Dr Patricia Lewis
So, welcome, everybody, to this webinar, hosted by Chatham House, on Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century. I’m delighted to welcome you all. We have speakers from many different countries and many different time zones, and I understand that that’s true for our audience as well, so thank you so much for joining us.
75 years ago, the nuclear weapon was used for the first two times, and hopefully, the last two times, in conflict. The US bombed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, destroying large numbers of people and infrastructure within the city, with one weapon. This changed the world, and the way the world looks at conflict. It formed very much part of the Cold War that followed, and the concept of nuclear deterrence was developed in which countries that possessed nuclear weapons, or were in alliances with those with nuclear weapons, felt that this was the ultimate way to deter war. This has been a highly contested set of values and set of principles for deterrence, in which others claim that nuclear weapons create a very difficult framework for negotiation, a very difficult framework for international relations, and are far too dangerous for their concentrated use on which nuclear deterrence depends.
Chatham House, a few weeks ago, published a paper, looking again at the underlying issues of nuclear deterrence, and we’re delighted to have some of our contributors to that paper with us here today to speak on a panel. Before turning to the panel, we are extremely fortunate to have with us Governor Hidehiko Yuzaki who is the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, and I’m going to invite the Governor to say a few words now to open up our meeting before I turn to the panel. I should just say as well that this is – this meeting is on the record. We are recording it as well, so that it will eventually be available to a wider group of people who can watch it on our website and can be distributed. So, Governor Yuzaki, I turn to you now to open up our meeting and bring us greetings from the city and the Prefecture of Hiroshima.
Governor Hidehiko Yuzaki
Well, thank you, Patricia, and good morning and good day and good evening, depending where you are. Hello from Hiroshima. I am Hidehiko Yuzaki, the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture.
Well, it’s a great pleasure to participate here in this webinar on the very important topic of nuclear deterrence. Well, you all know that this year marks 75th – 75 years since the first use in the war of a nuclear weapon in the world. Well, after 75 years, even though no country formally opposes the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, recently, no practical progress has been seen in nuclear disarmament. To ensure that nations are seriously committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons, discrediting the enigmatic nuclear deterrent theory, the primary rationale for the reliance on nuclear weapons, is of vital importance. Well, nuclear deterrence theory, that is deterring attacks from enemies by possessing nuclear weapons, is merely an idea shared and believed by people, and in fact a fiction, as Israeli Historian Yuval Noah Harari put it. So, it will lose its legitimacy, as well as efficacy, if everybody stops believing it. To put it in a different way, people have the ability to change the theory. No matter how hard it seems, the national security system, relying on nuclear weapons, can be changed because nuclear deterrent theory is only a fiction.
Well, tensions are increasing in Northeast and South Asia, but no adequate scrutiny seems to have been conducted during the long period of time after the end of the Cold War, to confirm whether the assumptions underpinning the deterrent theory fit the current reality of the world. Through the collaborative research of Hiroshima Prefecture with Chatham House, conducted in recent years, it has become clear that significant issues exist, regarding nuclear deterrence in four aspects.
One, the assumptions underpinning the implementation of nuclear deterrence, but two, the perpetual value of extended deterrence, three, influence from the emergence of new technologies, and four, the blurred boundary between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. Well, nuclear deterrence theory is based on truly uncertain assumptions, with technological innovation and geopolitical factors bringing into question any future prospect that deterrence will continue to prevent nuclear war. In these circumstances, we can no longer allow ourselves to stop thinking critically, or to depend on nuclear deterrence theory without any doubts.
Well, Pope Francis came last year to Hiroshima, and as he suggested during his speech, mankind’s departure from nuclear deterrence theory requires wisdom collected from all over the world, and action taken by all countries and all people. The usage of nuclear weapons would not only greatly affect military targets, but also civilians living in close proximity. Furthermore, the radioactivity and climate change brought by an A-Bomb could negatively impact all humans, flora, and fauna on Earth. Everyone on Earth is a stakeholder in this persistent issue, and we need to generate powerful momentum towards abolishment of nuclear weapons, by invoking the engagement of not only the community of specialist on disarmament and security, but as many people as possible connecting it to other global issues, such as climate change, communicable diseases, as we see now, and fair and sustainable development.
Well, regrettably, the elimination of nuclear weapons has not been accomplished during the past 75 years, once described as a period when no plants would grow in Hiroshima. We must take these facts seriously, and renew our pledge to abolish nuclear weapons as soon as possible, while A-Bomb victims are still alive. I’d like to emphasise that we need to share wisdom and take actions now, before the future generations blame us for inaction and irresponsibility.
Well, today’s webinar will be a very important and previous opportunity for us to directly listen to specialist views on those significant issues, regarding nuclear deterrence, and I’m looking very much forward to the panel discussion. So, thank you very much.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you indeed, Governor, for those opening remarks, and reminding us of the significance, and importance, and the difficulties in discussing these issues. I’m going to now open up the panel, and for those of you in the audience please feel that this is a very interactive discussion. We have a Q&A function. If you type your name into the Q&A function with your question, I can call on you, in the Q&A part, in the discussion part. If you would prefer that I would read out your question, you can write that also. So, please feel free to put some questions in, put some comments in, and I’ll try to get to as many of you as I possibly can in the discussion. So, I’m going to turn, first of all, to Jessica Cox, who is the Director of Nuclear Policy Directorate at NATO. Jessica.
Jessica Cox
Hi, hopefully you can hear me, let me know if you can’t. Thank you so much for the invitation and opportunity to say a few words about NATO’s nuclear deterrent capabilities and policies. Nuclear weapons have been a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence since its inception 75 years ago. As Heads of State and Government have reaffirmed on many occasions, the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capabilities are to preserve peace, prevent corruption, and deter aggression. NATO also remains committed to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key contributor to strategic stability and regional security. This includes bolstering existing regimes and expanding arms control regimes beyond the European theatre, and while my remarks are not going to be focussed on arms control today, I’m happy to get to some of our thinking in the Q&A.
NATO is taking steps now to continue to ensure that our deterrence and defence posture can address the full range of threats to the alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment. Most significantly, this includes taking steps to ensure the continued credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, in response to Russia’s growing nuclear weapons stockpile, and diversification of its delivery systems. This includes its deployment, as in the intermediate range missiles in Europe, its investment in short range indoor-capable missile systems, its growing stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and its development of hypersonic systems, including the avant-garde and [inaudible – 12:43], which it’s been testing and deploying, as well as its new air launch ballistic missile system, and tests of its [inaudible – 12:53] nuclear torpedo and nuclear-powered nuclear arms cruise missile. These are – these systems and these developments are causing increasing concern among allies that regional stability is no longer based – that our deterrence is no longer effective and that we may be called upon to take steps in response to these developments. And what we’re doing today is looking broadly across the capabilities of the alliance, to adapt our exercises, to increase our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, to look to adapt our theatre and missile defences, and to bolster our conventional capabilities. And we’re also taking steps to ensure that our nuclear deterrent will remain safe, secure, and effective.
This includes defensive steps that will maintain the credibility of our nuclear infrastructure and forces, with a focus on the resilience of our dual-capable aircraft capabilities. This includes steps to ensure that Russia will never – can never believe that they can use their intermediate range cruise missiles or under systems, to undermine allied unity or control oscillation in a crisis. We are taking steps to further improve NATO’s nuclear decision-making capabilities, to ensure a timely and effective response to any nuclear threats. And we’re continuing to enhance our nuclear command and control and communications resiliency and effectiveness against modern challenges and future threats.
These defensive steps are focused on the continued survivability, responsiveness and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence, and it is also important to reiterate what NATO is not doing in response. NATO does not seek an arms race, and we will not mirror Russia’s behaviour or its capability developments. As the Secretary General has stated many times, NATO allies have no intention of deploying new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, and that is an agreed principle from the allies. Furthermore, NATO remains committed to the key principles of the NATO Russia Founding Act and is not considering any changes to our nuclear posture that would be against its provisions. So, in the interest of time, because I only have five minutes, let me stop there and I look forward to your questions and to our discussion. Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Jessica, for a very clear and within time presentation. May I now turn to Doctor Nikolai Sokov, who is at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Nikolai.
Dr Nikolai Sokov
Oh, thank you, Patricia. I will say that the previous presentation was truly fascinating because, I’m sorry to say, that but they do feel young now, and it sounds like those days are in the ages when I was young and was just actually starting on the arms control track.
When we talk about the Russian perspective, I’ll do just a very, very brief kind of note on that. It’s important to understand that Russian attitude to nuclear deterrence is very traditional and very conservative, and so, Russia is fundamentally within the same theoretical framework, as it emerged back in the 60s. Even that is like an innovation because during the Soviet time, the very notion of deterrence actually was – did not exist officially. Soviet leadership completely, kind of, rejected it for ideological reasons and political reasons, and only in the 90s, did the Russian military really start to introduce just the theory of deterrence.
I wanted to commend Chatham House on an excellent, very interesting publication, very timely publication, because the issues associated with nuclear deterrence are extremely challenging, and they’re very important because, I’m sorry to say that, but nuclear weapons are here to stay for a long time. And the reason for having nuclear weapons is not so much simply the fact that other states have nuclear weapons, but because they have other missions as well. So, the most timely issues, the most challenging issues as well, is the relationship between nuclear weapons and other modes of hostile actions, that is conventional weapons and conventional forces, new technologies of the emerging technologies, and activities that do not represent war, that are below the threshold of war.
And specifically, I think the most interesting, kind of, question to ask is where nuclear weapons apply, where do you draw the line? Also, nuclear weapons apply here, but they don’t feature in this part of the continuum. I would say that the blurring of nuclear conventional weapons is not new. Well, in fact, it has existed from the early days of the nuclear era. Nuclear weapons have always been associated with the term ‘conventional attack’. That’s been a major policy throughout the Cold War. What happened with the end of the Cold War is that roles actually switched, yes, and today, we talk about the Russian escalate to de-escalate strategy, but fundamentally, basically, you know, at a conceptual level, it’s the same that NATO did during the Cold War. Yes, and NATO today, talks about nuclear weapons as being separate and special, much in the same way that the Soviet Union used to talk about nuclear weapons being special. So, what changed?
During the Cold War the Soviet Union did have an opportunity and did have the capability to wage and win conventional war. Today, NATO does have that capability, at least that’s the very firm conviction in Moscow and that’s how they operate. So, the interesting question is not about the blurring per se between nuclear and conventional, but how the blurring is operating nowadays, yes, and there are some differences. For example, during the Cold War, NATO primarily relied on short range tactical, to the maximum, or the intermediate range nuclear weapons to deter the Russian conventional capability. And by extension, everyone talks today about Russian reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. But in fact, back in 2003, actually Russia said that since NATO relies on long range conventional capability, then Russia should rely on long range nuclear capability to deter that. There isn’t really a lot overall of – for tactical nuclear weapons.
The second important point is, how far that continuum does go. In fact, the book does postulate things about hybrid warfare or the Gerasimov doctrine, yes, it implies – one of the chapters implies that that’s how we’ll, in fact, Russia conceptualise nuclear weapons and I don’t think that’s exactly completely correct. Well, in fact, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ and the whole concept was invented in the United States and, in fact, the whole application of actions below the level of war is to avoid the situation when you have to use military force and have to rely on nuclear weapons. So, we do need to very clearly define where nuclear deterrence applies and where it doesn’t. And so, I think the book is an important step in the direction of understanding what’s happening with nuclear weapons and their roles today. Yes, and I would be actually happy to discuss certain aspects in more detail, if there is interest, but I think this work should be continued and I’m really glad that Chatham House takes the initiative there. Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Nikolai, and thank you also, for sticking within time. I’m now going to turn to Doctor Tong Zhao, who’s at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. Tong Zhao, please.
Dr Tong Zhao
Thank you so much for having me. I want to apologise, first of all, the noise in my background, there is some construction work in my building, and I want to congratulate Chatham House for the excellent report on 21st Century Nuclear Deterrence, which provides a very comprehensive and insightful analysis on this topic.
In my initial remarks, I would like to offer a few brief thoughts on Chinese views of nuclear deterrence. Firstly, I think China has an interesting view about the risk of conflict escalation, both below the nuclear threshold and above the nuclear threshold. It has been pointed out, by experts, that China thinks a conventional conflict is very hard to escalate across the nuclear threshold. But once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the nuclear conflict would escalate very quickly and all the way to an all-out nuclear war. There won’t be any middle steps, after the nuclear threshold is crossed, which is very different from the mainstream view in many Western countries.
I think the result of this interesting perception is, China tends to dismiss the risk of nuclear escalation of conventional conflict. But on the other hand, China tends to view other countries’ efforts to control and manage nuclear escalation as either crazy or as an excuse to develop nuclear counterforce capabilities. So, we have to recognise the existence of an important perception gap between China and many Western countries, maybe a future dialogue to delve deeper on these different perceptions can help us better understand each other’s view and come up with options to jointly mitigate risk of conflict, both below the nuclear threshold and above the nuclear threshold.
Second point is about the impact of new technologies. Many people agree, new technologies could affect the stability of deterrence relationship. One important example is the introduction of dual capable weapons, weapons that can be armed with either nuclear warhead or conventional warhead. In many countries, including China, they are developing dual capable missiles and other weapon system. In China’s case, we the F26 ballistic missile. There has been – you know, China has developed such dual capable weapons, without a clear understanding about their potential escalation risks, because such weapons could cause misunderstandings, especially during crises, and especially if countries adopt and launch under attack postures.
There has been a growing awareness within China about the risk coming from dual capable weapons, but the awareness is not sufficient, is not deep or broad enough, to bring about necessary policy change to address this challenge. So, maybe some joint examination of the main powers to explore and examine the risks of dual capable weapons can help better build awareness of the risks and find potential solutions. And, of course, looking to the future, one question facing us is whether we should allow countries to develop dual capable hypersonic missiles, given their capability to manoeuvre, they introduce even greater risks of misunderstanding and convergent escalation. So, we’d better make a decision right now before those capabilities are deployed.
Last point I want to make is, I believe one eternal challenge for stable deterrence relationship is how to decide who is provoking, who is the aggressor, who tries to change the status quo, and who is the status quo power, who tries to preserve status quo? In the case of China, if you read – if you look at the US-China nuclear relationship, for example, US is emphasising low yield tactical nuclear weapons as a response to perceived Russian escalate to de-escalate strategy. But from the Chinese perspective, we believe the US is deliberately building up nuclear warfighting capabilities, and to intentionally lower the threshold of nuclear use by emphasising low yield technical nuclear capabilities. So, we see the US as the one that provokes and takes a more aggressive nuclear posture. So, this perception gap can cause serious misunderstanding.
And in the case of Australia, as another example, Australia’s new defence policy wants to develop more independent strike capabilities and sees that as necessary for self-defence. But from the Chinese view, Australia wants to help the United States contain China, and to better contribute to a US-led military coalition against China. So, there is a huge perception gap about who is changing the status quo and who is defending the status quo. I think that presents the greatest threat for countries to maintain their stable deterrence relationship. I think first, we need to recognise the existence of such perception gap. There is no such recognition yet, and I think more exchanges like this could be very important to build basic common understandings. I will stop here, thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Tong Zhao, and again thank you for sticking to time. We appear to have temporarily lost our next speaker, Tanya Ogilvie-White, so what I thought I’d do is, I’d just ask each of the panellists to answer my question and then hopefully, Tanya will be back on. If not, we’ll go into the broader discussion. So, 25 years ago, it was the 50th anniversary of the use of nuclear weapons, and 25 years ago, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was extended indefinitely. Where do you think we might be in another 25 years, if we can look ahead? Do you, in this panel, imagine a world in which nuclear disarmament has taken hold, that we’d be either rid of these nuclear weapons or on the pathway to that? Do you envisage a world in which many more states have nuclear weapons, and are also, you know, embedding that concept of nuclear deterrence? Or do you imagine that more or less the status quo will hold for another 25 years? So, if I could turn to each of our panellists who are on the line, who would like to go first? Nobody wants to answer my question. Jessica, go, you.
Jessica Cox
I’ll take a first stab. I mean, I think it’s quite difficult to, you know, always to do predictive analysis and think about where we’ll be in 25 years. I think, from my personal perspective, I think the next ten years are going to be very difficult. I think the trends are all in a very negative direction. I think that the build-up that we’re seeing, that they’re reliant more on nuclear weapons, is increasing not decreasing, and I think that there’s such a reservoir of mistrust, I think Tong Zhao just highlighted between many of the actors, so it’s going to be very difficult to overcome and to really change the dynamics in the shorter-term.
That said, you know, to be a bit more optimistic, I think that there are a lot of people that – I don’t foresee a future where there’s a big nuclear breakout, where there’s a large proliferation of nuclear weapons to new actors and new states. I think that the norm against both nuclear proliferation and nuclear use is quite strong, and I think that I’m not somebody who thinks that, you know, nuclear war is right around the corner. So, I think that if anything, we’ll be much more in a kind of status quo situation than one where things have changed significantly one way or the other.
That said, if you look at, you know, how quickly things could change for either the positive or the negative, you know, there’s tremendous opportunities there as well. So, if you look at, you know, the situation between 1975 and 1985 and how significantly things had changed, or between 1985 and 1995, I mean, there can be very significant shifts in positive directions very quickly too, where you have neighbours who are committed to change, are committed to taking drastic and dramatic steps. So, I think it’s – we’re in a position right now where the trendlines are in a negative direction, but I don’t think they’re so negative that the world is going to be completely terrible in 25 years. On the other hand, I think that things could change dramatically for the better, if there’s real commitment by world leaders, particularly in the P5, the whole P5, to making positive steps.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much. Actually, there was a question in the Q&A from Joelien Pretorius, asking “What is NATO doing to create the environment for nuclear disarmament, and on self-reflection, what is it not doing?” I think you partway answered that, perhaps you could just give us a few thoughts on what you think NATO could be doing more than it’s doing right now.
Jessica Cox
Sure. I mean, I think it’s very difficult for NATO, as an organisation, to say that we are or aren’t doing things for nuclear disarmament, and that the P5 and that the other nuclear powers are the ones that really have to take steps, and what NATO does do is have – play a very strong co-ordinating function among the P3. We have a lot of internal discussions about how we can collectively strengthen arms control regimes, how we can strengthen the NPT. We are actively working on doing some internal thinking about how we can look at new arms control measures for missile regimes to bolster both existing missile regimes and look at new ideas and new – you know, things that we can do. But from a disarmament perspective as opposed to an arms control perspective, and this is – disarmament is something that is squarely within the purview of the P5 and I think that from a NATO perspective, we have been very supportive of steps from the P3 NATO nations to reduce nuclear arsenals within the European theatre. The number of nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced by about 90%, since the end of the Cold War, so we’ve gone – you know, taken significant steps already and I think that, you know, NATO continues to look at steps towards disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, and things that we can do to just foster a more productive environment. And we also, you know, think of it as very important to continue to foster dialogue.
NATO allies are very supportive with the new – or the renewed US-Russia strategic stability talks. We’re very supportive of bringing China into arms control in some way, shape or form. Both the UK and France have been very clear that they’re not going to expand their nuclear arsenals and that their arsenals are steady. So, I think that there is a lot of things that NATO has done and that we are, know you – and that we have been doing and will continue to do into the future. But a lot of it isn’t, you know, big public splashy declarations, it’s a lot of work inside the Alliance to build common positions, to have discussions, to think through what is in the security interest of allies in the Europe-led area, and to really foster dialogue and create, you know, the environment for where the P5 can take steps in the future.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Jessica. Now, I know that Nikolai is prepared to answer my question, but I think I might just go out to the floor and then Nikolai, if you can incorporate your answer into that, that would be really great. I know that Oliver Mayer has a question. So, Oliver, if you could answer – ask your question, and if I could bring in Gareth Evans as well, with his question, because they are connected, I think. So, if we could go first to Oliver Mayer, and then to Gareth Evans, that would be great.
Oliver Mayer
Yeah, thanks very much, I hope you can hear me. My question, I suppose, to Jessica Cox and it also looks into the future, though not in 25 years, and NATO has begun a reflection process looking at NATO in 2030, and I’d be interested to hear from Jessica, to what degree NATO will also be looking at its nuclear posture, and nuclear sharing arrangements in that context, for example, we have a debate now, a lively debate on the ‘no first use’. Would that be something that NATO is willing to look at, with regard to the nuclear weapons assigned to the alliance? Thanks very much.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Before you answer that, Jessica, we’ll go to Gareth, and I realise that I’ve unfortunately, unwittingly, just put Jessica on the spot, which isn’t fair. So, I will also call on Orient Noda too, and I will read his question out at the end, so then you can answer three questions together. So, Gareth, please. Gareth, can you hear me? Gareth, can you unmute yourself, please?
Gareth Evans
Can you hear me now? Are we back on?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yes, you’re on.
Gareth Evans
Can you hear me now?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yes.
Gareth Evans
Okay. I wanted to focus also on ‘no first use’, on the basis that probably, that’s the best circuit breaker, both in terms of regenerating momentum towards disarmament generally, and also, just moving the game forward in a way that Obama, of course, tried, with a personal commitment, intellectual commitment, to sole purpose, but was stymied by opposition from East European NATO allies and Northeast Asian allies. Russia’s probably a lost cause in that respect, and Nikolai might want to comment on that. But is the United States now a lost cause, or can that momentum be regenerated under a Biden administration? I don’t know whether NATO institutionally can help the game to move forward, but it really was very, very depressing for all of us, particularly in East Asia and Australia, to see the absolute unwillingness to move down that particular ‘no first use’ doctrinal path, under the Obama administration, and I hope we can reverse that. What’s the view as to the possibility of that?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you, Gareth, and then Orient Noda wants me to read their question out loud. A question, and particularly for Nikolai, but I think that there are others as well on the purposes of nuclear weapons, “Aside from deterrence and other states have nuclear weapons, so how can we tackle them to dismantle the idea that nuclear weapons are here to stay and we have to live with them?” So, I think that, you know, we’re seeing a theme come through here of, you know, where are we going? I think this is the bigger picture that people need to have, a sense of direction of travel, rather than this is – it is what it is, we are where we are, which I think is characterising the debate very much. It’s where we’re going with this that people really want to get to grips with. So, if I could turn, perhaps, to Nikolai and then Tong and then back to Jessica.
Dr Nikolai Sokov
Oh, yes, thank you, Patricia. The question – so yes, I just need to clarify, when I said that all the weapons are going to stay with us, that was not a happy note, I actually don’t like it at all. Yes, and it is a sad note. So, the missions about nuclear weapons, that’s about what I actually mentioned. Well, in fact, the primary mission of nuclear weapons, or rather one of two primary missions of nuclear weapons is, in fact, to deter conventional forces that are superior. Oh yes, and this is still here with us, on the context or the conditions of, I change like a little bit, so that mission was emphasised by NATO, now emphasised by Russia. But an important thing to note here is that unfortunately, we do not pay sufficient attention to that.
Yes, I fully appreciate that NATO prefers to emphasise conventional, actually, forces in conventional response or to the perceived Russian threat. What that policy does miss is that Russia actually treats NATO conventional capability as more dangerous than its nuclear capability, because conventional is so usable. So, we’ll see the counter-response to Russia, and the bad thing here, actually, the worst thing here, is that there is not enough dialogue. I would have both sides say about the same things. Oh yes, I fully appreciate what Jessica Cox said about the efforts of NATO to maintain and foster dialogue, yes, and Russia is saying exactly the same thing. But the dialogue is not there, nonetheless.
Wars, if you actually look at what happened to the INF Treaty, and the possibilities or to resolve that issue were not used in full by both sides. I think it’s a shame. In fact, it’s a complete shame that the first time the two parties had a substantive dialogue on INF was under Trump. It was in December 2017, the first time that it was really in-depth. So, will Biden – oh, so, I’m jumping about just in the interests of time, so will Biden in fact be able to restore a dialogue? I don’t know. The political atmosphere is way too poisonous, in fact, for a serious dialogue. And once again, well, it’s completely kind of terrible, it’s very shocking, but we now have consultations like in Vienna already are two rounds of inter-agency, very in-depth. Well, of course, positions of the parties are extremely, kind of, different, yeah, but at least they discuss those kind of differences, yes, and they discuss that in-depth, and we have not had that since the conclusion of New START.
Yes, unfortunately, that dialogue is treated with Trump, who is considered the Moscow Stooge, and things like that. I don’t really know whether politically, in fact, Biden will be able to engage in the same thing. We do need dialogue, and we do need to pay very close attention to the relationship between nuclear and conventional. We don’t talk about that much, but in my view, that’s the main driver and, well, it’s not to say that we have an arms race in Europe, we’ve got several of them that go all at the same time and hand-by-hand. We do not have a big – oh, during the Cold War we feared like a World War III, oh yes, and that’s why the two sides were extremely, kind of, cautious to avoid provoking that. Unfortunately, I think the probability over small scale, low-level conflict is significantly higher today than it used to be during the Cold War, but those low-level, small scale conflicts always carry with them the risk of escalation and well, to be honest, oh yes, I’m more concerned today than I was even, like, in the 80s.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you.
Dr Nikolai Sokov
Yeah, well, I’ve never been as concerned since 1983, I must tell you, honestly.
Dr Patricia Lewis
That’s a very disturbing note to turn now to Dr Ogilvie-White, Tanya Ogilvie-White, who has managed to beat the Australian Wi-Fi system and come back to us. So, Tanya, you are one of our panellists, thank you so much. You’re from the Griffith Asia Institute and I wonder if you could give us your five minutes on this whole issue, and I’m just delighted you could be back.
Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White
Oh, it’s such a relief. Thanks, Patricia, and sorry about that, my whole computer crashed. Everything just crashed while Tong was speaking. So, I’ve missed a lot. But I tried dialling in on the phone and various things, but let’s not go into that, let’s just get on with this. Let’s get on with this.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Happens to the best of us, Tanya, so, go ahead.
Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White
Thank you. So, I contributed to the report that we’re discussing, that Chatham House has launched, and my chapter, or rather short essay, examined nuclear deterrence from Australia’s perspective. And at the time that I wrote it, there was a lot of interest in the newly-minted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and people were talking about how you could maybe get resistant states to sign up to the treaty. And the hope was that, well, hope depending on what your perspective is on this, the hope was that the non-nuclear weapons states, including Australia, might be losing their faith in nuclear assurances and might actually see the TPNW as a way forward. And so, in my chapter, I explained while faith in extended deterrence is getting shakier in Australia, belief in nuclear deterrence, and deterrence in general, is not. And as far as the Ban Treaty is concerned, Australia isn’t low-hanging fruit at all.
Here, belief in the conflict prevention role of nuclear deterrence is deeply embedded in Canberra’s strategic outlook. The defence community regards nuclear deterrence as fundamentally stabilising, and remains committed to it, despite growing uncertainties over how nuclear dangers can be managed, and despite growing doubts over US Alliance resolve. So you might think, well that sounds irrational, but actually, if you look at decades of Australian defence decision-making and realise how deeply militarily dependent Australia is on the US, and how that dependency is very, very difficult to reverse now, you can understand it a little bit better. Also, if you understand that Australia’s defence potency, conventional as well, would plummet without US military allowance – alliance, it makes it – it makes more sense. So, if you look through 25 years of defence white papers, you can see it all set out very clearly.
That said, if I wrote this same paper now, two years on from when I wrote it, there would be some interesting differences, and I would argue yes, Australia is now seeking new ways to address its defence and security needs, as its strategic neighbourhood evolves, and I would say, in this very dynamic situation we’re in now, the trend is towards embedding Australia even more deeply into the Indo-Pacific deterrence landscape. So, the thrust of last month’s defence strategic update, which sets out the government’s plan to buy long-range missiles from the US, and then develop Australia’s own advanced strike capabilities, including potentially, hypersonic weapons, that fits within that, sort of, the new emerging deterrence landscape as Australia – as Canberra sees it. And that sounds – might sound quite overly ambitious, but Australia and the US were engaged in ten years of quite close hypersonics co-operation, probably not as ambitious as it sounds.
Also, now I would say it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that if conditions in the region continue to worsen, that Australia – it’s hard to completely rule out Australia seeking greater certainty by developing its own nuclear weapons, and I would not have said that two years ago. And I think, you know, you can see the strategic debate going on in Canberra, it’s been going on for a couple of years, getting a little louder, and former defence officials have actually concluded, Australia should at least explore the lead time for developing its own nuclear weapons capability. And it is not a complete pipedream because Australia has many of the components that would make it possible to go down that road.
Now, going back to Chatham House essays, I would say they provide a very good insight into why it would be a big mistake for Australia to take that road. And also, I think, if you read the Chatham House report very carefully, or rather this collection of essays, you can see that Australia’s current trajectory on the conventional side in getting into their region’s missile race, I think is also potentially a strategic mistake. But at the same time, it’s not a black and white situation, and I think another thing that the essays do is that they provide context for the dilemmas facing today’s strategic decision-makers, and the reasons – there are so many reasons to worry about the evolving strategic environment, so many questions about how to maintain stability in this emerging environment, and I think it’s really telling that despite the growing risks of deterrence breakdown, many of which are discussed in that report, nuclear deterrence is still regarded by many states as the only credible conflict prevention system. I think that’s telling, and whether or not we agree with that, and I don’t agree with it, its prevalence says something about the security institutions we’ve created, and not created, to provide alternatives. So, we haven’t fostered enough trust and confidence through the systems that we have. We haven’t dealt with the hard cases convincingly. We haven’t adapted the institutions, and moreover, in this region, there are glaring gaps where institutions don’t even exist. So, if you are sitting in Canberra and you’ve had decades of money invested in the rules – you know, contributing to the rules-based order, seeing your security as being provided for by the rules-based order and the US Alliance system, you might start wondering whether your investments have been rather shaky.
So, I could just conclude by saying well, where does that leave us? It leaves us in having to face a really awful reality that nuclear deterrence is becoming a more dominant part of the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape, despite the growing risks of nuclear war. I would say that trust and confidence are at an all-time low, that the build-up, the missile build-up has begun in earnest in this region, and the future breakout of states that have relied on extended deterrence is a growing possibility. And so, I think rather than sit back and be fatalistic about this, we’ve got a lot of work to do. We’ve got to really work hard on preventing deterrence breakdown, those who can, that is going to be a focus, risk reduction, preventing deterrence breakdown, revitalising arms control, adapting it to today’s world, and then, reinforcing and really having a very serious discussion about the future of the Non-Proliferation regime, and how we have to strengthen its weaknesses and how we have to plug the gaps in it, ‘cause they’re growing. So, I say it’s all difficult, but it’s all urgent, and I think we have to be proactive about doing these things and taking it really seriously. Thanks.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you, Tanya. I think that was a really, really important contribution to this discussion. I’m aware of the time. I’m aware that we have fewer than ten minutes left, six minutes actually, and there are a number of questions coming up. One set of questions refers to the role of China in this, another set of questions looks very much at the conundrum that’s being posed by new low-yield, some might say more usable, weapons. New tech, emerging technologies and their impact on nuclear deterrence equations is coming into this, and also, you know, what can be done, in terms of confidence-building measures, the NPT etc. So, what I’m going to do is, I’m just going to turn to Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, and I know he has a couple of questions and ask him to keep them very short, I hope. And then, I think you can all read in the Q&A the excellent questions that have come up, most of which I think seem to want to ask me to read them out, and rather than do that I think what I’ll do is, I’ll just ask each of you to choose one of those questions to answer, and do your best in the final round, in order that we can end more or less on time. So, Ambassador Abe, if you would be so kind. Thank you.
Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe
Thank you. I’ll skip the first question about the NPT’s future, ‘cause I’m writing a piece of paper and that will tell my answers to the question. I’d like to put a question to Dr Tong Zhao about the possible contributions China can make to encourage the United States and Russia to go further in their nuclear weapons reduction. It’s a very point way to ask if China can join nuclear arms control. Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much. There were other questions about China’s role as well, and what China could do. So perhaps, Tong Zhao, if we could begin with you and you could address those.
Dr Tong Zhao
Thank you so much. I think what China can do first is to provide better nuclear transparency. China is less dependent today than before on numerical ambiguity about its nuclear forces for credible deterrence, which means China should be able to offer greater transparency on the overall size of its nuclear weapons.
And secondly, in terms of transparency, China can better clarify the nature of some of its missile systems, are they nuclear only? Conventional only? Or nuclear conventional dual capable? That clarification can help reduce risk of inadvertent escalation. And to connect with the point of ‘no first use’, which China wants to promote, one important reason in US is reluctant to adopt ‘no first use’ is because of concerns from American allies, including East Asian allies like Japan, which worries about China’s military power in the region. So, in return, you know, do for China to encourage US to adopt sole-purpose or ‘no first use’, I think China can offer some strategic reassurance to American allies, especially by explicitly giving up the military option of resolving territorial disputes near China. I think that would be really helpful to resolve this dilemma and also, help achieve a ‘no first use’ agreement that China wants to see.
Last point, China’s role in new future nuclear arms control to focus exclusively on nuclear issue, I think is a little problematic because many concerns about non-nuclear strategic weapon systems, and if we broaden the scope of where we’ll see that, there are many innovative ways to combine nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities together, and then offer an equal platform for all the major powers to participate as equal partners. One way to do so is to combine strategic nuclear weapons with theatre range and missile systems. US-Russia have advantage in the former category of weapons, but China has advantage in the latter category, combine these two categories of weapons would be an easy way for the three powers to do arms control as equal partners. So, I will stop here, thanks.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much. Nikolai, if I could turn to you very briefly, I know you’ve given a long answer to the previous set of questions, but if you could just address the New START discussions for the extension and where you see that going, and that came in from Elena Guy Vertek.
Dr Nikolai Sokov
I’m sorry, the extension?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Sorry, the extension of the New START Treaty, or the new negotiations, which are in Vienna at the moment, or have been recently, I should say.
Dr Nikolai Sokov
Oh yes. Well, I think the extension of New START is a purely political decision that should be made by the Trump administration and I think they’re really just using it for tactical purposes, well – and ongoing consultations. I think the chances are 50/50 that the Trump administration will extend it. If not, I hope that the Biden administration can do that. There’s absolutely no reason not to extend New START. One thing that we should do – oh yes, and that’s what we did not do in the previous ten years. New START was intended as a step, as an [inaudible – 60:04] to buy time to provide stability to negotiate a new generation treaty, yes, and we did not manage to do that within the last ten years. And I think it’s really vital that if we can extend New START, we do use the remaining five years to finally start serious negotiations.
We need to understand that the existing arms control frameworks are outdated. We do need to change the framework, and first and foremost, we do need to switch accounting from deliberate vehicles to actual nuclear weapons. We do keep forgetting that arms control agreements do not in fact address nuclear weapons themselves. So, we need to do that. It’s not easy. That’s quite controversial, it’s even painful, but we need to do that, and we should not waste any more time, we’ve already wasted ten years. I hope that we have another five years, because conducting negotiations, in the absence of any treaties, is so much more difficult. Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you, Nikolai. Jessica, and there’s been talk of emerging tech, there’s low yield and low threshold weapons, and you take your pick.
Jessica Cox
Sure. Well, I’ll start because I didn’t have an opportunity to answer the ‘no first use’ questions earlier. I’m going to pass on talking about what a potential Biden administration would potentially do, that’s not in my job jar anymore, and I’ll focus on the NATO aspect of it. You know, from a NATO perspective, I think it’ll be very hard to convince allies that the time is right now to have a ‘no first use’ posture. I think that the erosion of some of the transatlantic links, throughout the last few years, will make, you know, kind of, ‘no first use’ proposals even less appealing than they were four years ago when the Obama administration did this, and so, I don’t think that that is likely to be an outcome in the near term. But again, from a NATO perspective, I think it’s quite unlikely.
That said, you know, ‘no first use’ policies are only as good as, you know, the confidence people have in them. They’re political statements and I think that there’s many, many more things that we need to be discussing. I think Dr Sokov just outlined many of them, that would be, you know, more stabilising and more helpful in the long run than focusing on ‘no first use’. I think that there’s way too much mistrust in the system right now, particularly between the United States and Russia. I don’t think that that’s going to change if a Biden administration comes in. If anything, you know, people coming – the people that will come into a Biden administration were the ones that were – you know, that have the legacy of the Ukraine crisis and things like that. So, it’s not going to be a wholesale new group of folks coming in. So, I don’t think that, kind of, focusing on ‘no first use’ is where we should be. I think the strategic stability talks that are ongoing right now are really positive, the signs coming out.
I think we need to do a lot of work just levelling the playing fields. Tong Zhao spoke about this as well, really getting to some of these misperceptions between all the nations involved, I think is the starting point that we need to have, and really, kind of, big bold steps are probably not likely to be forthcoming in the next few years, and I think that’s okay. We have a lot of work that we need to do, and I agree with Dr Sokov that there’s not enough dialogue, you know, NATO has been asking for a new NATO-Russia Council meeting. I think that there’s been some discussions about when that would potentially happen or not. We need to use that as a form for talking, as well as the strategic stability talks, you know, China needs to be part of the discussion as well, whether it’s in a trilateral form or otherwise. But there’s a lot more dialogue that needs to happen, and a lot of – there’s just so much mistrust throughout the system.
On emerging tech, I can just say a couple of things, you know, the comment about the relationship between non-nuclear strategic capabilities and nuclear strategic capabilities has already been raised. I think that this is clearly an area that we need to look at for future arms control. We have to start thinking about arms control in new ways. Looking at parity between numbers is just not going to get us very far, particularly with the things that concern us now, from a European perspective, a lot of that is non-strategic nuclear systems, or strategic conventional systems, I mean, that’s really where we see the concerns. I think strategic parity between the US and Russia is good, and certainly from NATO allies, I think the vast majority have been very clear that they want to see New START extended, but that’s just a starting point, and really, you have to start thinking about the security landscape much more comprehensively than we have in the past. And I agree 100% with Dr Sokov, we have to think about it in new ways and think about the future realistically, and think about – and be more creative in how we develop solutions, because I think that the models that we’ve relied on in the past are just – they’re not going to be effective in the future.
And then on low yield just very quickly, from a NATO perspective, you know, I think NATO has been supportive of US development of a small number of low yield systems, as a way to have a range of options on the escalation ladder. NATO is concerned about Russia’s development of low yield systems, in a much more robust way, or non-strategic systems in a much more robust way. I do think that, you know, we see the US systems and NATO’s own B61 systems as helpful options to have, so you don’t just have to jump – you don’t have a decision between a strategic nuclear response or nothing. So, you know, I think we see this as a stabilising force.
That said, you know, certainly we don’t want to see the proliferation of tons of low yield systems and I think that, again, from a NATO perspective, we’re increasingly concerned about Russia’s low use systems and low yield systems, that range the European theatres as really part of something that’s quite destabilising for the region. So, I’ll stop there.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Jessica. I’m very aware of the time. We have gone over time, but I do want to go back to Tanya Ogilvie-White for a few remarks because she hasn’t been able to participate. And I think what we’d like to hear, Tanya, from everything you’ve heard so far and seen questions, whether we could think constructively about what we might do to go forward, taking what Nikolai has said, what Tong Zhao has said, and what Jessica has just said.
Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White
Yes, well, I do have two priorities as I see it. I think we need a dialogue on doctrine. A dialogue on doctrine and technology, you know, basically to increase transparency and to increase communication on, you know, where – in order for deterrence to work, and in order to prevent deterrence breaking down, we need to understand where red lines are. We need to understand how states expect to respond and how to react in certain scenarios. So, I think that sort of dialogue on doctrine would be a number one. One way to do it would be to get the nuclear arms states, all of them, together under an expanded P5-type process, I’d like to see something like that.
The other thing I’d like to see is a formal arms control effort for the Asia-Pacific region. So, countries coming together to talk about not just nuclear arms control but, you know, including conventional as well, and trying to really nut out some ideas for some, you know, some discussion that actually leads to some stability and some sense of stability, and within that also looking at the Non-Proliferation regime as it is at the moment, and ways that we can strengthen it and ways that we can bring discussion of new technology, technological developments into those discussions as well. So, that’s what I’d like to see and I think that would bring some transparency and some clarity, and it might actually build some confidence as well, because I think a lot of what’s going on at the moment is a huge amount of uncertainty, and that uncertainty is really driving insecurity and leading to worst case scenario thinking, and falling back on old solutions, which are not relevant anymore, or are more dangerous today, is the way I’d say. So, I’ll leave it there. Thanks, Patricia.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you, Tanya. That was a very good note on which to end. I recognise that we probably should have put two hours in for this discussion. Always leave them wanting more is a good mantra, I think, that most comedians rely on, so I’m not saying any of us are that, but I think it’s – certainly we need a, sort of, rematch. I think there are – this has been a discussion that has given us a lot of material to think about. There are some really good proposals, some great analysis. I want to thank all of our participants. I want to think Governor Yuzaki very much for coming in from the Hiroshima Prefecture and bringing that perspective in at the beginning, and I’d like to thank all of our panellists for contributing what is actually a very wide array of views. But in the end, I think, with a lot of common agreement on the ways forward and the ways to think about it, and I think that has been very constructive.
I’d also like to thank everybody who is participating and for the questions that you’ve put forward in the Q&A. I am aware that we didn’t answer, really, questions on the India-Pakistan issue, and I think that is a subject for another webinar that we should be doing, because I think it’s a really important one. And thanks to everybody for participating in the way that they have and thank you so much to Chatham House’s Membership Team for helping us put this on, and what I hope is the beginning of several of these types of webinars coming forward for our centenary that we began celebrating in July this year. So, thank you all very much, I hope you all got as much out of it as I did. As I said, we have recorded it, it will go online, and you can listen to it again, if you missed anything. So, thank you all.
