrations of CO2 reached 400 parts per million, which for those of you who follow climate change, was already beyond where, well, the limits that we were hoping to set as a global community. That level last occurred, I think, three million years ago, when temperatures were at 2-3° above warmer where we are now and sea levels were at 10-20 metres above what they currently are today. This – that news, that unfortunate news, was followed, just last year, by the IPCC’s special report on 1.5°, that I think everybody’s now familiar with, because it’s made quite an impact. And the IPCC announced that the world’s – although, you know, in order to keep warming below 1.5°, without an overshoot, that in order to do that, it’s practically impossible to do so, without some interventions with the atmosphere, particularly carbon removal technologies. This is part of why we’re here talking about geoengineering today, because of that very strong and clear message that the IPCC has sent us.
Moreover, climate change science tells us that even if we were to dramatically drop CO2 levels by decarbonising, and I think Doug referred to this, that the world continues to warm, but that doesn’t solve the problem that we still have the impacts of the onset of climate change and the impacts that are related to those.
For developing countries, and especially the most vulnerable developing countries and communities, the impacts of climate change are likely to be catastrophic. And, right, when I say likely, I was just in Tuvalu ten days ago and it’s beyond likely. I mean, they are feeling the impacts of climate change and the high – the sea level rose during the King tides two days before I arrived and the water was bubbling up through the streets and the airport, because the ground is so porous and the sea level’s already rising enough to have that kind of an impact today. For developing countries, the impact on their Sustainable Development Goals is likely to be enormous, poverty, hunger, health and wellbeing, access to clean water and sanitation, peace, all these Sustainable Development Goals that countries are striving to achieve and putting all of their resources and energy into.
One can make an argument, in fact, that nearly all of the goals will be negatively impacted by the advance of climate change. And, as we know, some of the impacts and effects, such as water table contamination from seawater, are irreversible, and that’s the case in Tuvalu. They have no groundwater. They depend entirely on rainwater for their survival.
Much of my work focuses on capacity building, as I mentioned, and one of the biggest difficulties for developing countries, when they’re working on projects for adaptation and even some for mitigation, but particularly for adaptation, to reduce vulnerability and to strengthen their resilience to climate change, is distinguishing between a development project and an adaptation project. In fact, most of those projects look exactly alike and to them, to those countries who have been working on their development goals for decades, they don’t – they struggle to prove that it’s an adaptation project and not simply an irrigation project for agriculture, or a water storage project for access to drinking water, for example. And climate change is moving faster than their capacity to develop and so, resilience and development strengthening their systems to adapt to climate change, is seeming more and more difficult, if not, in some cases, impossible.
So, I mentioned that to say that time’s not on our side. Realistically speaking, I think we’re all aware that the current financing for climate change, with mitigation and adaptation actions, is insufficient to meet the global needs and the United Nations Environment puts out a number of important reports. The gap reports are really important, to see the gap between what we’re able to finance and what we actually need to do, in order to protect countries and to enable them to continue on their sustainable development path.
And so, personally, when I first heard about the issue of geoengineering and solar radiation management, I was terrified by the prospect of it. It seemed like a futuristic technology that we know no – we know very little about, what the impacts will be. We don’t know exactly whether it’s possible, how it’s possible. And it just seems, and continues to seem, to me, personally, as someone who works on the climate change adaptation side of things, to – it seems particularly frightening what the prospects will be, and so do the prospects of the impacts of climate change. So, for developing countries and especially the – these most vulnerable ones, you know, we’re, sort of, we’re looking at rock and a hard place kind of scenario and yet, we can’t slow down or not find solutions, because for many of these countries it’s, you know, it’s – we’re talking about life or death scenarios, for many people.
So, I thought I would, kind of, highlight what I, and some of the – some of my colleagues who work on climate change, see as some of the risks. And Doug pointed to some of those, but I thought I would, maybe, underline a few of those and then talk a little bit about some of the potential benefits that we’re weighing as we look at the – at what is not so distant a future. There are – the risks seem significant and there’s this moral hazard risk, you know, the possibility that having a silver bullet or a magic pill could lead certain players, global players and – to feel that they don’t have the responsibility, that there’s something that can fix the problem and that they can, therefore, continue on – to continue with business as usual, in terms of climate – the climate emissions, because, well, we’ll just SRM our way out of it.
There’s also the instant gratification risk, where the temptation to reach for fast results will make SRM seem like a quick fix that governments or that others prioritise, in terms of resources, in terms of attention, in terms of financing. We prioritise that instead of greenhouse gas reductions, or instead of looking further into advancing the carbon dioxide removal technologies. Then there’s the risk that dramatically and rapidly altering the atmosphere to drop temperatures could lead to some unexpected atmospheric or hydrological consequences that we’re simply unaware of, because we’ve not done it at that scale, or in some cases, not done it at all. So, these are all great unknowns and seem like great risks, as – from the perspective of countries who, in particular, are vulnerable to anything that happens in their natural environment, in the atmosphere around them, where they don’t have the resilience, the infrastructure, to survive dramatic changes to their atmosphere.
Peter Betts
Again, are you – Maria, are you coming to a close soon?
Anna Maria Kleymeyer
Yes, sure, thanks. So, then, you know, there’s, from this – from, you know – so, after seeing the risk perspective, then there’s the potential benefit of buying time. And this is where I see that there’s a great need for additional research, a great need for additional information and understanding and to amplify or expand the options that are available. And that’s where the governance piece comes in, because that research, if it happens haphazard, if there’s not financing available for it, and if there’s not co-ordination around it, then it’s unlikely to happen and then you have additional other risks that arise.
So, these – I think I can close there and leave for additional questions, as we think about those conditions. Thank you.
Peter Betts
Great, thank you very much, Anna Maria, very sobering. Thanks very much. Let’s go to Janos and then we can take time for some questions.
Janos Pasztor
Thank you, Pete, and good evening and it’s nice to see some old friends and some, hopefully, new friends here. Thank you for coming, and maybe I just want to put two points down, before I get into what I wanted to talk about, which is to share with you a few thoughts about the governance issues. And the first is that, from our perspective at the Carnegie Initiative, we are not promoting geoengineering, we’re not against these technologies, intrinsically, either. We’re trying to be impartial about the need for them. So, that’s not our purpose. Our purpose is to look at the governance, if societies were to decide to go in that direction, then to make sure that they are well governed. And the second point is that governance, in our perspective, is really a broad concept, which address – which talks about decisions about some technology or some method, but it’s also about managing, regulating and ensuring effective participation of different stakeholders, with access to appropriate information, so that they can, actually, participate. So, governance is not just regulation, but it’s this broader set of issues.
Now, my colleagues have made a very important case, and I don’t need to get into that anymore, of why we’re in deep trouble, when it comes to climate change, and why there are, increasingly, discussions, if this is what it is that the emissions are not coming down the way they should be coming down. The IPCC special report is making the case of the challenging situation that we’re in. What’s the plan? And when there are – there is such a situation, then more and more people begin to talk about these alt – and it’s not alternatives, but additional, potential additional technologies. And as Doug, you said it very clearly, that governance challenge is that quite important? And in fact, many people believe that the governance of these technologies will be much more difficult to address than the actual scientific technical developments themselves. So, because it will – is difficult, because it might take a long time, it’s not too early to start talking about them.
Now, when we look outside, in the world, what we see is, actually, very little happening in this area. We have relatively little research going on. There is some and there’s some people planning physical experiments, but, in fact, there’s not a lot going on. And when you look at governments, and this is one of the jobs that we’re doing, and we’ve been engaging with a lot of government representatives and – to see what they’re doing in this area and the answer is practically nothing. Very little is happening. There has been not much discussion and the policy space is, basically, not ready to engage in this kind of discussion, yet, it may be necessary, not necessarily to deploy, but at least, may be necessary to see how one addresses these technologies.
Now, what are some of the key challenges? As mentioned already, research is already happening and it needs, itself, to be governed, not just to be regulated, and that’s part of it, but it’s also to provide guidance to the research community of what the society would like to see, in terms of research results. And there are people who worry about research, because they think that research today, we’ll do some more research tomorrow and then it’s a slippery slope to suddenly deployment, and these are issues that one needs to address. But the most difficult issues arise when – for solar radiation modification, when we think about decisions, decisions to even consider this technology, who should make that decision, where and when, in what context? Is it in the United Nations, in the OECD, individual in a country, how should these decisions be taken, even to consider and then, at some point, to deploy or not? And at the moment we can raise the questions, but governments have not started even thinking about how to do it. And the important question is when to start thinking about it. Do we wait until it’s 4° above historical average, or do we think about it now, knowing that it might take 15/20/25 years to figure all this out and make it happen, if we think we need to do it? So, decisions of – is crucial.
But then, even if we were to be able to make those decisions, how to implement it, how to set up an institutional structure that would allow continuous action on solar radiation modification for decades, possibly generations to come, in a smooth way, without stopping abruptly, because you cannot do that, irrespective of political economic processes that are happening in the world, to make sure that we don’t end up in the so-called termination effect. And then, who controls the global thermostat, who should say that we should go for 1° or 2, knowing that there are different impacts in different parts of the world? And indeed, local, regional, global impacts, will have to be addressed in glob – local, regional and global governance mechanisms and they will not all be the same. And there will also be the impacts on generations not yet born. So, we have to think of interregional and intergenerational aspects.
And then there are the more fundamental, religious and almost philosophical questions, which are of concern to many people, how can we, humanity, think we can play God and manipulate nature, manipulate the one atmosphere we have? Some people think we can do that and we should be able to and we have the technology, let’s do it. Others have deep worries about that. All that requires a societal discussion and debate that hasn’t happened and we believe it needs to happen.
Now, a few words about the – you know, in a, sort of, a perfect world, science-based, we can think of a nice rational process where we get the science, we understand what’s happening and then there will outcome a nice, multilateral process and a decision of how to deal with this technology. Now, the – we don’t live in a perfect world and it may happen that way, we don’t know that. We need to think about it. We need to try to plan for that. But, in reality, it may happen very differently, and we need to be ready for that, too, and how to govern that. What if a country unilaterally decides to do ungoverned solar radiation modification? What if a rich individual, ‘cause let’s face it, it’s quite cheap, the direct cost, a rich individual could just do that and decide, I’m going to save the world? Or what if a few countries, who are sick and tired of insufficient action by the world community to reduce emissions, they decide to do this? These are different scenarios that one needs to be ready for and one needs to engage, because some of these could have very substantial geopolitical considerations and impacts. Some positive, some negative and we need to be ready to do that, and that’s not where it stops. Just last week there was an interesting article about the global citizenship, using social media, taking action and thousands of individuals sending up balloons in different parts of the world and releasing aerosols, and thereby fixing the problem. Now, imagine the governance challenges of that. Now, how plausible that is, I don’t know, today, but the fact of the matter is that we need to, at least, consider that.
And then I’ll stop here with just saying that our initiative, what we try to do is we try to encourage this debate. We try to shift the debate from just purely the scientific, academic circles, into the policy space, so that governments can start to understand and the civil society and the private sector can engage in this discussion. And we’re doing that and hopefully, we’ll be able to catalyse and support a global learning process and capacity building process, to understand better these issues, so that we can deal with them when the time comes. Thank you.
Peter Betts
Great, thanks very much, Janos. So, my notes tell me that I’m actually encouraged to usurp my – the role of Chairman by asking the first question. So, you know, three very powerful presentations. Clearly, you’re right that we are not on track for 2° or 1.5°, clearly, you’re right that the implications of a 3° world are really damaging, and yet, you’re also right that there is, you know, very little debate in the, sort of, climate community about solar engineering, in particular. And, you know, if it’s raised then, I think, you know, fears people have, well, firstly, actually, and you alluded to this, “Well, if we talk too much about this, we will discourage the action we desperately need on emission reductions.” People also worry some of these technologies could have very negative side effects, as you, again, alluded to. And I think, insofar as the debate – thirdly, I think, insofar as the debate has started, you know, that people are recognising that scenar – that trajectories for 2° or 1½° need significant zero emissions, negative emissions, rather, that people are more focused on direct air capture, there’s, sort of, increasing sense, “Oh, well,” you know, “we’re going to have limitless amounts of almost free renewable energy,” you know, “we can do this, we don’t need these exotic solar engineering type solutions.” So, I mean, those are three pretty serious challenges. I mean, what would be your, kind of, one minute response on them?
Professor Douglas MacMartin
I guess I’m not going to address all of that, but my reaction right now is that we do not currently have a guaranteed clear pathway to a risk free future, and that it would be premature, this is my personal view, premature to exclude options. Direct air capture, we don’t actually know how much that’s going to cost. We actually don’t know how hard it’s going to be to store tens of gigatons of CO2 per year. The decision – the – there was something else I was going to add, but I forgot what it was, so I’ll stop there.
Peter Betts
That’s great. That’s great. If it comes back to you, come back, you know, interrupt. Any…?
Janos Pasztor
Well, I would say that if there is a – we are in a challenging situation, that’s fairly clear, and as you said, we don’t have a clarity of the risk free or wonderful options that can bring us to the objectives. So, in that situation, we probably need more options than less options and if there is a chance that we might need this option, however terrifying it may look, let’s at least understand it, so that we can take decisions. Because the reality is that we are facing a huge challenge of risk management between different options and, let’s face it, none of them are just good options. They are all difficult options. They all have risks, they may have some benefits, some potential benefits and the challenge is, how we address it together. But risk is looked at very differently by different people in society, different sectors, different stakeholders and people in different parts of the world. So we must engage them in that discussion of risk.
Anna Maria Kleymeyer
Perhaps I’ll just add to that. I mean, as an International Lawyer and having worked on a number of environmental treaties, that international governance of environmental issues, it provides not only an opportunity to better understand risks, through research information, exchange of ideas and perspectives, but it also gives the opportunity to develop mechanisms for further exploring new options. And so, this is – it’s not only about let’s make some rules and control a situ – a certain situation or control an outcome, but a lot of what the international treaties provide us with is information and opportunity for exchange and for small developing countries, it provides them an opportunity to have a voice.
Peter Betts
Fair enough. I mean, we should – I mean, these are difficult questions and we should hear from the audience. I mean, I suppose the only other observation I would make and before, sort of, throwing it up, and you may have reactions to this, is, you know, we – some of us have worked many years in the multilateral negotiations, we know how difficult it is. We know that, you know, in the end, there’s an incentive on countries to engage in a multilateral process, because, you know, no country can tackle all the emissions challenge on their own. They need to persuade the others to come to the table and reduce their emissions, whereas you don’t have that dynamic in geoengineering. Actually, a country, an individual country, could say well, I’m just going to do this and I’m saving the world and, you know, there’s nothing to force that country, as it were, to the table, if they really don’t want to come. So, that’s a challenge, yeah.
Janos Pasztor
Yeah.
Peter Betts
Look, let’s throw it open. Maybe I’ll take the lady in the second – oh, I have to take questions one at a time, rather than gather them in threes, so I think the lady there.
Member
Hello, thank you for that. Ooh, am I the lady?
Peter Betts
Yes, great.
Member
But maybe there is another one. Thank you for that. That was really very interesting and I hope that my question isn’t stating the obvious, since we’re talking about governance, here. So, forgive me if this is a naïve question, but I’m going to ask it anyway. So, we talked about the unintended quan – excuse me, consequences, from an environmental standpoint, obviously, but I was wondering, from a security standpoint, how much people are talking about that? I’ve heard, kind of, bits and pieces about security, so, if someone decides they want to do something hazardous to another country, not a, you know, save the world type, but a, well, this country’s pissing me off, so – forgive my American, but I’m going to – is there a discussion on the table about that, right now, as well, or are we focusing, you know, more on the environmental side?
Professor Douglas MacMartin
So, I’ll do a first response. In terms of the physics, with stratospheric aerosols, it’s pretty hard to mess somebody else’s climate, without messing your own. It’s, effectively, it’s a global solutions, so you’re just going to cool the entire globe and there’s, sort of, pretty limited opportunities for the…
Peter Betts
But cooling might be good for you and bad for your neighbour.
Professor Douglas MacMartin
In principle. Marine – you know, I could certainly hypothesise, has there – there may be some way in the future to do things with marine cloud brightening, you know, maybe if I cool here, it’ll steer rain somewhere else. But that’s not something that – I think nobody in the community even wants to, actually, research those questions and it’s, sort of, beyond our current understanding, right now.
Peter Betts
Janos, do you want to add to it.?
Janos Pasztor
Yeah. So, you asked, are there people thinking about this? Yes, there are some people. One of them is in the back room here. So, there have been papers written on this. But if you’re asking, have governments started thinking about the geopolitical security implications of this, not really. There have been discussions, for example, in the Security Council, about the implications of climate change on security, but not specifically of solar geoengineering. Yet, there could be some very substantial implications, again, not necessarily all negative, so it’s just – one has to understand that there are different issues here, but they need to be discussed at some point. For example, the potential for unilateral action and what the international community does to, either prevent it or to deal with it, if it does happen.
Peter Betts
Great. I’ve been told to take questions one at a time, but I think I’ll take three, just so that as many people – so, I’ve got gentleman there, gentleman there, and gentleman there.
Dr Hugh Hunt
Hello, my name’s Hugh Hunt from Cambridge University and I’ve got a question about intellectual property. I worked on the SPICE Project in 2011 and our experiment, the governance process applied back then, meant that our experiment was cancelled. And one of the key issues then was some patent applications that were in at the time, we worked out that the experiments, the outdoor experiments we were thinking of were going to cost, perhaps $500 million to do, over a period of a few years and no government research organisation was likely to fund that, so we would almost certainly have to go to a private enterprise to fund this research. And you can’t really get private enterprise to come onboard without some intellectual property. So, what’s your opinion about intellectual property, as it applied to geoengineering research?
Peter Betts
Okay and then gentleman here?
Dr Sam Geall
Sam Geall, Associate Fellow at – Sam Geall, Associate Fellow, Chatham House.
Peter Betts
Are you from any other organisation, or…?
Dr Sam Geall
And China Dialogue. It’s a question, I think, for Professor MacMartin, as the, sort of, Scientist on here, in that there’s quite a lot of discussion about risk, but it often comes back to, sort of, moral hazard and the difficulties of governing a process that would come out of a possible event, where geoengineering happened. I guess I was more interested in whether you could flush out what plausible mechanisms there are for the environment – for the purported environmental risks of employing SRM, even if – I understand that it’s very problematic to put probabilities on this, but just what’s plausible, in terms of, actually, outcomes that could be – that could spiral out of control?
Peter Betts
Great and then, finally, gentleman there.
Disaro Behadna
Disaro Behadna from Community Development Enterprise. I think the – talking about the governance is very important, but the most important thing is the framework for that governance, because usually, developing countries suffer more than developed countries. And if the framework just focus on who can do and who are able, then, what will happen, that who will suffer is the developing countries. So, it’s just like, if it goes just to, like, the Security Council or something like that, it will be only for the elite, who are capable. These countries are – some countries are capable of research and those who are not capable, of course, they cannot do anything. But at the end, everybody will be affected. So, I think the framework should include the, sort of, the developing and developed countries fairly. Thank you.
Peter Betts
Great, thank you very much. I don’t – I guess there’s questions that, sort of, gravitate more towards you, but then there’s questions more at the other end and to Anna Maria. Do you want to go first, Doug?
Professor Douglas MacMartin
So, the – with regards to the physical environmental risks, there’s a number. With stratospheric aerosols or marine cloud brightening, it’s not going to affect the climate the same way, so it will shift precipitation patterns, to some extent. Climate change also shifts precipitation patterns, right? So, ques – there’s some relative risks there. And precipitation is, actually, very difficult to predict with the climate models, so it’s a little bit hard to say precisely what those impacts are likely to be. Climate models will say, if you were, say, to go from 3°, down to 1½° of solar geoengineering, you’ll, effectively, overcompensate the precipitation a little bit, so it’ll be a little drier than a 1½° world without that, but difficult to make explicit bounds on a specif – on specific things.
To a certain extent, at least, we have a constraint on the potential for unknown unknowns, in that we have volcanic eruptions. So, this is – you – it’s hard to imagine a scenario that would be totally catastrophic, that we wouldn’t have seen from eruptions. But there are some big unknowns, like if you change the ratio of direct to diffuse light, which could have some impact on ecosystem competition, or even agricultural productivity. There’s the effect on ozone that I mentioned. Marine cloud brightening in – the one thing with that is because you’re doing a lot of – it only works on certain parts of the ocean, so you’re doing a lot of forcing on a small part of the ocean. So, you have a spatially heterogeneous forcing. It sounds more benign to put salt into clouds, than sulphate into the stratosphere, but that forcing could lead to much more spatially heterogeneous response. So that would be my…
Peter Betts
Great, thanks, Doug. Anna Maria, I don’t know if you want to comment, maybe, on the role of developing countries in the governance?
Anna Maria Kleymeyer
Yeah, just thank you for that comment and point. I think it’s very important, not only in terms of looking at how a framework will function and how we’ll manage the risks to countries involved, how that framework also articulates with other frameworks or other treaties, where developing countries, or developed countries, or where there’s, you know, difference of – in terms of contribution, participation and impacts on those countries. And I just wanted to – your point reminded me that there’s a growing opinion, and I’ve read it in a recent article, that technology like SRM could, in fact, reduce risks of the impacts of climate change for developing countries and that, as such, as an opportunity to reduce risks, it’s a benefit to developing countries and therefore, should be prioritised and looked into. Then the questions that Janos brought up, you know, so, who does it and how is it done and who pays for it, who participates in the decision-making? All those questions are unanswered.
Peter Betts
Hmmm, did you want to add to that?
Janos Pasztor
Yes, two points, one – first on Hugh’s question about the intellectual property, not getting into the details of that, but there are different views on this. And many would say that the temperature of the globe and how to address it globally, perhaps through SRM, is such a global issue and it is so much about a global good, that it really has to be done through public channels and not private channels that would make intellectual property out of this. Now, that doesn’t mean that private sector cannot be engaged and included in that, but it has to be in some kind of a publicly structured framework, otherwise, you might end up in difficult situations.
And then, a brief comment on the gentleman about the North/South issues. It’s absolutely essential, there is at least one group we work with, the so-called Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, SRMGI, whose specific objective is to engage developing country people, in early discussions about the governance issues. So that it’s not something that is developed, let’s say, in the North, as it often happens, and then let’s bring in the developing countries in the last minute, but rather do that from the beginning. So, there are people who are trying to achieve that and we also try to do that in our work. But in terms of structures and decision-making structures, it is fairly clear that if developing country participation works more effectively, through multilateral UN-type intergovernmental institutions, because that’s just the way – that’s where they have a voice. Sorry.
Peter Betts
Alright, so, I’ve got a question at the back. Did I see you as well? No, and a question over there. So – and so, gentleman.
Tom Wakeford
Hi, yeah, my name’s Tom Wakeford, from the ETC Group. Just to put this in historical context, it seems that we are embarking on something potentially, on the scale of the Manhattan Project. I mean, this is a massive potential scale impact. Professor MacMartin mentioned agricultural productivity. I mean, basically, my colleague, from the community development side, mentioned the impact on the Global South and who’s in control, predominantly in the Global North. It seems that SRM could, potentially, wipe out small scale smallholder agriculture across the Global South. So, going back to the analogy with the Manhattan Project, I mean, we now have various treaties that are more or less strong, more or less under threat, but which effectively say, okay, there could be a crazy person setting off some sort of nuclear thing, or building a nuclear project, but in general, you have controls on people developing nuclear weapons. So, I think a ban is part of a governance spectrum and one that, in the interests of actually having food to eat as the climate changes, we might want to consider.
Peter Betts
Okay, thanks very much. Is – so, gentleman two along from you.
Oliver Morton
Hi, I’m Oliver Morton. I’m an Editor at The Economist. Actually had a question for Janos, particularly. So, the IMO has decided to reduce the sulphate aerosol burden over the world’s open oceans and, thus, make a distinct, though not in itself catastrophic, as it were, negative geoengineering that warms the world. In doing this, there’s been no discussion of that climate impact of those changes and there were very good reasons for making those changes. Do you consider an international organisation legislating, effectively, to warm the world in this way, a failure of governance?
Peter Betts
And then final question for this round, from the gentleman there.
Olaf Corry
Yes, I’m Olaf Corry. I’m from the University of Copenhagen. I guess my question is also mainly to Janos, but to everybody, I guess. The, sort of, juxtaposition of greenhouse gas emissions reduction being a, sort of, free rider problem, where we have to get everybody onboard, versus solar geoengineering being a free driver problem, where we have to make sure nobody rushes out ahead, I want to question how, although it’s a, kind of, a neat way of thinking about it, but how much is the former actually a question of getting a few key actors to get their act together? And how much is the latter, actually, much more of a multilateral governance problem, as well, in the sense that if governance means anything different from power, then it has to have some kind of accountability built into that concept? So, in order to govern something on a global basis, that is an incredibly ambitious multilateral project, and as such, it has some of the similarities that traditional climate politics has, so to speak. What do you think?
Peter Betts
I don’t – pick the – I don’t know who wants to go first.
Professor Douglas MacMartin
So, in response to Tom’s question, actually, my first comment is this will actually, probably, be a lot bigger than the Manhattan Project. This would be the biggest thing that humans have ever deliberately done on the planet. Just to be clear, or clarify my previous response on the agricultural response, pretty much every paper that’s ever been written would suggest that if this is in addition to mitigation, as opposed to a substitute, that that would probably be a net benefit for agriculture, because of the – particularly in the tropics, because of the limitation on heat stress in the tropics. I would caution that with the statement that right this instant, me personally, I would say I am not – I would not be prepared to go, based on today’s knowledge, and say we should or we should not do this. Although that’s ultimately weighed, in part, in question of, I don’t think that the current impacts from climate change are sufficiently severe to warrant it. So, if a paper came out tomorrow and said, “We know with absolute certainty that if you don’t do geoengineering now, we’re going to get four metres of sea level rise,” you know, I might change my risk calculus. But I don’t think we’re in a position where we should be forced to decide today, is this a good idea? I think we, actually, do need to conduct the research. But I, actually, don’t understand why we would expect this to wipe out agriculture, smallholder agriculture, in developing world. I would expect that if you had a prior, the sign of the effect would be the exact opposite of that.
Peter Betts
Okay, great. Do you want to take those?
Janos Pasztor
Okay, well, I – Oliver’s question. So, I – and it’s not a – no, it’s not an easy one, but in some ways it is easy. I wouldn’t say it’s a failure of international governance. It’s a failure of disjointed international governance. What we have is, we have an international body looking at one set of issues and taking a decision, without looking at the broader set of issues. And this is very often what we do, in different disjointed international processes, that we solve a problem and we may either create something else, or we don’t solve something else, because we don’t talk to each other. How long it took between the climate process and the ozone process to get a proper discussion going, that the two issues were related? It took years and that’s the reality. So, I would say this is – and this particular issue will come up in other areas, too, as different parts of the world, which are still having a lot of local air pollution and they’ll clean up their cities and there will be, also, less sulphur produced and, therefore, there will be some heating, some global heating produced.
Peter Betts
I mean, not to interrupt, but, I mean, joking aside, it’s not clear to me that there wasn’t some, you know, calculation made that there – I think there was a recognition that this would have a modest negative impact on climate change, but it was, on balance, worth doing, in order to get the air quality benefits. I think that calculation was made.
Janos Pasztor
Okay, but…
Peter Betts
That’s my impression.
Oliver Morton
…not in any explicit or transparent way. There was one paper published by [inaudible – 52:13], but there was not – and when asked about it, the IMO said quite simply, “You just don’t talk about that.”
Janos Pasztor
And in the meantime, we actually know that the impacts are going to be even more challenging than what the science said, even up to even six months ago. So, we have an issue there, but – so, that’s part of the answer.
Then, Olaf, that’s – so, I agree with you, it is very challenging. That, I mean, that’s the bottom line, I think, what you said, is that this will require the kind of international multilateral governance that is very difficult to see how it’s going to happen. Because you could have the free driver problem of a country unilaterally going ahead and, you know, depending on which country that is, that person could get – that country could get away in doing it, because, you know, sheer power and whatever else. So – but I – you know, just because it’s difficult, it doesn’t mean one shouldn’t try to address it, right? So – but I agree with you, it is very, very challenging and – but we have to deal with it. That’s why we’re talking about it.
Peter Betts
Great. I think we’ve probably got time for one more question, maybe the lady there in the red?
Leslie Hook
Hi, Leslie Hook from the FT. I’d like to ask each of our three panellists, what is your personal view of the tipping point at which you personally believe the world should do solar geoengineering, is it 5° in 2080, or 3° in 2045? I know your institutions have rules about not endorsing, or – but just your personal perspective, thank you. A hard question.
Janos Pasztor
Yes, but it’s not possible to answer that, because we don’t know enough and it’s – we don’t know how long it will take from the time you decide now, we’re ready for this, how long would it take to actually put this in place? We have some ideas: 15/20 years of research, 25 years of discussion on the governance, you know, I don’t know. But, you know, if we are pretty sure now that in 25 years the temperature will be, actually, 3½° above historical average, then maybe there needs to be that discussion that now the decision has to be now and not in 25 years from now. So – and I don’t have the answer, personally, even just for myself, but I think these are the kind of questions we need to collectively look at and say well, when does one trigger a serious discussion and a potential consideration, right? We don’t know that, because we haven’t discussed it. And again, as I said earlier, different people, from different circumstances and different backgrounds and different current climate impacts, will think very differently about the way you weigh that risk and that’s the reality. Sorry not to answer your question.
Professor Douglas MacMartin
I don’t think I’m going to answer it either, other than to say I don’t know when something might change and right now, I would say very, very few people on the planet, probably you could count them on one hand, would say we should be doing this now. I don’t know when that might shift. It – but my personal view would be, I would far rather be in a position of having done some of the background research, so that we can either say, “No, here’s why not,” or, “If you were to do it, here’s how you should do it, here’s what we think the impacts would be, here’s what we think the uncertainties are.” So, that’s, sort of, on the research side. I would say there’s a case to be made to be doing the research now and I’d say there’s a similar case to be trying to develop the governance now, so that we’re not caught off guard at some point in the future.
Peter Betts
When do you ask the boiling frog, what time does the boiling – when does the point…?
Professor Douglas MacMartin
Yeah.
Peter Betts
Exactly.
Anna Maria Kleymeyer
Well, I would, I mean, I would, personally, say that I don’t know when the time is to start it, but I would – I think I would agree with Janos that I would say that now’s the time to start talking about it and to begin understanding it better, and intentionally, that we – that countries and individuals and actors intentionally begin to look at the issue and how it co-ordinates with all the other relevant parts of the puzzle, and whether we sequence it and how we choreograph. But I think that there’s a very strong argument for it being a part of our future and it – that doesn’t mean that I think it must, but that it looks like it very possibly could. So we need to, really, pull up the curtain and begin the conversation in a very open and informed way.
Peter Betts
Tricky question. My final shot would be that if you really want a debate, you may have to put out a proposition on when you think this should happen, that people can agree with or disagree with. But anyway, look, thank you very much, a great conversation [applause]. So, everybody’s invited to go to the reception upstairs, which is in the room, on your way out, up the stairs. Thanks.
