Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2020

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Welcome to Chatham House. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. I direct the US and the Americas Programme here, and I’m Dean of our Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership, and boy do we need leadership in the current era. I am delighted to be here with Rob Malley, who is President and CEO of Crisis Group. Crisis Group are jointly hosting today’s discussion and event with Chatham House. We are livestreamed. We are on the record. We encourage you to tweet and to engage. This is a tremendously important report: Ten Conflicts to Watch. I hope that you’ve read it, that you have copies of it. There are copies of it here, if you haven’t got it. I would encourage you to read, re-read, to think about it. There’s a huge amount in there. We’re going to try and unpack some of this in our discussion today.

Let me briefly introduce Rob Malley, who I’m sure is well known to many of you, not only and obviously for his current role at Crisis Group, which does really extraordinary work that those of us who think about conflict and international security, have been following for a very long time. But of course, Rob Malley is well known to all of us, who think about US foreign policy, international security and especially the Middle East. He was Special Assistant to President Obama. He was also the Co-ordinator for the counter-ISIS campaign and the White House Co-ordinator for Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf. He was on the National Security Council when President Clinton was in office. He has been one of the most influential and important voices in the public arena, in and out of government on the Middle East for a very long time. So, we are tremendously grateful that you are here today, that you continue to play this role, thinking about, working on, advising and contributing to very important conversations about international conflict.

So today, we’re here to discuss the conflicts that you’ve identified in the report, to talk about the report. We’re going to talk for a bit, and then we will open it up to all of you, so please be prepared with your questions. I should also say, I’m sure you all know this, because probably most of you are London-based and you come to Chatham House ‘cause you’re members, but it is our Centenary year. It’s 2020, we’re 100 years old, it’s a tremendously exciting year, and as part of that we’ve identified certain initiatives and themes that we’re working on. And one of them, I don’t know if you know this, is conflict prevention, and Patricia Lewis, who is our Research Director in International Security, is leading us on this. So, you will see a lot of work, coming out of Chatham House in this space, not only this year, but over the course of the next years ahead or of the decade.

Robert Malley

Happens to be our 25^th anniversary, so we could do a combined birthday at some point.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Well, there you go.

Robert Malley

We’re a bit younger, but…

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Business is being made, and I think we have had a longstanding relationship with Crisis Group, so this is very important. Ten Conflicts to Watch, I mean, several things struck me about this report. First of all, four of the ten conflicts are in the Middle East. I was looking at my map of the Western Hemisphere and the definitions of the Western Hemisphere, and depending on how you count, 1.5 of the conflicts, of the ten conflicts that you identify, are in the Western Hemisphere. I say 1.5, Venezuela and part of Burkina Faso is in the Western Hemisphere technically. If you add in the fact that the United States is something – is a country that you actually identify in some of your conflicts, that takes us up to 3.5 conflicts that you have in your report in the Western Hemisphere, but not very many, which is, of course, something to always remember, for those of us who watched conflict during the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere. Things have changed.

And you strike a real note of I think what Crisis Group is very well known for, and we were discussing this, of a pragmatic focus on the importance of talking to all sides, of negotiations. I was struck, reading the report, the optimistic or, you know, conflicts that I think some of us have become deeply pessimistic about, as you go through the ten conflicts the really nice thing about this report is it says this is the moment, and this is an opportunity here, there is what all sides should do. There tends to be a focus on compromise and talking to all sides, as I said, but it is really striking, in that respect. But, you know, let me start you out with one question, which of – I guess is the, sort of, obvious question that we can’t help but wonder, when we look at this, which is, you know, what do you try – when you identify ten conflicts, it’s not a large-N study, it’s analytical, qualitative, descriptive, really important work, but there are so many conflicts in the world, as we know from all the datasets. So, is it – you know, why are these the ten to watch? Is it that there’s a moment of opportunity? Is it game-changing moments? Something that’s happened? Is there a notion of, you know, we used to talk about conflicts being ripe for settlement in the old days? A window of opportunity? What is it? How do you identify these ten conflicts?

Robert Malley

So first, thank you. Thank you for – Chatham House, for hosting this. Thank you, Leslie, and it’s become an annual tradition and I really enjoy coming here at this time of year to do this. And it is a question we get a lot about how do we define the ten, and I can tell you number one is always an internal struggle, a tug of war. Not that it’s a great honour to be on the list, but people say, you know, “How could our country not be on the list, given what’s happening?” What we try to do is look at a few factors, and this – I’m sure that people in the crowd who – in the audience who’d say, “You should have put this country and not that country.” Looking back, there’s some countries we might have thought about differently, but we’re looking at countries were you have a – either an opportunity for a breakthrough or a real risk of things getting much worse. We aim for some form of geographic diversity as well, we don’t want – you know, we could have had ten conflicts in the Middle East. We had six, we could have had more, but we want to show, sort of – look at the areas of the world that may be under – in which there’s not enough focus. So, some of the cases that we talk about the whole world is looking at because it’s so serious, and others, like Burkina Faso, the world is not looking at, even though it could be extremely and is today, extremely costly and deadly conflict that’s currently going on there.

So, you know, our criteria are what we think are the conflicts that should be paid special attention to in the year, but as I say, there’s room for debate. I was telling you earlier, some of the conflicts we only decided at the very last minute, because there was too many. We always get more than ten, and I always say, “I’m looking for the day where we’ll struggle to get to ten, not to cut it down to ten,” but that’s probably not going to happen any time soon. So, not a science, and again, if you look at what happened in January, just January, just what happened between January 1^st and the end of the month, we could have written a report Ten Countries to Watch in January 2020 because so many of the ones that either we wrote about or didn’t write about have exploded, whether it’s in Iran, and whether it’s in Syria, whether it’s what happened between Israelis and Palestinians, with the plan of whatever we want to call it, the Trump plan. So, so many events have happened in areas that we either covered or didn’t that it just tells you that this is an unfortunately growing industry of conflict and we, just, are trying to bring people’s attention to where we think they should pay attention.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

I’m going to come back, in a few minutes, to some of the conflicts you didn’t cover, but we’ll wait on that, on the silences in the report. But yeah, what struck me, and I keep having to look up my notes ‘cause I’m surprised by this, but it’s very important, the first conflict in your report is Afghanistan, and you say more people are being killed in Afghanistan than in any other current conflict in the world. That is extraordinary. I don’t know how many of you would have guessed that, I’m a little bit curious. I won’t do a poll right now, but more people are being killed in Afghanistan than in any other current conflict in the world, and as we were coming in, I know that you were checking to see because you have a sense that there might be some of – some announcement of a negotiation. Could you tell us, you know, at Crisis Group, in your own work, what is your estimation of the – if there were to be a negotiated settlement that includes the Taliban, the government, in which the US plays a considerable role, what are the prospects in your mind of that sticking, and what would it take? You know, what does that – apart from just, you know, a deal, what would a deal have to look like, in order for that to actually stay with us?

Robert Malley

So, Afghanistan is a good microcosm of, you know, how we select a country. This is a country that, as you said, greatest number of victims of conflict, which because the conflict has been with us for 20 years, people don’t really focus on, but it’s been a particularly bloody year, 2019, but also, a real opportunity for a breakthrough. And, you know, I’m not known to dispense praise to President Trump that freely, but I would say that on Afghanistan, we applauded the fact that he, under his administration, agreed to engage in the most intensive talks with the Taliban, the most sustained talks with the Taliban, the most – the talks in which the most serious ingredients are being put on the table with the Taliban that has occurred, and that’s something that we think was a positive now. You ask how likely we’ll see a deal.

First off, the deal that we’re talking about right now, which may be announced as early as this week, is just a deal between the US and the Taliban. There’s an inter-Afghan war going place, and that’s the real deal that’s going to have to be struck, and so let’s not ignore the latter because of the former. But the former is important, it’s a first step, it’s a step that rightly or wrongly, the Taliban have insisted upon. They’ve said they’re not going to negotiate with the Afghan government first. They’re insisting on a negotiation with those who they consider to be the main power brokers in the country, the entity against which they’ve been fighting, and that – but that would be an important deal, but just a limited one, and they can – we can’t talk about an Afghan peace, an end to that conflict, until there is that inter-Afghan negotiation, that inter-Afghan deal that needs to follow, and part of what’s being negotiated between the US and the Taliban is a reduction in violence. I wouldn’t quite call it a ceasefire, although we’ll see what comes out of it. It’s commitments by the Taliban that they won’t allow any part of the country that they control to serve as a base for transnational terrorism, and some manner of troop withdrawal by the US, and then, very importantly, the beginning of inter-Afghan talks. And I suspect, again, we haven’t seen the texts, that the US would use the pace and scope of its withdrawal as leverage to see whether there’s going to be progress in the inter-Afghan talks, and they would, I assume, pace their withdrawal, based on whether the Taliban are engaging in those talks seriously.

So, that’s the – so, a pre – a necessary, but not sufficient condition is this US-Taliban deal. Then comes the bigger, much more complicated, because it involves the future of the country, it involves the rights of Afghan, it involves the political dispensation, issues that are going to be much more difficult not only to resolve, but then to make sure that they get implemented. And that’s, I assume, your question, will the Taliban seriously negotiate, and they may feel that once they get the US to agree to this deal knowing that President Trump would like to withdraw from Afghanistan, that it’s just – they just need to wait, wait the US out. So, there’s that risk, and then there’s also the risk that whatever they agree with – agree to with the Afghan government and other Afghan parties, they then believe that they have superior firepower, that they could ignore it, and the rights of women and the Constitution and the political order would be upended.

So, as you say, we’re very pragmatic. We’re trying not to be naïve about any of this, but compared to where we have been for 20 years, I mean, as an American I can say this, obviously, there are many other countries that have been involved in very long wars, this is the longest war, in United States history, and people are now being called to serve Afghanistan, who weren’t born at the time that the war started, which, again, from a US perspective, is quite dramatic. So, anyway, I think it’s an important conflection point, but the thing that one oughtn’t to do is if there’s a deal between Afghanistan – between the Taliban and the US to then not pay it attention anymore. The US and others are going to have to remain involved. We believe that there’s going to have to be some third party that’s going to play the orchestrating role, maybe – a bit like the bond process, way back after 2001, so that the US will obviously have to be there, but probably some other entity – country or ent – or institution should play the role of the, sort of, Chief of that orchestra of trying to broker the deal.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Somebody said this morning, under the Chatham House Rule, that the reason that we talk about endless conflicts is because they can’t actually be ended, and I think it was a way of, you know, putting a fine point on the need to stay with it, even if one gets to a lower level of tension. I’m sure we’ll come back to Afghanistan, as we have for many years, as we’ve said, but let me take you on to the nuclear conflicts, ‘cause you have Iran, and you’ve got a bunch of players in there, which is fabulous. It’s not just Iran. It’s US, Iran, Gulf when you label that conflict in your study, and of course North Korea is there. Very – obviously, very different conflicts, although I think we like to compare them, in part, because there is the nuclear question and because the United States, not only under this President, but certainly under this President, has, at different points in time, made this part of its, you know, Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign.

Could you talk a little bit about, again, why are they there? I mean, it seems that one could make the case that, you know, North Korea’s kind of where it’s going to be, it’s a game of containment, there’s no denuclearisation going on, you know, it’s become front page or back page, depending on how much rhetoric the US President directs towards it. But really, at some level, is it really a conflict to watch, or, you know, why is it a conflict to watch? From your perspective, do you have concern that, you know, the missile, that long-ra – that intercontinental ballistic missiles will change the game in that conflict, and where do you see that heading, and what role for the US President? And, I guess, a similar question on Iran, are you optimistic? Do you think that there’s any prospect for negotiating a new deal, a broader deal? And if you want to stick into that, you know, we are obviously in 2020, so another part of the game that’s going to change, in these two nuclear conflicts, is potentially, who sits in the White House.

Robert Malley

Right, I think that’s weighing very heavily on both the calculations in Pyongyang and in Tehran. So, let me take them in reverse order, from the way you presented it. I think the Iran case is a self-evident case and, you know, actually, as I said, after publication of the report is when things really got messy and dangerous in the Iran-US relationship with, as we know, the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the retaliation, and what could’ve really been, and I assume that it was – I don’t know if it was luck, part calculation, part luck that we’re not – we didn’t end up with an even worse shooting war. I mean, my assessment of what the Iranians did, when they retaliated, was they didn’t try to kill Americans, but they didn’t go out of their way not to kill Americans, and that’s why I say it was a mix of calculation, calibration, but also luck, because had they killed Americans, I am told that the list of targets on the US side was, then, was a long one and a robust one.

But so, I think the Iranian case is very self – it clearly deserves, belongs on our list, but unlike the North Korean one, this is an entirely self-inflicted or self-created crisis. One doesn’t have to be a huge fan of the Iran Nuclear Deal. I happen to be a strongly – a strong proponent to recognise that the decision to walk away, without a clear approach to how to avoid exactly where we ended up, which is Iran retaliating both by expanding its nuclear programme and by expanding its activities, its belligerent, aggressive, provocative activities in the region. That was completely predictable. We predicted it several years ago. I think we were not the only ones, but almost – it was almost exactly what people anticipated Iran would do. So, the notion that you can walk away from a deal, impose maximum pressure and not have the other side, in this case Iran, respond in some way, when they feel both aggrieved and betrayed because the US walked away, because they feel that it’s a form of economic warfare that’s being waged upon them, and they feel like they had no instrument if they went back to the table right away, it would’ve been naked, saying, “Okay, you won, you violated the deal, now we’re here in a weaker position prepared to negotiate something different.” So, I don’t think we’re on the verge of negotiations, despite what you might hear every now and then from the US, or even as the Prime Minister Boris Johnson said at one point, “Now’s the time to move to a Trump deal.” I think at some point talks may resume, may start again, but not before Iran feels like it has built in its pocket enough leverage, enough trade space, so that when they come back to the talks, it’s not as one country that was abiding by the deal and another that wasn’t, one country that has all the power, the other that has suffered an economic strangulation, but two countries that have each done things that the other side is worried about and wants to stop.

So, I suspect that the Iranian play will be a – as they’ve done, incremental steps to send a message to the rest of the world, and particularly to the United States, but also to Europe, “We will not take this lying down,” but not going so far as to provoke a confrontation, which, frankly, I mean, they may make a mistake, they may be out of miscalculation, but I don’t think that’s what they really want, and then wait to see what happens in November. If the Democrats win, it opens one avenue. If President Trump is re-elected, it’s a different one, but they, at some point, I think, are going to have to come back to the table, but they could – a lot of damage could be done between now and then. And as I said, it’s gratuitous, unnecessary, superfluous damage that could have been avoided, because you could have stuck to the Nuclear Deal and tried to negotiate something more with Iran, after a period of years where both sides would have seen that the deal worked.

North Korea’s different, and I – that one we’ve debated. Two years ago it was on our list, last year it wasn’t, this year it was, and exactly what you said is right. I mean, a plausible scenario is that the North Koreans will decide, “We will continue to do things, testing missiles, continuing to develop our nuclear programme, but keep it just below what we assume to be President Trump’s red line. He doesn’t want a confrontation,” I think that would be the calculus in Pyongyang, “So we can continue to develop our arsenal and wait for the day, if President Trump is re-elected, with President Trump, where we could sit down, but again, from a position of greater strength, where the notion of immediate denuclearisation would be a pipe dream.” They obviously would like to see sanctions relief, but they don’t – they’re not as desperate, and I think we’ll be hopefully talking about sanctions that really work the way people who inflict them think they will work, the notion that they can – that North Korea can live with this level of sanctions, even though they certainly don’t like it, and build what they can, staying just below that, what they believe to be the line after which President Trump would react.

So, it’s – but it’s, again, subject to miscalculation, where North Korea may do something, and that’s why we put it on the list, they may do something, again, to show that they’re dissatisfied with the fact that sanctions remain as powerful as they are, take some step that goes beyond – that shows that they may have the capability to strike the US with a nuclear bomb. In which case, the US would respond, and the unpredictability, the unpredictability of President Trump, the unpredictability of Kim Jong-Un makes it one that we should watch this year, because we’ve kind of exhausted the waiting game, and we heard President Trump say he doesn’t – or a leak saying that he had no interest in meeting with Kim Jong-Un now. So, this won’t be the year of diplomacy, it’s the year of calculated steps by both sides. Do they miscalculate? That’s the question.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Of course, diplomacy is about more than about summits, but there is a question mark, right, whether there will be more…?

Robert Malley

It would be, actually, and we recommend – it would much better to have working-level conversations. Not clear that those are going to take place either.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

So, let’s come to the sanctions question, ‘cause we did talk about this, it is tremendously important. It’s been a weapon of choice for the current administration. There seems to be a sustained belief or conviction that sanctions will deliver and they’re part of the maximum pressure way of thinking about bringing people to the table. Sanctions are clearly important in Iran, for the US Government response for North Korea, but also for Venezuela, which is one of the – it’s the tenth conflict, I think, in your report. And so, if – you know, I guess what we’re not really seeing, out of the US, is anymore sustained thinking on, you know, what are the conditions? What is it that makes – under what conditions do sanctions work? And this must be – you know, a lot of your work at Crisis Group is on the focus on negotiations, on pragmatic bargaining, but also, sanctions must be critical, in terms of your analysis of, you know, what are the instruments that the international community uses to force those negotiations? And, you know, do you have – when you look across not only these conflicts, but others, do you have, you know, a set of lessons to offer about the significance of sanctions, or perhaps, you know, the insignificance of sanctions in resolving conflict?

Robert Malley

So, obviously, we could spend an hour or more on this. We are…

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

We should.

Robert Malley

We should, some day. We’re preparing a study looking at, sort of, when sanctions are most effective, when they’re not, what the costs is. I’d say, as a first, sort of, very broad statement, obviously, not particularly – I’m not particularly enamoured with the tendency to resort to military – unilateral military action that the United States has done in the past. But I think the default option now, which is, “Let’s go to sanctions, when we don’t want to use military force,” may not be as costly or may not be as immediately costly, but it also has humend – tremendous consequences. And I’m sure that people in the audience who have come from countries that have suffered the impact of those sanctions, sanctions very often hurt the people they intend to help and help the people they intend to hurt. And you could see that time-and-time again, and when I say that I don’t mean that they are gifts to the people who they want to hurt, but the people in power know how to navigate conditions of shortage, conditions where you have to use the black market, conditions where you have to use the informal economy.

They are – that’s what they do. The IRGC today in Iran, that’s what it does. The Venezuelan regime, that’s what it knows how to do, and there has been this – and when it’s sexual sanctions, the kind of sanctions that the US has been imposing on a number of these countries, the average citizen suffers, and the theory of the case, which is, well, the suffering of the people is then going to translate into movement against the regime and the regime will implode, which, by the way, is not just – it’s applied to Iran, it’s applied to North Korea, it’s applied to Venezuela. One could also say, to some extent, it’s been applied to the Palestinians, the sense that economic punishment will lead either the leadership to surrender or the people to put pressure on the leadership to surrender, and none of those cases – we’re over four, in terms of those cases, but for a very simple reason, is that people’s countries, leaders don’t tend to give up as a result of economic sanctions.

Now, what we – what is clear from already just a quick survey of the cases that have succeeded or that seem to have succeeded, number one, the sanctions have to be targeted. They shouldn’t hit the country as a whole. They have to be targeted, targeted towards individuals, ideally, those who are guilty of whatever it is that one is trying to change. They need to be easily reversible, if the behaviour changes, and they need to be tailored to something that is realistic. So, if it’s tailored to – if it’s attached to regime change, to Iran changing its regional behaviour and changing its nuclear programme and changing its ballistic missiles programme, that’s pie in the sky, that won’t work, and it’s leading to exactly what we’re seeing. Likewise in Venezuela. If it’s tied to something concrete, in the case of the nuclear negotiations that worked with Iran, it was sanctions tied to steps that Iran was asked to take on the nuclear front, which were difficult, but not unrealistic, which would have changed one piece of the regime’s behaviour, but not the regime as a whole, then you may get some progress. And the other cases that one could look at, but when re – when sanctions are, sort of, the blanketed approach, broad-based approach where you are targeting the country as a whole, and the demand that is – that are – that is being made of the government, of the leaders of that country, is something that is unrealistic or that is so implausible that it’s simply not going to happen. That’s the cases where, in our estimation, the sanctions backfire.

One last point, which is the unilateral imposition of sanctions. Can be effective. I think we’re seeing today in Iran, contrary to what some experts thought, that unilateral imposition of sanctions by the US, because of its domination of the financial and banking sectors, can be quite effective. Nobody wants to do any business with Iran because the risk is they’re cut off – shut off from the US market. But that is dangerous for another reason, or dangerous from the US perspective, for the US, for another reason, is that it is causing a lot of resentment. How could one country decide unilaterally, what the foreign policy of other countries are going to be? And in the case of Iran, it’s particularly egregious because Iran has been – countries and businesses are being punished for complying with their international obligations under the JCPOA and under the UN Security Council. So, it is particularly, you know, as I say, it’s viewed particularly negatively in this case, and it leads other countries to start wondering they should – whether they can and should create a more independent financial mar – system that would be immune from the long arm of US sanctions. That will take a long time, but former Secretary of the Treasury, Jack Lew, in the United States, has warned against the fact that if this continues, you will see countries deciding they need to find a way to protect their sovereign ability to make foreign policy decisions, because if the US decides don’t do business with country X, how are they going to resist?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, there’s a lot of very interesting work, I’m sure you know, by Abe Newman, Henry Farrell and others on the weaponization and exactly, you know, how the US is using its economic power, and this is exactly, you know, the finding, that it’s going to lead to more rapid attempts to unseat America in its current role.

Before we open it up, I think I would be remiss not to ask you about two of the obvious silences, and they’re conflicts, and especially the first one – well, both of them, that you know better than anyone, I’m sure, that you’ve dedicated a significant part of your career to, that have certainly, you know, moved us all, over many, many years, and I think we would be remiss not to talk about them in a session, which is about conflicts to watch, Syria and Israel-Palestine. I was reading the piece that David Gardner had in the FT, I think it was yesterday or maybe today, where he says, “Half of Syria’s pre-war population,” which was around 22 million, “has been displaced, and even in the last few months, about one million have been subject to the onslaught and displaced, as a result of the attack on Idlib.” So, why is Syria not there? But maybe the more important question is, you know, where do we go from here with Syria? How do you see the next year, the year ahead? Is this, sort of, the beginning of the end, the final stage? What is your thinking on Syria? And then, of course, Israel-Palestine, the deal of the century, obviously not the deal of the century for the Palestinians and therefore, not any of us, was announced, since you wrote the report.

Richard Hawes I thought had a very useful piece that he published, again, I think yesterday, where he said there’s certain parts of this plan that are untenable, but the intelligent strategy for the Palestinians would not to be to just simply reject it, but to counter propose to use this as a moment to engage and to reshape the conversation, but to actually try and drive forward some sort of negotiation. Doesn’t have to be with the US involved, there’s evidence that the US doesn’t have to be the player and that it doesn’t always help. So, can you tell us about these two conflicts that are not in your report, but that clearly are part of your professional life, over the course of a very long time?

Robert Malley

So, I’ll start with Syria, and just some inside baseball for in terms of Crisis Group, it was a toss-up in the end between Syria and Libya. We chose Syria, but – and both cases – I mean, in the case of Libya, the reason was because Turkey was getting involved, Russia was getting involved, we thought this could really do something that could really lead that conflict in a very, very negative and destructive direction. Of course, the Turkey, Russia and regi – Syrian regime and Iranian conflict actually, is much more dangerous today in Syria, in Idlib, and it is – I mean, it stands to – as a stark reminder, yes, the basic Syrian conflict, we know where it’s headed and how it’s going to end, to some extent, some of it, but it’s not over. Ad what’s happening, Idlib today is – and to say this is quite extraordinary, given how brutal the Syrian war has been, we’re heading towards the worst humanitarian catastrophe of the Syrian war in a single episode, which is Idlib with 100s of 1,000s of people, and the reason for that – 100s of 1,000 of people trying to leave. The reason for that is that Idlib is a place where people who have no other place to go have gone, whether it’s the jihadist rebels or whether it’s civilians who, because they were in other places of Syria, there were deals with the regime or the regime was prevailing, they left and the place of last resort was Idlib.

Where do you go when you have nowhere else to go? That’s the issue that is raised by Idlib, and it does seem like the regime with – and Russia are trying to, if not take over the entirety of Idlib, to really steadily reconquer the parts of the territory that are still not within their grasp. The other areas in the East, the Kurdish area, but there you have the United States, you have – it’s become more – it was more complicated than they thought it would be, after Trump announced the departure that wasn’t. But Idlib seemed to be the place where they thought they could make an advance, and what is really worrisome is, first of all, the humanitarian consequences, second of all, the risk of an outright confrontation between Turkey, that has lost some of its soldiers in Idlib and is now based – you know, there’s a real feeling among Turks, many Turks who were not in that – of that view not long ago that they need to exact revenge, and you have Russia on the other side. And so, it’s a explosive situation.

The best outcome – best of the series of bad outcomes, would be that Russia and Turkey want, yet again, come to the table and agree on some kind of ceasefire, which they’ve done before, and they’ve done it at least twice before, and each time – at some point they’re going to have to resolve the root of that problem, which is, how do you res – what do you do with HTS, the jihadist group in Idlib, and how do you find a modus vivendi, so that the regime doesn’t try to take it over by force? But for now, the best that can be done is that Band-Aid, but an important one, which is for Turkey and Russia to agree, “Let’s stop – what are dividing lines, and let’s end there,” because this could get very brutal for the people living in Idlib, and it could internationalise the war, in a greater sense.

But just one last word on Syria, it sort of confirms the theme that we at Crisis Group have been feeling for a while, which is that the regime of President Assad may have won the war against the opposition, and now there are two pockets left. But the regime lost the war for Syria’s sovereignty, because it’s now being determined by outside actors, whether it’s Turkey, whether it’s Russia, whether it’s Israel, whether it’s Hezbollah, whether it’s Iran, and so what had, you know, what had made the pride of Syria, in the past, which was, you know, the Arab nationalist sense that this was a country that would decide its own future, we’re seeing how others are making decisions that are having – and, you know, as a result of the decisions that have been made by the regime, sort of, compromising any ability for them – for Syria to make decisions for itself, by itself.

Israel-Palestine…

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

The deal of the century.

Robert Malley

The deal of the century. And so, let’s very quickly say what it is, what it isn’t and what it is. This is not a deal that was intended to jumpstart negotiations, serious negotiations, to get the Israelis and Palestinians at the table. That’s not what this was about, I think it’s pretty clear. If that was what it was about, they could’ve presented a slightly different plan and presented it slightly differently. What it is was – it was a political step to help Prime Minister Netanyahu, perhaps to help President Trump, both of whom were – are facing election campaigns, and it was two other things. Number one, it was a statement by the US of what – of an attempt to redefine the parameters for resolving this conflict, and the way for the US to say, for this administration to say the illusions of the past have not served anyone, least of all the Palestinians, because look, they were – they’ve been fed the sense that they could get what they want and they can’t, because one party has one, it is Israel, and therefore we need to reset the clock in a way that will start telling the Palestinians, “Lower your expectations, because what you had in mind is simply unrealistic.”

That’s one very clear thing that the – or objective that the administration has been pursuing, and the other which is another theme we won’t get into now, I think it’s another piece of evidence of how the Trump administration has, in a self-reinforcing pattern, been emboldened to believe and to sense that by acting it could change the dynamics, world – global dynamics, and by doing things, rather than saying, but by doing things and by challenging tradition, by challenging custom, by challenging international norms, it is changing the shape of the world, whether it’s moving the embassy to Jerusalem, whether it’s killing Qassem Soleimani, whether it’s presenting a plan that really goes against all of the assumptions, traditions, customs, norms and laws that the international community has – had believed in, in the past. It is sending the message that they could change things because they have the power to do so, and that’s an important subtext if you have a second Trump administration, of what things may look like.

But so, on what Richard Hawes proposes. You know, I don’t particularly agree, I think for the Palestinians to come to the table, based on this plan, or on anything that is based on this one, this plan, we don’t need to get into the details, but it’s fundamentally unacceptable to the Palestinians. I’m not sure what they would get. It doesn’t – it’s not clear to me what else they could do, and where I think we are witnessing the end of a chapter, the end of a chapter in the Palestinian national struggle that had, you know, started – you could start it at any date, but it’s, you know, embodied in Yasser Arafat and then in President Abbas. But that chapter which started with struggle, but also was culminated in this attempt to negotiate a two-state solution, you know, with US patronage and with the Israelis and Palestinians at the table, that chapter, I think, is exhausting itself, and we’re going to go into something new. I don’t know what it will be, but it will be very different from what we were familiar with. And anyway – but it is – I think what’s also – what I was saying, in terms of the US being able to – or the Trump administration being able to, sort of, impose its own reality, yes, there’s been criticism of this plan, but far more muted than one might have expected only a few years ago. I mean, again, a plan that has Israeli sovereignty over basically, all of Jerusalem, except some areas on the eastern side of the wall, over all of the holy sites, over annexation of the Jordan Valley, annexation of every settlement, the reaction from the Arab world has been remarkably muted. Again, there have been statements from the Arab League, but this is – I think it sends the message as well that this is not an administration that people really want to confront, and that’s something that people should bear in mind.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Or maybe they don’t take the plan seriously because it’s so outrageous on the question of…

Robert Malley

They may not, but, you know, any plan like this has a – has ripple effects, because the next time Israelis and Palestinians are going to sit down, whenever it is, Israel will say, “Well, we have this plan, that’s the starting point.”

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Okay, we’re going to open it up to questions, certainly a lot on the table. The woman right here in the white shirt will begin. If you say your name beyond just – and your affiliation, not – beyond just being a Chatham House – though it’s wonderful to be a Chatham House Member.

Member

[Inaudible – 38:01] from Santander. Talking about Africa, one thing that comes immediately to mind is the interest that China has been building in the continent, particularly so in Ethiopia. How would you see, actually, China reacting in the event of escalating tension, considering all the assets they now have that they need to protect?

Robert Malley

Shall we take a few?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, we’ll take a couple. Gentleman right here [pause], and then one right here, we’ll take these three.

Euan Grant

Yeah, thank you very much. The name’s Euan Grant. I’m a former Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst, who’s worked in Ukraine and the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. My question is, what reaction are you getting to the report in Brussels and in continental Europe? I say that given that the new European Commission, the President has talked of a more geopolitical commission, and you’ve got some pretty firm words, some rather caustic criticisms in – particularly in your item on Libya, where the Europeans have really been very, very slow in picking up things that really have been on the horizon for a year or two now. Thank you.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

And then, just over here, there was a question, yeah.

Member

Hello, [inaudible – 39:30] from King’s College London. I have – and firstly, thank you, thanks a lot for the talk, it was truly eye-opening. Two questions about the conflict in Libya, specifically Turkey’s role in the conflict. To what extent would you say that Turkey’s growing military interest in Libya is guided by the desire to achieve two main objectives: one, the desire to acquire nuclear weapons given Turkey’s current political predicament in Syria, and in the light of recent US-Iran tensions, and also given the fact that Niger and Chad, two countries which border Libya, have seen increased Turkish investment in their economies? Two, to what extent would you say that Turkey’s growing military interest is guided by the wish to keep a check on Chinese and a French expansion on the continent, especially given the fact that the latter, with Opération Chammal, stands to complicate the Turkish Army’s military aims in Syria? Thank you.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Great, shall we…?

Robert Malley

Yeah, so a lot of questions and outside the, sort of, actors looking outside and at these conflicts. China, the EU, Turkey is obviously involved in those conflicts. So, first, on China, I mean, China, I’m not saying anything new, is playing a long game, and its game has been very much economic focus, in terms of investment, particularly in Africa, particularly – I mean, if you look – you mentioned Ethiopia, if you look at the whole of Horn of Africa, the role they’ve played, the ports they’ve developed, the economic investments they’ve made, it’s had some pushback, from a number of countries that have felt that it’s been done in a way that is on terms that are not viewed as entirely equitable. But it has been quite effective, in terms of a – of planting the seed of a long-term presence throughout, I mean, if you just look at the Belt and Road geographic span. I would say it’s facing some headwinds. Their own economy, that – we’ll see what happens – their economic setback that they suffered, and now with the coronavirus, it may suffer even more. So, there may be some setbacks in the near term, but the long-term game is pretty obvious. As we des – I described at the beginning of the essay, you have, sort of, three leading powers, global powers that each has a very different attitude. The US, sort of, trying to rewrite the rules in all kinds of ways, in terms of who’s the ally, who’s the – very transactional approach? Russia, which is trying to seize opportunistically – look at situations where it could advance its goals in the short-term because it sees it – a relative vacuum, and China, which has the patience of a power that knows that it’s time has come.

I can’t mention China, without mentioning my colleague Michael Kovrig. I just want to – for those of you who’ve – don’t know a colleague who was arrested, detained arbitrarily in China 400 and some days ago, has had no contact with his family since then, and it is clear why he’s being held. He’s a Canadian citizen. He was detained nine days after Ms Meng was detained in Canada on extradition charges. She was a – the CF – the Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, detained on extradition charges to the US. This is a game of – he’s being used as a pawn, and it is really something that’s unacceptable, and for any of you who have contact with the Chinese, to send that message. If they have problems with the way Canada’s treating Ms Meng, if they have problems with the US demanding that she be extradited there, there are oth – they should deal with it in the way – countries should always deal with it government-to-government, not by using a private citizen as a pawn.

On the EU, so we do a separate piece, which is the Ten Conflicts for the EU to Watch, which came out shortly thereafter, which I…

Euan Grant

Aid too many for them.

Robert Malley

Sorry, aid too many for them? Okay, well, then, you could watch and watching doesn’t necessarily cost all that much, but I think you raise, you know, you raise a point. I mean, one of the arguments that we make in that other piece, which would apply here too, is that given the global situation, in particular US policy, there’s, sort of, this unintended gift to Europe if Europe wants to seize this moment where – whether it’s politically, militarily or economically, there’s an opportunity, maybe a responsibility, but a challenge for Europe to step up, because decisions are being made that are affecting its economic autonomy. We’re talking about sanctions. Where’s Europe? It wants to do business with Iran, it can’t. Militarily, I mean, if the US decides to withdraw from Syria, from Iraq or from the Sahel, where does that leave Europe? Does Europe have the self – military self-sufficiency to make up if the US walks away? And politically, the – we spoke about the Israeli-Palestinian deal, we could speak about Venezuela, cases where the US has an outsized role. Is Europe capable of stepping up?

I think that piece we know got very good, interested reception by the new High Representative, who I think wants to think about how Europe can play a role in this very different climate. Nut it is a moment for Europe – unfortunately, one could say at a time when Europe has its own internal problems, whether it’s Brexit or whether it’s just the rise of populist movements, the crisis of governance, in a number of European countries. So, it might not be the best time for Europe to take on these challenges, but it is a time where it could do so.

Turkey and Libya, I would not have thought of those as the main reasons, frankly. I think when we’re working on a piece now looking at the real motive – the motivation that Turkey has in Libya, a lot of it has to do with the Eastern Mediterranean, the whole – the deal that Turkey – the long-sought deal that Turkey reached with the government of Sarraj, the Tripoli Government, the internationally recognised government, that’s what has – and that’s something that Turkey’s going to insist upon. Beyond that, of course, long historic relation between Turkey and Libya. The Ottoman Empire, the last country I think it left was Libya, and the competition with that other side of the axis, UAE, Egypt largely, in this Islamist, anti – counter-Islamist. I think that’s oversimplified, but I think that’s, sort of, if you want to use those labels, and so, I think for Turkey there’s a political imperative, there’s an economic imperative, and so they have – they are determined to make sure that they have a certain – a government in Tripoli that is closer to it than to its foes.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

We have a question right here and then right here, and then right at the back and we have more, but we’ll go for these three first.

Hilde Rapp

Hilde Rapp, Centre for International Peacebuilding, and obviously Member of Chatham House. Obviously, the focus of today’s discussion is really on conflicts that relate to US influence and power and the role US plays in those conflicts. I think you had been, sort of, signposting a little, I felt, that perhaps we need to think slightly more broadly, in terms of robust international order that everybody is signing up to, irrespective of the legacy conflicts that we have that are between the great powers. And that there is a, kind of, in a way, a dimension where the legacy conflicts and the power balances are at loggerheads with why conflicts in particular areas become violent. So, I’m thinking of conflict and violent conflict as two very different concepts, and I’m sure you do, too. I wonder if you can say a little bit more about that.

Robert Malley

Sorry, I’m not sure I foll – could you just repeat the last part, just in terms of your question.

Hilde Rapp

I just said, it’s obvious that there is a difference between conflicts, which are there all the time and conflicts that become violent, and the reasons why conflicts become violent are obviously complex, and they are – sometimes go beyond the power dynamics and the sanction regimes that you’ve been talking about, and I’m very aware that you’re very much aware of that, but I just thought you might want to spell that out a little bit more, because I think this is very much an important part of our discussion at the moment.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Thank you.

Ruth Newrick

Hi, I’m Ruth Newrick from the Ministry of Defence. My question is that we have not yet seen the full terrible potential of climate change to drive conflict. When do you think we might see the Ten Conflicts to Watch being significantly or even majority driven by climate conflict?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

And then the gentleman in the red.

Mike Davis

I’m Mike Davis, former Member of Parliament. I looked closely at all your ten examples, and one thing that’s quite absent, and I think it reflects the reality, is lack of reference to the United Nations, or the global multilateral institutions as either contributors to the current situation or a possible way forward for solutions. Now obviously, there are Security Council resolutions, like in Yemen, in Libya, there are international processes that have happened, but is there any negotiated role, is there any role for the international institutions, particularly the UN, in any of these conflicts?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Difficult with Russia.

Robert Malley

Great questions. So, on the first one, and I think you’re right, I mean, we could have a discussion. Most of what Crisis Group works on day in, day out if you see our reports, are on local dynamics, local motivations for conflict, how to prevent conflict, resolve conflict, based on understanding of the local reality. This discussion, obviously, is at a – is looking at it from a different angle, but that’s really the bread and butter of what we do, and of course, regional and global actors can contribute negatively or positively, I’ll come to the UN in a second, to those. And unfortunately, what we’ve seen, over the last years, but probably even beyond that, is that regional and loc – and global actors have been fuelling the conflicts rather than resolving them, because, as I write in the introduction, they seem to have no – less interest in conflict resolution and more in seeing how a particular conflict can serve their interests. But at the bottom, you know, these conflicts, any of the ones we’re talking about, they are deeply, deeply rooted in local dynamics. And that’s why our motto is, “Talk to everyone on the ground,” whether it’s the Taliban, whether it’s the Houthis in Yemen, whether – whoever it may be, to make sure that we understand what’s motivating them and understanding that sanctions and punishment will not make them suddenly change their behaviour. So, that’s a very good point to raise.

I’ll come to the climate change question, which is actually related to that, but first, just, the UN. I mean, it’s a fair point. We write a lot about the UN in other publications. We actually have a whole publication also on what the UN can do. It has not been particularly effective because of some of the divisions, the rebel divisions, which have translated in the Security Council. But that doesn’t mean that the UN, either through its peacekeeping missions or through its envoys, thinking particularly of Yemen where the UN envoy has had a very active role and has made real progress, we’ll see what happens with Libya as well, where there’s an attempt by the envoy to step up, but an envoy can’t do anything, however he – remarkable he or she is if global powers, regional powers are not on the same page. And that’s true in Libya, that’s true in Yemen, that’s true in Syria, it’s true wherever one is. And so, it does – you know, the UN is as much a reflection of the realities of global power dynamics, as it is an entity that’s capable of – or it’s more a reflection than it is an entity that’s capable of challenging and changing those dynamics. But we are – we constantly push on those issues, particularly those issues that don’t make the headlines. Some of the African conflicts in particular where the United States, Russia, China might not be as invested in the geopolitical dimension to give the UN a bigger role.

Now, climate change, and it’s – and it is something. We have started this year, maybe a year ago, a programme that we call the Future of Conflict Programme, and climate change is – has pride of place. We’re looking very closely now at the impact of climate change on violent conflict. Some of the things I’d say, just very quickly, first, I think it’s an important thing that that conversation on climate change now has different interlocuters at the table. The peace and security world is now – and that’s – you know, it was a fault of ours not to be at the table before as much as it was that we weren’t invited to the conversation, but we are – I think now you’re seeing more and more organisation like ours that are engaging in that conversation. I think that’s an important point.

Second point I’d make is climate change is an existential threat, perhaps the existential threat, which people should focus on, regardless of its impact on conflict. So, the fact that we now have the peace and security world, the military defence departments around the world that are now engaged in this conversation is important, but people should care about it beyond that.

The third point I’d make, and again, we could go on for hours on this, is we have to be careful not to oversimplify, but over – not underestimate the correlation between climate change and conflict. Like so many of these dynamics, whether it’s poverty, whether it’s marginalisation, whatever it is, whatever one could think of, it has an impact on conflict because conflicts are rooted in issues of sentiments of disposition, marginalisation, resource – misallocation of resources, scarcity, population, transfers of population, all of which are – in this case, there’s a correlation between climate change and those, but it’s not a one-for-one correlation. We don’t know how it’s going to play out, and this is where the local says such, and what we’re going to look at is trying to understand if we match where climate change may have the biggest impact and where you have the most fragile institutions that are not going to be able to cope with it, when it comes to the conflicts between farmers and herders, when it comes to the shortage of water resources. Where is that going to be more secured, and where’s it most likely to trigger or to aggravate, most likely to multip – most often it’s a conflict multiplier, rather than a conflict trigger. But it multiplies and it makes it worse, and so we’re going to try not – obviously, our expertise is not in climate change, but working with experts in climate change, trying to map out where is it going to be most harmful, and what can we say to those – to the countries, who have a stake in that con – in that area, how’s this going to play out? And what do you need to do to strengthen the institutions, so that they’re able to mediate conflicts between communities or to allocate resources better or to build the kind of institutions that are going to be necessary to cope with the aftershocks of climate change?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

I’m going to ask you one question, and we might have time for one more, if anybody has one, but on – in terms of – you know, I think this is – the idea that’s – you clearly recognise, that you’ve put on the table, that, you know, clearly, domestic drivers of conflict are core. But much of our conversation, because of where we sit, is inevitably going to be about how international actors affect dynamics. And one instrument that I think I suspect is very powerful, and we’ve seen it over the course of – in different conflicts that maybe doesn’t get as much attention, and I’m very curious what you think about this, is the politics of diplomatic recognition. And, you know, Venezuela’s an obvious case, the decision to recognise Guaidó. In your study of Venezuela, you say, you know, what we need is compromise by all sides, that we need to recognise that Maduro won’t necessarily go, but he needs to commit to elections. Do you have a read, or do you as a Crisis Group have a read on – you know, were you just, sort of, unanimously behind the decision by so many members of the international community to recognise? Do you think it’s had any negative effects? Has it made it harder to reach the kind of compromise that you put forward in the report? I mean, it’s not a neutral thing, right?

Robert Malley

Yeah. I mean, I don’t know, policy of recognition is a very interesting way of putting it. I’ve not heard it that way, but it’s come up in the Syrian context, it’s coming up today in the Palestinian context, and it did come up in the Venezuelan context. I think, you know, it’s a symbol – often a symbolic move, but there – I think there may have been ways to support Juan Guaidó, without going as far as recognising somebody who doesn’t control the situation on the ground, and so, what has it meant? Obviously, governments have their ex-patriots living in Venezuela, they’re not dealing with Guaidó to take care of them. If anything happens to them, they’re going to have to deal with the government that has control over the country. So, you know, we haven’t really looked into it, but I think there has – the problem in – with Venezuela, as with other countries, that they have – there was a rush to take a certain line, “This is the government we recognise. Maduro is no longer the legitimate President, he needs to go,” but there was no policy, other than I think in a rather unrealistic assessment that with sanctions, diplomatic pressure, isolation, he would have to go.

How many times did I hear this about Bashar al-Assad? How many times have I heard this about Maduro, that under this pressure, people around him are going to leave, defect and he will automatically fall? It doesn’t happen. I mean, maybe one could be lucky every now and then and that happens, but it doesn’t usually happen that way. Regimes stick together because they’re afraid that if not they’re going to hang separately, and so I think we’ve seen that in Venezuela, and we’ve been warning for some time, the approach which is maximum pressure, basically, on Venezuela and recognising Guaidó as the President and he has to step – I mean, he’s the one and Maduro has to leave, was attached from realities on the ground in Venezuela, and we have people there.

We recognise, obviously, the catastrophe that has been brought about by the Venezuelan Government on its people, and obviously, a lot of the mismanagement had nothing to do with the sanctions, but the sanctions have made things much worse for the local population. The regime and the elite, or the government and the elite have been able to find ways around it, and I think people may have read recently there’s a mini boom, a very artificial, but mini boom in Caracas, the government has managed to find ways to cater to its main constituency. And there’s not – there hasn’t been a plan that is a plan that has genuine, realistic compromise to get what the military needs, what proponents, Chavismo needs, and what the opposition needs, and we are working now on a report that will be – some people will say that it’s unrealistic, but at some point we believe that this roadmap we’re going to put on the table, of the compromise that all sides are going to have to make to save this country, which was, at one point, one of the wealthiest and is today one of the poorest in the hemisphere, and to prevent what we’re seeing happening.

And again, we wrote about this not long ago, which is as the state is losing its authority and its power, you’re seeing militias, you’re seeing armed groups, you’re seeing the dislocation of the state and its dismemberment, and whoever comes into power, whether the Chavistas stay in power, the opposition comes into power, what are they going to be ruling over, if that’s what this country go – moves towards? And so, when we speak to Chavistas who are – we’d consider them pragmatic, they don’t want to see the collapse of the government tomorrow, they don’t want to see Guaidó step in where Maduro is today, but they do want to see a transition, but they want a transition with guarantees to them, guarantees to the military, and that’s the way conflicts are avoided and resolved. They’re not through black and white projections of you go, somebody else comes in. It’s through compromise. There are compromises that are possible in this case. Of course, pressure on the government is going to have to take place, because it won’t give power over – it won’t accept a transition easily, but if the view is, all or nothing, they’ll pick nothing.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

That is, I think, an important note. It’s not necessarily pessimistic – it’s not an optimistic one, necessarily, to end. It’s a very realistic one to end on, and I think it is exactly where Crisis Group has focused its analysis, and to its real credit in a world where sometimes we like to take hard lines because it feels good, not because it delivers results, the focus on delivering results that are realistic, pragmatic and have the prospect of being achievable, I think is admirable and tremendously important, and I applaud you in your role. So, thank you. Join me in thanking Rob Malley [applause].