Dr Beyza Unal
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. My name is Beyza Unal. I’m a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security Department. Before the discussion starts, let me make a few important remarks. This event will be on the record and is being live-streamed. You can comment via Twitter using #CHEvents. CH is in capitals. I also ask all the attendees to put your phones on silent mode, please. In a second, I’m going to introduce the speakers to you, but first of all, let me start by thanking the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their support to the International Security Department at Chatham House and their help making this event happen. I’m also very pleased that the Dutch Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Simon Smith, is with us today.
Today we’re going to discuss the use of chemical weapons in modern conflicts. Recent use of nerve agents for assassination purposes and the use of chemicals, such as Sarin and Chlorine in the Syrian conflict have demonstrated the need for the international community to examine closely the CWC, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the role of OPCW in implementing enhanced verification mechanisms to prevent the future use of such weapons. I’m very fortunate today that we have three exceptional speakers with me. From the seating order, on my left we have His Excellency Ahmet Üzümcü, and yes, I can pronounce his last name.
Ahmet Üzümcü has a very long list of achievements and I will highlight only some of those. He was appointed Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in December 2009. Later he was reappointed for a second term in December 2013. Ambassador Üzümcü received Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the OPCW in December 2013 and in 2014, he was awarded the Medaglia d’Onore and the Sigillum Magnum by the University of Bologna, Italy. Last, but not least, in December 2015, His Excellency, Mr Laurent Fabius, decorated Director General Üzümcü with the Légion d’honneur.
In the middle seat we have Caitriona McLeish. Caitriona is a Senior Fellow at SPRU at the University of Sussex. She became the co-Director of the Harvard-Sussex Programme on Chemical and Biological Weapons in 2010, and she conducts research on the dual use aspects of chemical and biological agents and how to design effective mechanisms to prevent misuse of science and technology. In 2013, Ms McLeish began a research project to collect data on allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria, and latterly in Iraq; this work still continues.
On my far left we have Dr Peter van Ham. He’s a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute and since 2000, he’s also the visiting Fellow – Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. His research focuses on European security, transatlantic relations, as well as the proliferation of WMD. Previously, Dr van Ham worked at the European Institute for Security Studies, at Chatham House, among other places.
Now, I would like to ask Ambassador Üzümcü to give his opening remarks and then we will come back to the two panellists for their remarks. Ambassador, the floor is yours.
Ahmet Üzümcü
Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to start by thanking the organisers, especially the Dutch Foreign Ministry for supporting this event. Before we go into the mechanics of how best compliance and implementation issues can be dealt with in way of the non-challenges, which is the topic of today, it would be worthwhile to recall the key features of the CWC regime.
We all know that the Chemical Weapons Convention is the only Treaty of its kind, which prohibits in a comprehensive and uncompromising manner an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons. It’s also a Treaty that does not rely on mere declarations of intent but is backed up by verification. No less important is the oversight function that the world’s on-stage parties who have assumed a responsibility to ensure compliance by all members by acting through the policymaking organs of the OPCW.
The comprehensive nature of the Commission means that compliance is a rather broader concept. That’s why the Commission foresees a hierarchy of steps in the content of its Article 12, which contains the stipulations for measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance. Minor issues are to be dealt with within the organisation, which has various means at its disposal to persuade countries to comply with their obligations. In cases of particular gravity, which are generally understood to the Administrations affecting the fundamental prohibitions of the Convention, a referral to the United Nations is foreseen.
While the Convention mentions both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, it’s only the letters that has enforcement authority and therefore, in practical terms, a crucial role in upholding the integrity of the Convention in critical situations belongs to the Security Council. The use of chemical weapons clearly falls under this category, justify measures under the collective security provisions of the UN Charters. As the organisation evolved, following its establishment, different issues at different points in its life emerged as virtue of special attention and focus. Thus, in the past, the Executive Council adopted, in 2003, an action plan of promoting the universality of the Convention. This happened at a time when a need was felt to increase the rate of accessions to the Convention. The action plan enabled a systematic approach in persuading countries to join the Convention, with resources made available to the Secretariat for the purpose. The results were positive.
The Convention registered the highest rate of growth in membership of any Disarmament Treaty. Similarly, in 2003, the Conference of State Parties adopted an action plan on implementation of Article 7. This was a response to a general concern that the Convention will only be as effective as its national implementation through a domestic legislation and related measures. Here, again, the results have been encouraging. Initial implementation has steadily improved over the years, with investment of time, energy and resources in a planned and structured manner bearing fruit. Still, much remains to be done in this area.
A third major issue that was tackled by state parties in the characteristic spirit of compromise and consensus was the politically divisive issue of meeting the deadlines for destruction of declared chemical weapons. Through decisions that’s displayed and enhanced reporting and oversight measures, the two major processes, namely the Russian Federation and the United States, were allowed to continue their destruction campaign beyond the last deadlines, as given in the Convention. The bargain was that state parties needed to remain assured of their commitment and they would continue to demonstrate, in a tangible and transparent manner, the steps that they take was completely eliminating their declared stockpiles, within a reasonable period of time.
Today, 96% of all declared stockpiles have been verified as destroyed and only the United States remains to complete its programme, which is on track, aiming for an end date in 2023. The most important challenge was, however, re-ordering the priorities in order to ensure that whilst in some part of our mission was over, the organisation continued to remain an effective barrier against the re-emergence of chemical weapons. There were those who thought that once declared stockpiles were eliminated, there was little justification left for maintaining a well-resourced organisation.
Let us not forget that the ban on chemical weapons is permanent and the answers and fears of the world are many. A great effort was needed to bring home the Commission that in changing the security scenario around the world – in the changing security scenario around the world, a stronger, not weaker, organisation was essential. The role of the OPCW, in dealing with international terrorism, for example, shows how the organisation is able to craft responses to challenges that were not quite foreseen at the time the Convention was negotiated.
The incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in scenarios that could not have been anticipated a few years ago, have reinforced the point that the organisation needs to prepare and prepare well for dealing with the most unexpected situations that threaten lives and impale the rules that it has taken us a long time to sanctify. It is difficult to capture in a short intervention, the magnitudes of this undertaking, which involves no less than a fundamental change in our thinking in how we approach the Convention and in convincing everyone to embrace change by giving up the comfort of business as usual approach.
We have, today, before us, the outlines of a well-thought out and well-debated roadmap that when implemented, will indeed enable the international community to continue to reap the security and other benefits of the Convention well into the future. The reason for me to recount these episodes is to underline the fact that each of these issues was dealt with in the framework of the Convention and in the best traditions of multilateralism, namely through giving up on our maximums positions through constructive debate and discussion and by never giving up on the search for a compromise.
What we face today is the most consequential fork in the road. There have been a number of confirmations of use of chemical weapons at a time when we all were beginning to actually think that humanity was finally rid of the scourge of chemical weapons use. This has naturally brought an intense focus on the work of the OPCW. It’s important to bear in mind that the outrage we feel at the use of chemical weapons is precisely on account of the fact that the norm is now regarded as universal and its violation considered intolerable. Against this wide-spread sentiment of protecting the norm and upholding the rules of the Convention, we unfortunately find a political reality that prevents action beyond a certain point. That is the dilemma we currently face and that’s what we must try to resolve, as quickly as possible, to restore faith in the effectiveness of the multilateral system on which international peace and security are entirely dependent.
Chemical weapons use in Syria and incidents at Kuala Lumpur Airport and recently, in Salisbury, represent a rude awakening to the reality of chemical weapons in our contemporary world. These incidents naturally lead to the question of the role of the international organisations, in this case, more particularly, to the OPCW and what it can and should do to establish accountability, as well as to prevent recurs. It’s important here to appreciate the strengths of the existing international mechanisms, but also to be aware of the limitations under which these function. A bifurcation of responsibilities exist, whereby the Secretariat is made responsible for implementing the decisions of policy buddies where state parties are exclusively the masters. In implementing their will, the Secretariat draws upon not only its expertise, but also its commitment to objectivity and impartiality. Success is assured when these two organs work in tandem and each performs within the authority assigned to it. In this manner, they not only work productively with results often acceding expectations.
Take, for example, the mission to eliminate serious chemical weapons programme. No one doubts the fact that this became possible once the United States and Russia were able to forge an understanding and an agreement to resolve the international crisis, created by the imminence of the use of force, following the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta in suburban Damascus in August 2013. A shared responsibility was then created between the UN and the OPCW for the implementation of the actual programme for the removal and destruction of serious chemical weapons capabilities. An unprecedented international effort led to the removal and destruction of serious chemical weapons.
Then we were faced with reports of allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons, particularly chlorine, and I had to establish a mechanism to investigate those allocations. The fact-finding mission, which I established in Spring 2014, undertook investigations into allegations of use in the most difficult circumstances in Syria, primarily due to the ongoing Civil War. Security conditions made onsite activities highly risky and therefore, nearly impossible, especially after an armed attack on the very first attempt made by DFFM to visit sites of interest. Yet in the collection, analysis and reporting of evidence, we have never compromised on procedures and matters that are granted in the Convention and in science – and also how the West conform to international accepted standards. It’s only after following the most rigorous procedures that DFFM has documented numerous incidents, confirming the use of chemical weapons.
Similarly, the OPCW again, Joint Investigative Mechanism, JIM, as we call it, which was established by the UN Security Council 2235, in August 2015 to attribute responsibility, fulfilled its mandate and examined multiple incidents establishing in several instances the responsibility for the use of chemical weapons at the level of State and by the terrorist group that calls itself the Islamic State. However, the Security Council was unable to act further, and the mandate of the JIM was allowed to lapse. While the JIM no longer functions, the FFM continues its work.
On 7th April this year, the OPCW reacted to credible reports of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in Duma, a town in Eastern Ghouta. A team of FFM experts was despatched to Syria and eventually, after some delay, due to factors beyond its control, was able to start collecting samples on 21st April. The FFM has completed its initial deployment to Duma and the gathered samples are being examined by the OPCW designated laboratories.
In parallel with the activities of the FFM, the OPCW has also been working to clarify outstanding issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme. The OPCW, through its declaration assessment team, has engaged the Syrian authorities in order to resolve the gaps, inconsistencies and ambiguities in its declaration. The organisation has conducted 19 visits to Syria and had numerous consultations with Syrian officials, both in the Hague and Damascus. Provision by Syria of technically and scientifically plausible explanations to a number of questions remains the key to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion. The information made available so far has not been sufficient for the Secretariat to confirm that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a declaration it can be considered accurate and complete.
What I have tried to do, in these brief introductory remarks, is to underline that any treaty-based regime requires for its success a good faith effort and full and effective implementation. In the case of the Convention, this entails, for example, complete and accurate declarations, transparency, national legislations, international inspections and verification. It’s equally important for the various organs of the organisation to function to their fullest. The Secretariat must be allowed the space in which it can carry out its responsibilities, without the fear of political backlash and the policy organs, in turn, must ensure their full support for those who undertake serious risks in carrying out their responsibilities to conduct investigations on behalf of the state parties. Without such a well-oiled machinery, our advance towards a rule-based international order will inevitably suffer.
Chemical weapons use, whether it occurs in Syria, Iraq, Kuala Lumpur or Salisbury, is a serious wake-up call for the international community. If accountability is avoided, the potential re-emergence and acceptance of chemicals as weapons of war and terror will not be deterred. The notion that the OPCW does not go into attribution, needs to be reconsidered. There is nothing in the Convention that precludes such a role for the organisation. Today, there might be good reasons to actually clarify the role of the OPCW itself, in terms of attribution once it has the necessary information and evidence at its disposal. Wilful defiance of a valuable norm should not be allowed to go unchallenged. The investigative arm of two international organisations, the OPCW and the UN, have together decisively uncovered the facts. It’s now for the decisionmakers, the Governments to fulfil their responsibilities.
This, in my view, is the key challenge today in strengthening compliance and effective implementation of the Chemicals Weapons Convention. I thank you for your attention [applause].
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you very much, Ambassador. Now, without taking time, I would like to turn to Miss McLeish. Can you tell us what are the problems that exist today that you see, and how can we move forward?
Dr Caitriona McLeish
Sure, and thank you for allowing me to participate in today’s discussion. I’m going to reflect on three areas, by no means are these the only problem areas that we face, but I was inspired by your event outline, and the first of them is about the changing nature of warfare, because it does indeed seem that the nature has changed, and the experience of conflict has changed. This of course predates the conflict in Syria, but it does appear that these types of conflict experiences have some common characteristics to them. It appears that identity is a driver. It appears that actors, other than traditionally military forces are involved, that the distinctions that we previously had between war, between organised crime, between human rights violations appears to be eroding. That terror appears to be a tactic, which is used and that often these are part of a wider economic and social, regional instability issues.
If we consider the historical record for chemical weapons as filled with gaps as that is, what we can see is that indeed, there were explorations of utilities for chemical weapons that lend themselves to these sorts of objectives, of terror, of displacement, of de-stabilisation. And so, it was this that led a leading scholar in the area back in 2008 to suggest that, conceivably, chemical weapons will have a greater affinity in these sorts of conflicts than they did to the older type war experiences, and here, I’m reminded of a conversation that I had not so long ago, where I was teased about not understanding or not recognising that the word ‘disarmament’ contains the word ‘armament’ and speaking to the strength of the norm as the Director General did, I think it’s good that for someone of my age that we forget the armament side of it, but with events as they are, I think that we need to remember that these are weapons that can be used. They have been proven to used and we need to ensure that they don’t have an expanding role in our conflict situations.
The second reflection is a broader reflection and that’s really that these conflict experiences are occurring within a societal shift, a societal trend towards distrust and that’s distrust in position – people in positions of power, in international organisations, in experts, indeed. And I came across a trust barometer that was performed for this year and it really had some quite remarkable results of the levels of distrust that were felt over the 28 countries that it surveyed, and that’s food for thought, generally, but it’s also food for thought within the chemical weapons issue area, because linked to this, is the role of social media and the power of the filter bubble that exists within social media. We’ve seen how social media is being used, in terms of responding to allegations of chemical weapons use. We’ve seen social media users’ comments upon the allegations, upon the actions that are then taken, the responses that are then taken. We’ve seen the spread of multiple narratives about allegations and once doubt and mistrust is seeded online, it’s very difficult, not impossible, but difficult to rein that back in again, and in some ways, again, this is not necessarily new territory for chemical weapons issues. Allegations of use have always had or resulted in emotive responses. Association with them has always been used to vilify an enemy, but what is different, I think with social media, is the speed at which this is occurring and also, the amplification that’s spread, spatially, of these feelings.
So, what are we to do? This is the moving forward section. Well, the Chemical Weapons Convention is extremely clear, as far as I’m concerned, when it comes to use. The use of chemical weapons, by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances is not allowed. That formulation, that prohibition doesn’t refer to particular actors only. It doesn’t refer to particular agents. It’s complete, that prohibition. All toxic chemicals are to be regarded as chemical weapons, if they’re intended for purposes that are not permitted by the Convention or are held in types and quantities, which are not in line with such types and purposes, and this is what we call the general-purpose criterion and, again, I think that is very clear.
So, for me, it’s as simple as that when it comes to issues of use. So, the upcoming review conference presents a real opportunity, I think. I think it presents an opportunity for all those people, Governments, industry, academics, everybody who is associated with toxic chemicals to declare their understanding that use is prohibited. This may seem like routine business for a review conference, people making declarations, but I think, in these troubling times, these declarations are very important, and I think a co-ordinated declaration for everybody who uses and works with toxic chemicals, could actually be quite a compelling action to take.
There’s also the opportunity for the review conference, for the states parties to invest in the investigative apparatus, as the Director General has explained to us, and secure its future moving forward. Knowing about the scope and confirming the scope of the Convention, I think is one thing, but of course, holding to account is another issue area and it is key. We all know that avenues appear to be blocked right now, but we do have some interesting mechanisms, which are worth exploring, as well as, of course, trying to unblock the avenues themselves. Here I’m thinking about the IIIM, which has been called a quasi-prosecutorial office and that’s reflecting two aspects of its mandate.
I’m not a Lawyer, perhaps there are Lawyers in this room who may wish to speak more about that, but I see both some very positive avenues to explore there and to support, but also, there’s some limitations too. And then, of course, we have the Partnership Against Impunity, which is an interesting initiative, as well, and it seeks to support holding to account, in particular ways, and I note that at their recent meeting, they did call for a special session of the Conference of states parties and I’m keen to learn and hear more about this, in due course, as I’m sure you will as well.
But in general, I think the process of holding to account is going to be slow. I think it’s going to be frustrating. However, I don’t think that we should lose our energy or our hope, if we believe that the prohibition is clear, as I do, and that then, leads onto this idea of re-energising, which you mentioned within the outline, and I’m going to concentrate on re-energising around the norm rather than re-energising the norm itself and that’s because I think that the norm is the norm. It’s what goes on around it that we need to deal with, and I’m struck by some writing that a colleague of mine did, Jez Littlewood, in the biological weapons area where he said that, you know, “Threats change, but the key problem of deliberate use remains the same,” and he suggested that therefore, what’s needed is a management approach and that management approach should happen from the individual through to the international.
So here, if we transfer this into the chemical weapons domain, what we’re talking about is a layered environment where everybody gets involved and that’s the energy that I think that we need to bring. Where individual pledges, where oversight of activity in laboratories or in industrial facilities, understanding and adhering to legislation, whether it’s specific to security or in the broader area, is important and it’s as important. It must work with what it is that Governments are doing and what it is that international organisations are doing. It’s the ensemble of activities around the norm, which I’d like to see energy in, and I think that the multi-stakeholder approach is very much recognised. Certainly, there have been a lot of activities, especially over the last five years, that’s been led by the OPCW. I am, however, left wondering if there’s more that we could do in that area, and I’ll leave my intervention there. Thank you.
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you very much. Thank you. Now, I’m coming back to Dr van Ham. How do you see the future of the OPCW and Chemical Weapons Convention, in general, and I know that you have some aspects to add about UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well? So, the floor’s yours.
Dr Peter van Ham
Well, thank you very much for having me. It’s always a pleasure to be back at Chatham House. Let me just warn you, this is a long version of my very brief points I’m going to make. This is a report, which we published in October 2017. It was commissioned by the OPCW. It’s called, appropriately, Chemical Weapons: Challenges Ahead. The Past and Future of the OPCW, it’s still, of course, available online at the website of the Clingendael Institute, but just like Caitriona, I’d like to limit my remarks to three points. They basically hook-up to some of the aspects, which have already been mentioned, but I would like to bring them perhaps in a more pronounced focus and the first thing I would like to say is that one of the key challenges, if you look ahead for the OPCW, you could say is that it should and is probably already in the process of making a switch to classical disarmament, of course, very important verification to a much more political, non-proliferation international organisation, and this is – if you go to the OPCW and know what the DNA of the organisation is, quite a pronounced change.
This is an organisation which has, for a very long time, been under the radar, and very technocratic, and 99.99% of the population has no idea what it does, and, in that shadow, it has basically flourished. Of course, with all the events we’ve seen in the newspapers and most of them very dramatic, it comes with a lot of political contestation, and this is something which I would say the organisation is facing and has to address. Having said that then, the Ambassador has already indicated that there are some steps, which the OPCW has already taken towards dealing with this politicisation, if you wish, of the organisation. The Ambassador mentioned the UN Security Council decision to establish a UN OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, the JIM, which was very political.
It basically went into Syria to determine who was responsible for the use of chemical weapons. It doesn’t come more political than that, as we have seen. It started in 2015. It has published several very interesting reports, blaming amongst others the terrorist group, Islamic State, for the use of chemical weapons but, as the Ambassador has also indicated, at the end of last year it was basically not extended. This was before the Skripal case, even, and Russia has been very critical of this overall process and we have to acknowledge that the Russians, a few years back, have even proposed a kind of competitor to the OPCW, if you wish. Namely, what they call, a Chemical Counter-terrorism Convention, which should work in a Geneva-based Conference for Disarmament.
It doesn’t get much traction. I don’t think this will fly. I don’t think so, but the criticism is there. It’s very pronounced and I think the OPCW has to and is already starting to get its arms around this challenge, what to do? What does it mean for the organisation if it becomes a political platform, which, it inevitably will become and is. If you look at attribution, this is exactly what a political dynamite of today is. So, this is something which I think the new upcoming Fourth Review conference might or perhaps even should tackle.
The second point I’d like to make is the multi-stakeholder process, which Caitriona already indicated, and this is what I think is important, namely, the strengthening of the OPCW’s engagement with the chemical industry. This has to be done, is going on for the very simple reason that the chemical industry is truly globalised around the world and the OPCW’s involvement with chemical industry is still, at the moment, I think, not as involved as it should be. The OPCW is perhaps lobbied a little bit by chemical industry, but the role is still very unofficial.
Perhaps you should say, “Well, that’s exactly how it should be, but there are some opportunities, I think, where there is room for improvement, particularly because this is something, if you want to strengthen and maintain a norm, you have to have all the stakeholders involved and particularly, chemical industry, I think, is important, and they have a very important stake in it themselves. It will basically reflect very badly on chemical industry if it can be traced back. Now, this chemical weapons drama is linked to their facilities. Also, the verification system should be strengthened, in order to create a level playing field of all the chemical industries. If verification is different, it basically becomes skewed.
From this perspective, I think it’s important to look at opportunities, among other things, which I think is possible is to look at what the OPCW is already doing with trust funds and the OPCW has had something up with the trust fund on Syria, but only states have participated, including the European Union, and I think one of the things which could happen if chemical industry would put more money in this, is that the OPCW would become much more better endowed with financial and technical resources for verification. This is a little bit problematic to some because they say, “Well, you shouldn’t have butchers basically, determining whether their own meat is good,” but certainly, this is something which I think is an option which should be pursued.
Third and last and it’s also something which has been mentioned, is the simple fact that I think we should look at what’s achievable today and look a little bit further than only the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Now if you look at UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which was turned into international law in April 2004, it basically is very clear and looks at a whole range of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery, particularly geared to non-state actors and all the states, all the Member States of the UN have an obligation to, in their own national legislation, penalise and have judicial framework in place to deal with chemical weapons, including, you know, other weapons, and weapons of mass destruction categories to focus on that, not just for transport, but also for all the other aspects and if you look at how underfunded the 1540 Commission is, it’s quite astonishing, actually. Given its importance. So, one of the things, which I think we could do, is to look around the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW, look what’s, let’s say, the low-hanging fruit, we already have that, we don’t need a new Convention and to strengthen this and if we go in this direction, I think, we can also balance a little bit the political controversy, which the OPCW will no doubt get itself into in the future. Thank you.
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect, thank you very much. This is brilliant. What I see is the emergence of common themes, actually, from the speakers you talked about compliance issues, implementation, the role of OPCW, when it comes to attribution, as well as I think issues related to the scope of the Convention. In a second, I’m going to take questions from the audience, a couple of points before that. Please wait for the roving microphone before you start to speak and please state your name and your affiliation, and the third point that I have in here is that if I realise that you’re making a statement rather than asking a question, I’m going to abuse my role, as the Chair, and cut you off and I’m saying it directly. So, thus, please keep your questions brief, okay? And I’m warning you on that beforehand.
Now, I would like to take the questions. If anyone has a question, please raise your hand. Can I take the question there from the lady at the back?
Lizzie Deardon
Hi, Lizzie Deardon from The Independent newspaper. The Director General said that he’d like to see the OPCW explore attribution, does it have information that could attribute the Salisbury attack at the moment and has it shared that with the British Government?
Dr Beyza Unal
Can I take two more questions and then we can do them all. Richard Guthrie, from the – yes, here and then next to Richard.
Richard Guthrie
Yeah, thank you. Richard Guthrie, CBW Events. It follows on from the last question. Sergey Lavrov made comments about detection of BZ in samples and this seems, to me – I mean, this is now – the truth has come out, the misunderstandings that were there have become clear, but it seems, to me, a very interesting situation of the juxtaposition between transparency and confidentiality. Clearly, the testing system has to have confidentiality, but the lack of understanding, because of that high-level of confidentiality, allowed misunderstandings to be promoted, shall we say. So, are there lessons to be learned from that?
Dr Beyza Unal
Next to you Richard, can you go? Next to you, yes.
Ibrahim Olabi
Ibrahim Olabi from the Syrian Legal Development Programme. We’ve see a shift from focus and from the facts that are collected to who collects them. I was in Idlib, in 2014, a few kilometres away from [inaudible – 39:17] and I’ve seen first responders run to the area in order to be able to collect soil samples and other types of evidence, but we’ve seen those who tried to discredit that evidence do not focus on the facts themselves but focus on those who contributed in their collection. So, in the age of post-truth and disinformation campaign, sometimes state sponsored propaganda, what can be done to get the attention back on the facts?
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect, can we take these three questions? I think Ambassador, most of them are addressed to you. Would you like to start?
Ahmet Üzümcü
And sure. On Salisbury incident, of course, we are not able to comment on the origins of the agent, chemical agent, which was used there. Not only because we have no mandate for this, but we are not involved in the investigation, which is still being conducted by the British authorities. On the, you know, analysis of samples collected by our experts in Salisbury, indeed, there is a procedure, a strict one, which is followed the designated laboratories, as well as our laboratory. When we collect samples, either in Syria or elsewhere, we sent those samples to two designated labs and in addition to the samples collected, our experts add one positive and one blank sample, in order to verify the quality of the work, which is done – which is to be done by the designated labs. So, in other words, the designated labs should have analysed those samples blank and a positive one and identify whatever agents are involved in those samples. So, in the case of Salisbury samples, they used a pre-cursor of a chemical agent called BZ and these designated labs were able to identify them, but these samples did not have anything to do with the Salisbury samples. That was only, solely, for checking the quality of the work and the same applies to the blank samples. They were also identified that there was nothing in blank samples.
As to the collection of samples as well as other material, I should make clear here that the FFM is not only, you know, relying on the samples or their analysis, results of analysis, but on several material interviews with the health personnel who may have treated them and many other information that I were able to collect from different sources. So, it’s a combination of all this material on which they could draw conclusions and they submitted their reports.
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect, would you like to add any point, or should I go and take more questions? I think we have a lot of questions on the floor if – yeah. Okay, I need to choose from there. There’s no one I see. The gentleman at the back and then I’ll come here, back there.
Norman Domby
And Norman Domby, University of Sussex. I’m not a Chemist, first, I’m a Physicist, so I know something about nuclear weapons and very little about chemical weapons. Matter of definition, Caitriona said that “Any chemical which is used essentially in a retrograde way is a chemical weapon.” I wanted to ask, first of all, why we certainly had a criminal attack on some people by someone who threw hydrochloric acid over them? What is the – what distinguishes use of hydrochloric acid, in an assassination attempt and the use of Novichok, in an assassination attempt? Why aren’t both criminal, as opposed to chemical weapons? And the second point is, I was involved in the other poisoning in London, the Litvinenko affair. If Novichok was a chemical weapon, why wasn’t Polonium, a nuclear weapon, and why shouldn’t it also be banned by the nuclear treaties?
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you very much. Can we come here, to the first row, please, two gentlemen on the first row?
Ian Orr
Ian Orr, a retired UK Diplomat. In order to defend both their military forces and their citizens from chemical weapons, to what extent do countries need to maintain a small experimental, manufacturing capacity?
Dr Beyza Unal
Please go ahead.
Terrence Parker
I’m Terrence Parker, Member of RUSI and a Salisbury resident about 500 yards from Ground Zero, and so I had an opportunity to observe this activity, and I’m struck by the lack of expediency, basically. It’s – in Salisbury, we have clearance by committee. We have several layers of committee clearing it and I’m just wondering what’s done to try and speed up the testing process of samples because this seems to be the essence of the problem?
Dr Beyza Unal
Okay, three questions again: Salisbury one, but I would like to start with Caitriona first, on the first question.
Dr Caitriona McLeish
Of course. So, the way in which the Convention defines chemical weapons is toxic chemical weapons and it defines toxicity in a particular way and so, it’s placing a boundary, if you like, between what it can deal with and what it can’t deal with. So, it’s not that all chemicals can become chemical weapons. It’s that all toxic chemicals in the way in which the Convention defines it are to be considered as chemical weapons, and it may be – it may sound unsatisfactory to do that, but a policy problem has to become manageable and that’s done through creating boundaries. So, within the definition, the recent acid attacks, which we’ve had here in the UK and are occurring elsewhere, the acid would not be considered a chemical weapon.
Dr Beyza Unal
Okay, Peter, would you like to add?
Dr Peter van Ham
Yes, I think one of the charms and I think strength is of the OPCW and the Convention is a general-purpose criteria. Basically, you look at a chemical and how it’s being used so, that, for example, like Chlorine, if it’s used as it has been used in Syria, it could be and has therefore been a chemical weapon because it was used in a certain manner and that’s a very, let’s say, ambiguous, but also very pragmatic way because it looks at also, chemicals which we may not, at this moment, be aware of. And this is something, which I think is extremely important because during the Cold War we were basically focusing on tons of chemicals, tons of chemical weapons because this was the clear scenario of states and during the Iran-Iraq War in the 80s, we diminished that to several hundreds of tons and now we look at very small amounts because they and are used in certain scenarios. Which, of course, also implies that the organisation has to verify in a different way and we have to be alert in certain different ways, but what the new review conference might also have to address is riot control agents. Something which, well, many very civilised states have and sometimes use.
How do we deal with that? And there are all kinds of new weapons of this category, which are of a kind of psycho-chemical weapons quality, which are not killing, but debilitating and this is a new category, which the OPCW has to address, but it has the capacity to do so because of the general-purpose criteria. So, the organisation has a big chunk of work ahead of it, but at least has the formal role to address it.
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect. Would you like to add any point or should I just…?
Ahmet Üzümcü
Actually, I would answer the other two questions as well as them.
Dr Beyza Unal
Please, go ahead.
Ahmet Üzümcü
On general purpose criteria, very briefly, of course we are not pleased to see that chlorine was used to harm people, but I’m pleased to see that the general-purpose criterion are not contested by anyone. So, all toxic chemicals, which must be used to harm people, are now considered, and I think it’s confirmed that it would be seen as a violation of the Convention and if it be used as a use of chemical weapons and military forces to protect, military forces conducting some experimental, you know, activities. It’s allowed by the Convention, so some states parties do have small-scale facilities where they can conduct activities, research activities for protective purposes, and they can manufacture very small amounts of chemical weapons, in order to do it. But all those facilities are subject to verification and our Inspectors regularly visit those facilities, and on the testing of samples, actually, the OPCW designated labs were very quick and everything was done within the timelines that are foreseen, and I was told, by the British Authorities also, they were able – yesterday, they were able to analyse those substances very quickly and they were able to identify it in a very short span of time, and that’s also confirmed, in fact, by the effective treatment of victims. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be able to treat them properly, so all three main victims survived, and I think this proves the efficiency of the British authorities and others, and the contamination therefore, those who live in Salisbury, the contamination activities are underway, I’m told. This may take a little more time, but it’s being done.
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you very much. Can we go back to Henry there, second – the last, yeah.
Henry Dodd
Hi there, Henry Dodd from the International Security Department here at Chatham House. A question for all three panellists. On responses to chemical weapon use, as to whether you believe states have a responsibility to consider a military intervention in response, in order to protect civilians and further use? Thank you.
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you, responsibility to protect question. I’m coming – any lady that I – is there any lady who would like to – yes, Nomi, can we come to the first row, yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much. I’m Nomi Bar-Yaacov, I’m an Associate Fellow at the International Security Programme working on CWC with the OPCW. I’d like to Ambassador Uzümcü to kindly comment on prospects for universalisation of the Convention. We have some good news with Palestine acceding within 20 days or so, what about Israel and Palestine and how will the cancellation of the summit, the 12th of June summit affect prospects for future accession of the DPRK? Thank you very much.
Dr Beyza Unal
Amazing. I’m going to take the last question. Normally – I had a question in mind, but I’m not going to ask it, I’m just going to take the last question. Gentleman over there.
Pat Winter
Pat Winter from The Guardian. Could you just expand, if possible, about your remarks, which came at the end about the possibility of the OPCW taking on an attribution role, rather than just an investigative role and is the danger with that not that you will make the body more political and it’s already being infected by politics?
Dr Beyza Unal
Thank you. The question related to RTP, responsibility to protect, can – any one of you want to comment on that? I think if one of you can comment, it would be great, because we’re running out of time.
Dr Peter van Ham
For whatever it’s worth, I’m just an academic, so take it with whatever validity you want to give it. I would be against it, for the very simple reason that for the debate we’ve already touched upon, it’s very difficult to attribute and we’ve seen the contestation, even in the case of Syria where there was a lot of research. There have been samples taken, sent to designated laboratories and so forth, so this is a process which basically followed the rules and still, it was contested. And I think, on the base of that, you can’t have an RTP, but if you look around you and the whole academic debate, I think RTP is no longer, let’s say, given the sort of weight it had, let’s say, ten/15 years ago. So, I think it would be dangerous to go towards that route.
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect. Anything you would like to add, Caitriona?
Dr Caitriona McLeish
No.
Dr Beyza Unal
Ambassador, the question about the attribution and the OPCW?
Ahmet Üzümcü
And universalisation, I guess?
Dr Beyza Unal
And universalisation, yes.
Ahmet Üzümcü
On universalisation, indeed, Palestine in fact submitted its request to join the Convention, to the Depositary of the Convention, which is the UN Secretary General. We received it and Palestine – and the State of Palestine will become a party to the Convention within the next 20 days and, as to the three other countries: and Egypt, Israel and North Korea, there is South Sudan, but for South Sudan, it’s a matter of time. We expect it to happen soon. The situation is more complex. Egypt is linking this issue to the nuclear capacity of Israel, so from their point of view, Israel should give up its nuclear capacity before Egypt joins the Chemical Weapons Convention and they are promoting the AWMD free-zone in the Middle East, which would, in fact, prevent any country in the region having WMD capacity.
From the point of Israel, the regional security consideration do not allow them to join the Chemical Weapons Convention at present, although they’re a signatory state, they didn’t ratify the Convention. As to North Korea, we have made several [inaudible – 54:48] so far. I sent letters. We sent letters, together with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon and also, Mr Guterres, we never received a reply. Our requests for meetings were not responded either, but we hope that the new opening and the, you know, meetings, which we have foreseen, which I understand are postponed or cancelled at the moment, may resume, and those contacts could also produce, in fact, a result in regard to the elimination of the North Korean Chemical Weapons Programme. Looking at the open sources, they may have large stocks of chemical weapons, an active chemical weapons programme, and for the peace and security on the Korean peninsula, I think it’s essential that this programme is dismantled, and all stocks are destroyed, under the verification of the OPCW in the future.
On attribution role, what I said is that the Convention, as such, does not preclude giving an authority to the OPCW to get an investigation for the attribution and a mechanism, of course, could be, you know, developed within the organisation. JIM was an Atok mechanism and they worked, you know, the technical work was conducted within the OPCW premises by a group of experts, who were hired on a temporary basis. So, all capabilities may not exist at the moment within the OPCW Secretariat, so we may rely on outsourcing or hiring new experts but, technically, we would be capable.
There is a risk of further politicisation within the organisation, that might be correct but, on the other hand, all the work, which will be conducted, will be technical, will be science-based and, well, bearing in mind that the consequences may be also politically charged, but what I want to emphasise here that the international community does need to address this gap. I don’t think we can afford to continue in order to maintain the situation, in the absence of an attribution mechanism to investigate – to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons. So, that’s the main message that I’m conveying to state parties.
Dr Beyza Unal
Perfect, thank you very much. I thank the speakers for sharing such informative views and thank the audience for their enthusiasm to engage in a conversation. I think this is the end of the session now. Thank you very much [applause].
