Russia’s challenge to European security: Confrontation at the Ukrainian border

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

A very warm welcome to this Chatham House meeting on Russia’s Challenge to European Security: Confrontation at the Ukrainian Border. We’re delighted that over 300 people have registered for this discussion. I’m Roderic Lyne. I’ve been asked by Chatham House to Chair the discussion. On the Chatham House website today, there is a paper, which I co-authored very recently with Sir David Manning, who is a distinguished Chatham House Fellow, on ‘Putin’s gamble’, which gives some background to the discussion we’re about to have.

This discussion is on the record, and it will be recorded. When it comes to the Q&A session of the discussion, if you wish to submit a question, could you please do so using the Q&A function on your screen. We will then have to select some questions and will ask the questioners, or we will try to arrange to unmute the questioners at the relevant time. If you don’t want to ask the question personally, but would rather have it read out by me, please indicate that when you submit your question on the Q&A function. The chat function will also be open, if you want to share observations or comments, but Q&As should be in the Q&A box.

I am very delighted to welcome three, not only distinguished speakers, but highly relevant speakers, and in the order in which they will speak, they are, firstly, Mr Pavlo Klimkin, who was Foreign Minister of the Ukraine from 2014 to 2019 and before that, was the Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany. He’s served in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry since 1993, having trained as a Physicist.

He will then be followed by Dr Evelyn Farkas, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, the Balkans, Caucasus and Conventional Arms Control in the United States Department of Defense from 2012 to 2015. Before that, she was Senior Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Special Adviser to the Secretary of Defense at the NATO Summit, and at an earlier stage, she was a Professor of International Relations.

Thirdly, we will come to Dr Dmitry Suslov, who is the Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He’s joining us from Moscow. He’s well-known to many people in our audience as the former Programme Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club and a very active participant in that, and somebody who has published a large number of papers and who started life as a Journalist.

So, with no further ado, I would like to invite five-minute opening statements from the three panellists, following which we will have a panel discussion for about 25 minutes, and then the last half hour or so will be for your questions. So, Pavlo Klimkin, could I ask you to kick us off, please?

Pavlo Klimkin

Thanks, Roderic. Good morning, everyone. It’s great to have such an audience, such a crowd, folks. Now, we need political support, military support, but also, a sort of, intellectual support from everybody, it matters.

Let me map out five simple points from the very beginning. And the first one, what it all about? Why the current drive from Moscow? I would argue that it’s, basically, about two fundamental points for Putin. One is to reshuffle the current geopolitics and to try to establish the geometry or for the – for zone of influences. And if you read the Russian proposals, but even more so, if you listen to what is said now or in Moscow, it’s basically about establishing three different kind of spheres of influence. One, a dominant – kind of dominant ones, the second, priority sphere of influence and the sphere of influence and such. The difference is to have the only say, the final say, and to have a say. Basically, it’s about post-Soviet space, it’s about the former Warsaw bloc and it’s about different regions of the world.

The second point, which is critical for Putin and so, the Russian regime, is actually Ukraine ourself. It’s about us, it’s about winning, and I do mean winning the Ukrainian statehood. Putin was extremely clear in recent times about Ukrainian statehood, Ukrainian language, Ukrainian history, pretty much everything, which for him, actually, don’t exist at all. So, to have Ukraine, not just as a success story, but to have Ukraine as such, is a fundamental challenge for Russia, how he believes he had created it, and a fundamental challenge to the Russian future.

So, either Ukraine goes to the dominant sphere of the Russian influence or Ukraine and Ukrainian statehood should be destroyed by splitting Ukraine in different areas, and it would be, sort of, ideal option for Putin. He understands ideal is difficult to achieve in the present reality. So, he would definitely prefer the first one, the dominant sphere of influence.

The second point right now is, basically, a coincidence of the internal Russian agenda. 2024 another elections for Putin. This year the sort of, 100th anniversary, the 30th of December, for the creation of the Soviet Union. We almost forgot it here in Ukraine, but in Moscow, it sits deeply in many minds, and the kind of, fan club for the Former Soviet Union is definitely there. So, to deliver is – to deliver an emotion important for 2024 and after, and the emotion from the Crimean occupation is fading away, it’s basically over, is critically important for the Russian system of scraps, so-called scraps, Russian values, and their vertically organised reality. So, without delivering now, when Putin has an energy leverage and other leverages, when he has China watching how Putin can test the Western red lines, you know, would be – it would be definitely far more difficult in the years to come.

The next point, what’s – what are these impossible scenarios? I actually believe that all the sitenarios – the scenarios are already written in Moscow. We have now approximately 56 battle groups around our borders, but we also know that logistically, it’s possible for Russia to get another 25/30 battle groups in one or two weeks. So, it could be done reasonable quickly. Their current forces are not enough for a, sort of, blitzkrieg against Ukraine, but it could be done reasonably quickly. The most probable option for me, and I present, you understand, Moscow a bit, is a total destabilisation and using different sequences of destabilisation for breaking Ukraine and for changing the current reality, and we could talk about that in more detail later. As…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you. Pavlo, can I interrupt you there? I think that’s a very good introduction. There are questions that – there that I think we will want to follow-up in the panel discussion, if you’ll allow me to cut you off at this point and turn to Evelyn.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

[Pause] Thank you, Sir Roderic. Well, I will maybe cede some of my time to the good Foreign Minister. I do agree with his assessment. So, I thought – but I thought I would just give my quick read of what Putin wants, and what President Putin wants, what’s at stake, a little bit about the transatlantic reaction and then, a few words about possible solution.

So, it is clear that Vladimir Putin and The Kremlin are concerned, mainly about maintaining their autocratic regime with the kleptocratic economic system that co-exists with it and they do not want a flourishing democracy across the border, in Ukraine, in Belarus, in Kazakhstan or anywhere in the Former Soviet space. And in order to maintain his control over his federation and the government, Vladimir Putin has assessed that he needs a sphere of influence. Of course, this also harkens back to Russian nostalgia, not just for the Soviet Union, but more importantly, for the Russian empire. And so, what Vladimir Putin is doing right now, with this gun to the head of Ukraine, is actually, he’s putting the head – the gun to the head of the international order, because after World War II, we set up the international system under the UN Charter, so that borders could not be altered by force.

When Saddam Hussein tried to annex Kuwait in 1990, the result was the UN condemned his action and actually demanded that he withdraw. Now, in that case, we used military force to get him to withdraw. In this case, hopefully, we will not have to use military force, but we should use diplomatic pressure on Russia, and I do believe that Crimea – we have not paid enough attention to the situation in Crimea and that is a situation that ought to be, also, under negotiation, as the Donbas situation is, although the Donbas situation is an imperfect negotiation, as the Foreign Minister may or may not agree with me.

So, what I believe is that the international community should be more engaged. The transatlantic community is alarmed, and you asked this earlier, Sir Roderic, you know, are we too alarmed, perhaps? I think the reason we’re alarmed is because we know that if we demonstrate to Vladimir Putin, to President Putin and his government, his Kremlin associates, that there will be high cost for any additional military move, whether it’s a cyberattack or full-on, you know, air campaign against Ukraine, that there will be consequences. That there will be economic consequences, and sanctions have been described by my government and other governments. That there will be military consequences in the form of ongoing and better assistance to the Ukrainian military, to the Ukrainian Government. NATO itself has had to respond to a new threat that Russia posed by putting additional forces into Belarus, which, of course, shares a border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, which are NATO allies.

In addition to that, as I said before, we need to do more diplomatically, because I do think if the global community rallies and tells Russia that what it is doing now is threatening to set the clock back to the pre-World War II system, which puts everyone in danger – if you can alter borders using military force, I can only imagine, frankly, the situation for Ukraine would be worse, because we would have Viktor Orbán saying that he wants a piece of Ukraine as well. We decided, as a global community, that if borders were to be changed, they needed to be negotiated.

So, I think that’s probably where I want to leave it for now. I think it’s important to understand what’s at stake and from there, we can talk about whether the responses have been appropriate or not. Certainly – one last thought, we’ve only seen escalation from the Russian side, although they’ve said they’re not going to attack and there’s some diplomacy ongoing. So I haven’t completely given up hope that President Putin may turn away somehow, and I do think that this deterrents and what some may call an overreaction is part of what might get him to decide that he’s not going to get what he wants and, in fact, that he will – he and the Russian people could suffer as a consequence of his aggressive foreign policy. So, with that, I thank you.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Evelyn, thank you very much. I’d like to pursue that last point when we get to the panel discussion, because it ties in with what Pavlo was saying about possible scenarios. Dmitry, can I offer you your five minutes now, and then we will open the panel discussion?

Dmitry Suslov

Ah, thank you, Ambassador. Well, first, let me say that in my perception, it’s wrong to define the problem as Russian intention or preparation to invade Ukraine and as Russian invade – intention to turn Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. The purpose of the concentration of Russian troops at the Ukrainian border is different and is what Putin described as ‘creating tension,’ as drawing attention to the Russian concerns and fundamental dissatisfaction with the prevading – prevailing security order in Europe and compelling into the dialogue.

It is very unlikely, indeed, that Russia would actually invade Ukraine, because such move would be completely useless and even counterproductive for the purposes of Russian policy and security demands that Russia presented. If Russia invades Ukraine, the West would intensify its military co-operation with Ukraine, Ukraine would consolidate even more in an anti-Russian stance, and invasion of Ukraine would not become a sufficient security threat, directly to the United States and NATO, for them to officially reject the NATO enlargement policy.

The real problem, I think, is Russia’s exclusion from the NATO centric security order in Europe and Russia’s fundamental dissatisfaction with the principles on which, contrary to the Russian preferences, the European security system has been built since early 1990s, and Russian perception of both Ukrainian accession to NATO and of robust military co-operation between the United States, NATO and Ukraine, as existential threats. That is the problem, and there is nothing new, actually, with this problem. It has been existing since early 1990s. So, what has changed now is the context, which, on the one hand, makes the current situation untolerable for Russia, but on the other hand, creates pre-requisites for Russia to succeed now in what Russia has been failing over the last 30 years, namely to change the principles of European security order in a more satisfactory, for Russia, way.

So, what has changed? First, Russia lost hope with Zelensky implementing Minsk Agreements and changing Ukraine in a more balanced and less anti-Russian way. Instead, President Zelensky started to conduct, with the Western support, by the way, a more hard line, anti-Russian domestic policy and started to demand revision of the Minsk Agreements, instead of implementing them. So, Russia concluded that the Western pressure is absolutely necessary to change the situation and to compel Ukraine to implement the Minsk Agreements.

Second, United States and NATO has intensified military co-operation with Ukraine, which is seen as de facto integration into NATO centric family, without provision of the Article 5 guarantee, and these developments must be stopped and reversed. But at the same time, the global context has changed in such a way which created an impression in Moscow that now Russia can finally convince the United States and NATO to stop enlargement, to reduce their military co-operation with Ukraine, and to compel Ukraine to implement the Minsk Agreements, thus making Ukraine a neutral and decentralised buffer state, which is – seems to be the real purpose of Russian policy, for the observable future, vis-à-vis Ukraine. Not a part of the Russian sphere of influence, but a neutral country in-between.

Why does it seem possible? Because the Biden administration, first, has clearly identified China as the major adversary and wants to concentrate all its attention and resources on campaigning China. Thus, the United States is objectively interested in avoiding further escalation here in Europe and further escalation of the confrontation with Russia.

Secondly, withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan showed that the Biden administration can take politically costly, tactically unpleasant, but strategically necessary, decisions.

And thirdly, Biden is unlikely to go for re-election and thus, he has a much bigger freedom of manoeuvre than any alternative. Thus, a sort of, now or never impression has emerged in Moscow and the sense is that after 2024, the window of opportunity will predominantly shut.

Finally, I agree, Putin is thinking about his legacy and of course, stopping NATO enlargement and ensuring Ukraine becoming a neutral state in-between, instead of an anti-Russian fortress, is a great legacy.

Now, Russia has already achieved very much, as a result of the tension it has created. For the first time since 1990, since the reunification of Germany, we’re having a dialogue on fundamentals of European security, a dialogue not ignoring of the Russian proposals, which was the case with Medvedev’s initiative of the European Security Treaty back in 2009. The United States and NATO are already proclaiming readiness to discuss and agree with Russia on some issues that they were not willing even to hear about just several months ago. INF missiles in Europe, NATO-Russia the confliction mechanism, and so on and so forth. And finally, for the first time in several years, the United States seems to be making a serious effort to encourage Ukraine to implement the Minsk Agreements, instead of reviving them or simply ignoring them. This is already a huge progress, a huge achievement for us.

And the last point, for the – as for the major Russian demand ending NATO enlargement, it also seems possible for now. To make it possible, we’ll need, from the Russian perspective, we’ll need just to recognise the current realities and bring the principles of European security system in accordance with these realities. The principle, according to which Russia must have no veto on NATO enlargement, was relevant to the times which no longer exist. The times of the Western victory in the previous Cold War, the no confrontation in Europe, Russia being unable to inflict serious damage to the United States and NATO and thus, there was an understanding that NATO enlargement did not undermine the security of NATO countries and of the United States. Look, this context no longer exists.

We do have a new confrontation in Europe. Russia and NATO are adversaries and will remain adversaries for the observable future and relations among adversaries must be based on a different principle. Namely, that we must respect the red lines of each other, even if we consider them illegitimate, in order to avoid war and in order to keep our confrontation manageable.

In the meantime, of course, Russia will keep troops at the Ukrainian border and will even probably increase the military pressure on NATO and on the United States directly, unless it gets something which it considers acceptable, in terms of NATO non-enlargement. But keeping the troops as a, sort of, Damocles, does not really imply a real invasion, and I will probably stop here.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you very much, Dmitry, thank you, all. So, we will now begin a discussion among the panel, before we move to questions from participants. I would like to stress, to those who are thinking of asking questions ,that this is Chatham House. This is a subject on which passions obviously run very high, but Chatham House is not a place for polemics. That happens elsewhere more than enough. What we’re having here, and I think what we’ve had from all three panellists, is a rational and constructive and cool discussion.

I think, picking up Dmitry’s point about dialogue, Evelyn’s point and indeed, the scenarios that Pavlo was looking at, I’d like to ask the panel, perhaps starting with Pavlo, how they would assess the chances, within the various scenarios, of a peaceful negotiated outcome. What might motivate Russia to drawdown, to de-escalate? How much flexibility might there be among the parties? So, let’s start with the Ukrainian party, Pavlo, if we may, and then I would like to turn to the others. Pavlo?

Pavlo Klimkin

Yeah, look, it’s a, sort of, complex negotiations, with many issues involved, very different one, very asymmetric. Formally demanding any kind of guarantees, Russia actually does not want any guarantee, because firstly, nobody believes in guarantees, whether political or even legally binding, anymore. Simply don’t forget that Russia broke not just Budapest Memorandum, but all the legally binding guarantees in our bilateral agreements. So, who would actually trust any guarantees now, and politics is changing very, very quickly?

But more to the point, Russia actually does not need any guarantee. We’ve been talking about changing, reshuffling the way how geopolitics functions and it’s a real goal. It’s a real goal for Russia. So, I would say is the chance for a sort of, peaceful compromise is there. The point is what we should call peaceful. The sort of, hybrid war against Ukraine is underway, it’s about cyber, it’s about economy, it’s pretty much about everything. And at the end of the day, it’s an option about big military built-up and invasion is not the best option for Putin. I would even believe that The Kremlin would use different options, simply to destabilise, as I’ve already – as I’ve said, and break Ukraine.

We need to understand Kremlin’s goal now. I do agree with Dmitry that – and I’ve started talking about that, the sense in The Kremlin now that it’s the right time, and the clock is ticking for The Kremlin. Their only point is the fundamental difference what Putin actually understands and a neutral and decentralised Ukraine and what we understand under decentralised Ukraine. And it’s this – approximately is the same difference how we understand the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. So, we are in that mode and at the end of the day, we have also some points for our initiative.

So, to cut it short, I believe the chance to get it peaceful without big military invasion is pretty high. The chance for the hybrid war ongoing is 100%, and the whole focus for Russia would be to use as much hybrid as possible, to change the leadership in Ukraine. And we know that, basically, they wrote off Zelensky and his administration as such, and we also know that decentralisation, including the current reality in Donbas, where we have everything Russian and nothing Ukrainian, is the best dream for Moscow. So, for me, it’s the number one scenario, number two scenario, number three scenario, so far, how we see it.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Evelyn, Pavlo says, “The chance for a peaceful outcome is high.” He and Dmitry, essentially, agree that the objective of Russia’s actions at the moment is to make a change in the geopolitical order and in particular, as Dmitry put it, “to end Russia’s exclusion from European security architecture.” Now, the United States is leading the negotiations. The United States is due, I understand, to give some form of written response this week to the set of demands, rather maximalist demands, laid down by Russia, and Lavrov and Blinken said last Friday that they “anticipated further discussions,” though Blinken said, “these were not negotiations.” How do you assess the prospect for a peaceful, ultimately, negotiated outcome?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Well, first, I should say, Sir Roderic, that I agree with my two panellists, with regard to what President Putin’s trying to do. He is trying to remake the international order and I am concerned – you know, as somebody who sat in The Pentagon in 2014, when Putin – when President Putin launched his very risky military operation into Ukraine and surprised the international community and then denied it, denied that he was behind seizing Crimea, later admitted it. Same thing in Donbas shortly thereafter, he started the operations in Donbas using un – using irregular forces and he also denied it, initially. I don’t think that any of us can assume, when the Russian officials say that they don’t intend to launch a war, that that’s actually what they intend. We have to be worried about the worst case scenario. So, I cannot sit here relaxed about the Russian forces on the Ukrainian border.

Having said that, like I said, I am hopeful that there’s some way out. You know, President Putin has achieved one objective, which was the one that Dmitry mentioned. You know, he has put the Russian agenda squarely at the centre, right now, of the international table, if you will, and it is clear to all, including China, that Russia’s – Russia has grievances that they would like the international community to take seriously. So, that is true and Vladimir Putin, for a long time, and his military, have wanted to put Russian forces – additional Russian forces directly into Belarus. He’s also achieved that objective.

So, he has already achieved certain objectives that were already important objectives for the Russian Government, so he could call it a day and go home. The problem is, this key question that Dmitry called ‘existential’, which raised a lot of alarm bells in my head, because I know the Russian Nuclear Doctrine says, “If something is an existential threat to the Russian Federation, nuclear use is actually allowed.” So, calling, you know, Ukraine joining NATO an “existential threat to the Russian Federation” is alarming, because that is a principle that the West cannot – and the global community cannot compromise on, more than we have already. And I should point out that we are in a compromised position of sorts, de facto.

Why do I say that? Because the NATO membership in 2008 said to Georgia and Ukraine, “You can become members of NATO,” but of course, they’re not members yet. There’s a path to membership. There are many things that nations have to do, in order to become members. And so, we are, in essence, in a compromised situation, but it’s – but one nation cannot, and the NATO Alliance, cannot give a veto to the Russian Federation on this principle.

Now, there may be language that we could agree to, including with the Ukrainian Government, because we’re not negotiating over the heads of our Ukrainian colleagues, that somehow allays Russia’s concerns, right? And we can also make agreements about the positioning of forces. Of course, I’m sure it’s hard for my colleagues to negotiate with the Russian military and the Russian Government right now, because they were the ones who broke – who abrogated the International Nuclear Forces Agreement, who walked away from the Conventional Forces Europe Agreement. So many agreements that they’ve ignored, the Vienna Document, Conventional Forces Agreement. There’s so many agreements that the Russian Government has abrogated, has violated, but nevertheless, of course, we should try to get Russia back into those agreements and improve them, if possible.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Right, but it’ll – you end up with a very positive note on the prospects for reaching some agreement on strategic stability and European security, and you thought that some language, feasibly, could be agreed within NATO and with the Ukrainian Government, to deal with the perceived – perception in Russia, described by Dmitry, that Ukrainian membership of NATO, which has actually been a dead letter since 2008, would be an existential threat to Russia.

Dmitry, you listed some of the gains that Russia has already made by threatening the use of force, by exercising a degree of coercion, if you like, on both Ukraine and the West, very, very obviously, threat of force. Evelyn suggests that Mr Putin could now call it a day and go home. Could he? Is there sufficient flexibility on the Russian side now to move with United States, NATO and Ukraine, all of whom have to be involved, towards some mutually acceptable negotiated outcome that avoids further conflict?

Dmitry Suslov

Well, I do…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Or is that cloud cuckoo land?

Dmitry Suslov

I do believe that this is possible. First, I think we need to compartmentalise, to separate de-escalation and a peaceful outcome. I don’t think that de-escalation is possible in the observable future, because this Sword of Damocles must be there, right? Without the Sword of Damocles, nothing would’ve been possible; none of the negotiations, none of the progress that have been already achieved. So, you are absolutely right about coercion. That’s – yes, this is coercion.

Unfortunately, the whole experience of Russia-West relations since early 1990s proves that without coercion, we don’t achieve anything, we’re just ignored. But at the same time as I started, an actual military solution would be contrary, absolutely diametrically opposite to what Russia wants to achieve, right? In order to solve the problem through a military solution, Russia would have to occupy the whole territory of Ukraine. I don’t seriously – seriously, I don’t think that I – it is prudent, and it is likely. I – a repetition of the Georgian scenario of 2008, outright invasion, defeating Ukraine, moving out, would not solve the problem, it will make the problem worse.

And at the same time, the Western readiness to negotiate, the Western failure to reject the Russian demands, which were formulated in such a hard line way, you know, already create a, you know, an incentive, a hope, an expectation, that a negotiated outcome is possible. And as I said, in my initial remarks, by a negotiated outcome, Russia considers not just some progress on military technical issues, not just agreements on post-INF non-deployment of intermediate medium range missiles in Europe, the confliction mechanism between Russia and NATO along the old Russia-NATO frontier, and so on and so forth, something that Russia has been, actually, demanding for years, without any crucial success until now. By negotiated solution, we also understand and mean implementation of the Minsk Agreements, in their existing form since February 2015, because if these agreements are fully implemented, if Ukraine amends its constitution and becomes a decentralised state, then probably, the NATO question will be solved by itself, you know, the question of Ukrainian accession into NATO.

And even the more fundamental principle of whether Russia must or must not have a veto over NATO enlargement, even this is considered possible, and I don’t know whether Russia will keep on pressuring that, I mean – and probably no-one knows. I assume that even Vladimir Putin doesn’t know the limits of Russian flexibility in the course of these negotiations. The most important thing is that these negotiations will continue, right? But it’s hard for me to say whether Russia will continue to demand and link everything just with the NATO, more or less apparent, declaration that it’s come – that it proclaims the closed door policy, that it does not enlarge further, but even this is viewed as possible, in Russia. Very difficult for the West, of course. I mean, from the perspective of domestic politics, from the perspective of the Western prestige, and so on and so forth, very difficult, but still possible.

Why? Because Evelyn said that the principles – there are certain principles that cannot be compromised. Look, these principles were non-negotiable, again, in the context which no longer exists. Referring to the Paris Charter of New Europe now, from my personal perspective, is something like appealing to the Briand-Kellogg pact, in – somewhere in 1942, from the ruins of Stalingrad. Sorry, you know, the time is gone, you know. We are in a very, very different context nowadays and the rules, which we must follow, which we must respect, in this new geopolitical context, must be different from the rules that were adopted back in 1990, when the context was absolutely different in Europe and in the world. And of course, Russia does not want to change the rules how geopolitics works. Russia wants to bring the principles in, according to the rules of geopolitics, right, in accordance to the rules of great power relations.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

I – well, you’re appealing to the sort of rules of great power politics in a way that, to us, I think probably seems like an echo from the 19th Century, when we thought we were in the 21st. But let’s let that pass. I’d like to put a very direct question to Pavlo. Most of us don’t have an intricate knowledge of the Minsk Agreements and the difference between Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 and so on. Can you explain, to a wider audience, what is unacceptable to Ukraine in the Minsk proposals, why, as they stand at the moment, Ukraine would not wish to sign them? Can you also pick up the point that Dmitry made earlier, envisaging that Ukraine could become what he called ‘a neutral buffer state’? To what extent is that a sellable idea or not, Pavlo?

Pavlo Klimkin

I going to address your points the other way round, started with the last one. Actually, if you remember Ukraine in 2013 or at the beginning of 2014, Ukraine, at that time, was formerly neutral state and the former Ukrainian President, Yanukovych, and basically, his clique, changed the principles in a legally binding way and declare Ukraine a so-called non-blocker, which is, you know, conceptually rubbish, but still a neutral state, how we, at least, understand it. More to the point, we were, at that time, quite a decentralised state, because Ukrainian business plans actually ruled different regions of Ukraine on their own, you know, I would not say fully on their decisions, but considerably on their own decisions.

So, when we are talking about – and it’s important you understand what Dmitry has just said – when we are talking about neutral in a kind of, common understanding in the West, when we are talking about decentralised, in the sense of a different level of decentralisation or even federalisation, it’s not how The Kremlin wants the Ukraine to be, I would say, the number – the neighbour of Russia. It’s completely different sense.

Coming to the Minsk Agreement, the real problem with the Russian reading now on how the Minsk Agreements should be implemented is that The Kremlin wants to fully, and they mean fully in every sense, control Donbas, so far occupy Donbas, in the future the whole Donbas and probably other areas of Ukraine. Now, if you take the occupied Donbas, especially after the Putin decree or on massive passportization, we have Russian passport for almost every second person in the occupied Donbas. And the loyalty, in many cases, is there because of jobs, because of medical insurance, actually because of different emotional issues. We have, also, Putin’s decree about so-called integration of the Donbas economy into the Russian ones now. There are no more barriers between the occupied territories and the Russian economy. Standards are now Russian, education is Russian, language is Russian, history is Russian. Even the party membership, including the ruling party in Russia, is now mainly Russian. So, fundamentally, what is Ukrainian anymore?

And if we follow the Russian line on incorporating this kind on – of Donbas into Ukraine, it going to be, first, a Trojan Horse and after that, it would be quasi-veto right for any decision, and I mean literally for any decision of [inaudible – 45:49] and it’s not about just NATO membership or EU membership. Just imagine we need a, sort of, differ – a, sort of, economic programme with Germany, with the European Union, whatever, and we going to get a, sort of, meteorite. No, no, no, no, better let’s take money from Russia. So, it’s a way not to have Ukraine at all and as I understand Moscow logic, it’s exactly how we explained in the future. They believe they can buy time and fundamentally to achieve the deep level of decentralisation, and to have different entities in our territory, partly or fully controlled by Russia.

So, it’s a mix of dream and strategic plan and in Moscow and on Putin’s place, I am fortunately not in Putin’s place, but understanding his mentality, I would do more or less the same. The only problem, and it’s my last point, it’s not going to fly with Ukrainians, even according to the latest opinion polls, and we have the eighth year of the war. We have almost 75%, 74% of Ukrainians who are against concessions, even on Donbas, and we have almost 40% who are ready to fight for Ukraine, with arms in their hands. So, their mood is not the mood to give in, and any sort of decision to put on hold what we are just discussion, would not going to fly with Ukrainians. Maybe we can play with any decision to get us closer to the NATO, and I am fundamentally against it, but maybe, or our hand. But in all other cases, it’s not going to fly. It’s important to understand it’s a different country, different mentality of people. It’s a fundamentally different reality and, hopefully, it’s also understood in Kremlin.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you very much. I want to turn to questions very shortly, but Evelyn, I should give you an opportunity, briefly, to come in if there’s anything there that you want to come in on. Otherwise, I shall start the questions.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

The only quick thing, Sir Roderic, is that I would make sure that the participants, or the – and the spectators, understand that I’m not advocating for compromising on NATO enlargement, because I believe NATO has brought stability to Europe. It brought investment to Eastern Europe, first and foremost, when we first expanded, and it’s brought stability to Europe. We do have to deal with the problem that Russia views it as adversarial, but it has brought stability and economic prosperity to Eastern Europe, the Former East Bloc and in the Balkan areas, where members have joined.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

But that said, you’re not proposing that within the near or measurable future, that NATO should accept the admission of Ukraine and Georgia? You are talking about the existing enlargement, where it stands now. Is that correct? Have I understood you correctly?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

NATO has said that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO, so Georgia and Ukraine have to meet NATO’s criteria. So, I stand – I agree with NATO’s position.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

It said that, at the time, when it declined to put Georgia and Ukraine on the path to the Membership Action Programme status and the situation…

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Every summit…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

…has been…

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Just very, very quickly, every summit, they reaffirm that. So…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yes, yeah.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

…I’m just reaffirming that.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Their situation has been, sort of, fairly frozen since 2008. Turning to questions now, I have a question from Bobo Lo. Bobo, I think you wish to answer this question live, if we can technically bring you onscreen and unmute you. Are we able to do that? If not, I will read out Bobo’s question. Bobo.

Bobo Lo

Yeah, do you hear me?

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yes, we hear – you have the floor.

Bobo Lo

Okay, great. So, I’d like to ask the panellists how they see the China factor in the current crisis? I know Dmitry briefly alluded to it when he was talking about Biden’s foreign policy focus, but I suppose what I’m interested in is their views on to what extent, if any, Putin and Xi Jinping co-ordinating their positions or actions, or are they really completely separate entities here? Also, what are the implications of the crisis for the Sino-Russian partnership? And finally, if somehow, Putin does undertake major military action against Ukraine, would he wait until after the end of the Beijing Olympics, or would he be – just be influenced by operational criteria? Thanks.

Dmitry Suslov

Can I start with that insofar as…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yes, please.

Dmitry Suslov

…[inaudible – 51:10]?

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Fire away, Dmitry.

Dmitry Suslov

Yeah, first, let me just say one sentence on Evelyn’s comments about NATO bringing prosperity to Central and Eastern Europe. Yes, it did bring prosperity and stability to Central and Eastern Europe, but bringing prosperity to those countries, but at the same time, antagonising the major military power in Europe and the nuclear superpower, does not bring stability to Europe as a whole. I see just a diametrical contradiction here, right? If you keep the most – the major military power fundamentally dissatisfied and increasingly…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

You’ve made that point…

Dmitry Suslov

…dissatisfied.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

…already. Can you answer the question on China, please, Dmitry?

Dmitry Suslov

Sure, sure, sure. I think China question is fundamental. China question is one of the major reasons why Russia decided to act now, not before, and I think that there is a certain level of co-ordination between Moscow in – and Beijing. For the first time in history, aft – for the first time since 1950s, China has officially supported Russian policy in Europe. Beijing has officially supported the security guarantees demands that Russia put forward. This is tremendously important, and it does imply that there is a foreign policy co-ordination.

This foreign policy co-ordination will definitely increase, because from the Russian perspective, intensification of the military partnership between Russia and China is precisely one of the major pains, which Russia can inflict to the United States and NATO, in order to compel them to compromise on what the United States use as secondary, actually, secondary and peripheral, in comparison to the – to confrontation with China. I don’t think that an official Russia-China Defence Alliance with mutual defence guarantees is plausible in the observable future, but a more robust Russia-China military co-operation is in the making, and I think this is something that Russia is also ready to trade with the United States. If the United States wants to avoid Russia making China even more militarily capable against the United States, then the United States must recognise Russian red lines in Europe.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Pavlo.

Pavlo Klimkin

Thanks, Roderic. I would go even further. I would say there is a level of co-ordination between Russia and China, and not co-operation on that, but the level of co-ordination. I could explain it, I need more time for that, but let me just state here.

The second point and it’s – you can consider it a, sort of, gamble, but China considers the Ukraine as one of the interesting platforms to engage more in Europe, because fundamentally, in the European Union, it’s seen as mainly hostile, not probably in the security sense, but mainly hostile, but in Russia, China is also seen with a lot of prejudice, let’s say diplomatically. So, fundamentally, more China in Ukraine and more engagement in China would, for me, stabilise, somehow, the situation, and it’s a, sort of, picture which is not a, sort of preferable one for The Kremlin, but could be considered and discussed between the US and China. I would intentionally not to go deeper into details here, but it’s an interesting option.

The third point, Bobo, on the influence on China. China is definitely watching very closely. China would also like to test the Western red lines, but in a completely different sense, and you know it quite well from your understanding on China, so don’t put Russia and China on the same level and on the same plate here.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you. Evelyn, do you want to come in on that one?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Yes, please. So, first of all, thank you, Bobo, for the question. I do think, first of all, somewhere recently in the media someone asked the Russian Government whether they had agreed – whether the Chinese had asked them not to “launch an – a military attack during the Olympics,” and the answer was, “No.” The Chinese don’t need to ask. Vladimir Putin knows that he doesn’t want to upset President Xi’s nice Olympics. So, there – but the – I would agree with my two panellists about the level of co-ordination.

What I would like to point out is that certainly, if Russia launches another attack, a military attack, on Ukraine, the resulting sanctions will push Russia further into the arms of China and that is a double edged sword for Russia, because if you get a Russian Military Officer, a high ranking one, alone, pretty soon, they – and you get them in a situation where they’re frank, they will admit that they have to keep an eye on China as a potential military threat to Russia. So, there are limits to the co-operation between Russia and China, which is not to say that we shouldn’t be concerned about what they can do together, but I do think there are some dangers for Russia in becoming more dependent on China.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you. I want to take two questions together and using the Chairman’s right to read them. First – and they’re both mainly aimed at you, Dmitry, but not exclusively. The first one, from Nathaniel Beckett, Dmitry, is, “You talked about Russia’s spheres of influence, and you had the Former Soviet Union, you had the Warsaw Pact and then you talked about other countries. What are the other countries in the third sphere of influence that you had in mind and how much influence or control is Russia seeking in that area?” That’s the first one.

The other one, from Anna Reid, was, “To what extent – or does Russian public opinion factor in this and in particular, if this situation did not have a peaceful outcome and Russia was in a conflict with Ukraine, how – and taking casualties, how would the Russian public react to that?” Could you comment on that first, Dmitry, and then I’ll open it to the others?

Dmitry Suslov

Yeah, thank you. Well, I’ll try to be as quick as possible. I think that the concept – the very concept of the sphere of influence is misleading and outdated. It cannot be re-established, it cannot be recreated, you know, because the geopolitics in the post-Soviet space is already very much diverse, and there are many actors who are very actively involved into the region, not just the West, but also China, in the Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, in South Caucuses, and so on and so forth. I mean, so Russia cannot re-establish the classical dominance in the region. This is why, instead of spheres of influence, Russia put certain principles, I would say, tacit principles, to the post-Soviet countries, that they, first, must not join the security alliances of the others, especially the adversarial security alliances, vis-à-vis Russia.

Secondly, they must not be used as instruments of containment against Russia and thirdly, they must not develop their domestic identities on the anti-Russian basis. If these three principles are fulfilled, I mean, the post-Soviet countries get full freedom of foreign domestic politics manoeuvre. They can be democracies, they can be autocracies, and so on and so forth. I mean, all the rest is acceptable for Russia. Again, Russia does not want Ukraine to be a – back as a sphere of influence. It’s over. It’s over. We learnt the lesson from 2014. It’s impossible to imagine Ukraine becoming a part of the Eurasian Economic Union, CST or so on and so forth, it’s over. You know, now the purpose is Ukraine as not part of the Russian – kind of, Russia centric environment, but also, not part of the NATO centric sphere environment. As for Ukraine and accession into the Europe – with the European Union, I don’t think that Russia objects against it.

Now, as for the Russian public opinion, excellent question. The Russian public opinion would certainly not support a full-fledged war between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian public opinion is also inward-looking. They support the foreign policy, which is not costly. I – and a profound increase of the costs, resultative with a huge decrease of the standard of living, and so on and so forth, will be something that the Russian public opinion will not support.

I mean, pay attention how careful is the Russian Government even in imposing vaccination and, you know, the restrictions in the context of the COVID-19. I mean, it’s really difficult to imagine that since the Russian Government is really sensitive to the public opinion on those issues, it would, you know, make an order on a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, which will be contrary to the public opinion and contrary to the logic, according to which Russian foreign policy has to be cheap, effective, but cheap.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

So, turning now to Pavlo, your proposition, Dmitry, is that countries like Ukraine can remain independent, internally self-governing their own systems, whatever they like, but that Russia should be able to exercise a strategic veto over aspects of its foreign policy. Sounds a little bit like the Brezhnev Doctrine to me, but Pavlo, how would you regard that? Are there any elements of acceptability in that proposition?

Pavlo Klimkin

Of course, no, and the current reality and political and mental reality in Ukraine is fundamentally different from the Russian region. Of course, for Russia, it would be great to have a veto right on any sort of military alliances, it’s clear, but at the same time, the Russian politics is exactly about setting up new spheres of influences. The point is that their whole concept of sphere of influences now is changed. We do see it completely differently. We can’t become, under any premises, a member of the [inaudible – 62:38], or whatever rubbish Russia has created, but it’s up to Russia to have these alliances. It’s not possible to imag – even to imagine to any sort of real support in Ukraine for joining such alliances. I was the one who actually initiated leaving the community of so-called independent states created in the early 90s. So, it’s an intentional one not to have this link and this bond, so we’re managed by Russia.

But on the very top of that, and I agree, it’s also about cutting off any essential or non-essential military co-operation with the West and what you’ve been following now is a completely different scenario. We’ve been getting far more in the sense of military assistance and not just direct military assistance. So, through The Kremlin, by its action, actually, has shifted completely – a completely different way from the military assistance, both in scope and in quality.

And on the top of that, and I agree with Dmitry, it’s a critical point for Vladimir Putin and the Russian leadership, is not to allow any sort of domestic development, which is considered and perceived by – in The Kremlin, as a, sort of, anti-Russian. And Putin was very clear in his famous article, actually calling Ukraine ‘anti-Russia’, which is, for me, fundamentally not true. If you see any sort of, you know, public research within Ukraine, it’s actually Putin who made Ukraine anti-Russian and goes on to make Ukraine fundamentally anti-Russian. So, there is no way how you change this narrative. You need a lot of time. You need not just change in principles and not all of the head of Ukrainians, and Ukrainians are quite creative in understanding how we achieve – how we should achieve our goals. And we understand that the stake in the current bargain in this, actually is the future of Ukraine and our chance, not just to have our own choice, is definitely more. Is, fundamentally, is to escape any sort of quasi-veto rights on everything, including our domestic development by Russia. So, the Ukrainian political class now understands it’s far better than many years ago, even at the backdrop of war.

So, my short point, no way how you can achieve it in Ukraine and Putin will be forced to act in a different way from just his scenario of negotiations with the United States. It’s my educated guess.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you, Pavlo. I’m conscious of time passing. We have 29 questioners on the list. I apologise to the majority of them that we’re not going to be able to fit them all in, in the next ten minutes. I’d like now to go to James Nixey. James, do you want to go live to ask your question?

James Nixey

Absolutely. Can you hear me? Can you hear me?

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yeah, yes, we can hear you, you’re live.

James Nixey

Oh, well, thank you very much, Roderic, and thank you to all three panellists for a really super hour of discussion. Dmitry, you spoke very compellingly about compellence, that the 100,000 troops you’ve put around Ukraine’s borders are there, ‘cause if they weren’t, then the Americans and nobody else would come to the table. Okay, I understand that, and I appreciate that honesty. So, my question then, and I guess it’s actually be useful to hear Pavlo’s opinion on this, as well, especially, but Dmitry, if the discussions don’t go so well, if ultimately, there’s a no, if it’s not satisfactory to Russia, then what’s The Kremlin’s very next move, please?

Dmitry Suslov

Thank you, James. Well, first, we already have different answer from no. The United States and NATO were smart enough not to say no, but they proposed something, which is quite interesting, right? And as I said in my initial remarks, we have already achieved something, which was just unimaginable several months ago, when it comes to arms control, the confliction and even the prospect of Ukraine implementing the Minsk Agreements in their literal form of February 2015.

The major problem is with NATO enlargement issue. So, if the West is very tough in saying that this is non-negotiable, that NATO enlargement cannot be stopped and will not be stopped in principle, then I assume that Russia will continue to increase military pressure, not on Ukraine. It will keep military pressure on Ukraine, but simultaneously, it will increase military pressure and increase the costs for the United States and for NATO countries. How? By, you know, the build-up of military efforts, you know, Russian’s strategic submarines popping up more frequently in the Atlantic, some missiles targeted against European countries, NATO countries, and so on and so forth, and of course, coming back to Bobo Lo’s question, intensification of the Russia-China military co-operation. But again, I strongly doubt that even in such circumstances, Russia will invade Ukraine, because as I said, it will be counterproductive for the purposes that Russia wants to get.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Evelyn, you worked in the Department of Defense. There’s Dmitry depicting a scenario, effectively, of Russia upping the stakes in an arms race. Is Russia in a good position to do that? How would the United States respond? To what extent does China distract the United States in the strategic sense?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Well, look, we are in an alarming situation, and I also appreciate Dmitry’s honesty, but you know, this is – I mean, this kind of international coercion doesn’t get you friends in high places. So, at some point, even if we come to an agreement, Russia’s going to lose the battle for international, you know, influence, in terms of social influence, political influence, which is why I think we should go to the United Nations and make everyone understand what Russia’s doing. I mean, using force, bullying the international community, is really not the way to achieve diplomatic results. So, it’s alarming to me, although I appreciate the honesty.

Yes, I mean, the United States can sustain another arms race, we don’t want to. We have many other things that we would like to spend our money on, but we believe that this international order, that we established after the Second World War, is one that protects us from becoming involved in another global war. And so, we believe that if Vladimir Putin continues along these lines and continues to threaten the international order, that we have to arm and deter him from – and prevent him from achieving those objectives. So, I don’t really know that there can be any real solution, but certainly, we would love to have, I suppose, a situation where Russia is contained, in terms of achieving its objectives, and if it means that we’re back to a situation where we’re – we agree to disagree with Russia and we have to spend money to deter, excuse me, the Russian military, then I suppose that’s what the United States will have to do.

But China complicates matters, because China – if Putin succeeds in what he’s doing here with Ukraine and with the international order, China will then threaten the – China will then try to, likely, recapture or capture Taiwan and many other countries will follow suit. They will start to challenge borders. I already mentioned Viktor Orbán in Europe, just as an example, where there are old grievances and leaders think that they can achieve their objectives using military force. If the Russian example succeeds, they will try, and that’s exactly what I’m talking about, the increased danger, then, of global war.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Dmitry posseted this proposition of an arms race on the notion that NATO – that the United States might – and NATO might come back and say that the Russian demands that there should be no further eastward enlargement of NATO are non-negotiable. Now, the United States is due to give a written response to Russia this week. Do you think that the United States is going to say that in its response?

Dmitry Suslov

Whom are you asking, please?

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

I’m asking Evelyn that, ‘cause the United States. Do you think United States is going to come back, Evelyn, I see you’re muted at the moment, and I hope we can unmute you, when it gives a written response to Russia and say that Russia’s propositions about NATO enlargement are simply not negotiable?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

I believe that that is what the United States will say, largely. That doesn’t mean that they will not – that my government will not try to find some language to reassure the Russian Federation that NATO is not aligned against the Russian Federation if the Russian Federation does not view us as an adversary. The problem is, we never viewed the Russian Federation as an adversary, throughout the recent decades, until the Russian Federation started to act as if we were an adversary. So, we’re in a cycle now that’s very unhealthy and I’m sure that my government will try to diffuse that and try to explain to the Russian Federation and try to offer some language to convince the Russian Federation that NATO is not its adversary.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you. We’ve hit 1:15. I will allow a little overtime. I’d like to read one more question that’s come in from Sir David Manning, which is as follows. “If there are negotiations over Ukraine, who does Russia think should be at the table and what would Russia be willing to offer, or would it just be a list of demands?” So, Dmitry, I’d like you to answer that question first. I then invite Pavlo and Evelyn to give any closing comments and then, I think, we will need to wrap this session up.

Dmitry Suslov

Well, I – first – on the first part of that question, I think that Russia would prefer to make a deal with the United States and to continue negotiations primarily with the United States, as the most comfortable partner in the current circumstances. Again, because it is the United States, which is preoccupied with China, it is the United States who can take tough decisions like withdrawal from Afghanistan, and so on and so forth.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

But this is referring specifically to the aspect of negotiations over Ukraine. Are you saying that you would really expect the United States to negotiate over the heads of the Ukrainian Government? Is that a realistic proposition?

Dmitry Suslov

Well, I think that all decisions on NATO enlargement or non-enlargement are not taken by the countries who want to join NATO, but are taken primarily by the United States. Of course, in consultations with the other NATO countries, but all the core decisions on NATO enlargement, on the issues of the hard security order in Europe, are taken by the United States.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

What about the border issues between Russia and Ukraine, which you’ve been fighting over for eight years?

Dmitry Suslov

Once again, please?

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

The border issues with Ukraine that you’ve been fighting over for eight years, the incursion into Donetsk and Luhansk and the annexation of Crimea.

Dmitry Suslov

Well, yes, for the annexation of Crimea, this is, I think, beyond any discussion. I mean, Russia will simply resist any – the popping up of this question at the negotiation table. As for the Donbas conflict, I – it will depend on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. I fully agree with Pavlo Klimkin that Russia perceives Donetsk and Luhansk as Trojan Horses within Ukraine. Yes, this is precisely the case, but this is also precisely what was written in the Minsk Agreements, literally, right? Of course, not – the terminology of ‘Trojan Horse’ was not really, but implementation of the Minsk Agreements as they are written, you know, with even Ukrainian Government promoting cross-border co-operation between the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Russian Federation, which is also part of the Minsk Agreements, is precisely like that. And if Ukraine transforms in such a way, then the border issue will be over, you know. Donbas will be reintegrated into Ukraine as a Trojan Horse, right, and that’s it.

Whether it is implementable or not, well, I respect, fully respect, and I do recognise the reality that Minister Klimkin has described. But the Russian opinion still is that if the West takes a hammer and compels Ukraine, you know, sends a clear message to Ukraine that Ukraine must do that, that will be done, by this President or another President, it doesn’t matter, but it will be done.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Okay, thank you.

Dmitry Suslov

And can you, Rod, can you also – I forgot the second part of the question.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

What would Russia be willing to offer, or would it just be a list of demands?

Dmitry Suslov

Oh, I…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

That is in terms of Ukraine.

Dmitry Suslov

Well, I think that what Russia can offer, in these conditions, is some limits to the Russia-China military co-operation. Secondly, you know, Russia is not demanding a rolling back of NATO countries back to the 1994 borders, right? Russia does – is not demanding withdrawal of Baltic States, Poland and others from NATO. So, basically, I mean, Russia wants to prevent further enlargement of NATO, and I sense, I really sense and think, although I’m an irresponsible Analyst, not an official, but I think that the Russian demand on NATO military infrastructure being moved back to the borders of 1997 is something for the negotiations.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yes, that’s definitely for the junk basket, I’d have thought. Pavlo, we are well over time, but I must offer you and Evelyn a chance for a final comment. If you can just keep it to a minute or two, just to pick up any key points that you haven’t already had a chance to make, and then the same for Evelyn. Pavlo.

Pavlo Klimkin

Firstly, The Kremlin is the wrong mindset, because they can’t just think about the future. We – the whole sense of deterrence, defence and all the notions will be changed in the coming years, and it’s not about infrastructure. But The Kremlin is very much insistent exactly on the point to control domestic develop of the Ukraine and it’s not going to happen. What kind of scenario will take up is difficult to say now, but to control domestic developments is over, and in any sense of negotiations between US and Russia, or any other negotiations, to have something agreed and after that, to imposed on Ukraine, again, it’s not going to happen.

Putin, basically, killed off any prospect for the implementation of Minsk Agreement by issuing the – this decree on massive passportization and realises this decree. For a – if you ask any Ukrainian on the street of Kiev the key problem for any sort of Minsk Agreement, it’s even of the border control or any sort of constitutional issue, it’s massive passportization. It’s there, so just forget about it. It’s not my point to you, of course, but my point to everybody who still wants, basically, to hammer it out. At the end of the day, I believe Putin would act in a completely unpredictable way. It’s not about simply massive built-up. The pressure will be maintained over our borders. There will be new tricks. I’ve just get, or got, on my phone a message that the leadership of the ruling party in Russia now wants to send more weapons to those occupied Donbas, that’s Mr [inaudible – 81:25] saying it openly and in the backdrop of having Normandy meeting happening actually right now in Paris. So, the sense of that is, basically, going nowhere and we understand that all kind of efforts, formal efforts, are not helpful. It’s about US-Russia negotiations and it’s about Ukraine and Ukrainians, nothing else.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Okay, thank you very much. Evelyn, final word with you from the panel. Are you more or less optimistic than you were an hour and a quarter ago?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

I think I stand where I was an hour and a quarter ago, although maybe just a smidge more optimistic, because I think Dmitry made some good points. I mean, if he agrees, as an Ana – as a respected Analyst in Russia, that Russia has nothing to gain by launching a disastrous military invasion into Ukraine, that makes me feel better. Although I also agree with Minister Klimkin that the other attempts to undermine the Ukrainian Government will continue. And I want to also make it clear that when I, earlier, talked about the Minsk Agreements, I believe they’re flawed.

Okay, so, one other point I really should make, as an American here, as somebody who worked with the people who are in the current administration, including the Vice President himself, directly, the Vice President understands that this is a standoff, you know, between autocracies and democracies. He’s said it a million times. Is…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

When you mean the Vice President, you mean the first…?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Sorry, the President, the President.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

The Former Vice President?

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

The Former Vice President.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Yes, right.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Understands very clearly that this is a standoff between democracy and autocracy. His words last night were pretty alarming. He said, you know, “This would be disastrous for the world. We’re in a very dangerous situation,” and I believe that my colleagues, who worked very hard and very closely with the Ukrainian Government, will not make decisions above the head of the Ukrainian Government or the Ukrainian people.

So, I really want to emphasise that this is very different from Afghanistan, and I think that President Putin has taken the wrong lessons from our internal difficulties, some of which were, frankly, significantly contributed to by the Russian Federation, starting in 2016 with the inference in our elections and in our social media, in our domestic dialogue, and ongoing all the way through the – now, with the COVID crisis, etc. So – but what it – what has happened is, yes, we have increased, you know, dissention and disagreement in the United States, but the withdrawal from Afghanistan is not related to this. It does not mean that the United States is weak and won’t stand up for principles that are important to us, that keep us safe, and I think that’s an important distinction to make here, and Russia should not miscalculate on that. And I think that NATO allies, the Europeans, will be more united if this bullying continues. I don’t think that the French and the German will be able to stand in front of their people and say, “Well, let’s capitulate to whatever Russia wants because of this bullying.” It’s just not tenable.

So, I do think that my government will be firm. We will not deal above the heads of the Ukrainians, and I also say that because our Congress, while we have a lot of disagreement about a lot of things, we have a lot of strong voices in favour of maintaining this international order and standing up to President Putin and making sure that we don’t compromise on the key things that are most important to us. Doesn’t mean we can’t negotiate with Russia, but I think the Russian Government should understand that we are resolved.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

We must wind up now. I would like to thank our audience, first of all, for joining in such very large numbers, and apologise to those who didn’t get a chance to get their questions in. Given the appetite for this subject, I thought I would mention that the Head of the Chatham House Ukrainian Forum, Orysia Lutsevych, is taking part in the seminar tomorrow evening, on the web, open to the public, which I shall also be chairing. This is not at Chatham House, but organised by University College London and can be accessed through www.ucl.ac.uk/politicalscienceevents. You need to register in advance. It has a similar format to this.

Secondly, I’d like to thank Chatham House for organising this, I think, extremely timely discussion, but above all, I’d like to thank our three panellists. They’ve handled this discussion with great clarity, with great seriousness, and with extremely good humour, and I think it’s been enlightening for me and I’m sure it’s been enlightening for 300 other people listening to it. Thank you very much indeed and we now conclude the discussion and can leave our screens. Thank you.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Thank you, Sir Roderic.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you.

Pavlo Klimkin

Thanks a lot, by the way, bye.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

Yeah, thank you…

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thank you.

Dr Evelyn N. Farkas

…gentlemen.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Okay.

Dmitry Suslov

Thank you very much. Take care.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thanks, Dmitry. Thanks, Pavlo.

Dmitry Suslov

Goodbye.

Sir Roderic Lyne KBE CMG

Thanks, Evelyn. Meet again, I hope, in peaceful circumstances.

Dmitry Suslov

Stay healthy.