Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2018

Dr Patricia Lewis

Good evening everyone. My name’s Patricia Lewis. I’m the Research Director here at International – Chatham House, for International Security. I am absolutely delighted to welcome Robert Malley, President and CEO of Crisis Group, who’ll be talking with us today on Crisis Group’s ten conflicts to watch in 2018. Which is, kind of, now an annual, sort of, statement of the world and its problems that Crisis Group issues, and we’re so pleased to be able to host this discussion in London again. This is being live streamed and so, it’s on the record. I’d ask you please, to turn your phones to silent, but get them out and tweet away #CHevents, and I’m sure you wouldn’t mind an @crisisgroup reference as well. So…

Rob Malley

Oh, don’t mind me.

Dr Patricia Lewis

We’re – and that’s @robmalley, yes?

Rob Malley

Yes.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah. So, we’ll be employing this event to identify a number of key challenges ahead for global security and the potential for regional instability and particularly looking at the foreign policy implications for Governments around the world.

Rob, you’ve served in the Obama administration as Special President – as Assistant to the President, Senior Advisor to the President for the Counter-ISIL campaign and White House Co-ordinator for the Middle East. You’ve also been Programme Director for Middle East and North Africa at Crisis Group before you joined that, and you were then, before that, Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab Israeli. Firstly, your credentials are impeccable when it comes to talking about all of these different crises and you’ve got some real-life experience and, I mean, here you are in London, and we’ve got a fantastic crowd here, and I know you remarked on that coming in, so, I don’t…

Rob Malley

Well, when people think that, you know, the Western world is looking inwards, to get a crowd like this in the US on a foreign policy issue, there’d have to be some scandal associated with it. So, I am quite amazed by how many people showed and thank you for doing that and thanks for having me.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Maybe there’s just something you don’t know yet.

Rob Malley

Maybe.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, perhaps you could just say a few words about why Crisis Group does this every year and what impact you think outlining these top ten crises has on focusing the mind in foreign relations?

Rob Malley

So, first of all, I mean, I assume most people here know a little bit about Crisis Group and why we feel like we have some ability to distinguish among the so many conflicts, the tens and tens of conflicts around the world. The ten, and I have to tell you, it’s a battle among our Analysts. You know, everyone wants their conflict among the top ten, although it shouldn’t really be an honour. But they all feel like their conflict is one that should get more attention. We have Analysts on the ground and they’re the ones who we listen to. So, Crisis Group, we ask them, “From each programme, give us your top two,” and then we try to work out, you know, ‘cause they always give us more than two, what are the top ten? And it’s not necessarily the most – the bloodiest conflicts or the ones that are – that garner most international tension. It’s a combination of which are the most dangerous, which are the ones that may actually lack international attention and want to bring it to their attention, but also, which are the ones where there might be an opportunity for resolution and where our recommendations, we hope, will be listened to.

You ask about our impact. That’s something that we struggle with all the time, because the context today is not particularly conducive to us – people like us telling Governments pay attention, not just to what’s happening within your borders, not just to the conflicts that you think are having an immediate impact, like those that have to do with terrorism or with migration. But other conflicts, obviously, they have a human toll, and we think that matters immensely, but beyond that the stability of the world, what’s going to happen to their – over time, to the equilibrium and to the balance of power that all those issues? Again, for us, it’s our target and our – or our constituency are the civilians who are victims of conflict. This may not be the time when Governments care about that as much as we would like them to, but we keep knocking at their door. We keep trying to mobilise public opinion, like people in this room and certainly on conflict matters and conflict – any conflict that is man or woman made can be resolved by the work of men and women.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, there’s probably a fight for how you – the order in which you list them.

Rob Malley

Sure.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And you’ve got at the top this year the issue of North Korea. We’ve got the Winter Olympics about to begin. We’ve got the joint Ice Hockey Team. Is this an opportunity? Can you see a way in which this situation, in North Korea, can be resolved without conflict?

Rob Malley

So, the answer is yes, and firstly, North Korea is there, and people might question. Does that mean that we think that a nuclear conflict on the peninsula is a likely or imminent? And this is a case where it’s not so much the imminence or the likelihood. It’s the consequences of that conflict, which made it almost go without saying that we put it number one. Because I don’t need to describe to this audience what the impact would be of a configuration on the peninsula. People may talk about a bloody nose strike, which is what people are saying in the United States, a limited strike, to which we know that North Korea would either not react, or react in limited ways, but we don’t know. And it’s precisely because people assume that Kim Jong Un is unpredictable and undeterrable that people talk about a military strike. So, how can you predict or deter the answer that somebody would have when your very reason for going into war is presumably, that he’s undeterrable and unpredictable.

Why we think that there is a solution, so first, what’s the problem? The problem is that you have a nuclear missile programme on North Korea, which is moving, and it’s been advancing now for some time. And on the US side a red line, not an expression I like particularly, but a red line, which is we will not allow, or President Trump’s administration will not allow North Korea to acquire the capacity to strike the continent of the United States with a nuclear tipped missile. And then the race – and so far, sanctions have failed to stop them, and we know from experience that sanctions are not going to stop a programme that is viewed as existential by the North Korean regime, or by other regimes, for that matter. The threat of military action has not worked either. President has said, “No more missile tests.” They’ve taken missile tests. They’ve taken nuclear tests. So, that hasn’t worked either. So you could sanction, then people will suffer far – well before the leader will suffer and his nuclear programme will continue and outpace the strength with which these sanctions are supposed to squeeze the regime. So, that’s – if you just look at it that way, it is an equation that will lead you to war. Because they will reach the point where they could reach the – where North Korea could reach the point where it could reach the continent of the United States before any of the measures of the United States, short of military action, could stop it.

The answer is, can you slow down what North Korea’s doing and you give time to diplomacy? And that’s what we propose in a – Crisis Group proposes in a report that we just issued, not too long ago after this came – our list came out, which is in exchange for North Korea halting certain of its most dangerous missile and nuclear – aspects of its missile programme, the United States would halt and freeze some of its most provocative military exercises. Put time on the clock; give a chance to diplomacy. It’s not going to meet President Trump’s and his administration’s expectation and desire of an immediate denuclearisation of the peninsula. That’s a desirable, but unrealistic, goal. Right now, what we need to do is, slow things down to prevent a war that would be, you know, cata – again, it’s hard to even find the words to describe what the consequences could be. And when we hear people speak cavalierly again about a bloody nose strike, it won’t be a bloody nose for the people of South Korea, for the people of North Korea or for their neighbours.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And indeed, it could become, very quickly, a regional war…

Rob Malley

Absolutely.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…that could involve both China and Russia, given the geography, given the history and the way in which it began would be very significant. You know, China’s made it quite clear that the way in which it begins, if such a thing begins, would have a big influence on its own view of how it would react.

Rob Malley

Right, I mean, you know, I don’t know that we could pre – certainly not predict how China would – China and Russia may simply stand back and let the United States pay the price for another confrontation, which again, in this case, the major price would be paid by civilians on the ground. But I think what the Russians and the Chinese knew and learnt again from the war in Iraq, is let the US get embroiled in another quagmire, let it bleed its resources, its men, its prestige, its credibility. So, I don’t know how they would react. But again, for us at Crisis Group, and I think for – I assume for people here, what matters is what the cost would be in just loss of life and absolute destruction.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And of course, it could even lead to the use of nuclear weapons, which is…

Rob Malley

Nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, of which the North Korean regime has plenty.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So – well, we don’t actually know, when you say plenty, you – we don’t actually know the – that it is a nuclear capability. We know it has nuclear warheads and we know it has missiles. Whether or not they can deliver that…

Rob Malley

That’s right.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…is yet…

Rob Malley

But chemical and bio – I mean, they have weapons of mass destruction, which they could use…

Dr Patricia Lewis

In other…

Rob Malley

…on South Korea and they have artillery shells, which they could use on South Korea, where you have, you know, a million people that would be in the line of fire, or so.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And what North Korea’s always wanted as well is a peace treaty, beyond the ceasefire with the United States and could that form part of the package?

Rob Malley

So again, what we would suggest is, let’s first put time on the clock and then negotiate. What does North Korea want? What kind of security guarantees does it want? What kind of – does it want a peace treaty? What kind of relationship does it want with the United States? It may not be possible to reach a deal. I mean, I would – certainly, we’re not naïve. But give it a try and avoid the alternative, which would be nightmarish in comparison.

Dr Patricia Lewis

You mentioned Afghanistan. You know, we’re seeing now, you know, a pick up again, in violence, absolutely terrible exposures in Kabul and loss of life. Instability again, a comp – a big change in the politics again. How do you see that? Do you see that ever being resolved? I mean, how…?

Rob Malley

Ever, oh.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I mean, I know ever’s a long word, but in the foreseeable future, given everything that’s happened, how can the international community move forward on this?

Rob Malley

Well, again, what we say and what our Analysts in Afghanistan have been saying for some time is, the way you’re not going to resolve it is by thinking that you just need a little bit more military pressure. I mean, let’s not forget there were 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan at the – you know, after 911. That wasn’t enough to crush the Taliban insurgency. Now, we’re talking about – you know, even if we get to, give a number, 15,000/20,000, that’s much less at a time when the Taliban are much stronger, where they controlled vast areas of the country and at a – at this time for the United States to say, “We don’t want to talk to the Taliban. We’re simply going to squeeze them more.” That’s always – that falls to the fallacy one of my former colleagues was telling me the other day. This is a fallacy that we see in so many of the situations where the United States, I’m just going to pick on them, but I think it’s true of other foreign powers involved in military enterprises as well, like Saudi Arabia and Yemen, they tend to underestimate the leverage they have now, and they tend to overestimate the leverage they’re going to have with more military power. By which I mean they think – like, today, the United States does have some leverage over the Taliban. Negotiate with them. They don’t – they’re not going to be able to get them to surrender, but they have some leverage. They have some things that the Taliban would want to see from the US. But they – but the US convinces itself we don’t have enough to get them to surrender, so with a little – 5,000 more troops we’re going to get them to really understand that – and they’re going to get the message.

Underestimation of current leverage, overestimation of future leverage, that’s the story of creeping escalation in conflict, after conflict, after conflict. You’re not going to get to squeeze these entities. I mean, the – Saudi Arabia can’t force the Houthis to surrender, any more than Israel could force the Palestinians or that Syrians could force the opposition. And this notion that you – that by increasing the pressure, you’re going to get them to simply agree to terms of surrender, that’s an illusion that guarantees that wars and conflicts go on.

Our cries went for greater pragmatism and realism, which doesn’t mean that the US has to give into the Taliban or that Saudi Arabia has to give into the Houthis, or again, any other of those conflicts that one might imagine. But it means that you need to find compromise, middle ground and not live under this illusion that with just a little more power, as the US felt in Vietnam, or they felt in Iraq or Afghanistan. That with just a little more power you’re going to get them exactly where you want.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, I mean, this speaks very much to one of the trends that you’ve identified in this year’s report, which you’ve dubbed Militarisation of Foreign Policy, and we’re seeing this around the world, if you like, a, sort of, going back, away from the other trend that you – or rather, part and parcel of the other trend, where you’ve talked about the erosion of multilateralism. Those two things seem to go…

Rob Malley

Hand-in-hand.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…hand-in-hand. We’re doing a lot of work at the moment, obviously, with the anniversaries of – the centenary anniversaries of the end of the First World War, and you know, what led to that, how we can learn from that. And one of the things then, of course, is that we didn’t have an international system with multilateral organisations in the way that we have now, that can deal with it. We have seen progress on North Korea in the Security Council and in the past, we’ve seen progress on Syria, for example, and so on. It’s much harder now on Syria. But how do you see these competing trends, or rather, I was going to say – ‘cause the other trend you’ve talked about is US retrenchment, but in fact, if Afghanistan’s going to require more than increased troops and we’ve got a potential war in North Korea, is that retrenchment from the United States? So…

Rob Malley

I mean…

Dr Patricia Lewis

…how do you see all of this working and how do we get out of it? Solve our problems for us, Rob.

Rob Malley

No, I mean, there’s two – there’s a lot that you said I’ll try to unpack. But there’s this notion of a US retrenchment, which I always think if I was living in the Middle East and there were 30,000 troops, or in Europe, tens of thousands of troops, or North East Asia, or around the world, the notion of US retrenchment might sound very different. So, I think we have to be very circumspect about the use of that term. The US is still intervening with drone strikes and other forms of warfare around the world. The number of US – of true presence in Syria and Iraq has increased since President Trump took over. So, yes, he ran on a platform of being a semi-isolationist, but I’d say he’s an isolationist who’s also quite militaristic. So, we have the militaristic isolationist, which is a bit of a contraction, but it’s part of who he is, which is, on the one hand, he ran on the notion that the US shouldn’t expend resources overseas, it’s all about America first. But on the other hand, he also likes to project power, likes to distinguish himself from his predecessor, President Obama, who he felt was too weak in the world and so, we’re seeing these competing trends, which is why I’m not a big fan of talking about the retrenchment. I do think there’s a retrenchment from diplomacy and we’re not seeing the US being that active in trying to mediate whether it’s in Libya or in Yemen, or in Afghanistan, or in North Korea. So, we’re seeing, sort of, this view that diplomacy is not for us.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Would you say Russia’s doing the same thing? I mean, if you look at, you know the…

Rob Malley

Oh, Russia’s never been particularly engaged in diplomacy, but you know.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Well, if you look at the, you know, intervention, in – against Ukraine and then, also within Syria, but we have seen Russia, for example, negotiate with Lavrov and Kerry. We’ve seen with the Iran Nuclear Deal, we’ve seen Russia engage in diplomacy there. So – but we’ve also seen this, sort of, militarised foreign policy as well from…

Rob Malley

Sure.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…from Russia.

Rob Malley

I mean, again, I’m also – I think there is a trend. The trends, and we say this in the piece that I write, the trend is not – I think it’s too easy to say it’s all about Trump. I mean, you know, militarisation has been going on for some time. Certainly, you mentioned Russia and we could talk about Ukraine, we could talk about Syria, we could talk about the US and Iraq and Afghanistan. Those are military enterprises. So, I think we tend to idealise and to mythologise the past and, you know, the 90s were the years where everything was great.

It was great maybe if you were living in the United States. It probably wasn’t great if you were on the other – the receiving end of the US foreign policy, or if you were in Iran, though, or if you were in the Balkans. So, I think we have to be a bit careful. I think it is true that there’s right now a in – much more inward-looking perspective and with countries in Europe, dealing with populism, dealing with nativism, dealing with the fear of immigrants, dealing with fear of the other. And all that contributes to less attention and less resources, less interest in this crowd, notwithstanding less interest in foreign affairs. And so, I think you’re seeing years that are much more, as I say, looking inwards, rather than trying to think of how they could energise diplomacy. There’s some exceptions, but I think that is a trend. That is an accurate trend.

I just think we have to be careful about overgeneralising about, you know, now – there was a golden era of multilateralism and the era of multilateral institutions, where there was an altruistic foreign policy trying to resolve conflict and responsibility to protect. That was as much myth as reality. So, it was never as good as it was. It has gotten worse, no doubt about it, and it’s gotten worse because of some of these phenomena, countries that are much more interested in simply expanding their power. And the – you know, we could talk about conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Qatar and how that’s infecting the Middle East and infecting the Horn of Africa and infecting up to Egypt.

I mean, you’re seeing how regional powers are now taking advantage of the fact that we have seen the end of the era of unipolarity, where, you know, the US was dominant, that hegemonic era that probably lasted only about a decade, between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Iraq War. That’s the parenthesis during which – of the bracket era, where the US was perceived, and was largely dominant. I think since then we’ve seen, sort of, different countries expressing themselves and trying to have their – promoting their own interests. In some cases, that’s better than a unipolar world. In other cases, it’s not and I think, as I just said, and where we see regional powers competing for influence and we see – and I mentioned, you know, in that, sort of, micro-geographic system of the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, where con – and the Middle East, where conflicts can very quickly bleed from one theatre to another and there you don’t have diplomacy, you don’t have an attempt to try to bring people – bring countries together.

One of the themes that we – at Crisis Group we’re developing in a separate strand of work, is talking to Europeans and saying, “You’ve long complained about US hegemony control over foreign affairs, whether it’s, you know, their monopoly over the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, or over a whole host of issues. Well, now’s your time. If you really believe that there was an over – you know, an ex – an over-reliance on the US, or a dominance by the US, now’s the time.” You have a President of the United States who is unpredictable, unreliable and that much of the world wants to have little to do with. You have a dearth of diplomacy. You have an explosion of conflict. So, now’s the time, if Europe really wants to show that it can do things, despite, or without, the United States, to step up. Save the Iran deal, perhaps engage in diplomacy between – or try between Iran and Saudi Arabia, rather than take sides and exacerbate that conflict, try to show that it can do what it claims it couldn’t do when the US was dominating the field.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, European powers have stepped over the – up over the Iran deal and they’ve held – just before the latest decision point for President Trump, they held a big press conference with leaders, Foreign Ministers. Obviously, we also have Russia and China in that deal and the response from Iran. But what could happen should the United States completely undermine, and even withdraw from that agreement, what could happen? What – how could those countries, if you like, hold the line and see it through?

Rob Malley

So, this – I mean, Crisis Group just came out with the report again on this. I’m going to answer that to all your questions: go look at our latest report. But did – and looked – and the question that we addressed was not whether or not the US will withdraw from the deal, although we’re trying to predict that. It’s very hard with President Trump, because I think there are different voices in his head and – but the predominant voice is to, as I said, distinguish himself from President Obama, which would mean walk away. But we’re saying, “Assume it happens.” I think most European countries would say, “It’s a grievous mistake.” I mean, this is a deal that is living up to its expectations, maybe even exceeding expectation, in terms of Iranian compliance, and that’s not just me, and I helped negotiate the deal, so I’m biased perhaps. But it’s the view of the IEA, the Atomic Energy Agency. It’s the view – which monitors Iranian compliance. It’s the view of every country that negotiated the deal, including those, like France, that took a pretty harsh position. It’s true of the American – US administration itself, which is the one that’s just talking about walking away. So, there’s no doubt that it’s working.

But if the United States does walk away, our view, and we give some ideas in our report, is Europe should try to convince Iran to stick to it, rather than get into this tit for that: you violate the deal, we’ll violate the deal, which would lead Iran to be isolated. Because Europe is not going to sit on the side lines if Iran resumes its nuclear programme against the con – you know, going beyond the constraints that the nuclear deal has imposed. They will have to side with the US, even if the US is responsible for the collapse of the deal.

So, our message to the Iranians, to the Europeans is, see if you can at least preserve that part of the deal that can be immunised, protected from US secondary sanctions, see how much you can do. And then our message to the Iranians is, you’d be better off showing that you’re standing with Europe against the United States than standing alone against the two of them. It’s a hard message, because Iran has its own politics and we meet with Iranians and our Analysts meet with them all the time and they say, “Well, we have our politics. If the US is going to violate the deal, then we have to respond in kind.” That’s understandable, it’s unwise, and – because it wouldn’t serve Iran’s interest and like we said it all. So, they continue their nuclear programme, but then again, be back in the age of sanctions.

So, there is a way. It’s a very narrow line and we speak to Europeans a lot about this: are there ways to protect the deal, blocking legislation that would prohibit European companies from abiding by US secondary sanctions, finding ways to have the dealing that doesn’t touch the dollar trade, that doesn’t implicate the dollar, but other currencies. There are ways of doing it. It’s very hard and Iran will suffer if the US reimposes sanctions but will suffer less than if it also confirms European sanctions.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, before I go out to the audience and get everybody’s participation, just one quick question, what do you – which conflict would you have liked to have seen in the top ten that didn’t make it in? Which one do you think…?

Rob Malley

I would’ve liked? I wish none of them were in the top ten. I wish we – I…

Dr Patricia Lewis

But when you were doing the fight and so on, which one…

Rob Malley

So…

Dr Patricia Lewis

…did you lose the fight on?

Rob Malley

I mean, I wrote it in my introductory piece, there is one conflict which – very close to my heart, for reasons of my professional background and my personal background, which didn’t make it, partly because at the time that we selected it, it didn’t seem like it would’ve been in the top ten and probably still is not. But – and that’s the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It’s a perineal conflict, I mean, perineal, in terms of it’s always there, it’s always, sort of, on the verge of boiling, whether in Gaza or the West Bank. But there is a, sort of – it has remained relatively stable. That’s pretty much of a misnomer, but rela – compared to other conflicts. But of late, you’ve had things like President Trump’s decision to decl – to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and all of which is eroding, on the Palestinian side, faith in the United States, of course, faith in diplomacy, faith in non-violence, faith in the two-stage solution. And meanwhile, you have the cauldron that is Gaza, which is boiling because of the absolutely unspeakable humanitarian conditions there. You put those two together, you see the de-legitimisation of the Palestinian authority, which is inevitable, because what President Abbas stands for is for everything that I just said is being eroded: diplomacy with the United States, the two-state solution, the peace process, non-violence and Palestinians are going to question that if we continue to see this slow, but steady erosion of those pillars.

Now, there still is obviously, possibility that things change, but the reason that I wrote in the introduction that we might’ve added in had we known about the Jerusalem decision is, at some point the – you know, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is non-violent or relatively non-violent, until it isn’t anymore. And we’ve almost always been surprised by the explosion, whether it’s the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, war in Gaza, but these things happen with a, sort of, a dangerous regularity. Something will happen, something would explode, particularly at a time when Palestinians feel hopeless.

So, that’s one conflict, and I’m not saying I wish that it had been on the top ten…

Dr Patricia Lewis

No.

Rob Malley

…but that, you know, it could’ve made it, as it could make it every single year.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Okay, thank you. So, I’m going to go out now to people in the room and what I’d like you to do is, put up your hand and when – if I call on you, and I’m always looking at the back, particularly at younger people, and I’m – when I call on you, if you could say what your name is and if you’re from an institution, that would really help. I’m looking at the back here, please. Thank you. The reason at the back is ‘cause when I was a kid all the cool kids are sat at the back and…

Alex Farrow

Alex Farrow, Chatham House member. My question is about the Ukrainian conflict and the recent comments that have been made by General Sir Richard Shirreff about describing Crimea as the Sudetenland moment of Western Europe. I’m asking you is the Ukraine, do you treat it as if it’s a contained conflict that it is solely to the Ukrainian people, and a conflict between Ukraine and Russia, or is it indicative of a greater Russian process of Slavorussia and perhaps indicators of them having conflict or interests in the Baltic, with the ethnic Russian population there?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, and I’ll go to the front here, please [pause]. Thank you.

John Preston

Thank you very much. I quite – I’m John Preston of the Chatham House Europe Programme, and I want to spoil the simplicity of your ten by making it 11, and that is the Kurdish population and the disruptive effect they’re having on Syria, Turkey and Iran and whether we – you could count that as a conflict area? Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, and then, at the back again, please. There’s two hands I see there. But perhaps the – in the blue shirt and then I’ll come to you later, if that’s okay? The light blue shirt, thank you.

Urtzu Rai

Hi, Urtzu Rai, Chatham House member. My question is on Pakistan, which hasn’t made your list. But I think with, sort of, increased pressure from the holding back of US aid and the fact of it being a nuclear state, what chance do you see of, sort of, an internal meltdown, in terms of Government capability in the North West frontier and in Balochistan?

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, before you answer those, I’m just going to say to everyone in the room, there were three men who spoke just now. So, my challenge now is for three women, please, in the next round. Thank you. Please put up your hands when I come to you.

Rob Malley

Yeah, that’s one thing in which you don’t distinguish yourself from the US yet, and I’m not seeing as much diversity. Great questions. Let me try to answer them pretty quickly. So, Ukraine does make our list. In some ways, the danger there is of a frozen conflict. By frozen, I mean the status quo becomes entrenched and Russian dominance, certainly of Crimea, but also, of the Donbass, is – you know, that that’s – and their proposal for having peacekeepers does seem to be aimed at freezing rather than resolving the conflict. And getting people to accept the fait accompli, that, you know, this is going to be how it’s going to be, and the question of boundaries of the Ukraine being accepted. Does that – so, I mean, that’s a danger in and of itself in a – on a continent that had established a norm against the transgression of sovereign borders.

Is it part of a larger pattern? I mean, I think there’s no doubt that Russia’s been flexing its muscles and then partly coming out of a period during the post-Cold War, where they felt that they had been humiliated and treated as a second-class country. How far that goes and is this a train where they’re going to try, you know, bit-by-bit? As you say, the analogy that you mentioned. I don’t know that I want to make that kind of prediction. I think, obviously, Russia has ambitions now that it feels – because it feels that it had been on the receiving end of mistreatment about the Cold War and I think it’s important for Europe to set some lines about what’s acceptable, what’s not acceptable, to prevent, you know, lessons being learnt about how you can get away with challenging boundaries and challenging a sovereignty, which we have seen Russia do. So, I do think that’s important.

I think, you know, we’re looking at are there creative ideas to unlock the situation in the Ukraine? It’s hard to see our – what our recommendation has been to the Europeans and to the US, is to try to jujitsu a bit the idea that the Russians have put on the table of a peacekeeping force, but turn it around, so that it’s not used to freeze the conflict, but to unlock the conflict, so that these peacekeepers would be there to protect the sovereignty of the Ukraine. Obviously, that’s easier said than done, but at least try to work and see whether, under the pressure of sanctions and with this out, whether President Putin will take that exit. It’s not our prediction that he will, but you know, our view is, you keep trying, you put things on the table, you stick to your principle, which is the sovereignty of the Ukraine, but you also try to see whether you can prod and if there’s some pressure, economic pressure, deriving from the sanction, that will get President Putin to move.

The Kurdish question, that’s a great question. We do mention Syria and the risk of a confrontation between the Kurds, Turkey or, as the United States and the Kurds are allied in the East, so far, of Syria, does that become a pressure point and a conflict with Iran and Iranian backed forces? But we could’ve also spoken about PKK’s struggle in Turkey, and – or the campaign and the contribute to Turkey and the PKK. We could’ve spoken about Iraq. We could’ve spoken about Iran. You know, the Kurdish question, it’s – they seem to be at their apogee, as a result of the large degree of autonomy that they’ve gained in Iraq and the fact that in Syria, the Sunni had made huge advances, huge strides, as a result of the fact that they presented themselves and they were, in fact, the most effective ground force against ISIS in Syria.

That pendulum has swung for two reasons. Number one: over, how could I put it, excessive appetite on the part of the KRG, the Kurdish Regional Government, in Iraq, and the backlash to the referendum, which has really set back the Kurdish cause and in Syria, the defeat of ISIS led, very predictably, to the fact that the Kurds are slightly less important. And the real question is going to be, how do the Kurds manage to find a place between their relationship with the US, which is going to become – which is going to erode over time, because they are less useful to the US, and their relationship with Turkey, which is becoming more and more conflictual over time, because Turkey is going to view – not only view them as the enemy, but understand that the US umbrella’s not going to be as protective in the future?

Again, our recommendation there, but this is not – just as difficult as the one in Ukraine, but that seems to be Crisis Group’s job, which is to make difficult recommendations to people who don’t really want to hear them, which is the key to this is the Turkish PKK conflict, and if there’s progress made there, has had been – as was being made until 2015, there had been some advance between Erdoğan and Öcalan, and bet – so, between Turkey and the PKK. That came to a screeching halt, for reasons that we could get into, but as long as that conflict continues, Turkey will not abide a Kurdish role or autonomy in Syria. And if that happens, then the risk of finding an alliance between Turkey, Iran, the regime, the Syrian regime, aligned against Turkey – Kurdish ambitions for autonomy, that’s something if I were a Kurd, I’d be very worried about. So, there needs to be, you know, more emphasis, or more attention given, to the need for some kind of de-escalation between the PKK and Turkey.

Easier said than done, but without that this con – fundamental contradiction that the US – and I was party to it, so I’m not – this is not a criticism of the Trump administration that originated with the Obama administration, which is contradiction between using as your main ally in the fight against ISIS in Syria, the most inveterate foe of a NATO ally in the North. And how do you put that puzzle together is virtually impossible, which is why we’re – what we’re seeing today in Afrin, what we may see tomorrow in the Eastern side of Syria, will take place, unless somehow you can unlock this conflict between the PKK and Turkey.

Question on Pakistan, very quickly. You know, the pressure on Pakistan, the US pressure on Pakistan, is designed to get Pakistan to act differently towards the Taliban and towards Afghanistan. Okay, our Analysts diagnose this is not going to work. I mean, Pakistan is not doing this because there’s no pressure from the US. They’re doing it bec – again, we could debate the rationale or the justification. They feel that it’s in their national interest because of their conflict with India, because of their own security calculations, that it’s better for them to take the position and to take – adopt the policies they’ve adopted. So, you know, pressure from the US may work, but only if it’s coupled with some kind of diplomatic initiative to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan and perhaps to help de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan.

Do we see the risk of a real implosion of Pakistan? I can’t say that that’s – that hasn’t made the top of the list. I don’t think we see that as being in the cards. It’s the country that one always has to watch, because of the combination of their nuclear capacity, because of the domestic issues that they’ve – and instability. But I think our assessment is that’s not the place where we expect and I – the famous last words that may come to haunt me, where we expect, sort of, an implosion and this is – any time in the foreseeable future.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you. Please, woman just there. Remember, I want two more women to put their hands up for this.

Ursula Paynes

Thanks. Ursula Paynes from Save the Children. If everyone has a conflict minus Libya, we’ve seen a dramatic de-escalation in the number of people coming across from Libya, partly because of sustained action by the Italians and by the Europeans, convincing the Libyans to stop people living on boats. We know that the humanitarian situation inside Libya is really bad. We know that most foreign actors can’t get in there. Save the Children has had a lot of problems accessing Libya, working with the Government, trying to get aid in there. Do you see – I think, in some respects, it’s the forgotten conflict. It’s one that threatens Europe quite directly. You see – you know, you look at the map behind you and Libya is directly below the majority of Southern Europe. Do you see any prospects for that conflict being resolved, or for people becoming interested enough in it again to try and resolve it?

Dr Patricia Lewis

And here, please, and then there.

Member

Thanks, but not only am I a woman, but I’m from the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security and my question is about gender. So, three hat for you there.

Rob Malley

But that’s excellent.

Member

So, I know Crisis Group does do work on gender, peace and security, but reading through the conflicts to watch, there wasn’t a huge discussion around gender and despite the fact that, you know, gender is playing a big role in many, I would argue, most of these conflicts, in your perspective, what are the emerging trends, not so much in gender and conflict, but more in the policy spaces? Because we know we’ve seen this push in gender mainstreaming and, you know, having gender perspectives on policy solutions to conflicts, so I’m interested in your perspective of where you see the emerging trends in gender from more of a policy space? Thanks.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And then, here on the end, there and then, I’ll come to you the next round, okay. Keep putting up those hands, it’s brilliant.

Member

Amongst world leaders and Foreign Policy Advisors, where are you seeing signs of people taking a creative approach to solving problems?

Rob Malley

Hmmm, that’s a tough question, and I don’t know whether I want to name names.

Dr Patricia Lewis

But they’re good names.

Rob Malley

Good names, I know. But when you’re naming names, you’re obviously ignoring another. So, I mean, I – listen, it’s – this is not a time. I think it’s – I think I’m not saying something too controversial, this is not a time that has been – that is – in which we’ve witnessed great leadership on a world stage. I think leadership, as I would define it, which is leadership that is trying to resolve problems, work in a multilateral setting to address the global challenges that we face, from climate change, to hunger, to conflict, that’s not what we’re seeing.

I think President Macron has shown a leadership ambition and, in some cases, a leadership – leadership results, which are, at least, worthy of attention. He’s certainly – and he’s trying to do it in a way which is interesting vis-à-vis the United States. He’s certainly not reflectively anti-Trump. He’s trying to work with Trump, but maintaining a pretty independent stance. We’ve seen that on climate. We’ve seen it on the Iran deal. We saw it on the old – the issue surrounding the Lebanese Prime Minister, who was, sort of, a guest of the Saudis. So, I think we’re – I think there’s something there, but you know, we’re seeing – the African Union seems to, in some cases, trying to be a little more proactive as they see the rest of the world not caring about them, other than through two lenses, as I said earlier, terrorism or migration, I think. So, we may be seeing something there. But as I say, this is not a moment where we’re spoiled for choice when it comes to looking at world leaders, who are dis – who have distinguished themselves by their foresight and by their leadership skills, in terms of ending conflict, which is what, you know, our organisation is particularly focused on.

Jumping to Libya, first of all, we have to be optimistic, because the UN Envoy is a Former Chairman of the Board of Crisis Group, so by definition, we’re going to be – Ghassan Salamé. So, by definition we’re going to be more optimistic than we were a year ago. It is slightly a forgotten conflict, but it – and it’s a forgotten conflict precisely for the reason I was just giving, if migrants don’t come to the European shore, then people think it’s, kind of, resolved. Forgetting two things, number one: the price paid for the reduction, partly, and we’ve, again, we’ve written about it and others have documented it, you know, if you deal with militias and you, sort of, get them to make sure that migrants don’t come, then you have to look about how they’re being dealt with in Libya and that, I mean, that is now a story that is not one we should be very proud of. And so much of what’s happening in Libya has not been resolved: proliferation of weapons, you know, militias, the existence of several Governments, the contestation of the constitutional order, the inability to reunify the Libyans over, sort of, a national narrative.

Again, I’m going to be more optimistic, because I think there’s at least – there is attention giving by the United Nations and from what I’m hearing, some of the divisions of the past, which are still existing, but it seem to be lessened, between what the UAE and Egypt are doing, on the one hand, Qatar and Turkey, on the other, that seems to have somewhat abated. In part, because Qatar is preoccupied by other problems, its rivalry with – and the sanctions opposed against it by Saudi Arabia. But also, I think, a number of countries are prepared to give Ghassan Salamé a chance. So, there may be a window.

Again, I’m not going to be overly optimistic, but there is a window to try to bring some degree of unity to a country in which, as Salamé himself has said, “Where they are using their own funds to destroy themselves.” And that’s – it’s a very wealthy country and they seem to be pilfering the state wealth in order to kill themselves, which is – or each other, which is not exactly a wise course. But it is a country that we’ve been following closely and again, our message to the Europeans and to others is, don’t ignore it because the problem that you care about most seems to have gone away. It hasn’t gone away for good and in any event that’s not – that’s – it’s just a symptom of a deeper problem.

Gender, so that’s – it’s something that we are focused on increasingly at Crisis Group. I think you’re right to point out that it is now – it really has become a mainstream issue and not – and we’re trying to make it mainstream in our work. But, you know, some Governments have defined their foreign policy as the feminist foreign policy, you know. And now, if you look at Canada, if you look at Sweden, if you look at others, that’s obviously, something that they are pushing and they’re pushing hard, which is good for, you know, it’s good for everyone, but it’s good for NGOs, because they’re forcing NGOs to think in ways that I have to admit, is not – doesn’t always come naturally to, you know, our Analysts, who are great Analysts. But now, you’re know, we’re telling them, “When you interview people, make sure that you take that perspective in mind and it doesn’t mean checking a box and saying, “Women need to be in the peace process. Women need to be at the table.”” That, you know, you could say that, but it’s really understanding the perspective, understanding the dynamic, understanding not just how they could be victims of conflict, but actors in conflict. And so, we’ve done a lot of work, and some of the work that I think we’ve done best on the question of gender is when we – our reporting is focused on that question.

Women in Boko Haram, which we did – we had a report, which didn’t focus on gender, but was very much looking at the dynamics in Myanmar and what role women played in Buddhist nationalism, which when it went against conventional wisdom. And if you understand that, it makes it easier, not necessarily to resolve, but to understand the dynamics of the conflict and then to have much more realistic solutions. So yes, more women at the peace table, but it’s not just that, it’s understanding what role they play in conflict, as victims, as actors and that’s something that we need to do better and that we are – we were doing anyway, but I think under the leadership of the countries that I mentioned, we will be doing even more.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Perhaps as well afterwards, you might want to talk about gender being at the causes of conflict, as well.

Rob Malley

Indeed.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, at the – so, I’ve got one at the front here and then two people at the back, some – two people I’d called on before. So, if we can go to the front first, thank you.

Hassan Latif

I’m Hassan Latif. I’m a Journalist at [inaudible – 44:22]. I want to ask you whether you agree with John Kelly’s advice to President Abbas over the Palestine issue, whether you agree that he should play it down at the moment and not attack Trump to a great degree, but rather, sort of, concentrate on the positive role that America can play? We heard something in Maaref and some of the Arab press that he met an Advisor to Abbas and who was one of your colleagues, and that he told him that Trump will not last for more than one year, you know, and that they should be careful not to criticise the United States. Now, do you agree that this kind of attitude can reduce conflict? What we are seeing, in the last few days, is assassinations on, you know, on the Palestinian territory. So, do you think it’s a good idea what Kelly is advising?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, and at the back there were two people, one in green, yes, you, and then in the green jumper afterwards, thanks.

Member

Hi, so I hold this country dear to my heart, as I am from there. So, my question’s about Venezuela and whether or not it is a threat to the region, geopolitically speaking? Because we already see it as quite a threat to Colombia, ‘cause there’s been a huge exodus of Venezuelans going to Colombia and affecting it on a socioeconomic aspect. So, I was just wondering. And then, on the other hand, is this an issue that needs to be resolved internally, or is this something that needs to be resolved with some kind of help from – internationally, so…?

Tom Finn

Hi, my name’s Tom Finn. I’m a Journalist with Reuters. I had a question about Yemen. I just wanted to know what your thoughts were on the prospect for any kind of peace in Yemen, and it’s been nearly four years of Civil War there, that’s obviously caused immense suffering for Yemenis and the war seems to be very much dictated by the growing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And so, if the US can’t, or won’t, put pressure on its ally, Saudi Arabia, do – what sort of prospect do you see for any de-escalation of tensions there?

Rob Malley

Okay, again, three great questions. I’ll start with, first, with President Abbas. My colleague, Hussein Agha, was – his name was invoked. Both he and Secretary Kerry have denied that the report that went out was accurate. So – and anyway, I’m not going to comment on what Kerry might’ve advised or not advised. I’m going to tell you what I – what Crisis Group believes. I mean, we’ve said for some time, and we had a report years ago saying – the title was The Emperor Has No Clothes, which is telling the Palestinians and telling the Israelis, frankly, the peace process, as we know it, is most unlikely to yield what it was supposed to yield. As I said earlier, two state solution, and so, there’s going to have be a rethink of the way forward.

From a Palestinian perspective today, I would say I don’t know what President Trump is going to do, you know. We could all sit here and predict what he’s going to do. We’ve seen his track record so far. He’s not been particularly friendly to the Palestinians. But if I – you know, I would – I think that just as we tell the Europeans when it comes to the Iran Nuclear Deal, think about how you would act despite, and without, the United States. I would say to the Palestinians, also to think despite and without the United States. If it happens that President Trump, you know, challenges our expectations and there’s something that works, fine, but the exp – the anticipation, the expectations will be that he won’t. And so then, I think, for the Palestinians, and it’s not to me to give them advice, but Crisis Group is in the business of making recommendations, get their domestic house in order, which is, again, easier said than done. But national unity, agreeing on a way forward, what is their goal vis-à-vis Israel and relations with Israel? What means do they consider to be legitimate? Can there be an agreement among Palestinians, so that you don’t have the West Bank, Gaza, Fatah-Hamas and others, that you have a unified Palestinian position.

When I was younger, I was a student of national liberation movements, in my graduate days, actually, here in the UK and one lesson that I took from this is, national liberation movements never work if they’re divided. I don’t know that there’s a case of a national liberation movement that has succeeded when it was internally at war with itself. Now, there are some cases where they’re at war with itself and one line – one faction destroys the other. That’s what happened in Algeria. I’m not recommending that to the Palestinians. They went through their own mini Civil War in 2006 or seven. I’m not recommending they do that again.

In other cases, they tried to find some form of consensus on means, ends, objectives, and that’s where I think the Palestinians, what they need to do, because they’re not going to be in a position to advance their goals if they’re divided, if they’re fragmented, if they don’t have some minimal consensus on what they’re trying to achieve or how they’re going to try to achieve it. So, I’ll forget about what Kerry did or didn’t say and again, he’s denied saying what the – what was reported. Our advice has been consistent at Crisis Group for a long time, Palestinians should focus on what they need to do to strengthen their position, to be able to negotiate and from a position of greater strength.

And Venezuela, we do put it on our – in our list. I think it’s number ten, but it doesn’t mean that it’s the least important, and yes, we agree that it is – it’s a – it’s – number one, it’s a situation that is of great urgency. It concerns the Venezuelan people themselves and the economic consequences or consequences, in terms of violence, consequences, in terms of the democratic institutions. But that seems to have eroded quite significantly already. But also, the consequences for the neighbours and you mentioned refugees, instability, borders that become increasingly porous. So, yeah, something needs to be done. In general, you know, I would say Crisis Group’s philosophy, if there is one, is that conflicts that – in which those – you know, that nobody was going to be more interested in conflict than those – and in the protagonists. And so, obviously, they’re the ones, because they have an existential stake in the outcome of the conflict, they’re the ones who have to be convinced. But very often, it’s not going to be done without outside help, without outside pressure, without outside incentives. And here our view is that what needs to happen is to get as much as possible, greater consensus, because, you know, President Maduro can play the Chinese and the Russians against the others, some of the local actors again – or regional actors against those who are taking a harder line. If there could be greater degree of consensus, so that pressure could be put on him, in terms of how he’s going to treat the opposition, how he’s going to run the country, in terms of elections, what are the conditions for elections? Because right now he’s leading for elections that most of the world are not going to recognise as legitimate. So, that would make, certainly, no positive difference.

Can there be certain criteria that would be laid out by the Europeans in conjunction with the region and making sure that Russia and China don’t give him a way out? That’s the challenge. It’s a hard one, because some countries don’t feel the conflict in the same way. But that’s a theme that we see, in other countries, whether it’s DRC, the Congo, where if there’s not unity among external actors, then the local actors will always try to find a way to play one against the other.

The role of local actors, bring me to Tom’s question and the issue of Yemen. Yemen is a place that is, you know – again, I’ve personally had involvement, because I worked for President Obama. This is not one of my most glorious episodes, because obviously, we’re not – not only did we not prevent the war, but we still had – we had – we were not able to resolve it and have been criticised for our continued support for Saudi Arabia, which, again, we could debate and discuss why that was done.

Do I think there’s a way out? Yes, and I’d be more – even, you know, in some ways, I think Yemen is – well, I think we have to distinguish between two wars in Yemen. There’s one war, which is the war that is causing today, eight million people on the brink of famine, three million displaced, one million affected by cholera. That war, which is the war, if you want to be simplistic, between the Houthis, the alliance, today really, the Houthis, against the Saudi-led coalition, that one I think there is a way out. Because it is not – what is it that Saudi Arabia’s most concerned about? What it says it’s most concerned about and I believe they’re most concerned about, it’s Iran’s influence in Yemen. That influence has been a self-fulfilling prophecy, to a large extent.

For those of you who know Yemen, the Houthis don’t have a long-term relationship with Iran. That relationship only grew more intense and deeper, as a result of the war. Obviously, the Houthis would turn to the one country that was prepared to support them in the middle of the war, which was Iran and Iran was only too happy to oblige. If that’s the main concern of Saudi Arabia, then there must be a deal out there in which the Houthis agree to, not cut, but vary – to – but to alter, significantly, the nature of their ties to Iran. No more Iranian weapons, no more miss – no missiles that could reach Saudi Arabia. But in exchange, they’re going to want to have their own assurances, which means a share of power disproportionate to their actual weight.

That’s a deal that one could – still, when I speak to Saudis, they’re not opposed to it, they just don’t trust that the Houthis are going to abide by it and they’re also are not under sufficient pressure, and you mentioned the United States. Let’s give credit to President Trump on this thing, he has restored a better relationship with Saudi Arabia, fine. Use it. Use it to tell the Saudis okay, we now have better relations with you, we want to see you deliver in Yemen and, you know, we’re seeing more and more, from this administration in the US, greater concern about the humanitarian situation in Yemen, far more than we saw six months ago. President Trump tweeted about it, which is the highest expression in policy in the United States. So, by definition, he cares.

The State Department has been much tougher against Saudi Arabia and it’s – and so, I think there is greater leverage that this administration has, frankly, than the Obama administration ever had on Saudi Arabia. Use it. Use and say we can – “We will back your security, but in exchange, you need to stop this war and you need to stop this campaign, which is causing what I said earlier.”

Now, we have an excellent Analyst who works on Yemen and what she would say is that conflict is resolvable. You’d need a new Security Council resolution, because the one that is currently in force is slanted towards President Hadi in a way that is simply completely divorced from the realities on the ground today. But even if you did resolve that in the way that I just described, to meet Saudi security needs, but also, Houthis security and political needs, it would be left with the other war, which is the war that we’re seeing emerging with greater force these days, which is the Civil War within Yemen, between North-South, within – among – within – and I know you know Yemen wen, but – well, Southerners themselves at each other’s throats, Emirati allies against Saudi allies. That war, unfortunately, because of the fragmentation of the country, because the lack of central order, because the proliferation of weapons, that war is likely to continue. But, and this is a, maybe a, you know, a thin read on which to rest our hopes, but it is still a war that would cause less devastation than the war that’s taking place now with the virtual blockade of certain areas of the Yemen, the inability to bring in food and medicine, the air campaign, the closure of airports. That’s what needs to come to an end today. Both sides, the Houthis and Saudis have to stop targeting civilians. Were that to happen, I think then, we’d have to focus on that other war, which is – which would get probably, more intense, because people will be fighting for the spoils, but it’s still more manageable than the war we’re dealing with today.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Rob, we have a hard stop in two minutes.

Rob Malley

Okay.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, before I let you go, can we just go to Sub-Saharan Africa for a minute? So, in it you’ve talked about the Sahel, you’ve talked about GRC. Can I also bring to your attention our concerns about Cameroon and what’s going on in that region, and if you could just say a few words about the significance of each of those points.

Rob Malley

It’s a great point to end and you – we hadn’t planned it this way, because it is really one that I think showcases what Crisis Group does, which many others don’t, or can’t do. Because we have a presence in Cameroon, we’ve been saying for some time, be careful. There’s two – there’s several conflicts going on, which we detail in – and not in this report, the kind of, conflicts to watch, but we have another list of conflicts, which is the EU Watch List, which came out last week, and Cameroon figures in there. There’s a conflict against Boko Haram in the far North, but in the North and South West there’s a conflict between Anglophones and Francophones and that’s a conflict that our Analysts have been saying for some time. “Be careful, this one is going to explode,” and we’re now seeing Anglophones resorting more to arms insurgency, because the response from the Central Government has been so lacking and we’re very worried about that.

Elections are coming up this year. In fact, there’s a – well, very – I think it’s something like 18 elections coming up in Africa, which – and many of them are a reason for concern. This is one, because if it takes place in the midst of, you know, the general problems of the state, but amidst a real conflict between Anglophones and Francophones, that’s just going to make the situation worse. So, we have been coming up with recommendations now for some time about how Government, how President Biya needs to be more receptive to the general grievances of the Anglophone community, which is something again, a conflict that I didn’t know much about before I started reading Cris – anything about this, before reading Crisis Group reports. But that’s where we think – you know, not all of our conflicts are the ones that make the headlines, but all of them affect human beings and all of them – and some of them, which are the ones like Cameroon, where you don’t have regional actors and super powers involved. This is one that is very local, where African nations can make a difference, where, you know, France and the UK can make a difference, but it’s very local, it doesn’t have to spread. But it’s where we can make a difference and where we hope that Crisis Group, by ringing alarm bells, saying, “Here’s some practical steps,” can be taken to at least mitigate the worst effects of violence. We think we can be effective and so, thank you for raising that as the last one.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Well, thank you very much and I want to, on behalf of everyone here, thank you for your comprehensive knowledge. There’s so much more, unfortunately.

Rob Malley

Unfortunately.

Dr Patricia Lewis

As you’re right, what we’d love to have is the ten top crises that we prevented next year, right?

Rob Malley

That’s…

Dr Patricia Lewis

That’s what we need.

Rob Malley

…our goal.

Dr Patricia Lewis

That’s our goal.

Rob Malley

And thank you for the challenge.

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, thank you all very much. Thank you for your participation and your great questions, and I’m really sorry for those of you who wanted questions and couldn’t get them. Thanks, Rob, thanks to Crisis Group for bringing to our attention these difficult situations and helping focus the mind. I think that’s an impact already, so thank you.

Rob Malley

Thank you. Thank you [applause].