Lyse Doucet
Greetings to everyone [mother tongue]. Welcome to this, our special webinar, put together by Chatham House, entitled The Iraq War in Living Memory. Such a great title and we hope it will be a very interesting and, indeed, very urgent and timely discussion over the next 60 to 75 minutes. That depends on all of you who are joining us, how great your questions are, and how much you would like this conversation to go on for.
So, to begin, once upon a time, the Iraq War in Living Memory, memories, which are, as everyone who will be joining us knows, are still seared in the hearts and minds of so many and, most of all, of Iraqis, and it is a history which still unfolds. Ours today will begin, largely, around the US-led invasion of 2003, which was, as you will all know, a watershed moment for the people of Iraq, for the region, and far beyond, and its repercussions are still very much felt today. And the reason for discussing this today has been promoted by a very powerful, I hope you would agree, five part documentary series on BBC2 entitled Once Upon a Time in Iraq, And it has been telling the story of the Iraq War since the 2003 invasion, through the reflections, remembrances and experiences of civilians, of soldiers, and of Journalists and if you haven’t seen it yet, I urge you to either watch it on the i - iPlayer, it’s there for you to see. And if anyone’s joining us from the United States, a shortened version will be playing on PBS in the United States. But it is a reminder, if a reminder was needed, of what are the all too often tragic consequences, but certainly, the very powerful consequences in people’s lives of political decisions and the ramifications which can continue for generations to come.
So, today we would like to look at the issue of the Iraq War as Living Memory and to explore ideas about how do you compile these sort of narratives decades on and do these narratives help us to look back and re-assess the way we thought about decision making, in this case, in the early part of the Iraq-led invasion of 2003. And can we, and this is a really urgent and important question, can we actually trace a line, a straight line, a direct line, between what happened in 2003, to, of course, the rise of the insurgency, the – and the rise of so-called Islamic State, to where we are today with the protestors on the streets, young – in fact, protestors across, from across Iraqi society, complaining about corruption and nepotism, sectarianism, and the many ills which still affect Iraq today. And finally, we would also like to be guided by the question, and this is a question that many of you will have reflected upon in the years since the invasion, is that has the war in Iraq shaped our understanding and our perceptions of foreign invasions and military interventions more broadly. Is Iraq, indeed, a cautionary tale?
We have a great line of speakers joining us today, including Jo Abel, who is the Series Producer for Once Upon a Time in Iraq. She’s an award-winning Freelance Documentary Producer. She also worked on the earlier, widely acclaimed, series, Exodus: Our Journey Continues. Joining us, as well, is someone you will have seen in the film, in fact, you may know him from the most popular comedy programme in Iraq, Ahmed Albasheer, Comedian, Journalist and Director. His programme, Albasheer Show, began broadcasting in 2014 and anyone who’s had anything to do with Iraq, knows that Iraqis have a wicked sense of humour and Ahmed is proof of that.
Also, James Bluemel who’s the Series Director for Once Upon a Time in Iraq and he is the Co-Author of the book, which has been released alongside the documentary series, with the same – which takes the same name, Once Upon a Time in Iraq. His previous works include The Romanians are Coming, which was screened on Channel 4, and after that the series which I just mentioned, Exodus: Our Journey Though Europe, about, of course, the wave of migration in 2015 and what happened to some of those people, many, many people, who sought refuge in Europe, and that, too, was an award-winning series.
And finally, Dr Renad Mansour, who is – Mansour, who’s the Senior Researcher Fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, also the Project Director at Chatham House for the Iraq Initiative and he worked with James on the book, Once Upon a Time in Iraq, and also advised on the series. He’s also been, since 2011, a Senior Research Fellow at the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies in Beirut and he’s not just a thinker, but he’s also a doer. He was an Advisor, for a time, to the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Civil Society Ministry. So, welcome to all of you and welcome to you who join us from wherever you are living or working now, and we look forward to your questions as we begin our conversation.
Jo, could I, first, begin with you, to decide, in a very crowded news landscape and a very fractured world where people seem to swipe and click and move to the next story before the last story is even finished, the idea for going back and doing this kind of a very considered reflection about what happened in once upon a time in Iraq?
Jo Abel
Well, I mean, the idea came, really, from James early on, after we’d finished Exodus and I think he will talk more about that and about what motivated him to want to explore this really complicated landscape. I think to make any five-part series is an ambition and to find a way to tell the complicated and ongoing tragedy of the Iraq War in five hours was a challenge, to say the least. Documentary as a genre has great advantages and definite limitations. Essentially, our remit is to tell stories in a way that engages viewers and enables them to see and hear the experiences of others and I think that’s the difference in what we did is that we were there to tell people’s stories.
In Once Upon a time in Iraq we assumed, rightly or wrongly, that in the main, viewers knew the headlines of this war: weapons of mass destruction, an illegal war, an invasion that would liberate the Iraqi people from a cruel dictatorship, all those headlines that were told to us over and over again. And I think it’s important to understand that we’re not experts on Iraq, but we – you know, our job was to find a way to tell some of the stories from this war. And I think documentary as a genre differs in – to other types of programmes that have approached this subject over the last 17 years.
Everyone wants to make a brilliant film and to do that, you have to find the best cast, and this requires huge effort from the team. And that in this case, which was – identifies the series particularly, is the, sort of, tireless detective work of the Archive Producer to find the footage to bring the interviews to life. Two key starting points and good illustrations, I think, of how we built the series was, firstly, with Dexter Filkins and his extraordinary account in the Forever War, of his years covering Iraq for the New York Times. He was able to revisit his experiences and help us understand some of the realities and legacy of this war, whilst providing some context.
Similarly, when we found Waleed and discovered he was the lead singer of a heavy metal band in Saddam’s Iraq. We had no idea that there were hours of footage of him as an 18-year-old, and Miriam Walsh, our amazing Archive Producer, once again, tracked down the filmmaker who had followed Waleed in 2003 and 2004 and this meant that his memories and experiences could be brought to life through both interview and image. And I think, in a way, is the key to part of what has made the series so successful.
Essentially, that was how we built the series, with a cast of interviewees, who were able to return to their terrible times and share their stories. We were trying to cover 17 years of a complicated and divisive situation. You can’t hope to tell a whole story and had we tried to do that, we wouldn’t have had room for the stories we did tell. You have to make decisions that inevitably miss out great sways of context, so, for example, it was pretty clear early on that we had already heard a lot from the Politicians and not the people and it was their stories that needed to be told. I think it’s true to say that you can never expect to include everything you discover, or all the footage you film, or the testimonies you record, but you aim to weave stories that you’re told with events that contextualise them, and in doing so, create a series that draws people in. And, you know, I hope that’s what we’ve done and it’s how we have differed from other programmes that have been made on the Iraq war.
Lyse Doucet
It’s very – I don’t – I’m torn between whether I should assume everyone has seen it or whether I – we should give everything away, but it’s very raw, as you know, and you use some techniques, which aren’t often used in documentary making. You – we – you know, the outtakes, the things you cut out, people who are smoking, people who are drinking tequila, very awkward, very personal moments. A number of your – the people you interviewed said it was the first time since the, you know, the invasion of 2003, or since this battle, or since something very traumatising, that they have thought of it. So, we felt that – I mean, there was one review said, even, “It was like a therapy session.” Was this discussed about how raw it should be? I mean, obviously, it’s powerful, because we really feel the intensity of the emotion but, as filmmakers?
Jo Abel
I think that it’s very much in the model of how James, who – and it was James who did the majority of the interviews, of how he engages with people, and I think that people felt, both fear, but relief, at having the opportunity to talk about it. So, everybody was damaged by this war that we spoke to, whether they were Iraqi or American, in fact. But taking the approach of trying to understand their personal stories allows them to explore things that perhaps they wouldn’t have done. I think, you know, James is probably better placed to talk about this part of it than me, in lots of ways, but we weren’t setting out to trip anybody up, to – we didn’t have an agenda. We weren’t – we didn’t have a hypotheses that we were working from. We wanted to hear what it was like at the time when they were there and what the legacy of it, of that war was, for all those people. And I think there’s a simplicity in that, that clears the lan – a very, very complicated landscape that we weren’t – we didn’t have the time, nor were we equipped to be able to tell that complexity. And in the same way that Exodus was war and it was revealing and people were telling stories that were very difficult for them to tell, I think the same is true of the people that we’ve spoken to in the series.
Lyse Doucet
Ahmed, let me bring you in here. The – when you – let’s go back to the beginnings, Once Upon a Time. When you first got the call or the email to say – to ask you whether you’d like to go back over all your memories of this period, which, as we see in the film, it had highs and lows for you, what was your first thought?
Ahmed Albasheer
Well, first of all, I just want to say something, I never knew that tequila was allowed during the shooting of this film. So, that’s something you, Jo – you, James, you’re responsible for that.
Jo Abel
Not whiskey…
Ahmed Albasheer
Second of all…
Jo Abel
…was allowed, only tequila, only tequila.
Ahmed Albasheer
Whatever it is. Second of all, actually, this story, the story of my life, I don’t want to go back to it, because that story wasn’t so good. It wasn’t the kind of stories that someone tells it to their friend with a pride. It – I mean, with a happy face, because there is a lot of bad moments, sad moments, in it. There’s lots of sorrow, there is lot – there is a of memories that I don’t want to go back to it again. But since – once I talked about my story in a TEDx theatre Bagdad and it helped me a lot getting over some things. But after the – this documentary and they went through all the feelings, all the emotions and the questions was very – you, like, you would see it as a simple question, but at the same time, it was a relieving question for me. As you said, it’s almost a therapy session, it’s not just an interview.
I figured it out that there’s lots of things were very bad to me and I need to get rid of it and after this interview I did, and it’s helped me. But still, until this moment, I didn’t watch the whole movie, I watched only the half of it. I don’t want to go back to these moments again, because in Iraq we do this, we have a sad moments every – almost every day. There is a sad story in almost every house in Iraq, because of sectarianism, because of 1980 war, because of sanctions, because of regime up to 2003, the whole thing, I mean, the bombs, the terrorism, the militias, all of these. So, I’m sure every Iraqi house has their own sorrow or own, let’s say, problem, or big problem. So, I don’t – we don’t want to go there. We don’t want to go back. We don’t want to watch, because we want to look to the future.
I was talking to my friend, like, three minutes, five minutes ago, and she said that – five minutes before we started this session and she said, “I want a happy ending for Iraq.” And this is what we all want, a Hollywood ending for the Iraqis and I hope it’s – later on we’ll remember these moments as just the sad moments that we lived through, until we go to these good moments that we’re living on, we’re living in. But in this time, now, I don’t think so it’s possible.
Lyse Doucet
Even if – I mean, of course, I should mention, and I’ll take up some of these questions with James, is that with a film like this, where there are Iraqis, of course, who I think are the most important players of all, because it’s your country, your future, your present. But, of course, it involved Americans, it involved people from other nationalities and every – I suppose everyone will have their own sense of when it is time to go back and revisit what happened in those seminal events. But even if, Ahmed, you say perhaps it – you know, you’re looking to a better future and your eyes have to be kept forward, can I just ask of you whether you see what is unfolding in Iraq now as trace – does it trace back, for you, to that watershed moment of 2003? Is that, for you, the turning point?
Ahmed Albasheer
Oh, yeah, definitely, 100%, it’s all linked up to the 2003 moments, because we didn’t take down Saddam as we supposed to do. We should remove him, ourselves, the Iraqis, without the interference of a superpower and that’s – this is how they removed Hosni Mubarak. This is how they – you know, lots of Presidents. I know it wasn’t perfect after them, but in the same time, we should earn our democracy, we shouldn’t get our democracy from outside. And, yes, definitely it’s all linked to the 2003 moments, it’s all linked to the bad decisions that have been taken by the Iraqis and the Americans and the Brits and mostly the whole world. It’s all connected to the decision, when Bush took that decision to invade Iraq. It’s, everything is connected, militias, corruption, and inter – outside interference, the immigrants, the Iraqi immigrants, democracy, sectarianism, it’s all connected to that moment.
Lyse Doucet
And what the – this five-part documentary tells us is a story, and I don’t – well, Iraqis don’t need a documentary to tell them, but it’s a descent into something ever darker. You, in at least part of your life, are dealing with it through comedy. Is – does that help you and help Iraqis to deal with this, these dark forces that are now part of the Iraq landscape?
Ahmed Albasheer
We Iraqis just like – we are very similar to the Egyptians. We always make fun of our problems to get over it because, trust me, if you’re an Iraqi person and you’ve been dealing with all these problems, it will be ex – right, it will be impossible to get over a one bad thing that you’ve been through. And I know every Iraqi has more than 200 bad things have been through in entire – in his entire life. It’s not a bad thing about losing job or, maybe, getting a better job or a promotion. No, it’s a bad thing where you lose your loved ones by killers, where you leave your house, where you lose your job because of sectarianism, or lose your future because of sectarianism, and so on and so on. So yeah, I don’t know I was talking about, I have forgot.
Lyse Doucet
No, that’s okay.
Ahmed Albasheer
So…
Lyse Doucet
We understand. It’s just that it’s very interesting culturally that it’s a good – it’s – you know, we are – in English we often say the safety valves, that you deal with it through comedy, but it’s a – it’s…
Ahmed Albasheer
Oh yes, yes, so, comedy, we use comedy as a hope, some kind of hope. And in Iraq, we literally, our hope is – the hope for us is, like – we’re addicted to hope, so – whenever we see a window with a light open, we run to it because we believe this is the solution, this is the time for the new solution, this is the happy end that we are looking for everyone. So, comedy is one of these things. Actually, Iraqis could get over sectarianism, the sectarianism war of 2007, by using, of course with other solutions, but one of main solutions were joking about sectarianism in 2006 and 2007. They were making fun of themselves killing each other, they were making fun of militias and Al-Qaeda and terrorist and other silly militias and we – they were making fun of everything, this is how they could get over it. So, making fun of things, comedy, really helps Iraqis.
Lyse Doucet
Well, I hope if there’s any Documentary Producers listening to this webinar, that they will give you the starring role in that Hollywood film that Iraqis certainly deserves to see one day, so, hold onto that hair.
James let’s bring you in here to discuss about – Jo start – gave us a little bit of the backstory, if you like, to putting this very ambitious documentary together. Let me begin by asking you, and obviously, when you put something like this together, you’re thinking about who’s going to watch it, which audience did you have in mind when you were thinking about this documentary? Was it for maybe many audiences, but who did you want to – this to reach?
James Bluemel
Well, we made it for the BBC and our primary audience is, you know, British and I guess, by extension, Western. It’s, so, it’s made for a Western audience, to understand the impact the decision to invade Iraq had on Iraqis.
Lyse Doucet
Then – so, then I must – perhaps, well, it’ll run on PBS and perhaps it will also run on BBC World TV, which will give it a broader – I’m sure it will have an international viewing, as well, at some point.
James Bluemel
Hmmm.
Lyse Doucet
But if so, then I will ask the question that was asked in one of the reviews, of, “Why, then, not include the British part in this – in these sequence of events?” Some would say they played the enabling role to allow the invasion to go ahead, even though they weren’t the main actor.
James Bluemel
Well, they certainly legitimised it, I think, that’s for sure, and it meant that they could say they could say the word ‘coalition’, which is very useful for the Americans. I interviewed lots of British people, I interviewed lots of British soldiers, and the good thing about having the book is they’re in the book, if they’re not – it’s not completely wasted. The book is much longer than a five-part series and the series, in a filmmaking sort of terms, the series needs to be propelled by a narrative, and that narrative, you know, film one has to get to Bagdad. Who takes you to Bagdad? The British don’t, the Americans do and once you’re on that narrative, it was always that the British were always, sort of, doing everything second. They were never at the top of that spear. They were never really pushing events and then they disappear. So, they just sort of fell out there wasn’t enough, sort of, room to get them in the five-part series. And in that sense, I’m, what I’m hoping for British and a Western audience, is that the Western Army, the American Army that you see and the American Politicians and Tony Blair, that you see in the archive, that that represents our involvement, as well. They stand for the coalition.
Lyse Doucet
And what about is it possible for you to explain what your ambition was for this series? Some people have said, “Well, it gives voice to Iraqis whose voices haven’t always been the main players in previous Iraqi documentaries.” Was it to – some people say that it went away from a more ‘myopic’, to use the word used in one review, view of the world. What was your ambition, what was the signature you wanted to have through this documentary?
James Bluemel
I just wanted people to feel it. I wanted people to feel empathy and people feel empathy not with a topic or with an event, they feel empathy with other people. So, then, it was to make that connection and that’s why we included those moments that, you know, lots of other people might not have included, those off, sort of, off camera moments, I mean, they were on camera, ‘cause you can include them, but those moments which, sort of, take you in and, sort of, make you understand that person a little bit better. And it’s all about building bridges, I think, and if we – and that was the most important thing I wanted this film to do, was, yeah, it was to create empathy.
Lyse Doucet
It’s hard for Iraqis to watch, as we heard from Ahmed, and some Iraqis may feel it’s too early to go back over it. But it’s also hard for Americans to watch, because of that sense of responsibility that comes through so clearly in the film and it’s voiced by the American soldiers, who seem still damaged by what has happened. So, have you had any reaction from people who’ve been involved in the war to say, either, don’t blame everything on us, or to say, you’re right we do bare responsibility, even, for the rise of Islamic state?
James Bluemel
I mean, I had a reaction at the time from when I was interviewing, which was that they absolutely, they could draw a line between their involvement and, you know, the formation of ISIS. I don’t think they felt like they were personally, sort of, responsible, because of this thing that you take orders, but, you know, when you look back on your life, are you proud of that thing that you did in that country? No, I don’t think that many of them are really proud of that thing that they did in that country. And then, just after the broadcast, well, I haven’t heard much, you know, but you get this, sort of like – the occasional, sort of, communication from soldiers saying that it was accurate, what was shown was what it was like. And Waleed, who’s not on the – on this webinar, he got contacted by a solider that had seen the PBS version. And the solider said, like, “I was in Iraq, I was in your country, I did all this, and I just – you know, I’m in Toronto often, it would be great to, sort of, meet up and just try and make sense of this stuff.” So, people, I think, on both sides of the coin, Iraqis and Americans and British, have been affected by this.
Lyse Doucet
And are you hoping that there will be a lessons learned in this? Because, of course, the Middle East now continues to be riven by, to use Dexter Filkins’ term, “Forever Wars”, with discussion of who should intervene, although now it’s mostly regional players who are intervening, with either a nudge and a wink from Washington or London, or sometimes more active support from Paris or whatever other European capital.
James Bluemel
I think there’s lessons, obviously, need to be learned. I mean, for the film the very clear message is anti-war, you know, don’t rush into something you don’t understand. But I also think that, particularly for a Western audience, a lot of this stuff which feels like it should be very well known, just isn’t very well known. It’s been conveniently forgotten about and it’s reminding people that actions have consequences. And the world that we live in today, you know, is formed with a big, sort of, set of context, which goes back to 03. And so, we start – you know, before you start to blame refugees for coming over to Europe, you’ve got to understand the context of why this is happening.
Lyse Doucet
And it’s always tough, as you know very well, in this kind of a documentary, we were discussing before the webinar started, where you have some – you have a review coming from the Arab world, from an Iraqi, to say “Oh, we’ve heard this all before. Oh, we’ve heard – we know already of these personalities,” and then you get, from a more mainstream newspaper in the United Kingdom, saying, “Wow, impressive array of voices, haven’t heard or seen this before.” And it’s always difficult, isn’t it, to strike the right balance between those who know so much, too much, they believe, and those who are coming to it for – to the first time? And for them it’s something completely new and jarring, of course.
James Bluemel
Well, yeah, I mean, I guess you make these things to communicate to as many people as possible. You can’t just, sort of, ignore – yeah, I mean, the – I think the observation was that we had chosen people that were already quite well known in Iraq and, yeah, that might be so. I mean, I found them on – you know, a lot of it on the internet, so – but it’s not very well known outside of Iraq. And that’s, you know, that’s important to remember that this was made for an audience, a Western audience. It’s not really – well, it’s not like it’s not made for an Iraqi, audience, but the Iraqis are going to have so much more understanding and context that it would require, in order to, sort of, convey that, it would require something even bigger than, you know, the Vietnam series that PBS did. It would be huge, and we can’t do it.
Lyse Doucet
Well let’s bring in Renad here, of course, who straddles both worlds, you know, very much who watches every twist and turn in Iraq, knows it forensically, but also based at Chatham House in London. And, also, with one of the Authors of – the other co-Author of the book, with James. What, for you, is the value, important value, of going back in this way and giving these very, very raw personal narratives of what happened over these more than a decade in Iraq?
Dr Renad Mansour
I think that balance, certainly, James and I, and Jo, we had big discussions back and forth, because in my day job, as well as, you know, in my social science training, you bring academics and experts to discuss issues of history. Those that have gone through the archives and have done all the work already, to then discuss some kind of historiography based on all of their PhDs and James was having none of that. I remember I was in Bagdad and I was going around Iraqis, asking, “Who can be part of this film?” And I was like, “James, I have this expert, I have this, you know, this and that.” And he was like, “We want the voice or Iraqis, we want that voice that’s not an expert Analyst.” But more importantly, I think it’s – I wanted to note that James interviewed very senior American, British and Iraqi officials. Bremer was interviewed for two days for this but did not make the cut. Why? Because, at the end of the day, and I think James should actually talk about this, ‘cause he has a good explanation for this, they’ve already had their voice. Everybody knows the narratives, everybody knows how the neoconservatives and the Bush Administration will defend this or how the administration in London will defend it, or even how the Iraqis, the – many of them foreign Iraqis who came to Bagdad after 2003 and became multimillionaires, they continued to have a voice. The only voices that have missing are the voices of those people who didn’t have that opportunity, and they’re making their own voice now.
I think the October 2009 protests, moving onwards, is the first real challenge, the first real attempt for many Iraqis to say, “This is what we want and enough is enough.” And I think what James is doing is part of that, in a way, to give a voice to those who don’t have a voice, because they face a structure that is not looking out for many Iraqis.
Lyse Doucet
So, as someone who knows Iraq so well, in the five documentaries that have gone to air and, indeed, in the book that you co-Authored. What surprised you, did anything surprise you, change your view, give you a new insight?
Dr Renad Mansour
Well, certainly, the biggest learning experience was just how Documentary Filmmakers, how they’re very cool in the way that they’re able to make a compelling argument through storytelling. So, I think in terms of methodologies, that was better than my, kind of, this is my thesis, these are my arguments, and this is my proof to make my point. I mean, that was a big learning phase. But also, you know, I mean, going through the narratives when we speak to people like Ahmed and others, although I have – I mean, you know, again, for me, I know where they’re coming from. But are we listening – are we, going back, are we revisiting history? I mean, there was a lot – I mean, this is, really, one of the first times where we’re looking at Iraq, not a current affairs, but as a history, where we’re using archives, where we’re reflecting back. And are those narratives, are Iraqis sectarian?
You know, at some point there’s a big discussion in the series about this. Is it that, for example, the regime before 2003 had a lid on everything and as soon as you remove the lid, all of these sectarian Iraqis, sort of, burst up and they go to the subnational elements. Or is it that, and this links to your question on, sort of, the legacies, was it a political system that was put there that said you had to have this many Shias this many Sunnis, this many, you know, like, you know, Christians, Kurds? And this was also very mainstream at the time, right? So, Joe Biden, for example, made a map in the, I think it was the New York Times, where he said, “Sunnistan, Shiastan and Kurdistan.” That today, all of those arguments being made then, you won’t be had – you won’t feel is true today. Iraqis are rejecting many of those things that the Americans and the foreign Iraqi leaders tried to give to them under the guise of democracy.
Lyse Doucet
Yes, I mean, many – at the time, as you know, when they were – Bremer was putting together the – helping to put together the first governments, it was that system you’ve just described. And so, many Iraqis accused the Americans and that certainly comes out in the documentary, of fermenting, you know, some even say “creating sectarianism in Iraq”. And for you, I mean, obviously, a document has to have a strong arc. For an academic you’ll have lots of footnotes and ifs, buts, and/or – the – you’re comfortable with the arch, ‘cause you’re left with an abiding impression that were it not for the US led invasion, or – that everything can be traced back to the US led invasion of 2003.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, I mean, you know, even working at a think tank like Chatham House, I mean, oftentimes when I write, I write for a more mainstream audience and there are compromises you have to make, there are certain words that you have to use, buzzwords and all of this. It’s just part of the system to try and make a change in a different way. And I think the point of this isn’t to teach Iraqis what’s happened, but that the whole world outside, particularly the Western world, should know. Because, you know, you say that there aren’t any more attacks, but let’s keep in mind that Iraq is still being attacked.
Iran is active military in Iraq, the US is still attacking Iraq, including earlier this year when they killed the Iranian General, as well as militia leaders. So, the story isn’t over yet and I think that’s what’s important here. Although we’re looking back at history, we’re trying to learn, these are – I mean, how many times have you heard “mission accomplished”, right? I mean, it was only – it was six weeks after the invasion, the first time it was announced. Every single US President has announced, in different ways, some kind of mission accomplished in Iraq, and yet, we’re still there, beginning of 2020 now, people talking about ISIS maybe coming back, protestors who are being killed, conflict is not over. So, this is still very much a living conflict.
Lyse Doucet
I want to move onto contemporary events in just a moment, but let me just ask you one last question, since we’re now seeing Ahmed again in vision. Ahmed said, “Let’s” – you know, “It’s – our story’s not finished yet and we’d prefer to advance more and hopefully in a positive direction. We don’t want to look back.” And he may reflect the views of a lot of Iraqis. What would you say, as someone who had – who’s lived with this for so long, is there a value in going back? Like, for example, situations are very difficult, but – different, but I see an Afghanistan now, young Afghans are going back over their history, because they say we want to avoid the mistakes. So, a lot of them are thinking about asking these questions and saying, “It’s so important to interrogate history.” What would you say, Renad?
Dr Renad Mansour
Well, keep in mind that about 60% of Iraq’s population is under 25. They don’t remember much of the invasion, or, certainly, they don’t remember before 2003. So, they’ve, kind of, grown up in this hell, right? However, what I find remarkable about Iraqis, and it really struck me once, when I was driving, leaving Mosul, I think it was last year, and I had a, kind of – I was with a foreign academic who works on Iraq, and I was with an Iraqi academic. And that we had just given a, sort of, a panel at the University of Mosul, talking about the state and all of these issues. And, you know, the Iraq academic goes to the foreign academic, and he says, “You’re allowed to be that critical, you’re allowed to have no hope, right, and so, your analysis is very negative and critical, rightfully so. But us, as Iraqis who live here, if we had no hope, if we didn’t go back and try and romanticise some kind of elements of our history and, also, how would we see a future? I mean, that’s suicide if you have no more hope in living.” And so, most Iraqis, you know, I know, like, for example, and I want to mention this a friend of ours was assassinated a few weeks ago, Hisham al-Hashimi, right, and many people knew about this assassination.
I was speaking to Hisham a few months ago and he was hopeful about this new Prime Minster. I won’t go into current affairs, but it makes my point that this is someone who lived through sanctions, right, went to jail several times in his life, was part of an Islamic resistance campaign, felt violence, had family members killed, and yet, in 2020, after decades of being pounded and pounded, had hoped that this new Prime Minister might be the best chance. So, I think that that hope that Ahmed talks about and that going towards a kind of Hollywood ending still lives in every Iraqi who lives there, because they need it.
Lyse Doucet
Well, all of us who cannot begin to understand the issues, salute this hope and share your hope and hope against hope, as we say, that some – that it will take a turn. Because, as Ahmed said, “The story is not over.” And let’s move it now to look a little bit [inaudible – 37:45], answer some questions to you, right, and then I’ll come back to you, Ahmed. Is there was one – there’s – many of you have read or should read the article by Robert Worth in the New Times Magazine, called, The Iraq Kleptocracy, who talks about the existential crisis now facing Iraq. But there’s one phrase that I notice, which he said, “The American’s now have a moment, they could seize this moment to undo the damage,” the kind of damage that is discussed in this documentary series Once Upon a Time in Iraq, that if they do something to crack down on the corruption, in which they play a role in the oil sales, but also in backing the protestors that Ahmed was talking about, who, right across Iraqi society, whatever their sect, whatever their background, whatever their class, are all calling for the same kind of one nation, new nation. Is there a chance, Renad, for America to “undo the damage”, to use Robert’s phrase?
Dr Renad Mansour
Well, I mean, if you ask the academic, “Does international state building work?” in most cases the answer is no. And particularly when the US try and build states abroad. And so, it’s a structural problem, right. I speak to many American officials across the governments, who all genuinely, you know, they want to fix Iraq in different ways, but this is a structural problem where at the top there is a system and that system leads to inefficiencies, incompetencies, and, also, more malign, sort of, processes. And you’ve seen the article, the Americans went in in 2003 without a strategic foresight. Without any understanding, they bring in this young man who was going to be the King of Iraq for a year, who didn’t speak the language, I mean, its’ all a farce.
If you would tell someone who had no idea what the Americans did in 2003/2005 how many billions of dollars, you know, were unaccounted for, they wouldn’t believe it. You can’t make this stuff up, right? So, I think to now, then, go to America today and expect that America interfering to help civil society, I think many Arabs across the Middle East will give you their concerns about this. Of course, Ahmed will have other ideas. But in any case, Iraq – I mean, America could have a role in capacity building, in helping, you know, develop, in education, but these are long-term things. America has tried often to use military solutions to fix Iraq. If they remove the military solutions to try and fix the political problems by helping to build the new generation, by investing in things like education from the beginning, by investing in social services and healthcare, that might be the – a chance. But America will not fix Iraq as long as it continues to use Iraq as a pawn or a playground for its regional disputes with Iran and other issues. So, it’s that political element that often seeps into America’s state building in Iraq that makes it difficult for America really to have a coherent policy in Iraq.
Lyse Doucet
Ahmed, what do you think, to, again to use the phrase that Robert Worth used, saying that, “The United States gives Ten Billion Dollars in cash quote, cold cash, to the United – to Iraq for oil sales and that helps to feed the – this corruption that now seems to permeate many sectors of Iraqi society”? Do you think the United States, the West, more generally, should be helping to do something to put it right?
Ahmed Albasheer
I guess this is what we are – we were discussing all the time, is it the responsibility of the US or the world to take actions in Iraq and to solve the problems that they created, or they helped in a way, to create it, or they made it without knowing the society of Iraq, by the mistakes that they’ve done before? Well, if you talk to any Iraqi he would say yes, if – lots of Iraqis, I would say, yes. America – some people in Iraq believes that America will invade Iraq again and take down this whole system down and make new elections and make people choose again, their representors, again. Some of the Iraqis really believes that this is the solution. I don’t believe that this is the solution by invading again, because the invasion will create more problems, of course, and military as – but the problem is, okay, I agree with what Renad said, by there is not only – I mean, not using the military action in Iraq to solve the problems. But in the same time, we have a weak government.
This government cannot face the militias alone. The militias are killing and kidnapping Iraqis and they’re stealing their money and they’re building their institutions and they’re generating money by owning and put their hands on big institutions, economic institutions in Iraq and media, and they control mostly the whole country. How should we, or could we, get rid of these corrupt Politicians and militias and armed groups? I don’t know how we’re going to do it, it’s not my job to do it, my job is to make fun of these things only. But I believe that this is the world responsibility.
USA, UK the coalition the whole coalition, who started the war in 2003, this is their responsibility to solve the problem that they created. And I repeat the same thing that everyone, and maybe Renad also agrees with me, that the withdrawal from Iraq was a bigger mistake than invading Iraq, in 2003, because withdrawal was a disaster and it led to ISIS and Nouri al-Maliki did what he’s not supposed to do. So, yes, the world should take a big role in Iraq.
Lyse Doucet
That, I think, was – but I think the withdrawal decision, I was with Admiral Mullen when he made his last trip to Iraq, 54 degrees that day, we went to Mosul and to Bagdad. And it was his last attempt to try to persuade the Iraqis to keep some Soldiers. And he came and he said, “No, the Iraqis want us – all the troops to leave.” I mean, some of the decision making, of course, has to be bought to the door of Iraqi leaders, as well. Of course, they were leaders, like Maliki in the documentary, who says, “We were kept there by support, by the West’s support, as well.”
Ahmed Albasheer
Yeah, the fun thing in that matter, it’s very funny, because let’s say the majority of Iraqi’s asked – not the – I would say if we take divisions, I hate to say these words that I’m going to say now, but if we say that, the Shia Politicians bought the Americans to the country to rid of Saddam and the Sunnis, the Sunni Politicians and the Sunnis fought the Americans to get them out of Iraq. But then, now that was in 2003. 2020 the Sunnis are demanding the Americans to stay in Iraq and they’re going to protect them, and the Shia Politicians want the Americans to leave Iraq. So, that’s why it’s very complicated in Iraq. You never know what’s going to happen tomorrow and how people will change sides.
I never expected one day that Anbar, Salah ad Din, Ninawa, Diyala, these provinces would ever, ever – I mean, you see a solider, American soldier walking in the streets, and everyone supporting him and believes that he’s – maybe he can protect them. But now you can see that clearly in many provinces in Iraq. Maybe you don’t see American soldiers on the street, but you see the people are supporting the American troops to stay. So, it’s complicated, but in the same time, it’s not – it wasn’t the Iraqi decision, purely, on 2011 the withdraw. It wasn’t purely Iraqi decision; it was Iranian decision and the Iraqi Polit – Iran could control Iraqi Politicians and could manage to make them getting the Americans out, and of course, it was Obama’s mistake, also.
Lyse Doucet
Hmmm, we do need to discuss the regional players, ‘cause Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, but let me just bring in a question first, which will bring in Jo and James, that questions to the filmmakers, of, “How interested were broadcasters in revisiting the 2003 invasion?” James, you mentioned that you did it for the BBC. Did you approach the BBC or did the BBC say, “Let’s go back to it?” Did you sense there was a great interest in doing – I mean, it’s – doing five is a lot?
James Bluemel
I didn’t –no, I – it was having made Exodus and it was, sort of, wanting to understand how we got here, that’s what I took to the BBC. Using the same grammar that we had, sort of, done in Exodus, but exploring this historical narrative, this past tense narrative and I don’t think there was many other takers for that film. I don’t think Netflix were going to be knocking at my door, or Amazon Prime, or anyone else. It was the BBC that, sort of, recognised the importance of it and said, “Yeah, go for it.”
Lyse Doucet
And is it – problem is, it’s probably too early to say, because, obviously, a lot of people watch on iPlayer now, so, it’s probably too early to say, and we say in filmmaking, “Some of these series have a long tail,” so people may come to it, later once there’s, you know, there’s a buzz on social media about it, people are discussing it. But, either Jo or James, do you sense that, having chosen the – I mean, obviously, the – your ambition must’ve been in choosing to look at such a complicated political story, complicated history that gets more complicated by the year, but in choosing to do it through personal, very human, stories, that you could draw people in? And are you feeling now that you were able to achieve that, Jo?
Jo Abel
Yeah, I think we did – we have achieved that, and I think it’s been both extraordinary and surprising, because there wasn’t a lot of interest. You know, you’re always trying to raise more money for a series that is as big and as expensive as this. And there was very little enthusiasm for it, until, sort of, much later on. So, it was something that the BBC could support and was a really good platform for us to work from. And I think, well I hope that, you know, it will sell in lots of other regions and raise a sort of consciousness about the legacy and the ongoing and current tragedies that are being played out in Iraq, specifically.
Lyse Doucet
‘Cause one of the questions, it was, sort of, an additional question, was that, “Has the world lost interest in Iraq beyond seeing it only through the lens of mistakes made by the US and Britain?”
Jo Abel
Well, they – it’s difficult to answer that, isn’t it? I think there was a sort of – I suppose there was a sort of fear that there was a ennui with – that we would be met with disinterest. And I think that we knew that we’d made a good series, but we’d – we didn’t expect it to resonate in the way that it has and that the use of the human stories and allowing a Western audience to understand the way that this destroyed personal lives that are just like theirs, because that, in a way, is what has been missing. You know, when you watch in episode one the Shock and Awe campaign and I remember that at the time and it was like a firework show. You didn’t understand that, you know, Waleed was out on his bicycle getting cigarettes, that Sally Mars’s mother threw herself 0n top of her children. You know, in the West we sit so comfortably, and we don’t really understand what the reality of these decisions are on the people living in those places. And well, I hope it shocks people, I hope it helps people empathise and it’s, you know, I think, a better thing that it has been responded to in the way that it has.
Lyse Doucet
Renad, and if the BBC came to you and said, “What do you think we – what’s – what do you think we should do for our next documentary on Iraq?” what would you – what story would you want to tell that should be told now?
Dr Renad Mansour
I think – so, this documentary, obviously, has been shot in the last few years. I think what happened in October 2019, onward, is a big challenge to the Iraqi State. I think the protestors, but also the decision by Iraq’s so-called democratic leaders, who came in to free Iraqis from dictatorship, their decision as a collective to justify violence, to use violence, or to not speak out against violence in a way to put their – to end – to quit and they’re all complicit in this system. And, you know, Iraq, I mean, I don’t know how many – I know there are some countries, but Iraqis have been protesting a lot. It’s continuing protests and, yes, corona has stopped it, but I think Iraq would be up there, in terms of countries in the world where you have a continued protest movement, and these are all kids. And I think their story, they – I mean they make me feel – I never felt old until I went to Tahrir and started hanging out with some of these protestors and they were showing me on their phones all of these things, TikTok and all of that stuff. But I think once a story that’s ongoing and, really, it’s so – just to see it, you know, we write about this, Ahmed has done wonders to, you know, not just bring comedy into it, but also information, right, into how rotten the system is. For these protestors to then go out, knowing that they’re going to get shot at and to stay there in the squares, to me, is a story that’s in the making.
Lyse Doucet
I have to say, the stories that came from the square were absolutely inspiring, both for the unity among the protestors trying to shatter some of the fault lines that, you know, we talk about often in the news, but also, as you said, even when the security forces opened fire and sometimes shadowy security force, they still went out. And I think it is a great pity that because the news landscape is dominated by what’s happening in President Trump’s America, and, of course, now lately, the COVID-19, well of necessity, the world has to focus on COVID-19. But the Iraqi’s stories don’t get this kind of attention that they have in the past. Ahmed, if you – aside from your Hollywood blockbuster happy ending, what would be the story that you would want to tell about Iraq now?
Ahmed Albasheer
Okay, I agree with Renad, definitely, 2019 needs documentary, because the soul of the Iraqis, the things that they’ve seen, we never expected to see in our lives, not even in movies, not even in our dreams. The courage, the – I mean, everything connected to each other when you see someone. That’s why sometimes I say to my friends that, “I see them as an angels, that they can do mistakes.” And they keep saying, “No, you’re exaggerating, don’t do that to them, because they could make mistakes.” And I know they’re right, but sometimes I really – the hope that they gave me, and they gave the whole Iraqis, you can’t imagine the number of Iraqis who were texting me and writing to me on 2019, who were living outside and they have citizenships and they’re stable in their countries. And they were saying that, “Do you feel this is the moment where we’re going go back to Iraq and rebuild this again, do you think this is the moment?” So, I think more than five million Iraqis outside of Iraq are waiting for this moment, to go back home to build their country and I know many, many people they lost hope in Iraq, they never see Iraq in the news. After the protests they went back again to, maybe, to fix the Iraq situation. So, yes, I believe 2019 protests is something needs to be focused on.
Lyse Doucet
We had a question from Mohammed Adnan, who said, “What role can Iraqi protestors play in the future of Iraq?” And as you know, one of the questions which came up in the so-called Arab Spring, when young generations took to Tahrir Square in Cairo. Now the question’s being asked again about leadership and the answer sometimes comes, “Well, no, we don’t want to choose leaders yet, because they all get compromised by the system.” I mean, how will the Iraqi protestors, you know, the big mass of Iraqi protestors, how will they play a fut – a role beyond, of course, these very important protests that you’re – that you just, you and Renad both empathise, or both highlighted?
Ahmed Albasheer
This is what, exactly, the worst government in the world and the Iraq Government, I mean, Mustufa al-Kadhimi’s Government, should do is to protect Iraqis, the demonstrators, to follow their parties and then they go to the Parliament. And I’m sure they will get lots of votes, a lot of votes, because lots of people don’t participate in the elections, because they believe this is the same, the same Politicians that they are recycling again and come back again and by the way, this is the mistake of the US Government. You will ask me how, because America just brought democracy to Iraq and it’s not their fault.
In 2010 elections, when Ayad Allawi and Kamal al-Maliki won the election, the Constitution says that the bigger block should form the government. America and Iran agreed to repost Nouri al-Maliki again as a Prime Minister and this is when Iraqis started to lose their faith in democracy and they started to believe that, “Whatever we’ve done, whatever we’re going to do, it’s going be the decision of the Iranians and the Americans, it’s not our decision. So, now we’re not going to be part of the elections.” This is why you will see the race of what station the elections for 2010 to 2018, which lots of sources says, it’s less than 20%. It’s going down because people lost their faith in the election process. So, I think with – this is the gov – this what should, the Iraq Government should do and this is what the world should do, support the demonstrators to form parties and to go to elections and they will get – they will control the Parliament and they will form a new government, if they had the chance, and the security and there’s no arms and – by militias used against them.
Lyse Doucet
Renad, what’s your – Ahmed has mentioned twice Iran. And, you know it’s often been said the biggest victor in the invasion of 2003 was Iran, that it created a bigger space for Iran. And we’re seeing this played out most recently, of course, in what happened with the killing of Qasem Soleimani in Iraq. We’re reminded again about – and all the militias, of course, backed by one side or the other and it’s not just Iran. Turkey, of course, is involved in Iraq; Saudi Arabia has been trying to get involved in Iraq again. How consequential is this battle ground between the different regional interests? We see it playing out in Libya, we see it – we saw it, of course, with devasting consequences in Syria. How is it going to be managed, if it can be managed, in Iraq, going forward?
Dr Renad Mansour
I mean, yeah, very clearly, the story at post-2003 Iraq has been a story of are you on Team USA or Team Iran? And Politicians have had to kind of go between one or the other. Although, in recent years, the US has lost a lot of its leverage, from the time that they – of when the US withdrew, but also, you know, they don’t have the same time of access and power and in that vacuum, Iran has become quite powerful. Primarily, because for Iran it’s an existential crisis, it’s on its boarder, but also, Iran has strong relations with many of the Shia parties, but also, the Kurdish parties. Keep in mind Iran has been able to manage a system of working with state institutions, with the President and Prime Minister, but also with non-state what we call non-state institutions, with different types of armed groups, all of this environment Iran can kind of ride the wave. So, it’s not that Iran is all omni – you know, all perfect and is – you know, Iran makes mistakes.
2014 ISIS taking over and coming on its boarder was a big mistake from Iran, but it’s able to manage in a way, it’s able to, kind of, deal with crises and try and manage them. So, in that case, whereas the US, largely I would say, has a strategy that, you know, strike a little bit of self-gratification, but then who knows what’s going to happen next? And hope, somehow, that shaking the system, you know, something will come out magically that is what you want it to look like. I think Iran has a far longer – you know they don’t want to just gamble, it’s their neighbour, it’s their region. They have a far longer reach and Iraq is important for Iran because of its regional ambitions.
Iraq is a very wealthy country. You know, you talk about the money that has been spent, but the money that has been lost, keep in mind that that’s mainly Iraqi money, right? I mean, it’s the oil money, it’s the money from Iraq that many of the protestors don’t feel. And so, this is important to come back to the point of protestors, because all Iraqi leaders no matter how reformist they claim to be will still play the game. Mustufa al-Kadhimi as Prime Minster is still playing that game, he’s going to Iran. Protestors are really the only ones who are saying, “This game isn’t helping us, and we should change that game.” And I think that’s why, as Ahmed says, what they’ve done is very admirable.
Lyse Doucet
Hmmm. James, I’m going bring you in here now, and this picks up a thread of what Renad has just been saying. We had a question from John Mason, saying, “Do you think 2003 was a watershed year in the UK and the United States? Do you see any conflict since then that are repetitions of this pattern of war?” In all those hours you spent with Americans and British, and this you may reflect upon in the book, what lessons did they learn about avoiding this? Did they – were they now looking back to say what we did, what we should or shouldn’t have done and how to avoid it in the future? Is that kind of reckoning going on, aside from you asking the questions about it?
James Bluemel
That kind of reckoning is going on by people that were, you know, victims of the decisions, so the Soldiers. I didn’t get that sense of that sort of analysis and that sort of personal, sort of, re-evaluating of their – of actions by the decisionmakers was going on at all. And that’s partly why – and, you know, that’s a big motivation of why they were cut out of the film, it was massively disappointing.
Lyse Doucet
But you do hear now after the US/UK invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq, this idea now that these big liberal interventions is a thing of the past. You know, President Trump comes to power saying, “I want to end these endless wars.” President Obama said it as well, “I want to bring the American troops home.” There does seem, and I think, Renad, I see him nodding a little bit, there does seem to be a realisation that they went badly wrong and partly because they asked the wrong questions and didn’t know what they were doing, to pick up on what Renad said earlier about, you know, Paul Bremer’s rule. You didn’t get that sense at all, James, in going through all the transcripts, going through all the interviews or – Jo’s looking a little bit cynical there.
James Bluemel
I didn’t get the sense that the motivation to stop interfering was coming from a particularly overall good place, of a place of lessons learned and a wiser, kind of, foreign policy, no, not at all.
Lyse Doucet
Okay, Ahmed, I’m going to bring you back in because there was a similar question for you. I think people are very excited about your Hollywood film that you’re going to be preparing. But we had a question saying, “How can we arrive at a Hollywood ending without thoroughly examining our past and seeing how it affected our present narrative?” I don’t know about the question, but the sense that you’ve got to confront what happened if you have any hope of a better, more Hollywood ending, as you say.
Ahmed Albasheer
I believe that the solution in Iraq is very hard, but in the same time, it’s something we can do. A secular government that makes sure that all the Iraqis get the votes and their representors, of course, and I think the new generation understand that very well, that he needs – they need a secular government. They are not going back to their roots, as they say, a sectarianism or choosing representors by – only because he is sharing the group idea with him. And this is the 2019 protests was about, that’s why they were saying, the protestors, since 2011, this [mother tongue], “In the name of the religion, the thieves stole us.” So, it started off 2011. 2019 people were protesting against militias who were shot. Who – these same militias two years ago they were saying that, “We were protecting you against ISIS.” So, the same people understood that these religious parties and this extreme militia numbers are not going to solve the problems, they are make – going to make it worse. So secular government, people go to vote and, of course, let’s say transparent elections where everyone is going to vote and choose and in the same time, they guarantee that their votes are not stolen, just like what’s happened in the past elections.
Lyse Doucet
Well, I mean, we all want to believe that that is going – is what lies ahead for Iraq, but we also have to be mindful of what some of the threats will be. Renad, I want to bring you in on a question, as you know, there have been some comment that the – in this crisis presented by the coronavirus, that some are trying to benefit from it, including Islamic State. And we had a question saying, “Is the Iraqi Government turmoil likely to lead to lead to the return of ISIS?”
Dr Renad Mansour
Okay, so I can answer a more analytical question now. This is a much more…
Lyse Doucet
Well, I think you show…
Dr Renad Mansour
I’m more comfortable…
Lyse Doucet
Let’s show your flare.
Dr Renad Mansour
…with these kind of questions.
Lyse Doucet
We’ll get Ahmed to tell a few jokes and you can use in your…
Dr Renad Mansour
No, I think – I mean, I think conflict – look, conflict in Iraq is cyclical and every few years you have some version of ISIS returning. It’s, as I said, ISIS is not a military problem as such. Yes, it’s right, as Ahmed says, it requires a military solution, but it also requires a political solution. I remember when I went to Mosul immediately after the liberation, how happy the people of Mosul were to just be out of the Islamic State. I – you know, you probably remember as well, anyone whose been there at that time would remember that sense of joy. Keep in mind that Ahmed mentioned the 2018 election, Mosul had one of the highest turnouts in the whole country. And also keep in mind that the only incumbent to win was from Mosul, President Abadi from the current government, right? So, they very much had the sense of hope, just like we’ve been talking about in this whole panel. You go there now, and you speak to them and they tell you, “From the day of liberation until now, we have not seen our government yet. Where is the services, where is the reconstruction?” So, although I would say it’s a bit difficult to – that something like the Caliphate will return as such, certainly, the roots of ISIS, the socio-political and economic roots of ISIS haven’t even been touched, not by the Iraqi Government, not by the local governments in those areas that fell or by the international actors, who are still playing the same game as 2003, rather than changing it up.
Lyse Doucet
Hmmm, and I think I should mention, too that, you know, one of the highlights of the film was when Omar talked about what he did, the courageous work he did at Mosul Eye keeping that hope alive in Mosul during the time of the occupation by Islamic State. And now, you know, anyone who follows him on social media, getting books for the library in Mosul, rebuilding Mosul and you see that almost day in, day out, that, sort of, the expressions of hope from him, you know, willing Iraq and the city of Mosul to a different future. And I – we all do have to hold onto those threads, as small, sometimes, as they may seem to be. We’re coming to the – but sadly, as always, the questions are starting to come in. I think I’m just going give you each, if something’s been on your mind since we began our conversation, one last thought you’d like us all to leave with, of course aside from watching the Once Upon a Time in Iraq, which continues on BBC2 on Monday. It continues on Monday, 9:00pm on BBC2 and all the series is online. But, Jo, I’ll come back to you since you began our webinar and you’ve been sitting there like the sphinx and wisely listening to all of it, the last comment from you?
Jo Abel
Well, it has to be that, as Ahmed and Renad talk about, that there is some hope that Iraq can emerge as a society that can care for itself and I mean, I don’t know how idealistic it is, but I also hope that we’ve done a tiny, tiny bit to raise awareness about that and if we’ve done that, then that’s probably good enough.
Lyse Doucet
And James, I feel that I must ask you, having gone through, you know, from months upon end, I’m sure all those transcripts, and they must be in – you’ve carried them in your head for so long, at the end of it, it left you with some hope, James?
James Bluemel
I hope it left me with some hope, I hope. I’m very grateful to everyone that sat on that chair and went through that ordeal. I know for you, Ahmed, it wasn’t easy at all. And I hope that, sort of, dredging up a lot of those memories was, maybe personally difficult, but I hope there was a greater good for this film. I hope that’s what’s it’s done, a small thing, but something.
Lyse Doucet
Ahmed?
Ahmed Albasheer
I’m very honoured and I’m very proud that I am in this film and I’ve seen some of it and I’m very happy of the film and I know it’s going to be very important for the audience to understand what’s happening in Iraq. I want to thank everyone who worked on that film and, actually, we can never thank you enough, because we were always talking about how to get our voice to the outside world to understand what’s happening in Iraq, so thank you very much. What you have done is amazing and I cannot express my thanks in words, it’s going to be more than that, actually, thank you very much. And hope is the something that we grab on and this is the only way that it makes us – the only thing that it makes us survive until this moment, just like Renad said. So yes, we will still, we’ll remain grabbing that hope and one day, I’m sure, we will get to that Hollywood ending.
Lyse Doucet
And Ahmed, please promise us that when you get around – you find the courage to watch all five of the films, whether it’s next week, next year, next decade, drop us a line or tell us on social media what you think of all of them. Let us know whether you thought…
Ahmed Albasheer
Okay. Okay, promise.
Lyse Doucet
…they were worth doing. And Renad, are you going to throw away that bookcase behind you now, leave your life as a careful academic and become a carefree filmmaker?
Dr Renad Mansour
Not even close. I think I told James and Jo and Ahmed that I certainly have more cool credibility now that I’ve been, sort of, helping on something artistic in a different way, but I think we all have a role. Especially now that, you know, this is a history and let’s go back, look at – revisit history. Those narratives, Iraqis are sectarian, that removing Saddam unleashed sectarianism, or that it was only the Americans. I mean, let’s go back and look at what caused where we are today and try our best, as this film does, to try and guide the way people understand Iraq. As an Iraqi, you know, who travels a lot, you know, if I’m in South America, anywhere, when they say, “Hey, where you from, where you from? I mean, you know, you say – if I say, “Canada.” They’re like, “Oh, no, but where you really from, where you from, where you from?” So, I say, “Iraq.” And they’ll be like, “Oh, Iraq, ooh, either terrorist or Sunni/Shia,” or, you know, these are the ways they think of Iraq and I think it’s this type of medium that reaches far more than the eight people who read my academic articles.
Lyse Doucet
Well, as you say, we need both. We need the deep dive and the analyses that give us that understanding about that only can be provided by an academic. If it wasn’t for your really detailed analytical work, Jo and James wouldn’t have been able to do – to rise from that and do the kind of personal narrative that were so searing in this documentary, and I think anyone who works on documentaries knows just how much time, time, time, they take. And so, we thank James and Jo and Ahmed and Renad for all the time you took both to do this five-part series and, also, to do the accompanying book, which isn’t always the case in documentaries. So, that will be something else that people can sit down and think even, again, about what has happened in Iraq. And I – this phrase of the American writer, William Faulkner, who just talks about how, “The past is not yet dead, the past is not yet even past yet,” I think it applies to the situation in Iraq that’s unfolding today. And we all look forward to the sequel of the Hollywood ending and even if it’s not Hollywood, even if it’s sort of Leicester Square style, we hope that there will be a better ending for Iraq.
So, thank you to all of our panellists. Thank you to Chatham House and thank you to all of you who’ve joined us today. Do watch the documentary, if you haven’t already. Do read the book, if you haven’t already, and just, you know, make sure that you push to have more news about Iraq in our daily news, every day, it’s really worth listening and watching, too. Thank you very much to everyone.
