In Search of a National Compromise: Common Market 2.0

Thomas Raines

Right, good morning everybody, and my name’s Tom Raines. I’m the Head of the Europe Programme here at Chatham House. Delighted to welcome you all to this Brexit-focused event this morning. Couple of, just, bits of housekeeping before we introduce the discussion and the panel today. This is being livestreamed for all of our panel participants and everyone in the audience, so there’s a camera at the back. So, please bear that in mind. This discussion is on the record, not under the Chatham House Rule, and, in fact, the intention here is to spark a wider conversation about this topic. So, for that reason, you can also tweet about the discussion. Use the hashtag #CHEvents, but please put your phone on silent. So, the subject of this morning’s discussion, we were discussing the title. We came up with towards a National Compromise: the Common Mark 2.0, and, I suppose, in some ways, this is a very well-timed discussion, given the remarkable tumultuous politics at the moment. But at the same time, it’s a, sort of, terribly timed discussion, ‘cause we’re leaving in nine days and we don’t have a national compromise at the moment. The PM’s due to head to Brussels tomorrow. There’s an extension letter being drafted or being dispatch at the moment. We know Parliament has rejected the deal twice. The Speaker has rejected Parliament rejecting the deal or accepting the deal a third time. Parliament has rejected no deal. So, the list of options is growing thinner, in terms of a positive agenda for what Parliament can accept what a consensus and a majority can support.

This morning, we have a group of MPs from different parties, who have come to talk about their proposal for how we move through this impasse, how we break the gridlock that we find ourselves in, and I’m just going to introduce them before we get into the substance of Common Market 2.0. So, on my right is Stephen Kinnock. He’s the MP for Aberavon – Aberavon? Aberavon?

Stephen Kinnock MP

Aberavon.

Thomas Raines

Aberavon, forgive me, since 2015. Labour MP, as the surname implies. Previously worked at the World Economic Forum. Good think tank credentials there. Nick Boles, also formerly a think tanker, in fact, has been the MP for Grantham and Stamford, since 2010, I believe, and Conservative MP. Lucy Powell is the MP for Manchester Central. Used to work for Ed Miliband before becoming an MP in 2012, and Robert Halfon is the MP for Harlow. Also, the Chair of the Education Select Committee and a former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party. So, Stephen is going to introduce Common Market 2.0. He’s going to give a short overview of what it means, what some of the pros, the cons, the strengths, the limitations, and then we have a chance, both on the panel and as an audience, to really get to grips with what it means. This is a really, I think, a valuable opportunity for us to try to really understand the detail of what is a complex arrangement, but potentially, a way forward that a majority can support. So, Stephen, over to you.

Stephen Kinnock MP

Thank you very much. Well, thank you very much, Tom, Nick, Robin and everybody else at Chatham House for organising this event. I would also just like to say thanks to my fellow panellists today. We are a motley crew, you might say, but it’s been a real pleasure, and a privilege to work with you, and with colleagues from our parties in our wider group, the Common Market 2.0 Group. I’m really proud of the way that we’ve left our narrow party political tribalism aside, in order to try to work in the national interest, and in the spirit of compromise that I think this meeting is all about today. Thanks, also, to you, ladies and gentlemen, for coming along today so early in the morning, for what I hope will be an informative conversation about our proposal.

We call it Common Market 2.0. Michel Barnier likes to call it Norway Plus, but either way, we think it’s the best way forward, that can win Parliamentary support, and that can begin to reunite our deeply divided country. Now, someone once told me that the beginning of a speech should always contain a surprise for the audience; something that will really make them sit up and take notice. So, ladies and gentlemen, I’d like to start today by telling you that I completely agree with Nigel Farage. Yes, I agree with Nigel, who, in 2016, said the following to a BBC Question Time audience, two months before the referendum vote. “I hear people say,” this is my best Nigel Farage impression, “I hear people say, “Wouldn’t it be terrible if we were like Norway, or Switzerland? They are rich, they’re happy, and they’re self-governing countries.”” And I also absolutely agree with Nigel’s fellow Brexiteer, the MEP Daniel Hannan, who said, “Norway and Switzerland, I can’t help thinking they’re doing pretty well.” And if that wasn’t enough of a surprise for you, I’d like to add that I concur entirely with their pal, the Tory Brexiteer, MP Owen Paterson, who, in 2015, said, “Only a madman would actually leave the Market.”

Now, whilst you might find my budding bromance with the bad boys of Brexit quite amusing, there is actually a deadly serious reason for me sharing those quotes with you, because what they demonstrate is that, in 2016, Euroscepticism meant something that it apparently no longer means today. Today, Euroscepticism means setting off into the Brexit fantasy forest of unicorns and rainbows. Yet, in 2016, Euroscepticism simply meant being opposed to political integration, whilst cheerleading for the Single Market. It meant keeping the strong, mutually beneficial economic ties, whilst defending the nation state as the primary source of political power and accountability and that, in a nutshell, is what Common Market 2.0 is all about.

Theresa May’s interpretation of the referendum result spelled the end of the pragmatic Euroscepticism of 2016 and replaced it with a brand of isolationism that has only – not only been deeply counterproductive for the Brexit negotiations, it has also profoundly damaged our country’s reputation on the global stage. The fact is that 52:48 is not a mandate to remain in the EU and carry on with business as usual, but neither is it a call for a hard Canada-style Brexit, and it certainly isn’t a call for leaving with no deal. The referendum result must be seen as a call to leave the EU’s ever-deeper political integration, whilst maintaining a strong close and productive economic relationship with those 500 million consumer on our doorstep. In short, the referendum result is an instruction from the British people to move house, but to stay in the same neighbourhood.

So, what does Common Market 2.0 actually entail for the EU, and what is the pathway to get there? Well, for a start, it only requires a renegotiation of the political declaration on the future relationship, which the EU are open to amending. It does not require any change to the 580-page withdrawal agreement, which the EU has made crystal clear is sealed shut. The rewriting of the political declaration would specify an E – UK-EU future relationship, whereby the E – UK maintains full participation in the European Economic Area by joining the EEA’s European Free Trade Association pillar. EFTA is a Government – intergovernmental organisation that promotes free trade and economic integration, without political or monetary union. The EEA’s Single Market is essentially an extension of the EU’s internal market, beyond the EU 28, to also cover the three the EFTA states that are signed up to the EEA, namely Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Due to the issues with the Irish border, during the transition phase, which is due to end in December 2020, although, of course, now with this – the extension, that may well – that could well change, the UK will need to negotiate, on its succession to EFTA, a derogation that will allow us to negotiate with the EU a comprehensive Customs arrangement, including the common external tariff, unless and until alternative arrangements to secure frictionless trade on the Irish border can be agreed.

A major strength of Common Market 2.0 is that it is by far the fastest route to Brexit, and therefore, attractive to those MPs and to the wider public who are desperate to get on with it, whilst at the same time, removing all the risk of the Irish backstop ever having to come into play. It also recognises that a permanent Customs Union is not strictly necessary. Common Market 2.0 would give the UK full membership of the Single Market, which the UK helped to create, and which underpins so many British businesses’ trading success, but we would leave the EU’s political institutions, leave the jurisdiction of the ECJ, of the Common Agriculture and Fishery Policies, and the EU’s drive towards ever-closer union. We would also increase our power to control freedom of movement. I’ll say a little bit more about that later. Crucially, it is an option that is popular with voters.

Whenever myself, Lucy, Rob or Nick are out on the doorstep, in Aberavon, Manchester, Harlow or Grantham, we hear the same message time and again from our older voters. “We voted for a Common Market back in the 1970s. We did not vote for all this political stuff.” In the 1970s and 1980s, the British people broadly supported our membership of the European Economic Community, because it delivered clear economic benefits to British business and workers. It was only ever as the ever-closer political union took hold that the paths of the United Kingdom and the European Union began to diverge, and that, I think, dates from the Maastricht Treaty.

A newly founded UK-EU Common Market for the 21^st century would respect the public desire for striking the right balance between political sovereignty and economic integration. It would recast our country’s relationship with the EU in a way that would better reflect our history, geography and politics. Common Market 2.0 should also be seen as a reset moment for Europe. Popular consent for the European project is under threat, and Macron was right, recently, to talk about Europe’s future being one of several circles. He said, “We have to build a Europe with several formats to go further with those who want to go forward, without being hindered by those states that want, as is their right, to go not as fast or as far.” That is absolutely the right strategy. There are several European countries that will never join the Euro, that will never sign up to a European army, and that have deep reservations about the free movement of labour. The creation of an outer ring of non-EU countries that participate in the Single Market, but opt out of ever-deeper political integration, would be a huge step in the right direction, and the UK could play a central role in that outer circle.

Now, let’s turn our attention to one or two of the elephants in the room, one or two of the myths, if you like, that have been circulating about Common Market 2.0. Let’s start with one that I alluded to earlier, that Common Market 2.0 means no changes on free movement of labour. Yes, it’s true, that the free movement of labour would continue, initially, under Common Market 2.0, but there would be a marked improvement in our position, in that we could apply the safeguard measures that are written into the EEA agreement. These safeguards give a qualified, but unilateral right to any of the EFTA EEA members, under Article 112 of the EEA agreement, to suspend freedom of movement if that country believes it is suffering serious societal or economic difficulties. We would then be able to renegotiate freedom of movement, under Article 113, perhaps based on regional or industry quotas, but if negotiations were to break down, we could not be forced to reopen our borders. Article 114 allows retaliation from the other Single Market countries, but this reaction would have to be reciprocal. They could not, for instance, respond to our decision to suspend the free movement of labour by suspending our export of goods or services to them. These measures are clearly not to be used lightly, but the Article 112 and 113 safeguard measures could help to ease our public’s existing fears about the seemingly limitless nature of free movement of labour.

The second myth is that the UK would become a rule taker. This is simplistic, and it ignores the fact that under the terms of Common Market 2.0, the UK would be leaving the European Court of Justice, and thereby ending the principle of direct – the direct effect of EU law. The EFTA Court that the UK would join respect national sovereignty in a way that the ECJ doesn’t, plus, we would have one out of four EFTA Court Judges, rather than the one out of 28 that we currently have on the ECJ. Under EEA law-making, the EFTA nations have a right to be consulted by the EU at a technical level, and once a directive has become law, it is passed onto the EEA Joint Committee, on which the EFTA nations sit alongside the EU. From there, the EFTA nations can delay, adapt or veto legislation, either by claiming that it is not relevant to EEA nations, or that it triggers constitutional requirements.

It is worth noting that between 1993 and 2011, Norway and Iceland have derogated from EU law on 400 occasions between them, and it is also worth remembering that less than a third of EU directives affect the EEA in the first place. Under Common Market 2.0, we would restore policy-making power in vast areas, including agriculture, fisheries, foreign security affairs, justice and home affair’s, and taxation.

Myth number three, that we have to pay more or less the same amount into EU budgets. This is wrong. We’d pay close to 50% per capita of what we pay now. Each EFTA EEA member pays only for the institutions and services that they access. And myth number four, that Norway doesn’t want us. Well, the Norwegian Prime Minister has made clear her position. She has said, “If that – if joining EFTA is what the UK really wants, we will find solutions in the future.” She also said, “To find a good agreement, it is important for all European countries, and I hope that we will see an orderly deal that doesn’t disrupt economic affairs in Europe.” Myth number five, the EU don’t support it. Well, in May 2018, Michel Barnier said, “The only frictionless model for the future with the UK would be Norway Plus, Norway being part of the Single Market plus a Customs Union.” From the outset, Barnier made it clear that a Norway-style relationship would have been welcome by the EU side, and it would not – but that it was never explored properly because of our Prime Minister’s red lines. Michel Barnier has also made clear that the EU was ready to negotiate the future – renegotiate the future relationship. In January he said, “If the United Kingdom chooses to change its red lines, and to be more ambitious and go beyond a simple free trade deal in our future relationship, then the EU would be ready to do so immediately.”

So, that’s a flavour of the Common Market 2.0 proposal that we’re putting forward, but how do we get there? How do we break the deadlock in Westminster? Well, I mean, there can be no doubt that our politics is both polarised and paralysed. At one end of the spectrum we have the People’s Vote campaign fighting tooth and nail for a second referendum, and at the other side, we have the ERG, desperate for an ideological, 19^th century no deal, Brexit built on rainbows, unicorns and empire 2.0. But in all truth, it is not really Parliament that there’s a problem. The problem, of course, is the Prime Minister. It is her red lines that have tied our country up in knots. It is her stubbornness that has plunged us into this political and constitutional crisis, by depriving the House of the opportunity to have a proper debate about the most important issue to face our country since the Second World War. The fact is that there has always been a cross-party parliamentary majority for a sensible, pragmatic, bridge-building form of Brexit. Our cross-party group of MPs has held very constructive and productive conversations with the Leader of my party and his team, and we hope that we will be able to secure the Labour Whip in support for a backbench-driven Common Market 2.0 motion or amendment. And if we can combine that Labour bloc vote with a sufficient number of Conservative MPs, and here I look to Rob and Nick, no pressure there, guys, then we believe that we can get Common Market 2.0 over the line.

Ladies and gentlemen, Britain is a great country, but we are more divided than we have been at any time in living memory. Young versus old, graduate versus non-graduate, city versus town. These divisions were not created by Brexit, but they were ruthlessly exposed at the ballot box in June 2016. Since then, the fault lines have deepened and widened, to the extent that I believe that our country is in serious danger of tipping into a culture war. So, it is time now for Parliament to step up and do its job. It’s time for us to rediscover the lost art of compromise, and to break the deadlock. It’s time for us to find a way out of this mess. It’s time to heal the wounds, and to reunite our deeply divided country. Thank you [applause].

Thomas Raines

Stephen, thank you very much, that’s a really useful overview of the proposal, what it involves, how we might get there, some of the strengths and appeal that you think it has. I want to bring in the rest of the panel here, and get some different perspectives on some of the issues and challenges that you’ve put on the table there. Firstly, on this question about influence, and Nick, maybe I could ask this to you, if – is the political test for Brexit about taking back control, and do you think Common Market meets that test? If you – I accept that the – it’s been a stable arrangement for the EFTA states, and worked pretty well for Norway and others. But if you speak to Norwegians, and if you read what’s been written by, you know, for example, for the Norwegian Government about the compromise that Norway’s adopted, they’re, you know, pretty open and honest about the limitations of the influence that they can have on the process of legislation. In fact, you know, their view is, but that this necessarily involves delegating a lot of legislative power to the EU. How does that meet the threshold for a return of sovereignty, or taking back control, or however you want to interpret that demand from the Brexit side?

Nick Boles MP

Yeah, no, and that’s an incredibly important question, and, of course, it’s not perfect, because no compromise is ever perfect, but there are a few, sort of, facts I’d like to highlight. The first is that I’ve been a Member of Parliament since 2010, and I was a candidate in the 2005 election as well, elsewhere, and I represented fairly a strongly leave-voting constituency. I have never received a letter or an email, or had a surgery appointment or a conversation with a single one of my constituents complaining about a Single Market directive. Never, not once. So, the question, then, is what did they want to take control back of? Did they really want to take control back of the sorts of quite technical, quite nerdy, quite boring rules that govern an integrated market, or did they want to take back control of the much more intensely political, and indeed, sort of, social and cultural questions that come into play when you’re talking about home affairs, justice, foreign defence policy? Or, in my intensely rural constituency, did they want to take back control of our agricultural policy and our system of agricultural support? I very strongly believe that the extent to which we would actually not just take back control, but completely exit all of the EU’s non-economic policies, would be delivering an element of control that actually is much more the kind of control that people were looking for.

The second thing to say is about Norway. If you talk to almost anyone in what the – this country or the Daily Mail would call the elite, or the establishment, so anyone from a political party, any Civil Servant, any business leader in Norway, they’re gagging to get into the EU. They’re all desperate to get into the EU, but they’re not going to get into the EU, and there’s a simple reason why, which is that 65 to 70% of the Norwegian people are very happy with where they are, thank you very much, and they don’t believe they’re in the EU, and they don’t believe that they’ve given up their sovereignty, and they’re very happy with the halfway house that they have negotiated, and that is why this temporary position has turned out not to be quite so temporary, and if you talk to anybody who knows anything about Norwegian public opinion, they think there is not a single chance of the Norwegian elite getting their way, and getting into the EU. So, clearly the Norwegian people think that it is an improvement.

And the final thing to say, and it is really important, Stephen mentioned it, is that, of course, the whole point of the EEA is to align policies with those that have been adopted by the EU, as regards to Single Market, but there are exceptions. The Norwegians have not adopted a great number of Single Market legislation that they don’t like. The Icelandics, actually, it’s a much smaller country, have not adopted a great deal more, and there are some – you know, sometimes they just basically say, “We’re not implementing it,” and because it has no direct effect, unless it’s been implemented locally, it doesn’t apply. Sometimes they spin it out for five years. Sometimes they spin it out forever, and then what happens, well, what happens always in the EU, is there’s a negotiation, and there’s a negotiation and they agree to some derogation, to some exemption, to some way. Now, of course, you can’t do that in the great majority of cases. If you did, the relationship would break down, but so long as you’re doing it just when it really matters to you, actually, being in the EEA gives you much more ability to resist legislation you don’t like than it – than you actually have in the EU. Even though, technically, in the EU we have a vote, but once the vote has gone against us, it’s imposed on us whether we like it or not. That is not true if you’re in the EEA.

Thomas Raines

But in the EU – I mean, it’s quite interesting the way you framed that, because it’s ultimately about resisting the regulation, rather than any capacity to have a positive role in legislating, which just – and I’m just – there’s a couple of issues just to quickly – be good to get your view on, because, originally, firstly, you’re, sort of, proposing that, to some degree, this, sort of, deals with areas which are non-political anyway, or that people don’t, sort of, bring up to you in constituency concerns, etc., but isn’t there a slight danger in, basically, seeking a solution, which comes up with – which technocrahises, if I can use that as a verb, which is very ugly, but is a technocratic depoliticised version of lots of issues, which the referendum, sort of, revealed people do care about. Trade policy, for example. Now, maybe people in Grantham don’t come and talk to you, but I think, actually, that trade is deeply political, in lots of ways, ‘cause it affects their jobs, competitiveness, distribution across the economy. Immigration is another. Now, I accept that there are certain measures within the EEA that allow for the temporary suspension of freedom of movement, essentially, but is there a risk that, in effect, if it – if we outsource some of those political questions to the decision-making processes of the EU, and we agree to, basically, try and influence them from the outside, that actually, you produce something which isn’t a very stable arrangement at all, because you end up, you know, you end up with a party, at some point, which will want to readdress all of these issues, which haven’t been addressed by leaving?

Nick Boles MP

No, and I genuinely don’t think there is that risk. I think these issues have only become salient because of – we did vote to leave the EU, and then we’ve been arguing about them constantly for the last two years. If you look at, consistently, all of the polls up until the referendum, what number, in terms of people’s top ten issues that matter to them, these sorts of issues never made it into the top ten for decades. What obs we all know is that the primary mover of the referendum result was a very serious and genuine concern, and there is a, you know – we’re not able to deliver everything, if we do go – adopt the Common Market 2.0, about immigration and about free movement, and that is a real challenge, and, you know, we – I think Stephen’s right, that the existence of the emergency break puts us into a much stronger position than we are in the EU. But it’s still, by no means, a complete answer to people’s concerns, but I simply don’t believe that people are going to suddenly start worrying about the fact that Single Market regulation is one that – over which we don’t have complete sovereign control. There was no evidence of that before the referendum. It wasn’t in fact discussed during the referendum, wasn’t one of the main themes of the referendum, the Single Market directives and the way that – in which they limit businesses’ freedom. Nobody ever has complained about any of the international standards that we’re signed up. I mean, we all know that most industries are now governed by international standards that are set globally. Nobody ever complains about that, because, frankly, who cares who decides how big the motor in your hoover is? I mean, really not that many people, and that’s why, I think, that’s what underlines or underpins Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Dan Hannan, all of these people’s support for EEA EFTA, is because they recognised that it gave you control over the things that people care about, and that it integrated the things that are economically beneficial and that people don’t care about, and that’s why they supported it then. It’s just that, like every revolution, they’ve become radicalised, having gained their result.

Thomas Raines

You’ve also all been on a bit of a journey too, though, in that you’ve also, in the past, said things which were perhaps less of an endorsement of the Norway model than you might have now. So, in that sense, maybe we can turn a little bit to these – this question that’s, sort of, parliamentary arithmetic. Do you think you can persuade enough of your colleagues on the Labour side and the Conservative side to go on that same journey, and, basically, because there is this, you know – the view earlier on was this – in effect, this presents the worst of both worlds, rather than the best of both, because we’re half in and half out, so we have less influence but we still follow the rules, etc., and I accept that – and – you disagree with all of those criticisms, but how do you persuade enough of your colleagues to go on that same journey that you have?

Lucy Powell MP

Well, yeah, that is what we’re endeavouring to do at the moment. I mean, I used to be the Director of Britain in Europe, which you didn’t mention in your introduction, when we were campaigning for Britain to join the Euro. Some people in this room will remember that campaign, and I was on television regularly arguing with George Eustice and Nigel Farage and others who were advocating Norway at that point, and I would say, “This is a terrible thing because you have no say and you,” you know, etc., all those arguments. So, I – the journey I have gone on is a considerable one, but that’s because the times that we are in, and I think, actually, for all that we see on the TV and all the reporting of the – of this endless, sort of, awful groundhog day Brexit, sort of, vortex that we all seem to be in, actually, what is happening in the House of Commons right now is that many, many, many Members of Parliament, and we’re just representative of a few of them, are desperately looking for the compromise and the way out of this situation. That has not been fully expressed yet, because we’ve not actually had the chance to express that, other than through forums like this and work that we’re doing, but from Leavers or Labour MPs who represent very strong leave seats, you know, who a year ago never would’ve considered this option because of their concerns about sovereignty or free movement, which we’ve discussed, through to colleagues who desperately want us to remain, Conservative colleagues. I mean, George Eustice, who recently resigned from the Government, because he doesn’t want a delay, he supports not fully our proposal, but nearly all of our proposal, because he sees exiting the EU but staying in the EEA a way of actually reasserting some sovereignty, and he sees it as a very speedy way of delivering Brexit.

So, there’s a – and for remain people who want to stay in the EU, I think this a – you could describe this as a – the, you know, the economically most closely aligned version of Brexit, and for them who have ambitions of maybe re-joining at some point in the future, this is the best way to do that. So, I think, unlike most of the other options on the table, although there aren’t really, let’s be honest, many of the properly worked up and off-the-shelf options…

Thomas Raines

That haven’t already been voted against.

Lucy Powell MP

…that haven’t – well, yeah, or, really, that anybody’s actually pushing. You know, we believe we attract support from, and we are attracting support from Leavers and Remainers, Labour and Conservative, and the other parties, and that, therefore, we actually have an opportunity here, given the right circumstances and given the opportunity to express that, to command not just squeaking this over the line, as all the other potential options might have, but of achieving quite a sizeable Parliamentary majority for this, and, you know, since we’ve, sort of – well, Stephen’s been banging on about this for ages.

Stephen Kinnock MP

I’m not the only one.

Lucy Powell MP

Nick – yeah, yeah.

Stephen Kinnock MP

Over two years.

Lucy Powell MP

Nick’s been banging on about this for medium-term, and Rob and I are the, sort of, slight Johnny-come-latelies who co-authored the pamphlet earlier this year, which Stephen and Nick, actually, really wrote, but we helped with. But what, you know, we – everyone is looking for that compromise, really, and I think this is something that could fly.

Thomas Raines

Do you think the SMP, the Lib Dems, the Greens, others who, beyond your own parties, would – who, at the moment, are much more enthusiastic about the prospect of having a second referendum as a way to break this impasse, do you think they are persuadable on this question?

Lucy Powell MP

Well, I hope so. I mean, look, the reality is that a second referendum is highly unlikely to happen. There just isn’t the Parliamentary maths there to support it. We had a vote on it last week in Parliament, 334 MPs voted against it, and that was with, you know, the Labour Party abstaining on it, and there were other people who would’ve voted against that at that point in time. So, I just can’t see that happening, but, obviously, I totally understand those who want to stay in the EU and want to have an expression for that, and that is a campaign that can continue beyond what happens over the next few weeks. So, I hope that once that becomes clearer, people will recognise that this is the next best option.

Thomas Raines

And Rob, perhaps I could ask you to sum this question of immigration. Article 112 provides, in very specific circumstances, this option for, effectively, an emergency break, potentially. So, I suppose, two questions. One is, what do you think the wider political consequences of the UK unilaterally triggering an emergency break in that manner would have, either on the stability of the EFTA arrangements and more generally on the political relationship between the UK and the EU and EFTA member states? And secondly, in terms of making this case for Common Market 2.0, how much are you doing that on the basis that freedom of movement has plenty of benefits, and that case maybe wasn’t made enough during the referendum, versus, basically, betting the House on the emergency break?

Robert Halfon MP

Yeah, well, let me just give you a bit of context, if I may, before I answer the key points, and I come from a constituency that voted 68% to leave. It’s a place where there is a lot of deprivation, that people struggle with the cost of living, and although I voted remain, I was a very reluctant Remainer. I voted remain because I believe in alliances of democracies, but I didn’t like the EU, I felt it was undemocratic, and – but I knew, and I predicted this on radio a few days before, I said my vote in my constituency is going to be 70% to leave, because the way people were talking to me was that if the polling station had been 20 miles away, they would’ve walked to the polling station to vote to leave the European Union. And it wasn’t just because of freedom of movement, it was because of housing. So, for example, they – my town is a new town, they were promised that everyone would have a Council house, and then they might see somebody from Eastern Europe move in next door in a Council estate, even though they can’t get a house for their son and daughter. And it’s not because of racism, and the person from Eastern Europe may be renting or may have even bought the house, but that is the perception. They ring up the Doctor, they wait two or four – three weeks for a Doctor appointment, and then there might be somebody from Eastern Europe ahead of them in the queue. They may have lost their jobs at Tesco Logistics, as many of my constituents did have, and worked for many years, because Tesco hired tem – workers, temporary workers on the Swedish derogation more cheaply, and then moved the Logistics side. So, this is where a lot of this comes from. It’s not about racism, it’s not about people didn’t like immigrants, because they welcomed the immigrants that we have in our hospitals, and they know that we need them in hospitals, and so on and so forth.

And so, I would never have come to this, having promised my constituents, after the day of the referendum, that I would do everything possible to make sure that I followed their wishes. I would never have come to this if I felt that, one, there would be no control of freedom of movement, but also, if it diluted the idea that they would be withdrawing from the European Union. And when you, and I think Stephen touched on this, when you explain to people, in my constituency, and by the way, I – we are only 26 miles away from this building, my constituents, and I live there, I have one home. I know it’s very unusual for an MP, I genuinely live in my constituency, it is another world. It is another world, and it’s 26 miles away, it is another world, and the people out there in the streets are incredibly angry with all of us, and they’re very angry with Politicians and Parliament because they think we are not delivering on the referendum result, and the potential is for things to become as toxic, in my view, as when there was the MP’s expenses scandal. So, I think we have to deliver on the referendum, and I genuinely believe that the important thing is that what the public – the message of the Vote Leave campaign wasn’t, “Stop immigrants,” and I’m not talking about Leave – Don’t Leave, I’m talking about the moderate – more moderate Vote Leave campaign. The message was, “Take control.” And, actually, with the Articles, whether you would implement it or not, the key thig is you’re saying to the public that, actually, you can take control. You can control freedom of movement if you so require, and I think that is the crucial thing that allows me to explain to the public. And as, again, Stephen and Nick said, you are out of all the things that they hated, the political union, the EC – the most part of the ECJ, the CFP, the CAP, all the things that they thought, “Why on earth are we in a European Union?” but you get the best of joining the European Free Trade Area.

And I mentioned, at the very beginning, I’ll just conclude with this, is that I voted – I said to you I voted for the EU because I believe in alliance of democracies. I wish this had been plan A, not plan B, and it’s true, I knew about EFTA, but I came to this view, in the last four, five months at the end of last year, having read – heard Nick, who is the guru of this, and spoken to Lucy, and read a number of articles from David Owen. And then I saw that people like George Eustice resigned from the Government, a hardcore, principled Eurosceptic, supported membership, [inaudible – 40:13] Dan Hannan has been mentioned, still tweets about membership of EFTA, and I realised that it’s possible to sell this to a very Eurosceptic public, in certain areas of the country, and to those kind of people who’ve been left behind.

Thomas Raines

Even though this is also EFTA plus, this is EFTA minus the independent trade policy.

Robert Halfon MP

Well, that is until your full membership of EFTA. So, obviously, people have different views about this, but you would have – you would be part of a Customs arrangement, which would mirror the EU Customs Union, until the frictionless border was solved, and then you would be, potentially, part of a full – part of the EFTA, without the Customs arrangement pillar.

Thomas Raines

Until the frictionless border is solved.

Robert Halfon MP

Yeah.

Thomas Raines

We’ll just leave that there. Okay, enough questions from me. Let’s go out to the audience. If you could introduce yourself, and there’s lots of Chatham House members here, so if you could say more than just, “A Chatham House Member,” that would be useful. Yeah, if anyone wants a seat, seats are being pointed out at the front, that would be great. So, there’s question here, thanks.

George Peretz

George Peretz, I’m a Barrister from Monckton Chambers. I just have a slight disagreement with Nick Boles about the Single Market not being controversial, sometimes it is. I mean, you take issues like animal testing on cosmetics, or certain types of state aid decisions, you can get decisions that are quite controversial. I think the way I would put it is this, but, sort of, standing back a bit, the choice facing the United Kingdom is, how do we live with this extraordinarily powerful regulatory regime which surrounds us, effectively? And we can’t ignore it, it’s there, and in practice, for a whole variety of economic reasons, we’re going to follow it. And the area of state aid, the Government itself has already accepted we’re going to have to follow the state aid rules, even on the political declaration relationship that’s been sketched out. There really just isn’t the option.

The only coherent alternative option than working with the EU regulatory regime, which effectively means, largely, following it, is this Shanker thing on group that effectively advocates joining the United States regulatory regime, which is, bottom line, what they are about. And, just frankly, it seems to me that their position is wholly politically unrealistic, whatever you think about the merits of US regulation, vis-à-vis EU regulation. Just does not seem, to me, the British public are there. If you look at issues like GM food, beef hormones, all the chlorinated chicken stuff on agriculture, if you look at concerns about the NHS and the effect of a US trade deal on the NHS, seems to me, that our public opinion is pretty much European. So, we’re going to stay in the European Regulatory Area, the question is, how do you manage that relationship? And the EEA is a well-established and fairly sophisticated way of running that relationship in a way that gives those countries that are outside the EU, but are in that relationship, some degree of control over matters that are important to them.

Nick Boles MP

Yeah, I think – I mean, I think that’s exactly right. I’m so much aware that I know much less about this issue than George…

Lucy Powell MP

Yeah, yeah.

Nick Boles MP

…that we’ve actually asked George, and he has very generously agreed, pro-bono, to help us redraft the political declaration on the future relationship.

Thomas Raines

I’ll Just point out, that wasn’t a planted question.

Nick Boles MP

No.

Thomas Raines

We’d know who that was.

Nick Boles MP

If it had been planted, I wouldn’t have suggested he tell me I was wrong, as the opening. But the truth is, I think that’s exactly the right perspective on it, but again, on state aid, one of the reasons why, and you may have seen that we, in the last two weeks, have had two meetings with the Leader of the Opposition and his key Advisors, and one of the reasons, I think it’s fair to say, why the Leader of the Opposition is warming to this proposal is because what we’ve managed to explain to him, that actually, the state aid restrictions are not so bad that he can’t do most of the things he wants to do. Now, I hope he never gets the chance to do those things, ‘cause I’m a Conservative, but the truth is, you look at Norway and Norway spends more money per capita on state aid than any EU state. It’s got nationalised railways, it’s got a nationalised post office, I think, and many other things. So, the truth is that while, of course, we would have to accept these rules, and George is right, there isn’t – there is no regulation and standard-free autarky available to a modern nation state. You’ve got to adopt one or the other blocks of standards, but within the EEA, there is enough flexibility to allow this country to be a truly self-governing sovereign nation.

Lucy Powell MP

Can I just add in on that? I agree entirely with what’s been said, but I do think that, sometimes, this whole debate gets blighted by the black and white nature of arguments as presented when, in fact, nothing about this is black or white. You know, being in the EU is not wonderful and amazing and we’ve got all this sovereignty and we’ve got all this influence to change the rules, and aren’t we brilliant? And then outside of it, you know, we have to have nothing to do with the rules at all, and then this is, like, the worst of all worlds. You know, it’s a grey area.

Inside the EU, we’re subject to QMV, we very rarely, kind of, win those arguments anyway, everything we have to adopt automatically in this country. Any version of Brexit, other than the one that George outlines, which is the, sort of, purist, “Let’s be part of America,” any form of Brexit, from the Prime Minister’s deal, being in a Customs Union, Jeremy Corbyn and Keir Starmer’s version of Brexit, whatever it is, requires regulatory alignment, and would require us to, effectively, adopt the Single Market regulation. So, actually, what we’re saying is, let’s have a voice, let’s have an influence, let’s have a veto, let’s have some national sovereignty over that, whilst also leaving the EU, and I just think that – I think it’s – one of the things I learnt from that Britain in Europe campaign, when we wanted to join the Euro, we presented all the arguments as though joining the Euro was just going to be absolutely wonderful, and there were no downsides to creating a Eurozone at all. And then, the one-size-fits-all interest rate, which we, sort of, diminished at the time, became the central problem for the Eurozone, which we had totally underplayed, and we – everything about this debate has got costs and benefits, and we have to be honest about that, and not just present arguments as entirely cost free and benefit plus, or entirely the opposite.

Thomas Raines

You would accept that not being able to – I mean, you mentioned, obviously, you know, the UK can be outvoted on issues, which is decided by QMV, but not being able to vote versus being able to vote is a diminution of our influence and control over the design of legislation?

Lucy Powell MP

Well, we vote in different ways. There’s consultative, you know, requirements. We have treaty rights within the EEA EFTA. So, yeah, I mean, these are choices, and they’re – it’s just – it – what I’m saying is, it’s this sliding scale, but the idea that you are either a rule maker or a rule taker, and there’s nothing in-between, is just nonsense.

Robert Halfon MP

The EFTA Court is very different from the ECJ courts, very different, the impact it has on countries, in terms of the ECJ’s and imposition court, and the EFTA Court is more of a guidance court.

Nick Boles MP

I think the way I’d draw a distinction is that we would definitely be giving up influence over new rules being developed and applied to the whole of the EU. So, we would have less ability to help shape the new rules that the EU adopts for everybody in the EU and the EEA, but I think we will have a greater ability to resist the application to us of deeply obnoxious rules. So, the question is, which matters more to you? Is it that you want to have a huge amount of influence as a big player in the rules being developed for our whole continent? That’s what used to be our main reason for being in the EU. We voted to leave the EU. My argument would be, in the context of having voted to leave the EU, actually having a greater power to resist the application of the truly obnoxious things to our country, without being able to stop them being applied to the others, that, actually, is a – is something that is a more valuable thing and given the context of the referendum and the referendum vote. They’re different kinds of influence, and it’s apples and oranges, but we’ve already voted to leave the one kind. So, the question is, is it worth retaining the other kind? And I think it is.

Thomas Raines

Okay. Now, I need a question from a Lawyer who isn’t providing advice to the panel.

Lucy Powell MP

Telling us we’re wrong, yeah.

Thomas Raines

One at the front.

Tom Barrel

Tom Barrel from…

Thomas Raines

Sorry, just, actually, the lady behind you, excuse me, sorry.

Emma Nicholson

Thank you very much. Emma Nicholson, former MEP, former MP, House of Lords. How can the panel see the future of the relationship with the European Union? The EU, as Guy Verhofstadt said in this very room over a year ago, is in a great decline, but it hasn’t yet finished its mission, which is a total enlargement. Given that the highest likelihood that – is that we will leave, argument or no argument, in some form or other, how does the panel see us supporting the European Union, in completing its mission and being as good as it possibly can be in its job of peace and security?

Thomas Raines

Stephen, do you want to take that?

Stephen Kinnock MP

Thank you very much, and I think that’s a really important question, and I touched on it a little bit in the speech, based on what Macron is saying. You know, Macron is saying that, for decades now, the European Union has taken what you might describe as a one-size-fits-all, top-down approach to integration. And for decades now, leaders, not just Macron, many, many others, I mean, we’ve had everything, we’ve had a la carte, we’ve had multitier, we’ve had multispeed, we’ve had variable geometry, every single European Leader I can remember has said, “The EU needs to reform, and it needs to recognise that different member states are at different stages in their evolution and in their attachment or disattachment to – attachment to or disattachment from the European project”. And I think that this, you know, there’s no doubt that Brexit and the referendum was a massive reset moment for the United Kingdom, but I think it could actually also be a reset moment for the EU, because imagine if the United Kingdom were to join the EEA EFTA countries. You would create a new pole of influence of an intergovernmental relationship, counterbalancing the more supranational relationship that you certainly see in the Eurozone countries, and a recognition, I think, that there are a number of countries in the European Union that are never going to join the Eurozone. They’re never going to have that deeper political fiscal or monetary union, but want a frictionless trading relationship with this incredible jewel in the crown of European integration, which is the Single Market. What an amazing achievement, and what it’s delivered, in terms of growth and opportunities for our economies.

So, I think that what – if we had some imagination and some innovation and some creativity in all of this, we could actually see the opportunity of the UK joining EEA EFTA as an opportunity, also, for the EU to catalyse and kickstart the reform that it so desperately needed. I believe in this option because I’m a passionate pro-European. I want the European project to succeed, but in order for it to succeed, it has to reform, it has to change, it needs a new architecture, it has to be reengineered, and that’s never going to happen if it’s just as biased to inertia and nobody ever changes anything, and nothing ever – you know, sometimes, you do actually have a positive changing effect by stepping away, and influencing from the outside, rather than being on the inside and part of the, kind of, groupthink. So, I – you know, I – my – I think the answer to the question is, yes, reset moment for the United Kingdom, but let’s also capitalise this, potentially, as an opportunity for a positive, progressive reset moment for the European project as well.

Thomas Raines

Okay, thanks very much. So, there’s a question here at the front.

Adam Payne

Thank you. Hi, I’m Adam Payne, a political Reporter at Business Insider. I just have two questions. Firstly, in light of the events of the last few hours, I guess, that the Prime Minister looks like she’s going to request a short extension of around three months, and press ahead with plans and vote three, four, five, whatever, and the idea, as far as I can tell, has been that the route to Common Market 2.0 is the Commons, is giving increased control of this process, perhaps, through indicative votes. Is that still the plan, and if so, what is the route to that, in terms of Parliamentary procedure in the weeks ahead? And secondly, Stephen and Nick, you said that talks with Jeremy Corbyn have seemed to have gone pretty well. Can you reveal what the outstanding issues are, and…?

Nick Boles MP

We’ll answer the quest – one question that you’ve asked, which is about the extension. We’re obviously not going to reveal the state of private conversations. The extension of three months, I think we do need to be – I mean, I’m literally the Prime Minister’s greatest critic in the Conservative Parliamentary Party, so I’m not in the business of defending Theresa May, but her motion last week did not ask MPs to support a long extension. If you read it, and I read it at the time, it said – it noted that the EU Council is likely to ask or to insist, rather, on a long extension, if we don’t pass the deal next week. It just noted it, it never – we never voted for a long extension. We have always been very clear that one of the great advantages of Common Market 2.0 is that we can get it done in three months. We can get the political declaration changed, George has already written half of it, and…

Lucy Powell MP

Oh, have you, George?

George Peretz

Alan Dashwood.

Nick Boles MP

Oh, well, Alan and George have written half of it, and the EU, you know, reiterated literally yesterday, Barnier reiterated that the future relationship, the political declaration could be renegotiated very quickly, and then we would have a couple of months to get the withdrawal implementation bill through. So, this is the only alternative to the Prime Minister’s deal that can be done in the time that we’re going to have.

Adam Payne

But wouldn’t it have to be done – basically, you would need political agreement within Westminster by, basically, the middle of April, to avoid having to go through the process of organising European elections, etc.? So, you think that this consensus could be reached by…?

Nick Boles MP

I think you’d need to be well on the way to getting that consensus. You wouldn’t necessarily need to have formally passed a withdrawal agreement and a new political declaration, but I think if – you would need to have shown that you had a majority for the principle of a renegotiated political declaration, and that Parliament would then vote for the withdrawal agreement if that was achieved. I think you need that by the middle of April.

Robert Halfon MP

If the window for a second referendum has gone by then, I hope that if there is another vote that it will be voted down, which I’m sure it will be, then, where are most moderate MPs going to go, in terms of this idea, if there are indicative votes? Where – and I actually believe that this will get huge amounts of support from my side of the House and from Lucy’s and Stephen’s, because what are people going to vote for, other than the Moorhouse Declaration, which is not going to be accepted in any way by the EU?

Stephen Kinnock MP

And just on the – quickly, on Adam, we will be seeking time, Parliamentary time to have a debate and a vote on this. So, next week, there’ll be a retabling of some form of the Hilary Benn amendment. That’s going to happen.

Thomas Raines

Okay, thanks. There’s a question here.

Thomas Cole

Thomas Cole, Head of Policy at the People’s Vote campaign, and former International Negotiator for the European Commission, including on Iceland. You mentioned that this is a, kind of, an off the shelf agreement, but let’s be honest about it, it’s not. There’s the EEA and there’s the Customs Union, but there’s no third country, which is both at the moment. So, I’m wondering how long, in your mind, will this take to negotiate?

Nick Boles MP

Well, we might ask George.

Lucy Powell MP

Look, it’s not all in one go. I mean, I think the advice from George and others, and indications that we’ve had from Europe and elsewhere, is that asserting our current treaty rights, as members of the EEA, and remaining in the EEA, but via the EFTA pillar, so to speak, that could be done relatively quickly. We could be there by the summer, and then we would use the rest of the transition period to negotiate the comprehensive Customs arrangement, security issues and some of the other issues to – that need to be negotiated. I think what the last couple of years have really emphasised, and we knew this already, didn’t we? I mean, this was an issue during the referendum campaign, is that the free trade arrangements, bespoke free trade arrangements, negotiated with Europe, take an absolute age. That is the hardest bit of the negotiations. Liam Fox, Boris Johnson and others all told us this would be the easiest free trade negotiation ever done. That was LOL, wasn’t it? That’s not actually happened at all, so I think the bulk of what needed to be negotiated, in that transition period, would be relatively straightforward by going into the EEA, but you’re right, there still would be the Customs arrangement part of that security, and some other elements, but…

Nick Boles MP

And the derogation from EFTA.

Lucy Powell MP

Yes.

Thomas Cole

Is that because of the EU, we need to negotiate with them?

Nick Boles MP

Yeah.

Lucy Powell MP

Yeah.

Thomas Raines

So, just to be…

Nick Boles MP

But the question will clear, we will have the transition ‘til December 2020. So, the question is not, “Can we negotiate this by the end of June?” It’s, “Can we negotiate this by December 2020?” And the indications are that that should be possible, whereas, at – we discovered that the crucial flaw in the Prime Minister’s plan is that everybody knows she’s not going to have got a deal negotiated by December 2020, hence the backstop, hence all of the problems already.

Thomas Raines

So, can I ask, is the expectation, and I don’t know if you all have a completely shared view on this, in if these negotiations are successful in the way that you want them to be, what is the trading relationship between the UK and the EU? Are we in a Customs Union, formally, with the EU, and therefore, there is no Customs border visible or invisible on the island of Ireland? Are we in EFTA and have distinct trade arrangements, and then independent trade policy separate from the EU?

Nick Boles MP

Okay. So, one of the arts of politics is identifying those things you agree on and by recognising those things you disagree on. Now, I think everybody in this room would agree that there is simply no chance in hell of alternative arrangements that guarantee frictionless trade and no hard border on the island of Ireland being ready and agreed to by the EU before the next election, which is in 2022. So, what does that mean? It means that all of us, from Rob, who wants to get into EFTA, as a full-blown member of EFTA, signed up to all of EFTA’s free trade agreements„ and therefore, obviously outside the Customs Union and the Customs territory with the EU. Rob accepts that, until 2022, we’re going to need to be in a Customs arrangement with the common external tariff. Jeremy Corbyn, who wants a permanent Customs Union, the SMP, who want a permanent Customs Union, Plaid Cymru, who want a permanent Customs Union, they also accept that there’s no chance of those alternative arrangements being ready before the next election. So, what we have is the potential to form a compromise where everybody agrees that we’re going to be in a Customs arrangement with a common external tariff until those alternative arrangements are ready. We can all then go into the next election. The Labour Party will say, “We’ll stay in a permanent Customs Union forever.” So will the SNP, so will the Lib Dems, so will the other opposition parties. The Tories, maybe, depending on who their Leader is, will say, “We’re going to get those alternative arrangements, and as soon as we do, we’re going to join EFTA fully.” So, we don’t need to decide now where we’re going to be in 2022. What we need to decide is, how do we go from here to 2022? And on that, actually, you can build agreement, and we have in a draft motion that we’ve been circulating and discussing with everybody, but isn’t yet public, we have a form of words that everybody can live with, except for the most hard-line Brexiteers, who of course don’t even want to be in a temporary Customs arrangement for a couple of years.

Thomas Raines

Okay. So, it’s partly parking that question…

Nick Boles MP

Exactly.

Thomas Raines

…and building the bridge. Okay, I’m going to try and take a couple of questions now, ‘cause we’ve got about eight or nine minutes left. There is one question at the back there.

Sam

Thank you, panel. My name’s Sam. I’m here in a personal capacity. I’m a Conservative Party member. I voted Brexit, I’m from London. I went into the referendum remain, didn’t even ask for a referendum, but I had to make a choice, and it was the lack of reform in that package that tipped me, and I think many of our countrymen and women, into the leave camp. I’ve heard you on Today, I’ve read your pieces in The Times. Your persuasion today is infectious, and I’m onboard, but for all the conversation about Parliament and the stakeholders in this room, I’m not hearing much from you in how you’re going to take this message out to the wider country on what are quite nuanced, technically complicated things. So, here’s my question. How are you going to use the power of persuasion to build compromise and unite this United Kingdom? And what are the plans, over the next days and months, to do that?

Thomas Raines

Okay, thanks. Just hold that for one second, I’m just going to grab an extra question, ‘cause we’ve not got too much time left. There’s a gentleman right at the back. Yeah, thanks.

Adrian Galland

Hi, my name’s Adrian Galland. To go back to something that Stephen said right at the very beginning, how important is it to understand that there are in fact two jurisdictions within the EEA, and that you have the European Union as one jurisdiction and EFTA as another? So, it’s not a pillar, it’s a jurisdiction, and that the EU is a supranational jurisdiction, and that EFTA is an intergovernmental jurisdiction, which respects and upholds national sovereignty?

Thomas Raines

Thanks. Rob, would you like to take this first question about making the case to the country?

Robert Halfon MP

Yeah. Well, I think you made what was possibly one of the most important questions, and I was trying to explain to you in my remarks about the feeling of the people in my constituency, and how we reach out to them. I think before we can do anything, in terms of the wider public, we have to convince Parliament that this is the right option. But you’re absolutely right, what we need is a grassroots campaign, which says that we are taking back control, ‘cause that’s what people wanted, that’s why the Leave campaign was so successful, but at the same time, safeguarding jobs and businesses, which people are very concerned of, because, in my area, people have moved from scepticism about the Prime Minister’s deal to, kind of, real anxiety about wanting to get this done and wanting things to move on. But we will need a grassroots campaign to set out what the membership of EFTA brings, and it takes back control. It means we aren’t closing the drawbridge, and there are simple messages, and we’re out of the political union, and I think those are simple messages that we can get across to the public, but as Stephen set out at the beginning, we are just a motley crew at the moment, and we don’t have the fi…

Lucy Powell MP

We need the People’s Vote campaign.

Robert Halfon MP

The money of the People’s Vote campaign, or the money of the…

Lucy Powell MP

Or the ERG.

Robert Halfon MP

…or the ERG, but in order to convince the public that this is delivering the referendum result, which is key, and I wouldn’t be supporting it if I didn’t think so, the grassroots campaign is going to be incredibly important, and perhaps you might offer yourself as one of the Co-ordinators if that happens.

Thomas Raines

This is not purely a recruitment exercise.

Lucy Powell MP

Yeah, can I just add to that briefly? ‘Cause my constituency is a very remain constituency. It’s a Labour remain constituency as well, sort of, metropolitan, although the outer ring of my constituency is much more like Rob’s too, so yeah, I feel believe those things. But I have had no problem in selling this to my constituents either, at all, and I’ve had many meetings about it, lots of, you know, correspondents, email exchange. I’ve done lots of local media on it as well, and, you know, that’s what, I think, has meant that we are where we are with it, now, at this point, because it is something that both sides can get behind, and there’s very few of those options there. So, even though many of my constituents really just want us to stay in the EU and just want to stop this whole thing and get off, they will very quickly say to me, “But I could see that this is the best thing otherwise, this is the – I could live with this.” Lots of people will say, “I could live with it,” and there have been lots of public opinion studies done, where people have been taken through the issues, and so on. There was one just published this week by my old university, King’s College, where they, you know, took many people through the arguments, and this was clearly – nearly 50% of people said this was their preferred option of all the other options, sort of, on the table. So, I think it’s something that would – we could sell very straightforwardly.

Thomas Raines

Okay. I’m going to try and get in three more questions.

Stephen Kinnock MP

Shall I answer just on ECJ?

Thomas Raines

Oh, sorry, yeah, just…

Stephen Kinnock MP

Yeah, the answer is, absolutely, yes. I mean, there’s a key difference between supranational and intergovernmental courts, two very different jurisdictions, and I absolutely agree, by the way, on – the huge frustration that we’ve had is that I believe that this is a solution that has been hiding in plain sight for two years, and because of the tremendous noise, and I’d pay compliment to the People’s Vote campaign. They have made a huge amount of noise, they’ve delivered 400,000 people on the streets. I just regret that if – I mean, if we’d had 0.1% of the resource that we could’ve put into this campaign, I think we could’ve genuinely given it a voice, and we could’ve had that public engagement, but it’s not too late. We’ve got to now find a way of debating it properly in Parliament. Incredibly frustrating that the Prime Minister hasn’t given us the opportunity to do so, but, you know, we’re here today, and we hope that this will be the first step towards actually getting more public engagement.

Thomas Raines

Do you think, just very quickly, you can have that grassroots movement if it’s everybody’s second choice and nobody’s first choice?

Stephen Kinnock MP

I think there is an appetite in the country for compromise and people are sick and tired of this binary debate, as Lucy touched on earlier. People know that the world is a complicated place. They know that we’ve struggled to find a way through this, and that compromise, in general, in life, is the way that you get through complex and challenging situations. So, I think there’s something in there about tapping into that desire for finding a solution, stopping the trench warfare and moving the country forward. So, I hope that we can do that. I think the way to sell it is about rediscovering the last – the lost art of compromise.

Thomas Raines

Okay. Last couple of questions, very quickly. There’s one gentleman at the front here. Sorry, who I missed off last time. Yeah, go on.

Tom Barrel

Hi, Tom Barrel…

Thomas Raines

Just very – it’s got to be really quick.

Tom Barrel

Very quickly, from King’s College, and I think the idea is great. Lots of ideas have come out. I would be more interested to hear about how we’re actually going to get there, and what the probability, you think, of us doing so? So, really, the practicalities more than the idea, I think, would be really important to hear about.

Thomas Raines

Okay, thanks, and this is the last question, so definitely make it a good one. Sir, here.

Eduardo

Thank you. Eduardo of Debevoise & Plimpton. Just very quickly, sometimes the Brexit debate in these two years has been a bit insular, I think is fair to say, and I fear that we might run the risk of doing this again, even in the context of Common Market 2.0. I’ve heard a lot about how the UK, you know, this will be a great solution, because, effectively, the UK would have the chance, every now and again, to frustrate, you know, what the EU was trying to do, be it through the use of this emergency brake, which I personally don’t see how it could be used, given the circumstances in the UK, or by effectively, you know, refusing to adopt legislation. If I was a policymaker in an EFTA state, I would be very concerned about this, and I think that a knock-on effect on that is that when you actually come to sit down and negotiate this, you know, you might find that it’s actually a lot harder to negotiate than you would initially thought. So, I’d be curious to hear your thoughts.

Thomas Raines

Thank you very much, that’s great. So, two questions, one on the practicalities and one on this absolutely crucial question: is this negotiable with the EU state and the EFTA states? Does EF – do the EFTA states want a, kind of, a big brother joining the club, in a way, that, you know, our politics hasn’t advertised stability and security very much, in the last few weeks. So, it’s a crucial question, and then any final remarks you want. On this first one, Lucy.

Lucy Powell MP

I mean, quickly, on the practicalities. I mean, if we 100% knew that we all wouldn’t be here right now, would we? Because this is a case of, sort of, feeling our way through, to some extent, what we are working incredibly hard at, as a group and as a wider group that we represent, is to nudge everyone in Parliament, sort of, towards this outcome, and I think we’ve done a very good job of that, actually, over the last few months. I think, really, now we are getting to the point where the choices are really the Prime Minister’s deal, a second referendum, which, you know, is not really going to happen, a no deal, which is also hopefully not going to happen, because Parliament doesn’t want it to, although it might do otherwise, or this is the other option. And I think being, you know – the process has to enable a political solution, and what we’re concentrating on, really, is the political solution, and that takes everyone to agree with it.

Thomas Raines

So, we will – we’re really short on time, and I just want to get to this past question.

Nick Boles MP

So, this is a really, really important point, and I don’t – it’s very important that we don’t mis-state or overstate our case. None of us are saying that there’s any immediate likelihood that we will want or be able to pull the emergency brake on immigration. All we are saying is this, one, that David Cameron, in his attempted renegotiation of our EU membership, took the exact words of Article 112, 113 and 114 of the EEA agreement to the EU and said, “This is what I want,” the exact same words, and the EU refused it point blank. Why? Because it has a potential value. It’s there as a safeguard, as a, to coin a phrase, backstop. It’s not something that you would use in normal circumstances. It’s not something that could be used and maintained for very long, but imagine if Ukraine were to join the EU, and free movement were to apply from the get – you know, the start, and imagine that Ukraine was going through a bad economic period, and that the UK was doing very well, and its labour market were very buoyant, that in a circumstance where, as with Poland in the early 2000s, you had many, many hundreds of thousands of people moving in a single year into the UK, that’s the sort of circumstance where most people accept that the emergency brake might be possible to be used, and that could be a great source of reassurance to the British people that they’re never going to be put back in that situation again. ‘Cause, as you’ve seen, immigration currently is at levels that, you know, both the lev – the concern has come down and the level of immigration has come down from the European Union, and we’ve still got freedom of movement, is in full force. So, it’s just about, as Rob said, giving people the sense of greater control.

On resisting regulations, there I don’t entirely agree with you. Of course, the whole point of being in the EEA is to try and integrate and to try and align our rules, but Norway, every single year, and Iceland, every single year, there’s one or two that they resist. There are 300 legislative acts that Norway and Iceland, between them, have not adopted, and all that one is saying is that in extremis, in the place where you can’t negotiate an acceptable solution, that there is an ability to resist. That doesn’t mean that you’re going in there with a wrecking ball, trying to smash it all up. It simply says that in extremis, in exceptional circumstances, we have the right to resist, and I think that that will be reassuring to people. It doesn’t mean that we’re going to come along and upset their very happy situation. Far from it, we want to benefit from it.

Thomas Raines

Thanks, and Rob, you wanted to make a final point.

Robert Halfon MP

Can I just make a very quick point? I think I’d also underline your question, was that are we joining this, basically saying on all the things we don’t have to do? But, actually, I tried to, in my remarks, say I believe in this, because I believe in alliance as democracies. The Norwegian Prime Minister, the Iceland Foreign Minister has welcomed the idea of Britain joining. I think it would be great for the geopolitical balance of Europe. It’d be a good counterweight to the EU, and I think it would be good for the EFTA countries, if Britain were to belong. It would be good for the United Kingdom, and good for the balance of power in Europe, and that is one of the reasons, as a believer – I’m a liberal interventionalist, I believe in alliances of democracies, and that’s one of the reasons why I think this is a very exciting option for the United Kingdom, not just because we’re able to derogate from this or that, or not part of the political thing, but in order to sell it to the public, as the gentleman at the back said, we have to explain that we’re delivering the referendum result.

Thomas Raines

Okay. Thank you very much [applause]. Thank you all for coming. I wanted to thank the panel and say good luck for the next couple of weeks. We all counting on you.

Robert Halfon MP

You’re a registered charity…

Thomas Raines

We are.

Robert Halfon MP

…you can’t express that.

Thomas Raines

No, I just wish good luck in the sense of contemplating the issues that you do.

Nick Boles MP

Rob, that was a brilliant way to end.