Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the beginning of Chatham House’s centenary week. Not quite the way, obviously, we had thought about kicking it off when we started this year back in January, but nonetheless, a year that is going to be all that much more different as a result of COVID-19 and very much more different going forward, as well. So, what I’d like to say, first of all, is a huge thanks to all of those individuals who’ve taken the time to join us this week, but most importantly, to all of my think-tank colleagues who’ve come and joined us today for this first of our centenary week events. I’m thrilled that everyone’s here and that we’re able to have this discussion. I was just saying that I apologise, we won’t be able to do justice to all of the topics we’re going to be covering or necessarily to all of the great people who’ve joined us today, as well, but this is an important time, an important opportunity for us to be able to get together and do the most important thing for a think-tank, which is have a discussion amongst all of our colleagues about how they’re coping with this incredibly complex world at the moment.
And I’m thrilled, I’m not going to introduce each think-tank person as I go along, in advance, because we’ve got a huge number of people who’ve joined us, and I want to say a big thank you to them. I know how busy they are and how many of these meetings they find they have to join every day. But what we’ve decided to do is do a little bit of a breakdown and have a conversation amongst my 14 colleagues here about some of the biggest issues taking place in international affairs, which includes the new geopolitical environment we’re in, the prospects for multilateral and regional co-operation, and the more polarised national politics and a bit on sustainability in the global economy. Just touch on each of those topics with a number of my colleagues.
I would say here that we really want to talk about the perspective from think-tanks and the perspective from your role as Directors of think-tanks and I really look forward to hearing your thoughts about how you’re coping, like we are at Chatham House, with this very complex environment. It’s ironic, having been founded in 1920, that there are so many echoes of the 20s now in the 2020s. And one we did not expect, which is the echo, of course, of the COVID and the pandemic that took place, the unfortunately named for the Spanish, Spanish flu, back in that particular period, adding to all of the risks.
So, I’m going to kick off with some discussion about how think-tanks are managing this much more tense geopolitical environment, and I’m going to start, in particular, with John Hamre, the President of CSIS in Washington. We’re starting with John, just ‘cause I felt it was important to get a perspective from inside Washington at this time. Most importantly, also, John was my former boss, so I, kind of, feel an obligation to turn to him first and hear his viewpoints. But John, I think if you could just give us two or three minutes, really just a taster of what it’s like right now leading research, leading a think-tank, at a time where we seem to be getting an echoes of a rising geopolitical contest between the US and China and the, kind of, decisions and choices that’s posing to you as the CEO of CSIS in Washington. Over to you, John.
Dr John Hamre
Thank you and congratulations to you and Chatham House. You have done such a brilliant job and makes me so proud, congratulations. You know, it’s obvious to everybody in the world that we’re going through great chaos in the United States now because of both the COVID pandemic, we’re – and the George Floyd murder. I think – but underlying both there is a common dimension and that is that the federal government is becoming weaker and weaker. It is – it has less capacity to address problems because of the way that partisanship has become so brittle and at the same time, policy innovation is now moving rather dramatically away from Washington to the private sector and to state and local government. Now, this is a challenge for us, obviously, because our historic model has been to work in Washington, work with the federal government and so, if policy innovation really is going to move dramatically, it’s an interesting problem.
It’s also we’re entering into, finally, the post-Cold War era. I think the last 20 years have really still been a part of it. We’re at the post-Cold War era, but this is not going to be so much a geopolitical competition as a geoeconomic competition. So, for us, it means we have to shift the way we think about problems in foreign policy away from our traditional framework, which is thinking about how the State Department and the Defence Department works. It’s much more working with industry, it’s much more working with private sector and so, we’re shifting fairly dramatically. The great challenge, of course, is how do – how does the liberal regulated capitalisms survive against state capitalism and how do we pushback in a way without bifurcating the global international order? That’s the central challenge we’re working through.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And John, just very – one very quick follow-up, Arnold Toynbee, I was looking back, somebody mentioned this morning, in fact, that he gave a speech and an article in international affairs at Chatham House back in 19 – right at the end of 38/39. And you could see at that point that Chatham House was caught between groups who were saying, “You cannot advocate,” you know, “a return to another conflict. In their case, it was a return to a World War I, a repeat to World War II and others who were strongly against appeasement said, “This is a time to stand up and be counted.” And you could see Arnold Toynbee, Director of Research, literally, admittedly, getting pulled in two directions on his board and amongst the members. Are you feeling any of that in Washington right now?
Dr John Hamre
Well I – that shows up as in the debate over whether President Trump has abandoned traditional values as part of American foreign policy, that’s how it shows up here and I would say that, you know, it divides, roughly, the way people divide on Trump generally. 60% of Americans feel the value foundation of foreign policy should be strengthened, sustained and strengthened and 40% are saying we should pull back. We’ve been taken advantage of, etc. I – and so, I – and it is the backdrop to this, but the real change is that federal government is weaker and it’s going to be weaker. And it’s – and so, how – what I – but I think what you’re seeing is the way that the change is occurring right now in America. It’s coming from corporations putting pressure on Politicians and the Politicians are buckling. You know, I mean, it is amazing what’s happening. So, this is a time of really profound change and we – you know, think-tanks – and we’re going to be in the front of it, because corporations need help, you know, state governments need help. So, I – we’re busier than ever.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, thanks, John, for those comments. Let me turn now and go right around the world to Beijing, to Zhongping Feng, Vice President of the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, CICIR, which is one of the most highly regarded think-tanks in China. Maybe I could pose a similar question to you, Zhongping, if I may, which is how are you working in the think-tank space, advising government? I don’t think there’s the same problem in Beijing that John Hamre was describing in Washington. In other words, in Beijing still very much the government remains at the centre of all decision-making. How are you finding the demand for your advice, is it changing under this much more intense geoeconomic contest, as John Hamre was describing it to you? Over you to, Zhongping.
Dr Zhongping Feng
Thank you, Robin. Let me start it by also saying many, many congratulations to you at Chatham House, to you and to your colleagues. It is the right time for us, indeed, to do some, you know, think-tank people to do some deep reflections. You know, John mentioned the situation in the United States and, you know, and the think-tank, a lot of people in China are deeply, deeply worried about the, you know, so-called – the talks over the so-called New Cold War, or someone called the Cold War 2.0 or 1.5, you know.
I think, you know, my message is we missed – when people are talking about the old Cold War, we missed why war is. We missed the words of Europe, words from European countries. My argument is, you know, oh, you know, we need to make sure, you know, European colleagues to understand actually, you know, Europeans can have a – their position can actually have an important impact on this world, you know. Europeans are politically important because it can accelerate this so-called World War, but at same time, it can also, you know, reduce the scale of this – us in that role.
So – and as – another argument, I think, you know, as a think-tank, is we need to think about the lessons we learned, both in Europe, in United States, in China, from the 21st Century. I followed the European affairs in the past 20 years. I think the biggest lesson Europe has learned from the First World War and the Second World War is, we need to build up some multilateral institutions to reduce the feeling among each other, to gradually build up, establish some trust and the lessons were learned in China from the 21st Century, I think, too. One is, you know, China need to become an independent power in the world. That’s the, you know, the lessons we learned from the past history, 100 accumulations. The second biggest lesson we learned is opening up to the world, especially opening up to the developed world.
What does this mean these two lessons, the Europeans lessons and Chinese lessons mean for today’s world? I think we need both China and Europe, and a think-tank colleague – and people, we need to let your governments to understand so im – how important to have some globally multilateral institutions, in order to reduce tensions. Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Zhongping, thank you. Just one very quick follow-up question to you, as well, though. To what extent do you find you are able, in CICIR, as in other of the big think-tanks in Beijing, how much is government listening to the think-tanks right now? I’m sure – I know you, you’re an experienced Analyst, you’ll be warning about the risks of escalation of bad conflict. Are you finding that the government is listening to think-tanks, or when you have a more geopolitical environment, do they tend to listen to themselves? An easy question for you to answer from Beijing.
Dr Zhongping Feng
I tried my best to publish some articles, in order for them to read the newspapers, for example. And also, you know, important to have workshops like this, okay, I all – from time ago I saw the people from the think-tank were, essentially, making circles, they also take – participate in the mediums like this. So, we certainly have some, you know, influence on people’s thinking.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
That’s good to know. Well, look, you turned out by throwing the big challenge, interestingly I thought, to Europe, as I was asking you a question about China. And, conveniently, the next on my list, already, was Nathalie Tocci, the Director of IAI, the Instituto Affari Italiano, so the Italian Institute for International Affairs, and I must say that, Nathalie, we’re thrilled you’d be with us. I didn’t know if you expected to be thrown the question that somehow you were meant to, and Europe was meant to help resolve the situation, but how are you finding this more contested geoeconomic and geopolitical world? I find that the debates I’ve been listening to, there’s been a real heating up of the sense that we are entering a more competitive phase, it might be geoeconomic, as John Hamre said, but how are you finding this in Italy and how are you coping with it as the Head of IAI?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Well, I think, Robin, that in many respects the, sort of, period – I mean, the crisis that we’re going through has clarified a number of things that have been, sort of, you know, bubbling away under the surface for some time. So, you know, we’ve known for some time that we were moving away from a unipolar structure. We weren’t quite know what was the structure that we were moving towards. Well, now we know that, huh? So, we know that it is a G2 world and on top of that, we know – and it may be a G2 world that is the overarching, you know, the sort of, overlay within which different power centres operate, but that is the big global overlay.
We also know, unfortunately, that this G2 world is a conflictual one. Now, whether it’s a new Cold War or not, well, it’s obviously going to be different. One, hopefully, it will not be a hot war, so, hopefully, it will be a cold war in the sense of sorts, but it will be a different one, because, firstly, it is not a multidimensional sort of conflict in the way in which the old Cold War was primarily. And because – so, it is more multi-dimensional, which means that it’s more difficult to regulate, which increases its – you know, the risk and the dangers to it. But on the positive, it is also a more interdependent Cold War. I mean, the interdependencies that exist between the United States and China are, obviously, infinitely higher than those that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States.
So, I think as think-tanks, as European think-tanks, well, firstly, we’re, sort of, called on to try and understand, basically, you know, what is the context that we’re operating in? And as I said, you know, the picture has started clarifying, but only to the extent that it’s, kind of, clarified the questions that we have to address. I think there’s a second big aspect, which also reminds me very much of what the history of my own institute was during the Cold War, which just a, in a sense, relational, a connecting function that as European think-tanks we can play within this new environment. I wasn’t around back then, but IAI was the think-tank that brought to the United States the first group of Italian Communist Parliamentarians back in the early 19 – late 1970s. And, sort of, thinking back at that, kind of, you know, sort of event and in a sense, the, sort of, political role that we played as think-tanks back then, which was a political role that somehow got erased after the end of the Cold War, well, I’m just wondering, also, sort of, picking up the suggestion that Zhongping Feng was making, whether there is that relational aspect, that in, sort of, connecting the dots, that we can play.
And then, third and finally, obviously, there’s the advice question and here I think that as Europeans we’re basically left to understand how to position ourselves in a G2 confrontational world in which our aim, let’s be very frank, is not that of being equidistant. We will not be equidistant between the United States and China, but at the same time, we do want to have an equilibrium. And we want to make sure that that equilibrium is determined by Europeans themselves and that we’re not forced or coerced into taking one position or another. And that’s, kind of, advice which, you know, in my view, really boils down to what do we mean by autonomy and how do we achieve it, how do we articulate it, is, I think, again, a, sort of – that the big piece of advice, which, obviously, then has all sorts of specific meanings, whether we’re talking about the economy or digital or environmental security, but that it’s the big box of tricks, in a sense, that we’re, sort of, left to untangle.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, that’s very – and to your point, we won’t be equidistant, but we do want to define our equilibrium, I think is a very neat way of putting, of course, Europe, as usual, trying to have its cake and eat it, but – like the Brits, as well. But I think a very important point to have raised and I’m wondering – I’m going to turn to Yoichi Funabashi now. We’re jumping all the way over to Tokyo, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, but somebody known very actively in the think-tank, having also created the Rebuild Japan Initiative before this current one. Yuichi, I sometimes wonder whether Japan is in a similar difficult position to the one that Europeans find themselves in, China, your neighbour. And as John Hamre was saying earlier, at a time when corporate voices are bringing more and more pressure to bear on governments, where does that leave think-tanks in Japan, where I think appreciating the risks that China poses geoeconomically and politically is understood, but the interdependence is massive? How are you handling that with your Asia-Pacific Initiative, Yoichi, over to you?
Dr Yoichi Funabashi
Yeah, I really commend your strong leadership and thank you very much, once again. I think we really have to get real. We have to do a reality check. Whether you like – whether we like it or not, we actually are now entering into Cold – a new Cold War in geoeconomic terms. We are not in Cold War in military, no, but I think that, increasingly, that we are witnessing that a liberal rule-based international order, a multilateral one, being challenged from all fronts. And during which they have economic crush and, you know, also, you know, expanding [inaudible – 19:39] of the influence and technological hegemonic struggle. They’re all now, you know, here.
So, I – at our institute we just established an Institute of Geoeconomic Studies at API, by inviting a Professor Jun Murai, a legendary scholar in Japan, specialising in internet, AAI and 5G and the others, because that – I think that what is unfolding here is that the intensifying the geoeconomic struggle, particularly in digital area. So, I think that is very much important.
Also, I think that it is very crucial for middle powers, like some European country and Japan, Australia, Korea, I think to really pool their resources and exchange views and notes and how to really cope with this new challenges, particularly geoeconomic challenges. And, for instance, in this case of COVID-19 crisis, I think it is very much important for us middle powers and think-tanks, particularly in middle powers, to co-operate, to compare notes and how – you know, and to draw that best practice and good practices or how to cope with that and this crisis. And, you know, given that lack of international co-operation to cope with that coronavirus crisis, WHO and the others, you know, they are misfunc – dysfunctional.
So, I think that civil society and think-tanks are very much now in – should be expected to play an important role to address these issues.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, Yoichi, very clearly put and as you say, we’ve got to get real. You said we’re in the geoeconomic Cold War, it’s happened already, and the digital space being one where it’s most actively seen. I’m going to keep moving through my colleagues here, ‘cause I’ve said and we’re so lucky to have 14 think-tank heads with us, that if I don’t keep moving, I’m going to – somebody’s going to drop off the end and I don’t want anyone to drop off the end. So, I’m going to – I want to just let my colleagues know that I’m going to move straightforward, because I think there’s a good link here to the situation being faced by Michael Fullilove and Australia. ‘Cause I think there was a comment there about ‘middle powers’ that we heard from Yoichi Funabashi, that there is a need for those countries that perhaps find themselves squeezed in this geoeconomic conflict between, perhaps, a values and a historical connection to the United States, to what was called the West, but at the same time, cannot escape the geoeconomic reality of the world’s largest soon to be economy in China. And certainly, if you are in the Asia-Pacific region, finding that that geoeconomic weight really pulls you very close into its orbit. And I’m just wondering, Michael, if you’re there, and the Executive Director of the Lowy Institute, whether you could share a little bit how you are coping. Is there a new regionalism emerging, or maybe clusters of countries that are trying to find a way to navigate, and is that something that the Lowy Institute is exploring, in particular? How are you coping with this very brutal political debate, but at the same time, this desire to try to find a way forward? Michael, over to you.
Dr Michael Fullilove AM
Well, thank you, Robin, and let me join John and others in wishing Chatham House happy birthday. I think the scale of this event shows the global reach, almost the imperial reach, of Chatham House. And – but I do want to compliment you, Robin, on being a very effective Director and an excellent colleague and I wish you every – well in everything except cricket, if I can put it that way, Robin.
In terms of the regionalisation and the globalisation, Australia used to suffer under the tyranny of distance and now we suffer from the predicament of proximity, where wealth and power have moved eastwards towards us. And so, the old model of sending troops to conflicts in the Middle East as a down payment on an alliance is over and this is really the central front of geopolitics is in our part of the world. And we’re right in the middle of the US-China rivalry, because the United States is our old ally and China is our most important economic partner.
The – let me say two things. First of all, how does Australia rela – react and then, how does an Australian think-tank react? Australia reacts in two dimensions, first of all, by building thicker connections in the region and even last week, Australia announced a major defence strategic update, more defence spending, and much more lethal deterrent capability, much – many more operate – really re-pivoting the Australian Military towards our region, rather than those sorts of global coalition operations. But at the same time, retaining those links to the global ally and building links with other countries around the world who are all confronting a similar challenge. And I’d find – I’d point out to those that those two dimensions operate at the think-tank level, too.
We are – as the Lowy Institute, we are doing more with our colleagues, many colleagues on this call and others, with Samir Saran at ORF, with colleagues at CISC in Indonesia, in Tokyo, in Port Moresby, in regional capitals. We are working heavily on Asia. Asia touches every piece of work we do and yet, at the same time, we are trying to do more with our global allies, more with institutes in the United States and, also, more with likeminded – with institutes in likeminded countries. So, for example, for many years we’ve been involved in the Council of Councils, which Richard Haass, who’s on this call, instituted, but we are also doing more with other sorts of institutions. So, for example, a few weeks ago I hosted a meeting of the D10 Strategy Forum, which is something the Atlantic Council has started with Foreign Policy Planners and Think-tank Directors from ten major democratic countries.
So, as foreign policy – as the diplomatic geometry is changing, think-tank geometry is changing, too, and we are trying to find more allies. As Funabashi said, Funabashi San said, “Compare notes with other colleagues” about how we deal with the China challenge. And just to finish on that point, Robin, I think the challenge here is where – we have to co-operate with China, where our interests overlap, but we need to be able to pushback against China when our interests diverge. And that is the common challenge that is felt, not only in Australia, not only in Tokyo or in Seoul, but in London, in Paris, in Berlin, in Brasilia, in Buenos Aires, all around the world, we’re all grappling with that challenge, so I think we can help each other think it through.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Oh, very good points, and I think, as you said, the changing geography, in a way, of think-tanks. Fortunately, as we all know, there are many more institutions around than there were in the 30s and those early years when think-tanks had to grapple with these problems before. But, hopefully, we’ve thickened up the scoop a little bit of ideas and the lessons learned and the mistakes not to be repeated from the past.
Hak-Soon Paik, you’re President of the Sejong Institute in Seoul, in South Korea. I thought that, actually, quite a good mix, ‘cause I think although not mentioned immediately by Michael a second ago, I know that those, kind of, regional linkages between countries that share values, and I think Michael used the likeminded term and I think on this D10 group there’s some suggestion, certainly by the British Government and others, that South Korea would be one of the countries that would be involved in maybe a G10, a G7 that expands itself out a little bit. Could you just share your thoughts on how you’re coping with this at the Sejong Institute in Seoul, Hak-Soon, over to you?
Dr Hak-Soon Paik
Okay, and thanks, Robin. I would just say that the British made it so great a country – contributions to humankind and English literature and the Chatham House view. I thought that you’d laugh or smile, you know, I did this joke. This joke is of my own creation and I did this as a way of congratulating, you know, your contribution for the past 100 years.
Sort of, going back to, you know, the thing we are talking about, I think, you know, with Korea, not only Korea, but also the Sejong Institute, has – and it’s quite the same, you know, problems as my colleague at the Lowy Institute, you know, pointed out. But if you look at the problem from Seoul, definitely regionalism, a deeper regional induration, would help in overcoming the negative aspects of divided geopolitics we are suffering from these days. But in this region, you know, East Asia, in Northeast Asia, we have very strong opposing sub-power blocks clearly dividing the integration on – in this region. We have China and Russia and North Korea on the one hand and the United States, Japan and South Korea and Taiwan on the other.
And – but more importantly, we try to, you know – we have a problem in still and not gotten out of the trap, mental trap or, you know, obsessional trap, if you will, in which we almost automatically, you know, try to understand non-traditional security issues and the like of naturalisation of security issues. For instance, you know, COVID-19, this is a non-security – human non-security issue and it’s a human security issue, but the United States and China, for instance, and Japan and Korea, as well, you know, almost, you know, instantaneously, you know, tried to, you know, interpret it as a, you know, a – in the concept and in the policy of – in the context of, you know, traditional security issues. So, there’s a level of co-operation between us.
And so, I think, you know, one thing we have to do, regardless of whether we are talking about how to overcome the negative impacts of divided geopolitics or, you know, the implications of, you know, deeper regional, you know, integration as an answer to how to – how best to navigate, you know, among this security environment, we all have to make sure that all those human, manmade disasters, including COVID-19 and – should be, you know, very seriously discussed, in our effort to – whatever we do for the pandemics of the general climate. Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much. That was perfectly heard, Hak-Soon, your comments there. This idea that even issues that are not connected automatically to geoeconomic context or geopolitics, like COVID-19, instantaneously, as you said, become areas of geopolitical conflict. This is going to create dilemmas for think-tanks that try to separate out the functional issues from the geopolitical and they’re all going to get meshed together, as John Hamre said at the beginning, in a more geoeconomic environment. We can’t separate out the economic from the political at the moment.
Let me turn, then, just to keep things going, ‘cause I want to make sure I give everyone a good chance, you’ve all been so disciplined with your time that we’re actually on time, Thomas Gomart in Paris, the Director of IFRI. And it does remind me, if I could just throw a bit of Chatham House history in, as well, that, I’d say tragically, in a way, two of our most illustrious scholars in the last – you know, this side of the Second World War, if they don’t mind me putting it that way, William Wallace and Helen Wallace, two of the people who really championed the idea of the UK forming part of a regional organisation to strengthen their power, obviously, are living to see the day where that is now being lost. And I’m wondering, Thomas, how optimistic are you in France, in Paris, that Europe will be able to come together, provide some of the strategic autonomy, to use the terminology that’s been used, to deal with this much more complex environment? Thomas, how are you advising this from Paris?
Dr Thomas Gomart
Well, on that I am simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic, and I am pessimistic for all of the reasons we debate all the time doing think-tankers, you know, about European strategic autonomy. I have no time to elaborate, but more deeply, I am pessimistic for our job, given the evolution of expertise. The fact that now expertise is directly attacked by Politicians. We are all facing, sort of, little trumps, you know, on each European political sins, and I think that’s something very challenging for all think-tanks. In France, in particular, we enter a presidential campaign, as you know. I am also very optimistic for our job, given the fact there is a huge social demand for geopolitics and for geoeconomics. For instance, you know, in the French education system it has been decided that geopolitics will be taught before ‘A’ Levels, for instance, which is, you know, reflecting something.
That leads me to a second point, Robin, and I should have started with that, it’s to congratulate, of course, Chatham House, because we see a far – you invented the job of think-tanks, you know. And there is this late reaction on Eur – Continental Europe to create their own think-tanks. You mentioned, you know, IFRI, there was – before IFRI it was CEPE, Centre d’Etudes de Politique Etrangère and there was a fantastic job made between CEPE and Chatham House just before the Second World War, for instance. So, we are in this history and this history, once again, was invited by you, by CFR, and was very important, I think, you know, in the transatlantic relations.
That leads me to my third point, I think that for us, and it’s also a way to respond directly to your question, what will be the most challenging thing will be to combine the global narrative, the regional narrative, and I do believe there won’t be a European strategic autonomy without a European narrative, with the national narratives and think-tanks like ours I think are capable to act, to operate and to link these three levels.
In terms now to finish about, you know, the main challenges regarding European strategic autonomy, I see two things. The very first one is to be able to produce expertise and piece of advice regarding the current fight for technological supremacy between China and the US and its consequences for Europe. That’s a very big issue, obviously. And second, also, to explain that the global – the climate warming is something, I think, more and more challenging for Europeans. I have no time to elaborate on the great deal, but it’s also a way for me to say that during the Cold War, you know, many think-tanks were the home for, I would say, so-called defence intellectuals and I do think that we will become more and more home for, I would say, environmental intellectuals. It seems to me highly important, because the Politicians on that, very often, are not very reasonable and I think that we should work on that.
Let me finish by saying you, Robin, personally, my thanks, because you were one of those who supported me when I became a Director and it’s a good day for me to be there for your celebration. Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, Thomas, and we’ve – I was pleased to be able to be with you for your 50th anniversary in Paris, in that wonderful location of the Sorbonne, I think it was last year. Seems like a whole generation ago, almost. So, I’m delighted you were able to return the compliment and be here today. Very much appreciated and best to you and Thierry and all of your colleagues at IFRI in Paris.
You mentioned a very important point at the end, there, about this need to focus on the environmental, the climate diplomacy, which is bubbling underneath the surface there, and more than under the surface. But even at this COVID-19, in this moment of geopolitics, and I’m proud to say, if I’m – I think I’m allowed to do this, on our centenary, our largest area of research at Chatham House has been, for at least ten years now, and continues to be, in the energy, environment, and particularly environment, and climate space and over resource management, in particular, with our Hoffmann Centre and our Energy, Environment and Resources Team. So, a big shout out to them and I know they’re incredibly busy with work and we look forward to collaborating with all of you on coming up with good ideas in that space, going forward.
I did want to shift, and I’m just going to keep moving through the agenda here, ‘cause that way we’ll give everyone a good opportunity to intervene, as all the others have done on here, into this difficulty of dealing with a more polarised world, that everyone has described – each of the speakers we’ve had so far has been talked – talking about the complexity, as a think-tank, of dealing in an environment where expertise is no longer as appreciated, it doesn’t sit inside a particular narrative, where nationalism is on the rise. And I remember that a lot of the biggest Chatham House studies in the 30s was a whole series on the rise of nationalism then. It feels like we should be, as we were about five/six years ago, doing even more in that space today. But I’m wondering, Richard, if I could turn to Richard Haass first, because Richard, you are the Council on Foreign Relations, but you are, like Chatham House, our sister institute, founded out of the same dinner at the Hotel Majestic, back in May 20 – in 1919. You have retained, through your membership, but also, I think, expanded, a much more national dialogue through CFR. And I’m just wondering if, I mean, say whatever you want on the geopolitics, but if you could just give us a window into how you’ve been adapting CFR to deal with the more complex national dialogue about America’s place in the world and the kind of role think-tanks play. Over to you, Richard.
Dr Richard Haass
Well, thank you, Robin, and I expect there are days that we regret that we did not become that joint institute that was envisioned a century ago, but seems to me you’re doing just fine without us.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, we’d love to share a bit of your endowment, but apart from that, it’s fine.
Dr Richard Haass
Well, fair – duly noted. Look, on the geopolitics issue I just say one thing, which is I think this is an important moment for think-tanks, which is that for so much of our careers, particularly those of us who are relatively ancient, we were working – you know, during the Cold War, you woke up every day, you had a pretty good sense of what would greet you. I spent too many years thinking about warheads on launchers and all that and now this really is a moment for first order thinking, whether it’s about US-China, whether it’s about global issues, the structure of the international system, what we mean by order. So – and by and large, the Academy has opted out, because it’s too theoretical and too quantitative and so forth.
So, I really do think this is an important moment for organisations like these, which is to tackle these big issues. There really is almost a palpable sense of living in history and to both come up – come forward with the analysis and come forward with some prescription and I think we’re on the hook for both. So, I really do think this is a time to think big and think not just day-to-day, but also medium-term and longer-term. Governments are unable to generate, for the most part, that kind of creativity. Again, the Academy has largely opted out. So, I really do think we are – we have both an opportunity and obligation to fill that space, which is, in some ways, a natural segue to what you asked me. Yeah, we are operating in a hyper-politicised environment.
We’re also operating in an environment where we can’t take anything for granted, in terms of what people know, because I’ll speak of my own country, the education is so inadequate in these areas, you can graduate from virtually any higher education institution in America and be functionally illiterate about the world if you choose to. There’s tons of information available on the internet, but there’s no-one there to edit it or authenticate it. There’s no-one there to guarantee that people get a comprehensive exposure to anything. The same is true of our cable television, our radio. So, I think we’re operating informa – we’re both flooded with information and it’s widely inadequate at one and the same time. So, one of the things we do, I think, need to do, is be a provider of information that’s comprehensive and accurate. We’ve done a lot of work on what we would call explainers or basics, essentially putting out educational material, ‘cause the schools aren’t doing it, we’re doing, to put it bluntly, at the Council.
I think in terms of dealing with the politics, the partisan and the divided landscape, one is to make sure that we all always offer up a range of views and not just for the sake of offering up a range, but a range of informed views. And this is true, I think, of who works on our staffs, like our Fellows, who we invite to speak at meetings, who, in our case, we would invite to publish in our – in foreign affairs. But it’s got to be a range. You’ve got to fight pigeonholing, I think, and just speaking to your own particular constituency, it has – it puts pressure on money, I understand that. In a funny sort of way, it’s often easier to fund if you’re predictable and more radiological and I would say, like, as is often the case, resist temptations and think about multiple funding sources in terms of type but offer directions. It’s a challenge, but I think it’s a challenge worth it. I’m a great believer, as you know, in not having official sources of funding from governments, I think there’s a sense of that.
Could I just say two other things in dealing with this environment? I don’t want to go on for long. One is to put your stuff out on a range of media outlets. Like one of your – from – you know, so, for – in the United States it means yes, you go on MSNBC or CNN, but you should also go on Fox and you should pub – or this radio show, or this newspaper. I think there is an argument for, again, not just speaking to the particular choir that you like.
And then, lastly, we’ve spent an awful lot of calories thinking about who do we reach, you know? So, in a country of 325 million people, we only have 5,000 members. That doesn’t – you know, it’s not a significant percentage. So, what do we – so, you know, so, we’ve targeted students, faculty and Administrators in high schools and universities? We’ve targeted the people who give sermons every week in churches and mosques and synagogues. We’ve targeted Governors, Mayors, we’ve – and we have targeted Journalists. What all these groups have in common is, in some ways, they’re force multipliers. Every one of these people has access to lots of other people, obviously business leaders, labour leaders, besides Congress and the Executor. And so, besides the obvious governmental or colleagues, which were the, kind of, constituencies I think, think-tanks deal with naturally, we all want to influence our governments, we all want to influence one another, I do think we need to look at who in society are the drivers of the conversation and many more people show up in church every Sunday than show up at event – at our events. Many more people are in classrooms every week and I think that we have to make more of an effort to get beyond those who opt into the debate, those who are self-joiners who are – one of the things I tell, and I’ll stop with this, I say, “It’s fine to speak to world affairs groups, but it’s actually much more important to go speak to rotary clubs.” Try to get beyond the people who are self-defining and self-joining the foreign policy/international relations conversation and think about getting out to a broader citizenry and I think for all of us that’s – it’s not either/or by the way. We should continue what I would call the inside game, the more establishment elite thing that all of us do. But I believe we have to spend part of our time and resources on reaching constituencies that are not traditionally part of the foreign policy conversation and I think in Europe, the question of – in Brexit and votes like that make that point. For better and for worse, these are now popular subjects and what – and I just think that we have to now – we can’t just be elite or establishment organisations.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Very well-made points, Richard, thank you for that and, also, giving the flavour of what, specifically, you’ve been doing at CFR. And I remember one of my predecessors as Director used the expression about the ‘rifle shot approach’, which was so in vogue or necessary back when, but now we’ve moved to the position, as you said, where you’ve got to, kind of, enlarge the aperture. And I liked your point about ‘informed views’, ‘cause I think what we struggle with in many think-tanks is involving a diverse view of people who disagree with you, you sometimes wonder are those informed disagreements or are they just plain disagreement for an ideological reason? And trying to navigate that one is incredibly difficult. Thank you very much, Richard, for that.
And I just – as everyone’s been so good on time, I’m going to jump to South Africa, to Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. Elizabeth, thank you for joining us there, and the Chief Executive of the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, which is a sister institute of Chatham House, from our, I think Michael called it our ‘imperial’ days. Maybe colonial was the right term, slightly, to be used from that historical moment. But Elizabeth, great you could join us there from South Africa. Could you just share a word or two, ‘cause we know, talking about polarised political environments, obviously, South Africa’s still having to grapple with the heritage of an incredibly polarised political environment, how are you managing this issue from your standpoint? Elizabeth, over to you.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
Great, well, Robin, let me also add my congratulations to Chatham House for its centenary, from the younger sister, which is a young 86-year-old, we turned 86 in May this year. So – and it’s great to be able to join you and also to say that, certainly, over the last few years, we’ve also really developed a very good engagement with your Africa Programme at Chatham House, apart from the history of co-operation over many years.
Just a couple of points, I think the first issue, and this is not only about South Africa, but also, more broadly about the continent, is that while we are facing a much more polarised environment, the relationship between the primary constituency of think-tanks, the policy community and think-tanks on the continent, has always been very difficult. It’s been very difficult because they’ve been seen as part of a broader community of civil society organisations, which as the continent, many countries on the continent, were democratising, was seen as almost being in opposition to the government. And in the absence, also, of a strong opposition within Parliament, and this also goes for South Africa, by the way, think-tanks and other civil society actors almost became that opposition and so, that’s the milieu in which we have been operating.
Also to say that think-tanks on the continent, and to some extent this mirrors partly South Africa, but not entirely, obviously, have been relatively weak, haven’t had the kind of strong policy, engagement and particularly also, in international relations, which, of course, is now much broader than it was, say, 50/60 years ago, not just looking at internat – at foreign affairs and defence, but obviously covering a whole range of issues. So, they are coming – or, you know, into this highly polarised environment, already, on the backfoot.
Having said that, a couple of points which will, I think, echo, to some extent, what Richard has been saying. I think the first point that we’re – at SAIIA and in South Africa are recognising and trying to act on, increasingly, is the fact that the policymakers are not the only audience and the most important audience. That, in fact, policymaking these days is happening as much as a result of what is happening out on the street or through actors that are the loudest. And so, you, as a think-tank that comes in with a reasoned, rational approach, is sometimes shouted down and shouted out and that, I think, also reflects a lot of the points that many colleagues have already made.
So, what does that mean for how we engage? I think a couple of things. Firstly, clearly, that it is about broadening your reach and here, thinking about many of the actors that are much more activist in the way in which they engage with policymakers. So, civil society organisations, we, as an institute, through our work on governance in the continent, have engaged with a number of civil society actors who are involved in governance initiatives within their own countries and, sort of, bringing in some of our research dimensions into that, that’s one avenue.
A second avenue relates to how we have built up the way in which we engage with youth. Youth in high schools, but also, over the last several years, really built up a cohort of young people in universities, largely in universities, who are dealing with – who are engaging as youth on the challenges, that both have a local, as well as a regional and global dimension. And so, they have created youth policy committees on gender-based violence, on climate change, on issues around how youth can really be mean – participate meaningfully in policy engagements. Not a – not tick box exercises where the government says, “I’ve invited five young people and they sat at the table and they made an observation.” It’s about much, much more than that and so, that’s another way of, also, sort of, not only broadening, but going into communities that would traditionally not be part of the remit of, you know, an elitist foreign policy institute.
And perhaps two last points. One is the importance in this highly polarised environment, and in South Africa we have the overlay, of course, of our history of Apartheid, to really be able to create platforms that are not always politically correct, platforms that bring together different views, that allow these views to be properly debated and so, the issue of informed debate, that’s one of our taglines. But that, also, then bring into those discussions, actually, evidence-based research. So, it’s not about everybody having to – having an opinion, but that opinion is simply driven by emotion rather than facts.
And lastly, I think we need to, and this is a critique of, I think, think-tanks in South Africa, and probably within the continent, as well, we always say, “We need to be focusing on over the horizon thinking,” and I think a lot of the time we’re not. Partly because of our circumstances, which means you’re constantly trying to find and trace the money, but we need to have our eyes and ears open and out there. And I think the means of engagement with the broader community, as well as having a much more diverse group of people internally and who – with whom you engage externally, I think would provide that kind of input into being much more relevant.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Elizabeth, thank you very much, and especially your very interesting point about think-tanks almost being seen as the opposition, you know. As such an arm of civil society in many of the countries across Africa, is a really important observation which probably applies to a few other countries, as well. And, obviously, your comments there, you’ve come from such a young continent, unlike many of the other think-tanks that we’ve heard form, who are grappling with the other end of the spectrum, and you’ve got a whole massive challenge of engagement, which must be, actually, very thrilling and, kind of, dynamic, which is excellent in that sense.
Let me turn to Carlos Leal, ‘cause we’re literally going all the way from South Africa, now, to Brazil, the President of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas Foundation. Carlos, you know, for better or for worse, Brazil is thought of as a place with now some pretty polarised political debate, as well. You’ve Presidents who get impeached, actually do get impeached, and out of office, and a very conflictual environment. How are you, the leader of a very large and highly respected academic institution and think-tank, how are you coping with this environment? Over to you, Carlos.
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
The first thing is that I don’t talk.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
It’s alright, there’s only a few million people listening to you on the link. It’s only being recorded.
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
This is very important, you see, Brazil has had a long tradition of non-confrontational politics. Recently, we have been – we have left that tradition. But it is most likely that we will come back to it in the medium-term, it’s part of our institutional evolution. There are many things going on. This COVID crisis it’s not only a sanitary crisis, it is an economic crisis because of – that was triggered because of confinement, but it is also a long-term crisis because of the push in digitalisation. So, we are going to have a lot of people unemployment – a lot of people unemployed, not because of confinement, and it’s a fact, but because of digitalisation.
On the other hand, it also means that instead of competing with other regions of the world with our average education, we will be competing with the average of a top part of our education against the average of a top of part of other parts of the world. So, many people are noticing that there are many opportunities. You see, the big thing about these, all these toys that we are using now, Webex, Teams, Zoom, etc., it’s the ecosystem that some of them have behind that allow you to process technologies much faster and much better. And that’s – we have an issue on productivity in this country and this is going to change a lot of things. So, if you have a danger of a crisis and an opportunity, it is a Brazilian tradition that we will get the opportunity and stop bickering. This will take a while, it’s true, and there are many factors for that, and recent past corruption is one of them. There are many people that are still very angry. But I think that things will go – will move forward. You see, we have elections every four years for Presidents and – but a delay of two years, we have elections every four years, too, for Congress, meaning the both Deputies and the Senators. So, this is bound to move, yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah.
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
So, I mean…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, you’re…
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
…the important thing right now is that – your question was, can think-tanks thrive in this environment? Yes, but you have to choose what thrive means to you. You can have short-term success in politics by become a party there in a think-tank, or you may start to look at more – at things that have a long-term influence. The debt crisis, is that going to be a world debt crisis within a year and a half from now? Countries have been printing money like mad, no-one knows. So, what does it mean for Brazil, with the world standards charge changing? So, we are looking at that, we are studying that. There are people interested on what we are studying, and we are taking the long-term view.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Sounds like the right approach to take and so, you are echoing Richard’s comment there about think-tanks being able to take that longer perspective than governments…
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…are able to do. Incredibly…
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…important point. Thank you very much, Carlos. Thank you for…
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…bringing that…
Dr Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal
Congratulations on the – on your 100th birthday.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, all the way from Brazil. Thank you so much for those remarks. I want to jump to, now, back into Europe, to Volker Perthes, because although I won’t have a chance to catch many of the questions being put in, in the ‘Q&A’ chat by people who are watching this event online, but also as members adding questions. There was one very important one that jumped out at me, Volker. I’m sorry to throw it to you, but I think it’s a good segue, slightly, also, to what Carlos was saying, about the challenges our societies are facing. Volker Perthes in Berlin, “Were think-tanks asleep at the wheel?” question. Did we spend too much time enjoying globalisation and the great post-Cold War moment where we thought everything was fine and now, we’ve almost been creators of this more polarised national political environment, ‘cause we were not warning against it? Volker, tough question, but you can handle it.
Dr Volker Perthes
Well, thank you, Robin, and thanks for the last 100 years and good luck for the next 100 and thanks for at least 30 years of intensive co-operation between our two organisations.
Look, I would respectfully disagree with that being asleep at the wheel. I had the chance to look through what we did in our last 15 years, because I’m preparing to handing over, after 15 years, to a new Director here at SWP, and then you find out where you actually did all these warning things. What you never did, and I think we cannot do, is to say, look, this is going to happen. But what we can do is we can tell policymakers, deciders, that here are a couple of risks which we see, and you better get prepared for them, or you better get prepared for risks as such. I mean, risk is, sort of, part of the normalcy with which you have to live, which you have to handle, and I think we weren’t so bad here, relatively speaking. But to be more self-critical, I think sometimes we are collectively, sort of, very much of an in group, where we clap one another on our shoulders and say that we agree. We often do and probably we should disagree a little bit more often, even between think-tanks and in different countries of the world. Which makes it so important for me to tell some of our friends who say that we, as think-tanks in liberal democratic countries have to put up a fight for democracy. Well, as a citizen, I would say yes, but as a think-tank, I would defend the necessity of a think-tank to speak to those who are not likeminded and find out more about how others see the world. And sometimes that doesn’t go down too well with some members of our political leadership, but I think it has to be explained, can be explained.
Let me speak about, so, which I think was a lead question for this group, sort of, the fragmentation and polarisation. Here Germany is, obviously, in a different league than the US at the moment, or Brazil, or even South Africa. We do have our own right-wing populists in Parliament, as everybody has in Europe. Since we are a publicly funded think-tank, we get some fire, particularly from these right-wing populists or extremists, whatever you want to call them, and asking in Parliament, in parliamentary interpolations, why we use our money to speak positively about migration, for example. Now, that happens, but it is okay, at the same time, even those right-wing parties in Parliament, or, so, it’s one only, they would take our advice if they want to know how the world is going. And I would say that, generally, particularly over the crises of the last years, it’s not only COVID, it’s the whole unravelling of an order as we know it, particularly in my country, there is generally more demand for sound expertise. And what may be a particular German feature is, since we are seeing that the United States is not there to lead, as we knew it and as we found it very comfortable that it happened, there is more demand for expertise on geopolitics, on international relations and there is a realisation, okay, we have to know more, we have to do more, certainly we should have sound analysis. And for us, as a think-tank, it’s particularly important, particularly, also because we are publicly funded, which in contrast to Richard, I would defend as a good thing to remain independent from certain vested interests, that you have to make clear that you are not the government’s spokespeople, that you differ from government opinion on a fact-based – on a factual basis, that you are pluralistic in the research you do, and that you do – that’s a very, sort of, ancient word, that you do your research sine īrā et studio, as it’s called in Latin, without hate, without prejudice, without a certain agenda.
And then – and here I agree with almost all my colleagues and Richard started that, but I put it in different words, I think our task has changed a little bit, because in the past I would say we have to speak truth to power, that’s still true. Today, I guess, we have to speak truth to the people much more than we used to do and that means we usually use the four Is, because that I, the letter I, and because that goes in English and in German, and that means information, which the public needs, the public wants. It means interpretation about where we are in the world. It means ideas, that’s mainly what governments, decisionmakers, are asking for, but it also means irritation. And I think as think-tanks, we should maintain our right and defend our rate – our right to irritate those who take the decisions, a little bit, from time-to-time.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, Volker, and that willingness not always to be popular, as you said, but to irritate and right now, the – you also made the point about putting up the fight to be able, also, to speak to the not likeminded and that think-tanks have a particular role to play not to be following the crowd on these issues, but to be trying to create some of those bridges. And I think the wonderful group of people we’ve got here today is a symbol of that, so thank you very much for making those points.
I’ve got three more of my colleagues I want to bring in now. I’m going to go straight into that group, ‘cause I can see we’re already at ten past two and this is meant to finish in the next five to ten minutes. So, everyone’s been amazingly disciplined on their time, so, thank you very much, indeed, for being so focused. I’m going to turn, actually, first, to Samir Saran and then go to Daniela and then to Francisco Santibañes. But first to Samir Saran, who’s the President of the Observer Research Foundation. Samir, I think you’re probably in Mumbai. That’s certainly where I’ve met you in the past. But Samir, you’ve talked a lot about the way technology is disrupting both economies, international politics and I presume, think-tanks, as well. I’ll give that as your entry point, but any comments you’d like to share, as well, about this new environment for think-tanks? Over to you, Samir. And host of the Raisina Dialogue, I should say, as well, which is a wonderful gathering. Samir, over to you.
Dr Samir Saran
Thank you, Robin, and let me first congratulate you for a century, in cricket terms, and while you prosper and continue to engage in public service, as you have done for the last 100 years, both you and Michael should be prepared to lose in cricket, because that power centre has certainly shifted.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
It didn’t tail off. I’m not going to cut you off. You’re allowed to – you can rib us on cricket, if you want. Okay go ahead.
Dr Samir Saran
Well, no, but I, you know, I was hearing my colleagues speak and I guess there are three threads, which are visible, which are implicated by technology, by globalisation generally and by the kind of politics we are engaging with today. The first, of course, I think someone used the word ‘street’ and I think that’s the important term to engage with, as think-tanks, today. Street consensus is more potent than elite consensus and I think as soon as we can begin to reconcile with that, we become more effective institutions. It is people who need to be, like Volker was suggesting, engaged with, informed, learned from and made partners in the progress that they seek, and there are two reasons for doing this.
First, I think the takers on the street, and be it Berlin or Buenos Aires or New Delhi, and I’m in Delhi, not in Bombay, Robin, you would find that the affection, the romance around globalisation, is at its nadir. People are not buying into the global project anymore. It was much easier to sell the global ambitions, ideas, globalism, global projects or many of our institutions in the past, because globalisation was seen to be doing good to many people and lifting many folks out of poverty, delivering prosperity, jobs, sustainability. Clearly, that project has hit a road bump and I don’t think this is a political bump. I think, again, if we are true and honest, I think globalisation has hit an economics bump, but economics is wrong, inequality is, it’s stark. There is a life expectancy difference of 30 years between the top 10% households and the bottom 10% households. Right to life has been priced variably by globalisation and unless you can start responding to the principal equality that must be enshrined in an economic project, politics will get messy and as the street consensus becomes more important, the space for you to engage in high politics is going to be restricted by immediate economics and I think immediate economics requires urgent attention, otherwise big global projects will always tend to suffer and that is, in many ways, also the design that we need to work with as think-tanks.
The second big question, of course, is that many of us have not made that transition where we can think about 21st Century questions around technology and innovation and the fourth Industrial Revolution, because we still have a 20th Century project to complete. We still have to complete schools and hospitals and powerlines and roads and rural development initiatives. So, we are – countries like ours are at one level, still engaged with 20th Century debates where the role of the state was very different, they had an eminent domain, they used to give licences, they used to give operating permissions, they used to have a different form and format. And we have to engage with the innovation sanctuary, where the state has to be absent, the state has to allow space, the state has to allow complete freedom. So, policymaking, in many of the parts of the world where we are grappling with both of these realities, is even more complex, and then, the streets that you need to walk are very different.
Now, globalisation may have English as its language and Thomas, please forgive me, but domestic politics is fought in vernaculars. And I think-tanks, unless they can be multilan – multilingual, both in their thought and in their pronouncements, are going to struggle. Now, all of this is captured very nicely, these contradictions, these challenges, these different urges, these pulls and pressures, are captured in your tutor app on your phone, or in any other social media that you inhabit. Technology allows and gives a microphone, a megaphone, a loudspeaker, to everyone. Now, it breaches the boundaries between elite and street, it breaches the boundaries between opinion and analysis, it challenges the concept of purity of research with the legs of a catchy rhetorical idea and I think in think-tank terms, our principal ideal has to be to defend research. We have to defend research, but we have to be able to achat – attach it to the lingua franca of the digital age. And I think our biggest challenge, going ahead, is going to be that how do you make longform research sexy? I’m sorry if I’ve offended anyone by using that term, but I think unless we can make longform sellable in bits and bytes, the digital world is going to ignore much of the produce, so that’s one part.
Second, I think, think-tanks have to shed the hypocrisy. Think-tanks will – if you ask a think-tanker ten years ago, “What should governments do?” they will tell you, “Decentralise, invest in big data, invest in AI,” invest in everything that think-tanks have never done. None of our think-tanks have invested in the solutions we implore our governments. I think now we have to be two tanks. We have to create the formats, the pilots, the incubators, that can then become, also, an experiential centre for governments and other stakeholders to embrace. So, I think we have to quickly move into two tanks, because the street wants more immediate response from the rather lethargic ecosystems that were built in the last century.
And the final point before I end, I think I completely relate to what CFR is trying to do and I think I heard this earlier from Ambassador Haass, as well, but I think by the time – you know, when I was growing up, my grandmother used to tell me about the rights and wrongs and principles and ideas and stories about mythologies and stories about foreign lands. That used to be the age between ten to 15 or ten to 16. It’s now the handset, the mobile phone that tells the kids that. By the time kids reach college and by the time they reach their master’s degree, then we start engaging with them, they’ve already made up their mind. I think we have to start engaging with the much younger constituents. If we don’t go down to the schools, if we don’t start engaging at – with a demography which is far different, we have lost the debate before even entering it. So, I think the demographic challenge, both in terms of the two projects I mentioned: the 20th Century and the 21st Century, the language challenge, the aid challenge and, of course, the global challenge, that how do we make globalisation sexy again? Now, the pandemic tells us two things, and I’m going to end with that, number one, since I have been born and since I understand the world, I’ve never seen Uncle Sam absent from a global crisis like I have seen Uncle Sam absent this time. Uncle Sam is not there anymore, and you don’t have champions to champion globalisation and the most – the strongest contender for the position of Uncle Sam has been implicated in the pandemic. So, the two big actors who should be underwriting, defending, promoting and supporting, and sustaining global projects, are both, in some sense, perversely implicated by what we have experienced in the last four months. So, it’s an exciting time to be in a think-tank. The most important phase of our lives, probably, is ahead of us. The next ten years is going to create a whole new template for the rest of the century and, hopefully, we’ll partner, Robin, as we’ve been doing in the past.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Samir, thank you, both architectural and passionate and I think your comments there about needing to shed our hypocrisy, but also how to make globalisation sexy again are big rallying calls. Thank you, Samir, for those comments. And a reminder, ‘cause I got a question from Neil Carmichael in the Q&A line about, “Is Chatham House reaching outside London, at all, to these groups?” And I think both with our SNF CoLab, which is creating more immersive experiences, as you said, ways of communicating longform into the digital era, and I think all of us, as think-tanks, are involved in that, to our resource’s capacity. But also, even such a London centric think-tank is London and we are a very London centric country, as we know we have been, we’ve been running meetings through our Queen Elizabeth Academy in Liverpool, Bristol, Manchester, Edinburgh, all sorts of places, which we had not done before. So, I’m not saying this with pride. It’s taken us a long time to get there, but at least, like all think-tanks, if we can’t learn our lessons, then we’re not think-tanks.
Daniela, let me bring Daniela Schwarzer in now, the Director of DGAP, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, founded, again, a little bit as part of the Chatham House family after the Second World War. Daniela, now, you’ve been shaking up DGAP since you took over, and I’ll let you share a few thoughts and then over to Francisco for some last words, and I’m delighted we’ve got pretty much everyone who was here at the beginning is still with us. We’ll be going for another five/ten minutes and then we’ll be finished on the half hour, I’m sure. Over to you, Daniela.
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
Thank you, Robin, and happy birthday, congratulations for all the great work you’re doing and indeed, DGAP, again, is another younger sister. We are 65 years old and very much followed the Chatham House model.
Let me just pick up one point where I guess we differ and I would like to follow-up on what Samir said, engaging the younger generation and going regional. DGAP has been doing that for now a few – a number of years and quite successfully. And the good news on that is, really, we run eight regional chapters, entirely based on volunteer work, so, our members actually engage and they help us bridge, you know, with the geography and bring the conversation to the regions, to the municipalities where they live and work and this enables us to really reach out to other audiences. They are still all, you know, elite and foreign policy interested, but now we are starting and this year, under the German new presidency, we are starting the first project where we are using our regional base to reach out to other constituencies who have really nothing much to do with European affairs, and we’ll see how that goes. Because I entirely share what a number of speakers said before me that it is very important to engage other constituencies at this point in time.
Second comment on the younger generation, again, a piece of good news, which really gives me trust in the next generation, 1,000 of our members, that is one third, are younger than 35. And, again, they work – they, basically, setup their own programme, we help, we support, but this is their thing. And they are interested in international affairs and they bring in, again, new constituencies, many of them young professionals from – not from the diplomatic service, but in other areas of society. So, I think that’s the future where we need to go when it comes to DGAP, as Chatham House Member organisation.
But let me briefly comment on – because this is the part of the conversation where we are supposed to be speaking about geoeconomics, tech and think-tank work, and I’m conscious of time. So let me briefly add a few thoughts to what Samir has been saying, on how I see think-tank work changing and what, again, what we’ve been doing around here in Berlin and where I see the future of the way we think about knowledge generation, as a first thing.
First of all, this section is supposed to be on tech and geoeconomics and this brings me to my first point. I think interdisciplinary work is all the more important now for international relations think-tanks, who used to recruit their staff from a pretty, I would say, narrow disciplinary background of European affairs, maybe international affairs, maybe security studies. But what I realise by the day is how much we need other disciplines to work with us and some of them we simply can’t recruit into a think-tank, simply because of the payment levels we have, the salary levels we have in the non-profit world. But here we need to look into partnerships. For instance, when we work on tech issues, we need specialists who understand the topical areas we work, and they may in a different professional context, and they work with us. And, interestingly, they do this with a great interest, and we have built, over the past month, a number of partnerships, which are extremely fruitful, I believe, for both sides.
Secondly, I think we need to really develop our methodological toolkit. We need to learn, as think-tanks, how we work with big data, how we can use co-operation with organisations who work with AI applications, to put their instruments to the questions we need to answer in order to see whether we can generate more knowledge and more insights into the very pressing questions we need to answer. And very early on in the discussion someone said foreign policy is increasingly defined, not by governments, but by other actors and interna – the way international relations evolve. And, of course, the private sector is a driver of many, many developments and what we need to understand, as Researchers who have as their key goal to advice policymakers in their choices and to provide independent insight, is we need to understand how these organisations work and how they think about the future and where they are driving this world. This is particularly true for the area of technology where, really, all the fundamental questions we are faced with at the moment have a relevance.
Take, for instance, the discussion we have on systemic competition and the future of democracy. If you don’t understand the role of technology in all of this, the role of platform economies, the role of, or the way authoritarian leaders are ready to use technological developments. You know, we can have a discussion on the protection of Western liberal democracy, of course, and we can be very normative about it, but we need to understand the mechanics that are going on in other places of the world and we need to draw conclusions. And sometimes they will be very sober, because, in fact, the toolkit for our policymakers will be rather limited in facing that, but we need to be aware.
And my final point how I think-tank work is already changing and will change more in the future in the area of geoeconomics and technology, is we need to involve stakeholders much more and much earlier in our thinking process. So, this old idea of researching and then handing out the results and going into a discussion when things are almost ready, I think is past time, at least for some of the issue areas we are covering and so, this, let’s say this co-operation very early on in the process is key and then, of course, and this was discussed by others, the communication we need to think of. We need to reach the audiences in the way they consume information at the moment. And this may, again, be uncomfortable for a think-tanker who likes research-based publications, but we need to be ready to be far more flexible in putting out our messages, but always making the offer to provide and deliver sound policy advice, based on the research, but the way we communicate the key messages, of course, has to change over time. Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Daniela, thank you, very thoughtful comments and thanks for being so disciplined on getting them over after so many other comments. Everyone’s been able to make something new. I thought your comment about the interdisciplinary aspect is especially important. I mean, I am conscious, having worked in think-tanks most of my life, that specialism, you know, was always what was treasured the most and sought after and then you end up with buckets of people, each specialising. But as you said, in the kind of world we’re in today, you’ve got to look for those interconnections and you may not be able to have them all under your roof, incredibly important. And this issue of not sending information, but letting people take ownership of it and so on, incredibly important, as well. And I’ll do a shoutout to Chatham House members, as well, who, like yours, are a third under 30, in our case. But I think your point about getting them to design their own programmes was very important, as well. Thank you, Daniela.
Francisco Santibañes, thank you for being so patient, ‘cause we’re jumping from Berlin all the way to Buenos Aires, just to complete part of this world tour. And a couple of people had asked questions about countries we did not get involved on this and it – as it is, it’s been a challenge, but an absolute pleasure to have so many diverse views. But I’m glad we’re able to get, as well, CARI, the Argentine Council for International Affairs, in with us today. Francisco, you’ve just took over as Secretary-General very recently. Argentina a country that is constantly being buffeted one way or the other economically, but it’s so close to the heart, both on the Western Hemisphere and in Europe. Why don’t you share any thoughts you’ve got and then I’ll do a wrap up, but over to you, Francisco.
Francisco de Santibañes
Thank you, Robin, first of all, congratulations for you and Chatham for this first 100 years. Thinking about what’s happening in Argentina, my idea will be that one of the things think-tanks can do is to give more visibility to challenges that are ignored by the leads, no, not just Politicians, but also, in the business community. And this is – Argentina is an example, because we are in a crisis, a major crisis, as in other times in our history and society tends to focus on the emergency, no, short-term solutions. But technological change, economic change, is also showing that inequality is growing within states and among the states and one of the big losers in this will be Latin America, we are seeing this.
One example, Latin American kids maybe may lose their entire school year because how hard coronavirus has hit, but also, because it coincided with the start of the school year. And this means a loss of human capital and more inequality within our societies and in relation with other countries. So, that’s, I think it’s an important point to give more visibility to subjects that are not discussed now in Latin America, in Argentina particularly, and education is one of those subjects.
How to do this, there are some points, some were mentioned already. One thing is to be closer to society, no, not just as a way to enlarge our audience, but to understand better the feelings and thinking of society, hmmm? We may face a credibility crisis of think-tanks because we are perceptively close to the leads. So, it will be important for us to be closer to the average citizens to understand and that will allow us to build bridges and create consensus.
A second point, providing accurate information. Yeah, this was already mentioned it, I think it’s key. It is still one of our main responsibilities, more now than ever, because of social networks, and fake news, it’s a – one of our most important tasks. Another challenge is to provide an environment, a culture, that promotes free – a free exchange of ideas. This is under threat in many societies and this is key to have a better product as the think-tanks, but also to promote international discussion, hmmm? To decrease the levels of uncertainty, the levels of conflict, it’s very important to have spaces like this one today to share our views and this it will be more important now than ever, more important than in the Cold War, because we are more centred now in international relations and civil society, not just states, and think-tanks have important role to play there.
And maybe my last point, it’s very important to be flexible, hmmm? John mentioned this, as think-tanks technological change, we may have to start investing less in real estate and more in technology. We will be able to get closer, as you mentioned, Robert – Robin, to people from other parts of our countries. It’s important, in a nation like Argentina, that the leads, the decisionmakers, are in Buenos Aires, a big city, the virtual meetings give us the possibility to be a more national think-tank, but also, opens other challenges. We will have more competition, it will be easier for think-tanks around the world to be part of the discussion, that’s a challenge and an opportunity. Thank you, Robin.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much, Francisco, thank you for wrapping it up and, actually, still making a key point. I think your point about the intergenerational inequity of the COVID-19 crisis is an incredibly important one to make at the end. And what we can do, as a group of institutions, to make sure that we’re part of the solution rather than the problem and not be trapped, in a way, as being seen part of an elite that is not making the difference. So, I think it was a very important point to draw to the end.
We’ve gone 15 minutes over. I have to say I was amazed how disciplined everyone had been in their remarks. And as much as I’d hoped to give people the chance to come back in, but I noticed we’ve got the bulk of the people who were there at the beginning still on this call, ‘cause it’s been such an interesting conversation, I was going to give – if any one of my colleagues had a last comment they wanted to jump in on, they can, literally, unmute themselves and make it. But I’m going to count to three and if I don’t see anyone do it, I’m going to jump in and just share some very last takeaways that I’ve picked up from these remarks. I’m counting to three, it’s sounding silent in the background. You’ve probably all got other meetings to get to at half past the hour, so let me wrap up and say just a few things I took away from this very important call. We are now in a geoeconomic Cold War, big ideas, over the horizon thinking will be incredibly important at this time and actually, having wider networks to think-tanks and making sure that we’re open for debate, even with people we disagree with, will be as important. ‘Cause we’ve got to be careful we don’t just become smaller communities at this moment of competition, whilst sticking, of course, true to our values as think-tanks.
Second big point, policymaking, obviously, is not just about governments. John Hamre’s opening comment, picked up by many of you since then, it’s about civil society and it’s about the private sector, but most importantly, it’s about an increasingly active and engaged public, how can we help them be an informed and engaged public, so that we’re going for good ideas becomes incredibly important? And what can we do not to just be seen as part of the elite, but part of the answer?
And lastly, how do you run, as Samir Saran said, both a 21st and a 20th Century agenda simultaneously? We used to say we’re in the 20th and 19th Centuries, now we’re in the 20th and 21st at the same time. Interdisciplinary is essential, maybe becoming do tanks, piloting, implementing, sharing, but as Francisco said at the end, and as he said it at the end, I’ll call him out, keep telling the truth, keep showing the facts, keep playing that core role that we do. Whatever our political environment, keep speaking truth to power, as I think was mentioned earlier.
So, look, a big thank you for all of you who joined this call, members of Chatham House, who’ve stuck with us right to the end, a little bit over time, but especially a big thanks to my think-tank colleagues, who’ve joined us here for our first event in our, kind of, centenary week. Our first event was 5th of July 1920, nice that you were here with us on the 6th of July 2020 to have this conversation. Thank you very much. Look forward to seeing all of my think-tank colleagues again, hopefully not just on Zoom, but physically. We can unmute, so we can all say goodbye to each other and thank all of you who joined us and posed lots of good questions. I’m sorry I only got to a few to them. Bye everyone, see you soon.
Dr Samir Saran
Goodbye.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
Bye, thank you.
Francisco de Santibañes
Bye, bye.
Dr Michael Fullilove AM
Happy birthday.
Dr Zhongping Feng
Thank you, have a nice evening.
