Lindsey Hilsum
The doors are closing, just like in the theatre with the curtain, isn’t it? Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to Chatham House. My name is Lindsay Hilsum. I’m the International Editor of Channel 4 News. I have, rather fortuitously, just been in Saudi Arabia, which is one of the reasons I’m very, very pleased to be here tonight amongst you and to hear what these people have to say. So, I’m joined on the panel by Armida van Rij, who is the author of this report that some of you may have seen, that’s just come out from King’s College, where she works, Security co-operation with Saudi Arabia: Is it worth it for the UK? And so, I’m sure many of you will be interested in reading this and she will give you some details of how you can get hold of it, as well speaking to us in her presentation.
Madawi Al-Rasheed will be familiar to many of you. She’s the Editor of the recent book, Salman’s Legacy, and she is a Professor at the LSE. And we’re particularly happy to have Mai Yamani, who many of you will remember from here before and who’s, I think, been hiding from us, and we’re very excited that after an absence, she’s back. She is now at Mosul University and she has just written another book, Cradle of Islam.
Now, you may notice the person who isn’t here. That is the gentleman from the Foreign Office, Neil Bush, and we’re really sorry that he has had to drop out. I think it’s really unfortunate because, obviously, discussing this issue of the relations between Saudi and the UK, we really wanted somebody from the Foreign Office to speak to that, but we will soldier on without him. And is there anybody from the Foreign Office in the audience? [Laughter] Ooh, you’re such cowards, aren’t you? I know that some of you work for the Foreign Office and then you’re just, oh, you’re the ones looking at your toes. But I hope that – I want there to be discussion. Normally, any of you who’ve seen me Chair something before know me, know that I’m very harsh with anybody who makes statements, and I will be harsh with anybody who makes long statements. But I think we do want a little bit of to and fro with the audience and people have different views, that’s what this is all about.
It is all on the record. It’s being livestreamed. It’s such an important time to be talking about the UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. Of course, we know about all the change that’s going on in Saudi Arabia, the social space widening, the political space narrowing, and the controversy about Britain continuing to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, despite what’s happening in Yemen. There was a statement from the Foreign Office last week saying that there should – in fact, it was just a couple of days ago, I think, saying that there should be an investigation into one of the attacks by Saudi aircraft, which killed, I think, 40 children in a marketplace in Yemen. Spain, I noticed, today, has announced that it is stopping sending some arms to Saudi Arabia now.
So, these are very critical issues. Britain, as it leaves the European Union, is looking to the other countries in the world. It, obviously, sees Saudi Arabia as an important partner and is also particularly important when we look at what’s happening in the Middle East and the increased tension between Saudi and Iran. And, also, the Trump administration’s policy of being so much on the Saudi side and against Iran and not doing anything to balance, which had been the policy of previous administrations. And so, where does Britain fit into this new Middle East, into these new relationships between the West and Saudi Arabia? So, those are some of the issues that I hope we’re going to talk about. So, let us start with Armida. Our speakers are all going to talk for about seven minutes. I will be strict with them, and then we will throw it open. Armida, let me start with you.
Armida van Rij
Thank you, Lindsey. So, as Lindsey just highlighted, it is a really important time to be talking about the UK-Saudi relationship. The context here in the UK is on Brexit. It’s something that the Government is currently all consumed by. There are massive questions still pending over some of the UK’s post-Brexit future bilateral relationships. At the same time, with the new Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, we’ve seen a more muscular foreign policy being conducted by Saudi Arabia, particularly with regards to Yemen. But there’s also been other incidents, such as detaining the Lebanese Prime Minister, and the Qatar blockade, etc.
We’ve also recently seen, which you alleged to, just now, a UN report into allegations of war crimes in Yemen from the coalition, but it really concludes that all foreign parties to the conflict are at fault, really, which are very different conclusions from the Joint Incidents Assessment Team, which is the coalition-led assessment team, into its conduct in Yemen. So, it’s an important time to be talking about this relationship, but this relationship is also one of the UK’s most controversial ones. So, some of you, in the audience, may well think that it’s absolutely crucial for the UK to engage with this country, and that it’s very important for UK national security. Whereas others of you may well think that, actually, it is fundamentally wrong for the UK to engage with such an autocratic Government. So, there are some difficult questions here.
Now, we undertook a study, where we saw to map the UK’s objectives, thank you, where we saw to map the UK’s stated objectives in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and to assess to what extent that has given it any leverage or influence over Saudi foreign policy. That’s one of the arguments we very often hear, that by engaging directly you can export values, but also, it gives you some leverage and influence over that Government.
Now, I all encourage you to read that report, of course, but the bottom line is that the UK isn’t getting what it says it wants, and that’s problematic at the moment. So, I’d like to take you through three key points. The first is, what are those objectives? What does the UK say it wants? Secondly, what are the outcomes of the relationship? And then, how can we start addressing some of these issues? So, first, what does the UK say it wants? What are its objectives? Now, as I’m sure some of you may very well know, the relationship between the UK and Saudi is very much based on two pillars: the security pillar and the trade relation or the economic pillar.
Security is very much justified around, well, counterterrorism is very important in this relationship; intelligence sharing is absolutely crucial. We, quite recently, heard the new Foreign Sec, Jeremy Hunt, say that “Saudi intelligence helps British bombs from going off – from not going off on British streets.” So, there are some areas there.
Then, the trade relation and, in particular, with the oncoming of Vision 2030, which, I suspect, some of you might talk about, which is, essentially, a series of economic reforms to reduce the Saudi Government’s reliance on oil. So, with reducing that the UK sees this as a potential for investment opportunities and wants to use this as an opportunity to grow British business in the country. Again, all of this is in the context of Brexit, and you guessed it, of course. So, Britain is looking to strengthen relations with non-EU allies, but that makes for this very difficult context.
Now, the UK says that it wants to co-operate with Saudi for national security objectives and for trade relations. We looked at the extent to which that actually holds up. What we found is that, actually, there are very limited benefits and, perhaps, unexpected costs to the UK of this relationship. In terms of security, there are some security benefits, that is, undoubtedly, true. However, this is very much revealed in secrecy and it is very hard to measure, based on publicly available information. This is very different, if you look at some of the UK’s other bilateral relationships, for example, with the US or with France, where there’s a lot less secrecy around some of the intricacies of that security relationship.
In terms of economic benefits, that’s actually also quite limited, and I know this is controversial and I know that there’s been a lot of work done around this, which we’ve all looked at, it’s worth noting here that there’s a difference between economic benefits at a national level or economic – limited economic benefits at the national level and at the regional level. So, while, for example, only 1% of UK economic output actually comes from the defence industrial sector and only – that supports only the 0.6% of jobs, BAE Systems, which is the main defence company in the UK and also the prime contractor for the Saudi Government, supported 9,500 jobs in Lancashire, for example, which is a region with fairly high unemployment. So, the gap between regional effects and national effects is different, and it’s worth bearing that in mind.
However, if we look at the trade relation, exports to Saudi Arabia from the UK only account for 1% of all of UK exports and imports, only of 0. 3% in 2016. And then, if we look at the arms trade, which is a central element of the UK-Saudi trade relationship, there was only 30 million for the Treasury, resulting from arms sales in 2016, whereas, the total revenue, in 2016 for the Treasury, was nearly 700 billion. So, that means that the revenue for the Treasury was 0.004% in that given year, which is really quite minimal.
And coming to the question of influence and leverage. From our analysis there is very little publicly available evidence of any UK influence over Saudi Arabia. There is, however, a lot more influence of, evidence, sorry, of Saudi influence over the UK, which would point to quite an unbalanced relationship, which is, again, problematic in this context. For example, quite recently, a Home Office report into terrorist financing was not published because of fears that that might reflect badly on Saudi and we know that the Saudi’s pressed for that to be – for that to not be published.
In 2005, there was a Serious Fraud Office investigation into corruption allegations for Al Yamamah, which is the biggest arms deal that the UK’s ever done with the Saudi Government. That was suppressed as well, which, in 2008, the High Court actually found to be contrary to the law. Now, it’s worth noting that that investigation was suppressed by, then, Prime Minister Tony Blair, stating, specifically, that he was concerned about the prospects of BAE systems winning future contracts for Saudi Arabia. So, that shows the close relation between the Government and the defence companies here in the UK, sorry, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how concerned they are, in terms of how that might affect their relationship with Saudi. And then, there’s a point of exporting values, so, Theresa May has said, repeatedly, “That by engaging with countries that may not share values, we will export our values of liberal democracies, etc., and that, eventually, that will, that message will come across and that will change the behaviour of other states.” Now, that hasn’t really happened in Saudi, in case anyone hasn’t noticed.
So, then, there’s the final question of reputational damage, and this is where it gets really difficult. So, under global Britain, which is the future foreign policy agenda, as far as we know it, Theresa May and Jeremy Hunt and Boris Johnson and all the others have, repeatedly, stated that they want the UK to be a defender and an upholder of the rules-based international order. But, at the moment, the UK relationship with Saudi means that the UK’s actually providing diplomatic coverage for Saudi’s actions in Yemen, in particular, for example, at the UN. So, when a Dutch-led investigation or a suggestion to have an international commission for enquiry into allegations of any child violations, etc., in Yemen, that was suppressed by the P3, so the permanent members, who are all arms supporting states, to Saudi, the Arab Nations and Saudi Arabia. That would have seen – that specific proposal would have seen the potential for recommendations to the International Criminal Court. Now, we know that eventually, that was diluted to having an independent investigation by UN experts, which has just concluded. So, that’s still something, but it’s a lot less strong than it would have been otherwise.
There’s also, if you compare some of the statements made by members of the UK Government, with regards to Saudi Arabia’s actions or with regards to Houthi rebels in Yemen’s actions, they’re really quite different. So, even recently, when there was a statement published by the UK Government about Yemen’s – well, the attacks on Yemen in August, all of them done the by Saudi-led coalition. So, when it’s saying about Sau – what it’s saying about Saudi is, well, about the coalition, sorry, we are deeply concerned and we welcome that the coalition’s announcement of regret and action to address the recommendations of that investigation. If we then look at what they say about the Houthi rebels, these attacks have targeted residential areas and shown no regard for civilian life. Yet, we know that, whether deliberately or not deliberately, that is, at the moment, still up in the air, the Saudi led coalition has also targeted civilian targets in Yemen, so that’s problematic.
Then, finally, other arms exporting countries, like Belgium, like Germany, and like Norway, have recently either started reviewing or have halted the stream of weapons from their countries to, either Saudi, the UAE or other foreign parties in Yemen.
Now, in the UK, we’re not seeing any of that, kind of, discussion and that’s problematic. So, we’re seeing discussions in Parliament. MPs are very much picking or holding to account various members of the Government, but we’re not seeing this publicly, in the rest of Government, and that’s a lack of thinking there. And, again, this also shows – it makes you question, you know, where is the UK on that front? And it really is a missed opportunity to show its commitment to that international rules-based order that it says it wants to uphold and defend and export, to some extent. So, that brings us to a real difficulty and none of this is easy, I don’t – I’m not trying to portray it as such, namely, which is what happens when you have perceived economic benefits, which are then contrasted with international obligations, ‘cause that’s what some of this is, and a countries norms and values and what the UK is doing stands pretty much opposed to what it says it wants to be doing.
So, how do you go about addressing this issue? How do you go about rebalancing that relationship? How do you go, perhaps, moving towards extracting some of that influence? We – I mean, based on this research, we would recommend, first of all, that the UK conducts a robust review of its relationship with Saudi Arabia and, specifically, of the costs and the benefits. We recognise, or I recognise, that there is some information that they will have access to that we don’t have access to, because we’re academics, so no-one ever shares anything with us. But – so, I’m sure that there is something there, but, at the moment, and based on the publicly available information, it’s not worth it. So, you need to review the relationship. If you then find that the cost outweigh the benefits, you need to start thinking about how you’re going to – what you’re going to do about that.
Secondly, we would recommend limiting and actually being more selective in the ways that the UK Government engages with the Saudis. This needs to be based on a more nuanced understanding of the potential costs and benefits, so not just driven by economic interests, but also, well, what’s the reputational damage for the UK? Does it affect your credibility on the international stage? Does it affect your credibility as an international actor? These are bigger questions that, at the moment, are not really being discussed.
And, finally, this all amounts and it’s, again, a shame that Neil Bush can’t make it, the UK Government needs to be more transparent about its relationship with Saudi Arabia. As mentioned before, it is far more transparent about some of its other bilateral relationships than it is with Saudi, yet, this is one that is so controversial and, of course, some of this is highly sensitive. But without the ability to quantify some of the leverage or some of the influence, really, any efforts by the UK Government to extol the importance of the relationship with Saudi Arabia are being undermined, so that’s an issue, as it stands, at the moment.
Lindsey Hilsum
Thank you very much, Armida. Can I just ask you one slightly technical question? The 30 million for the Treasury…
Armida van Rij
Yeah.
Lindsey Hilsum
That’s from tax or what? Is that – I mean, how is that calculated?
Armida van Rij
Yeah, so that’s from tax.
Lindsey Hilsum
That’s from the taxation? Okay, that’s fine. Okay, there’s a lot to think about there, but let us do that with the help of Mai Yamani.
Dr Mai Yamani
Thank you. So, two Kingdoms: the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who have been close allies for the last few decades, since 1932 and the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Now, both Kingdoms are going through a transition period, global Britain, a new Saudi Arabia. Can this alliance be maintained in this moment of unprecedented dual trans-relationship? I will focus on Saudi Arabia, Saudi domestic policies, Saudi foreign policies and regional policies. Saudi domestic policies, since 2015, there are the reform economic and social reforms, plans, by the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, specifically Vision 2030, that is the aim is to wean off Saudi Arabia of its dependency on oil.
Among the plans, there is a $500 billion city called Neom, serviced by robots. Positive press for future, futuristic, robotically run city for cinemas, for concerts and women driving cars. There is only – the problem is, some of the reforms are not implemented, for example, the shares in oil, Aramco Oil Company, have to sell, have stalled. So, to sell or not to sell? Women were driving cars but, at the same time, the women activists, who have been campaigning for the right to drive cars, have been detained. So, reform or not to reform? Arbitrary arrests of hundreds of activists, religious figures, prominent businessmen and senior figures or members of the al-Saud ruling family. This creates cracks in the Saudi legitimacy. Meanwhile, the importance of oil has waned. Foreign policy, since 2015, is seen as ambitious, assertive, aggressive and alarming, as in the war on Yemen, the blockade of Qatar, and Canada last month. What dominates Saudi foreign policy is the perception of Iran as an existential threat and the fear of Iran’s expansionist, expansionism, in the Middle East.
Regional policy, in March, 2015, Saudi Arabia declared Operation Decisive Storm, that is the war on Yemen that became one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes, with no end in sight. The United Nations describes the war on Yemen as the worst war since World War II. $200 billion have been spent on the war, with no achievement.
The UK, together with the US and France, are the main suppliers of arms. Meanwhile, Saudi hegemonic ambitions have created – the Arabian Peninsula, have created cracks in the crisis in the region. The Gulf Co-operation Council, that was created in 1981 to counter the power of Iran in the region, has been – has fractured, with the economic and political war on Qatar. So, now there are the trio: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and also, the quartet, the Arab quartet: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.
Oil money has been used to – as soft power, so to have the dominance of Saudi Arabia in the region, but also, to buy the subservience, submission and silence of the Saudi people, now, there is into the abundance of oil, money. So, two Kingdoms, allies, in a period of transition, the UK in search of a post-Brexit identity, Saudi Arabia moving into a unprecedented, volatile state or direction. So, the questions are can this close relationship be maintained, unchanged? Thank you.
Lindsey Hilsum
Thank you, Mai Yamani, and, finally, let’s go to Madawi Al-Rasheed for your remarks.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Thank you. I’m going to start this by just mentioning how far the Saudi regime could go on the streets of Britain. In the front row here we have a gentleman, a Saudi in exile, called [inaudible – 24:42]. Over the weekend, he was attacked by Saudis who recognised him. Why was he attacked? He has a YouTube channel and the Economist actually wrote an article about him. He uses satire and comedy, in order to undermine what he believes is an authoritarian, repressive regime. So [inaudible – 25:03], if you could stand up and show them where you were punched in the face. So, this goes on, on the streets of Britain.
Lindsey Hilsum
Madawi, I think I have to – as a Journalist, I have to come in here and say, we can’t say exactly who hit him.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
No, we can’t, but the Police…
Lindsey Hilsum
You don’t know if they were connected with the Government in any way.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
The police have been notified.
Lindsey Hilsum
There may have been other people who thought he wasn’t funny. I just want to say we have to be a little bit careful about leaping to conclusions.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes, well, they did admit, if you watch the YouTube in Arabic and you will see what those thugs had said to him. Anyway, we’ll leave it there. So, there are well rehearsed arguments against the continuation of this alliance that had become sacrosanct between Britain and Saudi Arabia. As Mai mentioned, this relationship goes before 1932. In fact, it started early in the 20th Century and it has evolved. In a way, I sense, when you talk to British officials and, unfortunately, we don’t have one on the panel, that it is a relationship that is cherished, that remains as a symbol of a distant British past and, here, I specifically refer to the Imperial colonial history of Britain in the Middle East.
There are arguments against the continuation of this unequivocal and unconditional support, that the British Governments, successive British Governments, had given Saudi Arabia over the years. Of course, there is the arms sales that had become more controversial, and thanks to British civil society, these are now talked about in Britain, itself. There’s also the historical association between Saudi Arabia and radical forms of Islam that Britain had suffered from, but we don’t want to talk about that now, because Saudi Arabia is fostering and developing moderate Muslims. So, there’s also the problem of Saudi exiles who, students and others, who find themselves in Britain, who cannot go back to Saudi Arabia, simply because they have tweeted or they have mentioned a critical opinion against the Saudi regime, all that is well rehearsed and we know. And here, we are very realistic. We do – I do not require or demand that Britain sanction Saudi Arabia or shuns Saudi Arabia, on the basis that, well, this is a dictatorship or a repressive regime. On this logic, if we follow it, then, Britain may not have anybody to talk to in the Arab world and, therefore, I’m very realistic in what one expects from a democratically elected Government, like the British Government, when it deals with Saudi Arabia. So, between the unconditional support and the extreme sanctioning of Saudi Arabia, or being critical of Saudi Arabia, there must be a middle way and the middle way goes too far.
There is one assumption that the constructive engagement of the British Government, with a regime like Saudi Arabia, would lead to reforming that regime, exporting the values of Britain, especially those related to democracy and human rights and, also, the international norms and values. As, Armida, as you mentioned, in your report, we don’t have evidence of this, that Britain had used its importance and critical importance for Saudi projects, whether they are economic or educational, in order to pressurise the Saudi Government. Successive British Governments think that anything that goes in Saudi Arabia is their business. Under international law, Governments are not meant to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. But both countries, Saudi Arabia and Britain, do, and Saudi Arabia, regionally, had moved from diplomacy to actually aggressive behaviour, in turning the tide against democracy, and its role, in the last years, had been very, very destructive of the democratic civil society in the Arab world, in the neighbourhood, in places like Bahrain, in Yemen, which precipitated a humanitarian crisis.
In Egypt, when an elected Government was toppled, because of Saudi and UAE money, supporting the return of the military to power, tried to subverse the nas and democratic experiment in Tunisia, undermining their survival of the Jordanian regime, by cutting off subsidies and help. And also, undermining the fragile peace that persist in Lebanon, against all odds, by forcing or instigating a, kind of, resignation by the Prime Minister to create more chaos in Lebanon.
So, the logic of the British Government that we have no choice but to support the Saudi regime, not only for the domestic security of Saudi Arabia, but also, for the region, proves to be illogical and also, doesn’t hold against any substantial evidence. We find that the collapse of the democratic moment in 201,1 in the Arab world, was actually a direct result of the intervention of certain monarchies in the region that saw the threatening moment. And this moment was extremely threatening because it was a grassroot movement that had no ideological affiliation with the radical Islamists or the moderate Islamists or the left or anybody, apart from people wanting a change of the regimes that had oppressed them, that had plundered their wealth, as a result of corruption, and so on and so forth. So, that historical moment was so threatening and what we are seeing in Saudi Arabia is an attempt to reverse that. And, unfortunately, Britain had put its weight against that, even when Saudi Arabia mentions that, “Well, we want you to put this group on a terrorist list,” Britain welcomes the suggestion, starts an investigation, then we have a report that the British Government sits on for months and months and months, because they do not want to offend Saudi Arabia.
The other occasion that you mentioned about the British Government succumbing to pressure, so we’re not here talking about the old colonial relationship that I started my discussion with, but we are talking here about a Government that is repressive, that is authoritarian, that blackmails Western Government. It sees itself as indispensable for our survival in Britain, but we don’t have the evidence. As you mentioned, the employment figure in the arms trade industry is actually insignificant. The money could be found elsewhere and the argument that we need in Britain, Saudi Arabia, because its collapse will create chaos in the region. I am not sure what more chaos we can witness in the region than the havoc that was created in place like Yemen, in Egypt, where thousands of people are behind bars facing execution.
Today, Saudi Public Prosecutor recommended that one of the clerics in Saudi Arabia, Salman al-Ouda, be executed and there are 37 charges. Without the Rule of Law, without an open court, we cannot actually take these accusations and charges at face value, but Britain continues to support Saudi Arabia. And when they execute people, they claim that, “Well, it is not up to us.”
I do remember one incident, where a particular MP, from a particular political party in Britain, talked to me and Mai, because we were giving a talk on human rights at the House of Parliament, and he talked to us. “What are you doing here, women, ladies, tarnishing the reputation of your country?” And asking us to change our policy towards this regime. So, basically, we are not trusted, as full citizens, as full British citizens, in Britain, although we have been British for decades and also, we’re regarded as agents of foreign Western Government by our own Government. So, we’re actually in-between. We’re not listened to in Britain and we’re accused of treason in Saudi Arabia. But the fact is that both of us are here because we can’t go back to Saudi Arabia. We’ll be on the death-row, like Sheikh Salman al-Ouda and thousands of other people. Recently, women, from the Eastern Province, was put on, with the same recommendation that the Public Prosecutor recommended, she is regarded as a traitor and she will be executed. So, basically…
Lindsey Hilsum
I’m going to ask you to wind up.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
I just want to conclude by mentioning one important point, that the argument that Britain uses to continue its relationship with Saudi Arabia, as it is, and I mean, the unconditional support, is futile. The Saudi regime is imploding from within. Don’t expect a mass revolt Egyptian style, it is going to implode from within. All the evidence is there, but people refuse to see it. In – today, there are thousands of people in Saudi prisons. They have been there since Mohammad bin Salman came to power. Doesn’t mean that the prisons were empty before, they were full already, but this situation is unsustainable. A new reform – so-called reformer cannot rule, cannot create moderate Muslims, when he puts all the clerics in prison and calls them radical.
If you want to create moderate Islam you need to have an open space. You need to have a room like this, where people come together and debate what moderate Islam is about. They need to have a forum. But Britain continues to support this regime and buying the rhetoric and the PR campaign that had come, at least in public. I’m sure, if we talked privately to people in the Foreign Office and in Government, they really don’t believe the rhetoric. I’m sure they don’t, ‘cause they’re intelligent people there and – but they…
Lindsey Hilsum
You need to wrap up.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
It is a pragmatic position that is unsustainable and it will implicate Britain, in the future, in the chaos that Mohammad bin Salman, or any other Prince, has already put in place. Thank you.
Lindsey Hilsum
Thank you. Right, I’m in a difficult situation because I now want to turn to the chap from the Foreign Office. But, in his absence, I’m just going to put a couple of the points that have been put to me by when I’ve spoken to British Diplomats, in the last few months, and I have talked to a few on Saudi Arabia, just to make a few counterpoints, to add to the discussion. One is that there has been a massive social opening up in Saudi Arabia, and I don’t think anybody is talking about a political opening up, but socially, it is hugely different. And this is about people being able to go and see films, this is about girls and boys, men and women, mixing. When I was there, a few months ago, I went to the circus and you know what? It was hard to grudge the joy on the face of those children, who’d never been allowed to go to the circus before, it was pretty good. And musicians, who previously had been told they couldn’t do anything, who would have their instruments smashed, well, now they’re being supported to make music, all kinds of different music. So, I think that’s one of the things that our absent friend might talk about.
I think another thing our absent friend might talk about is to say that in terms of reputation and so on, that Britain has to work with its allies, which means America and France, and that Britain, I think, they would say it always works as a partner with America when it comes to Saudi Arabia and Britain has a different policy on Iran. And if it just takes a totally different policy from the Americans, on both Saudi Arabia and Iran, that is not going to work and is not going to help them influence the policies they would like it to be. I’m sure they would also say, or mean, if they didn’t say, that if they didn’t sell the weapons, the French would, because that’s what they always say. And I think that they would say that they feel that they do have an influence and that the social opening up is evidence of that influence and that this – because Mohammad bin Salman is so young and because he is so popular, very popular amongst young Saudis, and many other Saudis as well, and because of the women driving and so on, that this is evidence that this relationship, over the years, has borne some fruit.
So, that’s my attempt at saying what I think they might have said, with a few bits of my own, and I think we should now throw open. Is there anybody here, first of all, before we go to general questions, is there anybody here, who is involved directly in trade with Saudi Arabia, who would like to say something? Oh, you are always so shy. Anybody from the Saudi Embassy, who would like to say anything? Well, how can we have an open debate if you won’t talk? If you won’t talk we can’t debate, and that’s a fact, right? So, I think the people who are here, who would want to make those points, should make them, otherwise you have no right to complain, if they’re not made, yeah? Is that fair? Yes, we go to the lady here.
Aisha Salika
And my name is Aisha [Salika – 40:05] from…
Lindsey Hilsum
Hang on, Aisha, we’re giving you the microphone.
Aisha Salika
Yeah, my name is Aisha Salika from SOAS. I think I’ll add to the question, which was asked earlier. How do you convince a world, which can’t be bothered about human rights at the moment, especially the West? I mean, I went to Washington and he was hugely – Mohammad bin Salman is hugely popular. How do you present a picture which says, on the one hand, that people – or there is a social change in Saudi Arabia, but to say that no human rights is important and, therefore, it should be weighed as well and that what is going to happen? I mean, the story that you’re telling about an internal implosion is something which is not sinking in. And, very briefly, to the author of the report, would you say there needs to be a review of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, a review of how British – how Britain makes its foreign policy? Because it’s not just Saudi Arabia, with other countries, I come from Pakistan, and Britain has very good relations with the Pakistani military, at the cost of the people there and in both…
Lindsey Hilsum
Okay, I think that’s fine. Thanks for those points. I’m going to take a couple of more points, anything from over here? Oh, what a quiet audience and I wonder why. Yes, we’ve got somebody there, yeah.
Lewis Brooks
Lewis Brooks from Saferworld. The UK Government often, sort of, has this line about that if they halted arms sales it would have no impact on Saudi Arabia or the conflict in Yemen. And I was wondering whether the author of the report, or other panellists, had any, kind of, views on – take on that, in light of the report’s findings.=>
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, no, yeah, and there’ll be no impact if you halted arms sales. Anybody from over this side? I’ll come to you at the front, sir. Yeah, we’re coming to you, yeah.
Ali Mohammed
Yeah, hi, and my name’s Ali Mohammed, I’m from Bahrain. So, my first question is to Armida, how do you find the lack of policy in Saudi Arabia and how is that giving the Saudi Government the space to commit all of those violations? And the second question is to Dr Madawi, how do you find the impact of the Islamic culture on that policymaking in the future? Thank you.
Lindsey Hilsum
Impact on policymaking, but I didn’t quite understand the first question, could you try and explain it to me again?
Ali Mohammed
Alright, so the first question is, we all know that there is a lack of policy in Saudi Arabia, so there is no clear policy about cybercrime, because basically, my background is IT. So, what I researched in cybercrime, I noticed that there is no policy about cybercrime and mostly, most of the Arabian or GCC country use those laws to actually restrict the freedom of exhibition and they have been doing it for so long. So, I was wondering how do you find this from Armida point?
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, as you say, it’s a lack of policy formulation.
Ali Mohammed
And then, the impact of the Islamic culture on further policymaking in the future?
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, and on Islamic culture and policymaking. Let’s get a few comments on that. I don’t know which one, do you want to take any of those?
Armida van Rij
Yes, so I’ll start with review of the relationship with Saudi or review of the UK’s foreign policy as a whole, I think that’s actually a really good question and I think it should definitely be the latter. I think there’s this bigger question, especially now, where, in part because of Brexit, the UK Government has this opportunity to redesign and carve out the space that it wants the UK to play on the international stage. That involves making, sort of, quite difficult decisions around what does it want to do on the international stage? What, kind of, country does it want to be? Who does it want to do this with? How’s it going to pay for this? And those are some really tough decisions and, again, we’re not seeing that, sort of, debate or thinking in Government at the moment. But I think that you’re absolutely right and that also means that – I mean, the UK Government can’t say that it’s a defender and upholder of a rules-based international order and then do some of this, as we’ve discussed before. So, it needs to decide which way it’s going to be and before it tries to, sort of, export certain values, look at itself and think, okay, but are we doing this?
Lindsey Hilsum
What about the issue about, which the gentleman from Saferworld made, that the British often say, “Well, it wouldn’t make any difference if we didn’t send in the weapons because, you know, France or whoever would fill the gap?”
Armida van Rij
Yeah, so I’d flip that on its head a little bit and say, well, what we often say is, if we – well, what you often hear, if we don’t sell weapons, then, you know, they’ll go to somewhere else. I think, in terms of the context in Yemen, specifically, the argument very often goes, well, because we engage directly, we can teach them and we can train the Saudi Airforce.
Lindsey Hilsum
And I think that maybe British Officers who have served there would say that, you know, that’s what they do.
Armida van Rij
Yeah, but I think it is, I mean, perhaps it’s optimistic, but it is one of those things that if you were to start drawing a line and if you can get some of your allies on board with that, such as the US, then perhaps it can actually have an impact. And also, I mean, there’s something around the long lead times for procurement of some of these issues. So, I mean, the procurement cycles are incredibly long and the UK, for example, and some of these systems aren’t interchangeable, so when you’re talking about a weapon system, you’re talking about a system of a system. So, the UK produces 81mm mortars whereas China produces 82mm mortars, these aren’t always interchangeable and that you can’t always fit different bits and pieces of equipment on different bits of equipment, produced by someone else. So, that’s worth bearing in mind as well, yeah.
Lindsey Hilsum
Okay, Mai, did you want to take any of this? Can I ask you maybe about will there be actually, sort of, no policy, in a sense, in Saudi Arabia? That there is no, kind of, real policymaking structure, as it were, do you perceive that?
Dr Mai Yamani
I would first just make a reminder.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, sure.
Dr Mai Yamani
When you mentioned the fact that there are cinemas today.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes.
Dr Mai Yamani
There were cinemas since 1965, I used to go to cinema in Jeddah.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes, yes.
Dr Mai Yamani
So it’s not the first time, and the music and all this was traditional.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes.
Dr Mai Yamani
[Inaudible – 46:30], jazz, they were all the traditional that had been abruptly…
Lindsey Hilsum
But they were suppressed and it is the…
Dr Mai Yamani
Abruptly stopped and suppressed.
Lindsey Hilsum
And they have come back up again.
Dr Mai Yamani
But what is interesting is that, in many countries in the West and the PR, this cosmetic thing is like, you know, we have concert, we have pop, and that is just the superficial level of reform.
Lindsey Hilsum
Not to the young people I met in Jeddah and in Riyadh a couple of months ago, they didn’t see it as superficial, they thought it was important in their lives.
Dr Mai Yamani
Yes, but as Madawi is saying, I think that the fact that this there are so many detentions that are different to people.
Lindsey Hilsum
Sure.
Dr Mai Yamani
Whether it is in the Eastern Province who are suppressed and repressed.
Lindsey Hilsum
Sure.
Dr Mai Yamani
Marginalised ‘cause they’re Shia or the other, there are regions. So, it is a very selective policy of reform in the country.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah. Madawi, did you want to take any of these questions?
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
I just wanted to comment on a couple of things. I mean, by focusing only on arms sale, we miss an important dimension to the military relationship. There are operational rooms where British – the military, participates and this has been reported in the war on Yemen. So, it’s not basically selling a missile here or a typhoon there, it’s about British defence personnel being on the ground working with the Saudis. They claim that they are observers and none of us have access to these rooms, but to go back to your point about the secrecy, why is this relationship secret? Frankly, Britain prefers to deal with Princes when it comes to selling arms because they don’t want a national elected Government, a democratic Government in Saudi Arabia that would that vet contracts, that would vote on certain contracts, reject some and accept others, like what happens in Kuwait.
Lindsey Hilsum
I think that they would say that they do sell weapons to many countries.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes.
Lindsey Hilsum
Which are democracies.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
But there are no debates.
Lindsey Hilsum
They don’t only sell weapons to countries without Parliamentary scrutiny and so on, that might be a little bit unfair.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Absolutely, but there’s no debate in Saudi Arabia. Nobody’s going to challenge any, kind of, contract, and if you – if there is a Princely reshuffle, then the British Government will be at a loss, who should we deal with? Well, it used to be Bandar bin Sultan, or somebody else, but now, who is our man in Riyadh, who we can actually communicate with and sell the arms? So, it’s a personalised relationship, unlike the relationship of the British Government with other Government, where…
Lindsey Hilsum
Let me put you want to the question that this gentleman was asking.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
So, the other point, the other point about the opening up of the social sphere, and if we’re talking about UK-US, UK-Saudi relationship, I don’t think having a cinema in Saudi Arabia is a result of transferring British values to Saudi Arabia. It is…
Lindsey Hilsum
She’s answering my questions, not yours, go on.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Actually, it is – no, but it is important to talk about the so-called reforms and what kind of reforms. You call them cosmetic non-reforms, reforms, what the Saudi people – if you have 20 million people starved of any personal freedom, the moment you give them a little opening, of course they’re going to enjoy it, but, of course, it’s a distraction. So, you go to the circus and we know, from our academic background, what the relationship between the circus and repressive Government. In fact, why the circus is so important, it was so important in the Soviet Union because people would imagine, would hallucinate, would aspire toward the unrealistic and it’s a distraction and, you know, we could work on that in an academic – in a classroom.
Lindsey Hilsum
I want you to answer this gentleman about the Islamic culture and policymaking.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes.
Lindsey Hilsum
Can you respond to that?
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Well, I’m not sure what you mean, that the Islamic culture will influence Saudi foreign policy. Saudi foreign policy is Godless, right? It is based on national interest and not only the national interest of the Saudis, but the interest of a clique that is self-sustaining, that monopolises power, that does not allow anybody to give any opinion about how foreign policy should be conducted and, therefore, Islam shouldn’t be part of the conversation.
Lindsey Hilsum
But I think one of the interesting things, and I got this from your book, one of the essays in your book, about the rise of nationalism as an ideology.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes, there’s a place.
Lindsey Hilsum
As opposed to Islam as an ideology, which is an interesting move or a change that some people are seeing in Saudi Arabia. I think that is quite interesting.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes, well, popular nationalism.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
I mean, we – it is not only a Saudi phenomena, it’s become a global phenomena.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes, it is, yeah.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
And populist leaders, I mean, Brexit, itself, was part of the…
Lindsey Hilsum
Absolutely.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
…populism that plays on people’s fears, on unemployment, on apprehension about their future and it is very popular. So, Mohammad bin Salman had captured the souls of the youth in the country, which is the majority cohort, by introducing cinema, by having this, kind of, openness.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, but he is very popular.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
But there is a dark side to that.
Lindsey Hilsum
Which you have explained to us.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yes.
Lindsey Hilsum
Let’s go to the back and we’ve got three at the back there, that gentleman just next to you, there.
Alexander Neff
Thank you, very much. I’m Alexander Neff, I’m a member at Chatham House. I just wanted to ask, whilst I think you very well articulated the cost benefit analysis of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, as it currently stands, I’d be interested to know how much analysis you’ve done of the future economic benefits that have been touted by many representatives of the Government and, indeed, people from the business community. Just, for example, off the top of my head, I was reading about how the advent of – well, of labour reforms in Saudi Arabia will mean that private schools are going to be much more important and I read that Pearson has just secured a big contract there. Additionally, you know, the reform of capital markets infrastructure, whilst the Saudi Aramco IPO has been postponed, who’s to say that other British financial advisory businesses won’t be, you know, very keen to see, you know, greater strength.
Lindsey Hilsum
So, by increased that, yeah, it’s a good point.
Alexander Neff
I just wonder how much of your analysis looks at the potential benefits of what the new Saudi Arabia’s going to look like, rather than, as you very well articulated, you know, that what Saudi Arabia is like now? So, that’s my question.
Lindsey Hilsum
Okay, that’s very good. We’ve got another two at the back there, and these two gentlemen. Yes, that one and then this one, yeah.
Richard Stanforth
Hello, and my name’s Richard Stanforth. I’m from Oxfam and I actually met the Foreign Office last week and one of the things that we’re actually doing tomorrow is putting out a Press release, detailing some of the attacks that we’ve seen, over the last month, and some of the figures behind that. And we were highlighting some of the attacks on our own infrastructure.
Lindsey Hilsum
And your question?
Richard Stanforth
Sorry?
Lindsey Hilsum
Your question?
Richard Stanforth
And my question is, basically, the point I made to the Foreign Office, that we actually see, in the US, President Trump has called for a ceasefire, the US Government has come out very strongly, recently, about the attacks on water infrastructure and I was quite – I wonder if you can comment on the US verse UK relationship with Saudi? The US actually seems to be taking a stronger position at the moment.
Lindsey Hilsum
You were wondering if the US is taking a stronger position than the UK?
Richard Stanforth
Yeah, I mean, basically, I don’t know what comment.
Lindsey Hilsum
Okay, thank you very much, and there was a gentleman just in front, yes.
Liam Walpole
Thank you very much and, first of all, my name’s Liam Walpole. I’m from the Oxford Research Group, and I want to thank Armida for this piece of research that she’s done on behalf of us, so thank you very much. My question is, do you think that part of the problem with, sort of, selling the Saudi-UK relationship is that it Government hasn’t been particularly transparent about that relationship? And, perhaps, if it had been more transparent about its role in the Riyadh targeting rooms, then the arms sales wouldn’t then have become a political issue.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, the transparency. Okay, shall we go back? ‘Cause, actually, I’m quite interested, Mai, in your view on this issue about whether you think that, actually, the US has been more critical than the UK, or more questioning, when it comes to arms sales and what’s been happening in Yemen and so on, do you see that at all?
Dr Mai Yamani
Well, we know that the President Trump has revived the importance of the US relation with Saudi Arabia. So, if you think of what are the foundations of, or pillars of legitimacy of Saudi Arabia, that is relationship with the US, with the United States, oil money, unity of the Royal family and their persuasive identity and back to Islam, here. But I don’t know whether this unpredictable, again, what is happening with their relationship with the US. I don’t have a clear, I don’t know if the – anyone here has a clear…?
Lindsey Hilsum
No, I mean, there is – they have put a – there is something, which was said, recently, was they have actually started to question the behaviour, the Saudi behaviour, in Yemen and the targeting and so on, and that’s come only through Congress, I think, which I don’t think we have seen here.
Dr Mai Yamani
The only conversation has been the United Nations…
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes.
Dr Mai Yamani
…declarations.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, yeah. Future economic benefit, Armida, that’s quite an interesting concept, isn’t it? Because as Saudi diversifies, yes, education, all sorts of other things might come up. Did you look at that?
Armida van Rij
Yeah, so, I mean, we know that Saudi’s looking to increase its FDI from, I think it’s 3.8% of 5. something percent, 5.7% by 2030. Within that package there will, of course, be opportunities for British business. We also know, however, focusing on the, sort of, arms trade element of it, that they’re looking to build their domestic defence industry and that they want to, by 2030, again, procure over 50% of their budget and use that on procuring from domestic defence industries, rather than foreign companies, which is up from 2% in 2016. So, in terms of the arms trade relationship side of it, that will change. At the moment the UK exports – well, 48% of UK exports go to Saudi Arabia, that’s not sustainable. There is a question of whether, in the interim term, there will be opportunities for the UK to help build this domestic defence industry. But I think the Saudis are currently talking to Russia about that, which the UK is delighted about.
Lindsey Hilsum
Oh, that’s interesting. Well, there’s gratitude for you.
Armida van Rij
Yeah, exactly, but there is a…
Lindsey Hilsum
So, what about the other things? Because one of the things that, certainly, British Diplomats talk about a lot is exactly what the gentleman there was talking about, that the, you know, the future opportunities of non-defence related things, because of the building of the new city, which Mai mentioned and, you know, the whole opening up of the economy and the social space.
Armida van Rij
Yeah, I think that is an interesting question but, at the moment, Vision 2030 is still – I mean, we’ve seen some wonderful PR campaigns, but it’s still pending.
Lindsey Hilsum
It’s a slightly blurred vision, still.
Armida van Rij
It’s still slightly blurred and we haven’t actually seen a lot coming out of it yet, in terms of whether it’s actually feasible economically. So, to answer your question very directly, it focused very much on the current situation, but with the acknowledgement that things will change, particularly in that defence sphere.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, transparency, I think, Madawi, that transparency, which the gentleman there mentioned, I think that is something which is very key for you, isn’t it?
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
Yeah, I want to say it’s extremely important, you know, when we actually kept – you know, we are not told about these, kind of, secret deals, we only hear in the Press. But, I mean, it is important if, you know, you have a country that is – you’re dealing with, there is a lot of trade flow and a lot of future potential, that this has to be in the open. Of course, we don’t want to know the secret, sort of, correspondence because, you know, future historians would have to look at that and sometimes, they’re shocked. I mean, some of us who had worked in British archives about things 30 years ago. You discover the reality of the relationship but, even then, there are certain things that are declassified and they’re not classified…
Lindsey Hilsum
So, you’re always going to have some need for secrecy, but…
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
So, we’re always going to have some secret dealing and wheeling.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah, sure.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed
But it’s important, as a starting point, to have an open debate about this relationship.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yes.
Armida van Rij
If I can just add to that.
Lindsey Hilsum
Yeah.
Armida van Rij
I think, at the moment, there was a poll done in 2016 on how the UK public feels about the relationship with Saudi, and I think something like 39% said that the Saudis should be treated as an enemy versus 37% said that Saudis should be treated as an ally. So, public support for the relationship with Saudi is very low in 2016, I don’t think – I’m not aware of a poll that’s been done since.
Lindsey Hilsum
But that might change, that might – so, it’ll be interesting to do that poll, in a couple of years’ time, if MBS stays on.
Armida van Rij
Yeah.
Lindsey Hilsum
And because with all the things about women driving and, you know, all of these things, which I think would be seen by many people in the UK as positive outcomes and positive change.
Armida van Rij
And I don’t know to what extent.
Lindsey Hilsum
That might or might not change.
Armida van Rij
That low, those low numbers are based around the lack of transparency, I don’t know that. But it’s just worth noting.
Lindsey Hilsum
Okay, right, now we are, sadly, coming to an end, because I can look up there and I’ve been told that my job is to stop this at 7:00 on the dot, so that’s what I’m going to do. So, I’m very sorry not to take everybody’s questions and I’m sorry about the people who had very interesting things to say, but who haven’t said them, ‘cause I know you’re out there. But I would like to thank our panel very much, and I would not like to thank the Foreign Office for not showing up, and I would like to thank Chatham House for affording us this opportunity. Thank you very much [applause].
