Webinar: Testing Traditions in American Foreign Policy: A Conversation with Robert Zoellick

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Ladies and gentlemen, members of Chatham House, welcome to this Director’s Conversation with Bob Zoellick. Thrilled to have this opportunity, under the broad title of Testing Traditions in American Foreign Policy. Dr Robert Zoellick is a well-known figure, both in American policymaking, but also in American thinking and writing, and we’ve managed to coincide this conversation not just a day ahead of the Presidential Debate, which I think is something we don’t want to get dragged into immediately, but obviously, at a moment also of the release of his new book, or his book on America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, which is something that must have – Bob, I’ll come to in a minute, taken some time. It’s a big topic and, knowing Bob Zoellick, it’s something he will have gone into in great depth, and with a lot of perspicacity.

Bob Zoellick served in the George W. Bush administration as the US Trade Representative, and then, as the US Deputy Secretary of State, and was then appointed to be the President of the World Bank from 2007-2012. He also served in the George H. W. Bush administration, where he was a close associate of James Baker, initially at the Treasury, but then at the State Department, and went on to become Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, G7 Sherpa and, very importantly, one of the Architects of that pivotal moment in American foreign policy and European foreign policy, of German unification, where he led the 4+2 Talks, 2+4, get them the wrong way round, 2+4 Talks.

Now a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, from which he got his JD in Law, and is Master of Public Policy at the Kennedy School. So, Bob, it’s wonderful see you again. I know we’ve – you’ve participated in at least one other event of ours at Chatham House a little while ago, but this is a public event, as I said, one timed very well, with the release of your book, as well as a moment where all anyone wants to talk about, I don’t know if wants maybe is the wrong verb, can talk about is the US Presidential election.

Before I turn to you, the first question, just to remind everyone this is on the record, which means you can tweet, tweet away if you want, #CHEvents, and we will do Q&A. We’re not going to use the ‘Chat’ function for your questions, please put them into the ‘Q&A’ function at the bottom of the screen. You can upvote questions’ which I will try to pay attention to, in turn, the most popular ones. But don’t use the raise hand and all of those things, just focus on the Q&A, which would be perfect. If I can call people in to unmute, I will. Otherwise, I’ll ask the questions. We’ve got a relatively limited amount of time. We can go a little bit after the hour of 5pm here in the UK, but – so, 45 minutes or so, it is a conversation-style, but I’ll turn to our guests and our members in about 20 minutes.

So, Bob, I think the most obvious question to ask you is not where do you think the US Presidential elections are going to go, why did you write this book? I could say why did you write it now, but what drove you to write the book?

Robert Zoellick

Well, first, Robin, thank you, it’s great to be back with Chatham House, although virtually. It would be nicer to be there in person, and also, thank Emily for all of her work in putting this together.

So, Robin, I had the idea for the book many years ago, when I read Henry Kissinger’s book Diplomacy, which, you may recall, used history to talk about foreign policy. But I always had a sense that he reflected more of a European perspective. So, even while, in years of public service, I was often thinking about how I might try to do something that used history to share the American experience and ideas. And so, the approach that I’ve taken in this book is to focus on people, in part because I wanted to appeal to wider audiences, people that like biographies, this is a form of a multiple biography, but also, episodes in the practical work of policymaking. And this was, in a sense, a conscious choice, because a lot of the work that I’ve seen in universities on foreign policy, tends to focus on international relations theory. And my experience is that while those topics are interesting to debate, they’re frankly not too useful when you’re dealing with the question of Germany in 1989, or Darfur in 2005, or restarting the trade system in 2001, or dealing with climate change. And so, I wanted to give people a sense of the practice of diplomacy, while also sharing these good stories. And I suspect this has also been somewhat the case in Britain, in the United States, the field of diplomatic history has somewhat faded over the years, for an understandable reason.

People have wanted to bring in unappreciated actors and themes, but it’s led to somewhat of a fragmentation in the field. And Fred Logevall, a Professor at Harvard, has just produced a wonderful biography first volume on JFK, wrote a piece where he said, you know, “Why have we stopped teaching political history?” So, this is, in some ways, to try to nudge the system back. And in my years in government, I would often torture my associates with questions about what they learned in history, and I learned that insofar as they had studied some history, it tended to go from 1945 on, or World War Two on. And frankly, there’s a lot of interesting stories in the first 150 years.

Now, from Britain’s perspective, 150 years may not seem that long, but for the United States, there’s a lot of interesting tales. So, in a sense, the book is also a series of case studies. So, for people interested in the practice of diplomacy they can ask, what would they do?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And, no, I was just thinking about this idea of international relations theory dominating the whole process and being able to bring the human element in. I suppose the obvious question then to ask about that, and part of the reason people have gone for the international relations theory, is that when you go individual-by-individual, you almost find it impossible to learn lessons across that could then be applicable, as you’ve said, you can end up with some very interesting anecdotes. But I know from the blurb we’ve put together for this meeting, and having just taken a quick skim, you have five, kind of, lessons, five theories of American foreign policy that you’ve brought about. Why these traditions, as you call them, why did you pick those five? What, you know, what are they and, I suppose, they cut across all of your case studies, would be my question, question mark?

Robert Zoellick

They do, Robin, and I didn’t want to be heavy-handed in that. A lot of books will try to create a framework and then force the messy facts into the framework. I actually – in each of the chapters, I try to make somewhat of a diplomatic assessment, so for would-be Diplomats or people in the civil society that deal with governments, there’s a lot of little insights you could pick up. But the traditions focus first on North America, which is interesting because, as you know, as a student of the United States, when you get on foreign policy websites, you’ll read about Europe, and Asia, and Latin America and, to a degree, Middle East and Africa, and very rarely do people talk about North America.

Well, obviously, it was a big part of this story in the 19^th Century. But even in the 20^th Century we almost went to war with Mexico again. In World War One, Germany proposed to Mexico that they join in war against the United States, for which they’d receive the States of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, for some reason they forgot California. And then on, for example, the greatest nuclear showdown in the Cold War is in the Caribbean, the same North American space. NAFTA, in my mind, which I was part of, was much more than a trade agreement, it was integrating and modernising Mexico.

But there’s a bigger story for the future, and Ronald Reagan actually captured this in a speech he gave in 1979, launching his Presidential campaign. It’s almost unimaginable today. He said, “The United States would be better off with Mexico and Canada stronger, and it’s time that we stopped thinking about our nearest neighbours as foreigners,” which is a little different from what you hear from the Trump campaign. And I think the logic there is for the United States as a global power, it will be stronger and more effective if it’s got a North American continental base of three democracies, you know, integrated economy, better demographics than the rest of the world, energy self-sufficiency, ability to export. But that has to be a conscious policy.

The second tradition is the importance of trade, transnationalism, and technology and here, what I wanted to emphasise was that from the start of the United States, trade was more than a matter of economic efficiency. When Thomas Jefferson was drafting the Declaration of Independence, John Adams served on that committee, but he chaired his own committee, to come up with a model treaty in 1776, and it basically was a trade agreement. And because, you recall, this is a world of empires and mercantilism, and so, trade was their foreign policy. But there’s an important aspect of that, which is, they were trying to open space for private actors, so today what we call transnational actors. And that’s been an important part of America’s engagement with the world, whether missionaries, or engineers, or civil society groups, or soldiers of fortune, and in particular on the technology side. So, to understand the United States, one has to really get a sense of how its innovative capacity of technology, particularly in the 20^th Century.

Then the third is the role of alliances and here, as you know, for 150 years the United States stays away from alliances because of Washington and Jefferson’s, sort of, early warning, wanting to stay away from the European system. So, in some ways, you can look at much of American relations with the world as ways to interact as alternatives to alliances. And then, all of a sudden in 1947-49, frankly, it’s unplanned, it’s quite by accident, the United States creates this alliance system that also has economic dimensions, and it guides the world for 70 years. It has to adapt, it has to change, as you mentioned, I was part of the effort with German unification, where we were trying to end the Cold War peacefully, but the question will be, what is the future of that alliance system?

The fourth one is the importance of public and particularly Congressional support. Again, many foreign policy experts in the United States, sort of, treat Congress as a foreign land. Kennedy had absolutely no ability to deal with Congress, and he kind of was dismissive of it. And from the very first story, where I talk about Ben Franklin on, I explain how Congress and public opinion is critical for the basis of support going forward and will be again.

And then the fifth and last one is the notion of America’s purpose and here, I’m not talking about exceptionalism, because obviously, all countries have a sense of their own special nature. I’m trying to relate that, in some ways, the best way to explain this is for people that have a dollar bill in their wallet sometime, go look at the back and you’ll see the Great Seal of the United States, and perhaps you’ve just skimmed or never thought about it, but there’s this unfinished pyramid, and it is unfinished, which is quite symbolic. It has the Eye of Providence above it and below it is Novus ordo seclorum, which is new order of the ages. So, event these – this new nation, small on the borders of the Atlantic Coast, it was thinking in big terms and my argument is, the nature of the purpose changes. So, at first, it’s to simply preserve a republic in a world of empires, then it’s to preserve the union, and coming out of the union are some notions about how one deals with confederal structures, or co-operative arrangements.

By 1900, the United States is a World Power, and it’s a question of how it engages in the balance of power system, which I talk about how Teddy Roosevelt mediates wars in East Asia and the First Moroccan Crisis. For Woodrow Wilson, it’s to make the world safe for democracies, it’s not to make the world democracies, but it’s to preserve safe space. For Roosevelt, with Churchill, it’s the Four Freedoms in the Atlantic Charter, in the Cold War it’s the leader of the free world, for Bill Clinton it’s the indispensable power. And my argument is, this is a key aspect of how Americans see their place in the world. But it changes, based on the conditions in the world, the state of freedom, and the basis of public support.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Very, very interesting and we’re going to want to come back, I’m sure, to many of these comments, ‘cause as you say them and especially as you went through your series of purposes, if you see what I’m saying, and how they evolve, I find it particularly interesting. But it leads to the obvious question, because there was almost a flow of that, you know, towards freedom, and I know a lot of non-Americans, I count myself included, would think of America’s purpose slightly as the beacon on the hill, that it is meant to be the thing that other countries could aspire to, in terms of individual freedom, I’m not going to, you know, put everything in that basket, but that aspect of freedom and individual freedom has always been such a calling card for people outside the US. But in that context, where does – not ‘cause I want you to talk about President Trump, but where does Trump fit into the traditions of American foreign policy? Is this a return to status quo ante, pre-47-49, would you say was the norm, the 150 years, and it’s just been coming inevitably? Or is this an aberration? And there’s some other new phase that you haven’t quite coined yet, compared to your other five, coming up? What’s your take?

Robert Zoellick

Well, from my perspective, Trump is clearly an aberration, and we can explain but, you know, his whole political power has been as a disruptor and as someone who’s trying to break away from the established system. And that show – we can talk more about that, how that shows up even in his foreign policies. But, as you said, I think, you know, I didn’t want to write a book just on Trump. I wanted the book to, kind of, have a longer life to it.

And, as you said, for the first 150 years, America avoids alliances, but what I wanted to underscore was, it wasn’t isolationist. Many Europeans assume that because we weren’t part of the European security structure that we were isolationist. And I partly wanted to recall some of the earlier ideas and experience, whether related to international law, or arms control and regional security, or economics and trade, because those could very well be important elements to the future system. And then, as we referred to, the way that the alliance system comes together in 47-49, is not planned, I mean, America plans to bring the troops home, it has expectations that the British economy is going to be much stronger, and what basically the sequence is, after coming back from a meeting in Moscow, Marshall understands that Stalin wants upheaval in Western Europe. So, he comes up actually not with a security plan, but with the Marshall Plan for economic support. He realises it won’t work, unless Germany is part of it, because of the economy. That really, sort of, precipitates the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany today and then once you create the Federal Republic of Germany, you have two concerns. One, the French and others are anxious about rebuilding Germany, and of course, you’ve got the Berlin crisis and so, the Soviet Union shows its sharp teeth, and so that leads to the creation of NATO. And then, what is also in the background is the 1930s economic experience, and the collapse of that system, and that, I think, is still relevant for today.

But the point is, while that alliance system took hold, sometimes people look at it through, sort of, rose-tinted glasses. It always required very careful diplomacy, you know, I have a chapter on the Berlin crisis with John F. Kennedy, and this was – this actually extended to Cuba, this was a nuclear showdown. The – Vietnam is, in a sense, the extension of the alliance system beyond what we were willing to defend. The events of 1989, which I was involved in, sort of trying to bring it to a peaceful end. And so, the system always has to adapt, and my own view is that it should play an important role in the future, it probably needs a combination of a new and traditional agenda. So, I think the United States could actually combine some of its domestic work at home on biological security, inclusive economic growth, climate change, digital security issues, with a European agenda, while not ignoring the traditional anxieties about Russia’s threat to the border or regional hegemons with nuclear weapons. And the alternative, which I also discuss historically, is the world of 1900, because you would now have a different set of powers, but if that alliance system really fragments, you’re more likely to have a world where you’ve got China, India, sort of, the European Union, on economic issues, perhaps political security issues, clearly the United States, Japan, trying to work out a relationship with both the United States and China, Britain having to figure out its new place, that’s a very different world than the ones that we’ve grown up in, and it’ll have costs.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

You know, it’s interesting, the way you’ve framed it, as you said, it’s not an aberration, but I think most people when they, again, bringing this from a British perspective, with a fairly short memory of history or even reading of history, take that period of American isolationism of the 30s and, sort of, think of that as the normal America, if you see what I’m saying. That particular moment where it closed in on itself and therefore keep waiting for the clam to shut again, as it seems to be doing now. I mean, Congress played, and you mentioned that public opinion and Congress were important, and you elided the two together in your point about your tradition there, I think was your fourth tradition. Where do you see the role of Congress today in this, because a) Congress has become incredibly partisan, again, maybe that’s a return to the past, I’m not sure, but Congress and the relation between the Presidency and Congress has really become quite a determining factor of American foreign policy. Is there anything, either historical that you think about today, is there a pattern from the past, is there something to learn from the future, about Congress’s intercessions and involvement in American foreign policy?

Robert Zoellick

So, there are always ebbs and flows, and indeed, in my introduction after the United States, frankly, negotiates this great Treaty of Independence with Britain, one of Ben Franklin’s colleagues says, “Well, don’t you expect that, you know, you’ll be – this’ll be met with a great wave of appreciation?” And Ben Franklin says, “I’ve never known of a peace treaty that didn’t get somebody upset, and the idea of blessed are the peacemakers is probably more left for the afterlife than this one.” But my conclusion would be, it ebbs and flows, but it’s always important. So, I have a chapter on quite an interesting individual named Charles Evans Hughes, who works quite closely with Balfour in 1921-22. And this is right after World War One, and remember, the US Senate has denied Wilson’s treaty in the League of Nations and the Senate’s in the ascendency. One of the Senators from Hughes’s own party says, “It doesn’t matter who’s Secretary of State, the Senate’s going to run everything anyway.” And I show, within two years, how basically Hughes turns that around, with a shrewd sense of public opinion and, frankly, created momentum for naval arms control related to regional security.

Then, as you referred to, you have the Neutrality Laws of the 1930s, which are quite restrictive. In the period of 47-49, some of these historical episodes have been well-covered, so I try to bring out some dimensions that are under-appreciated. And I talk about the role of Senator Vandenberg, and there’s a lot there for people interested in, sort of, the Congressional dimension. Then, as you mentioned, in the Cold War there’s a shift to Executive power but, if you recall Vietnam in the 70s, Congress tries to roll this back. And I think today, one of the questions I’m trying to tee up will be, you’ll have changing coalitions based on the public attitudes.

On the positive side, and I know, you know, sort of the predominate view is gloom, but if you actually look at a lot of the younger members of the House, Democrat and Republican, they’ve had military service or intelligence service, they’ve been, sort of, engaged in the world, and I hope that will be a constructive thing. But the key notion is, there’s a place for key actors. And just to give you and your audience a little insight, kind of, sort of, below the radar screen, you know, the Sub-Committee on Appropriations, so that’s the spending committee, the one that deals with the international side, in the Senate, has been chaired by Lindsey Graham, Republican of the Senate of South Carolina, and it’s really been run on the Democratic side by Pat Leahy, quite a liberal democrat from Vermont. But yet, despite what Trump has said, they’ve guided American appropriations for international affairs to maintain the interaction. And in a practical sense, when I became Head of the World Bank, and I needed to make sure I got capital increases, I not only worked closely with both of them, but I also created a caucus in the Congress to support the World Bank. So, these are, kind of, the things, if you’ve been inside the system, you have a sense of how to actually make things happen.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Perfect. Look, I’ve got a whole slew of questions I could ask you, but I can see questions coming in, so what I’ll do is, I’ll weave mine in, in the gaps or, you know, if I see an effective link. And I’m going to, sort of, jump around, I’m going to take the first question that was up there, that’s been liked by a couple of people, by Dina Mufti. But just so my colleagues know, I will turn to Duncan Bartlett in a minute to ask the second question. So, Duncan, just hold on ‘cause I think you can come on camera, whereas Dina would like me to ask the question to you. So, Bob, from Dina Mufti, the question, “What might trigger countries to abandon the US dollar as their reserve currency, you know, what is the probability of it being taken up by a basket of currencies?” Obviously, the role of the dollar, I imagine, is going to be a feature in your book, or is a feature in your book. What’s your sense of the prospects of it being abandoned in the anytime near future?

Robert Zoellick

Well, it’s interesting, in the first chapter after the introduction is about Alexander Hamilton, and it’s the importance of establishing credit, and actually, how he recognises, it’s amazing, in 1781, the war is still going on. He retreats to the library of his father-in-law, and he really, he understands Britain’s power through the Bank of England, and credit and debt financing system. And he understands that war – his ability to fight wars of attrition depends ultimately on credit, and so, this is a theme that actually, kind of, runs through some of the other stories. The strength of the dollar is an incredible gift from predecessors, it shouldn’t be abused. One has to obviously worry when, sort of, spending and debt seems to surge further and further.

But having said that, since I’ve dealt with this issue over 30 years, I’ve often had to, sort of, respond to people that keep thinking that the dollar is the principle reserve asset, it’s going to slip away. It’s actually moved in the other direction. It’s actually strengthened, and whenever you have a crisis, certainly the global financial crisis, even the start of this pandemic, and more knowledgeable people may be aware, fed swap lines to make dollars available were critical for European and other banks. Now why is that?

The point is, you have to make a choice, so where are you going to put your money? The euro has moved up as a potential reserve asset, but obviously, it’s had its challenges over the years as well. The pound still has some reserve asset status that Britain would be wise to recognise, allows it to run its current account a little differently, but nothing is forever, right? The renminbi? Well, you don’t have open capital markets, they’re not liquid, they’re not deep, they’re – you know, and one saw, a couple of years ago as China started to open up its capital markets, it didn’t want to give up control. So, the renminbi will play a role in trade, but it’s not necessarily, I think, likely that under the current political system, it’s going to become a critical reserve currency. And so, it’s possible that you could imagine, sort of, people looking to alternatives, at time people looked to the yen and others, but the strength of the dollar is partly based on the strength of US capital financial markets, and the rule of law system.

Now, can we abuse that? Yes. I mean, if I look at the handling of the TikTok case, looking like it’s, sort of, political manipulation, that, in my view, is a very dangerous approach. But I think for at least the substantial future, while the dollar will probably be a little weaker, has weakened a little bit over past months, as a reserve currency, I think it’s going to remain significant.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And again, certainly is, to somebody on the outside, it’s always struck me that this sense of perpetual growth that the US projects, that it has this capacity partly because of its openness to immigration, its amazing endowment of natural resources, its relative geographic safety, there’s always this sense that it could grow its way out of anything. Now, again, as you said, one should never test this to the nth degree, but it’s a point.

Now Duncan, Duncan Bartlett, Asia Review, any case, Asian Affairs. Duncan, why don’t you ask your question, we’re able to get you on camera. So, go ahead.

Duncan Bartlett

Thanks very much, Robin, and thanks very much, Mr Zoellick, for your remarks. You’re encouraging us to take a longer-term perspective on America’s diplomatic activity. You’ve touched a lot on the North American situation. As I’m the Editor of Asian Affairs, can I ask you to give your perspective on how the diplomatic relationship between the United States and China, in the 19^th Century and the early part of the 20^th Century, affects the current US-China relationship, please?

Robert Zoellick

Yes, that’s a very interesting question. I do have a number of chapters, starting with the Open-Door Policy, and obviously, the 1921-22 issues, Nixon and Kissinger and I think there’s three legacies from the relationship. One is the Open-Door principle, the United States always looking upon China as a great commercial opportunity, but often, a light that shines just a little bit over the horizon, not quite fulfilled in the way people want. On the other hand, you know, people need to recognise it was the fastest growing the market for US exports for 15 years prior to the Trump administration. So, I think people underestimate the importance of the Chinese economy to the US today, as part of the confrontation.

Second, there’s clearly an idea of, sort of, China as a power or potential power. So, back to the era of the Open-Door which, by the way, was a British idea, that Hay adopts, was the notion – remember, in the world of 1900, Africa has just been carved up into colonies and Europe, and Japan, and Russia were threatening to do the same thing with china. And so, the basic US policy to try to maintain China’s territorial integrity, while keeping an open door. And that carries forward in the 20s and the early Republican era, obviously FDR keeps hoping China will be a power after World War Two, then we have the Nixon-Kissinger, so how does China fit in, in the international system, and obviously, I wrote something about this, is the need to push China to be a responsible stakeholder.

But there’s a third theme that is also really important, which is much of the American experience with China is based on the missionary tradition. From the 19^th Century, and this is an important part of Britain too, most of the US contact with today’s civil society, or church groups or others, comes from missionaries. And these, the children of missionaries become the writers of books like Pearl Buck with The Good Earth, which is a bestselling movie, they become the Diplomats, they become the Time Magazine. And so, what the missionary story suggests is that the United States has always wanted to convert China, whether to Christianity, small ‘r’ republicanism, capitalism, and what happens is, when China then rejects it, and decides they don’t want to become, sort of, the junior partner in that system, then America reacts quite hostilely, as you saw at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, you saw in 1949, you saw in 1989, and I think we’re seeing it today. So, I think part of the lesson is, you know, to recognise China for what it is, not that we don’t want to try to engage it and nudge it as part of the system. But then, not overreact when it ‘disappoints us relative to our standards’.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Excellent, thanks very much, Bob. Thanks for a good question, Duncan. Let me just keep moving around a little bit. I’m going to call in a couple of minutes on Nick Westcott, if he’s there, and if he can come on camera. Nick, hold on for the moment, but we’ll come to you in a second. I just wanted to come back to one of the questions I had on my list, which I’m not sure will come up, having seen the list of questions, but I think it needs to be asked. How do you think the changing nature of American society is going to affect American foreign policy and, again, as you’ve taken a historical sweep, you must have seen some ebbs and flows, but there’s a real public awakening taking place out right now, especially a reassessment of racial injustices and inequalities, and some deeper societal divisions? Do you think these are likely to, sort of, playout into the capa – into the choices of a US foreign policy, or even the capacity to undertake the foreign policies? Do you think there’ll be something different about American foreign policy going forward, do you think?

Robert Zoellick

Yeah, very important question, and as we’ve alluded to, I think Trump’s foreign policy partly is a reflection of his political base, whether it be the wall with Mexico, or protectionism, or clearly wanting to get out of foreign wars. But there is support for a different approach. So, I don’t know if this has been reported yet in Britain, but the Chicago Council on Global Affairs does an annual survey, which just came out, and the numbers are quite striking. When asked about, should the US have an active role in world affairs? The numbers are 68% yes, 30% no. Support for NATO 73%, consult with major allies 71%, is trade good for the economy 74%, good for consumers 82%, even US jobs 59%. And the message here is, I think the American public have not retreated to an isolationism, but it’s a critical role for the President to frame this. So, I also point out, late in 1945 Gallup did a poll and asked Americans “How important will international affairs be?” 7%. 7%. It rose up to 14% over the next year, but, you know, Truman, in a different way Eisenhower, Reagan, Clinton, they saw part of their job as shaping, sort of, America’s international engagement.

Now, as for the social or, sort of, racial dimensions, at times, this has pushed America inward. So, the 30s would be a prime example and on the racial side, it’s clearly been a huge detriment. It was a detriment around 1900 with, sort of, anti-Asian actions that undermined what Teddy Roosevelt was trying to do. At times, it’s undermined our relations with Latin America. On the other hand, it also has been a prod to overcome some of these issues. So, you can see, in the 1960s during the Cold War, the Civil Rights movement also led to a discussion of how can we stand for freedom if African-Americans and Blacks are treated as the way they are? And I’m struck today, Robin, that the movements in America such as #MeToo or Black Lives Matter, tend to echo around the world. And I think, you know, this is a challenge for Americans because when we face these and overcome these issues, it goes back to the point where I think it enhances America’s status. But, you know, and this is where I perhaps differ with some that believe all foreign policy is driven by structural forces. This is the role of leaders.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks. Sorry, a nice punchy endpoint. No, thank you very much for that comment and very, again, interesting your point about the Civil Rights 1960s period, in particular. Nick Westcott, Nick are you there, would be great to get you in? It’s a question that I think we’ve all been waiting for and [inaudible – 35:33] as well, Nick.

Nick Westcott

Thank you very much. Bob, your book is fundamentally about US foreign policy, but in passing, you have quite a lot to say about Britain. And in this country, you will notice the belief in the special relationship remains strong, the belief with increasing desperation. So, from your point of view, how does Britain fit into this new world that is emerging, that you were describing at the beginning, that the US is going to have to find its place in? So, were does a post-Brexit Britain fit in there? Thanks.

Robert Zoellick

Yeah, thank you for that question, Nick, and it’s interesting, I didn’t design this in the book, but there’s a number of chapters, perhaps not surprisingly, that revolve around the US relationship with Britain. And I think, particularly over the past really almost 100 years, the US has had a sense of special relationship with Britain that sometimes is more doubted in Britain, and perhaps it’s the uncertainty. But just to give you, again, a little reference point, Alexander Hamilton, right after our Revolutionary War, basically seeks a strategic partnership with Britain, because he thinks that the United States will grow as a power, but it could fit in to the mercantile world of Britain. And interestingly, the then First Minister, Lord Shelburne, has a similar idea, but politically, they both don’t have the base for it, for the next 100 years. And as I mentioned, John Hay, who was allegedly Queen Victoria’s favourite Ambassador, basically, when it comes time for the Open Door Policy, he draws it from what I call ‘idea merchants’ from Britain, who felt that British, as an imperial power, sort of, couldn’t play this role. So, it goes on and on, it’s not just Thatcher and Reagan, it’s, sort of, throughout the period.

And so, for Britain today, I think this is a critical moment, and it’s a critical moment not only for Britain, but it’s a critical moment for the United States, because I think Britain can and should play a significant role. My advice would be, first, don’t split up. So, when I read about Scottish secession, I understand all the complaints about the money and the fiscal side, but that would be a terrible signal of confidence to the rest of the world. And, by the way, the service sector and universities and other qualities in Scotland, I think add a lot to Great Britain.

Second, recognise the value of British institutions. This is the challenge in America these days, too. But in my experience, the Bank of England, the Treasury, your intelligence agencies, your universities, these cut above their, sort of, place and size, they’re influential, they’re part not just of the power resources, but they’re part of, sort of, the intellectual debate component. Obviously, my advice for Britain is the same as the United States, the more you’re open to goods, people, ideas, capital, frankly, I think you’ll be stronger. An important economic ecosystem for innovation, Robin and I were talking about how this is a strength that sometimes is under-recognised for people on US recovery. But when I think about some of the research institutions, the vaccines, some of the innovative capacity in Britain, you want to foster that. And then, the last point, again draws from my personal as well as experience as well as historically, and that is, full-service powers get extra points. And so, you know, as Britain’s military shrinks, I always get a little worried. And – because it’s not that you’re going to be, sort of, a World Power, but frankly, your ability to contribute across the board on military issues, makes Britain a different player than, say, Germany is today with all of its strengths.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Bob, thanks, and I’m just going to piggyback very quickly on this, we’ve got a lot of questions left and not a huge amount of time. But you give a very good description of what Britain should do. Could you just say a word or two about how you think Americans perceive Britain right now, the old thing, the special relationship, which under Obama and David Cameron was briefly recast as the essential relationship, but what’s your thinking about this? Does it have a purpose or a value in today’s world? Was it even just a little bit of marketing in its own time?

Robert Zoellick

Well, understandably, Americans are preoccupied with their own internal political debate and there’s a sense that some of the forces that have assaulted the US political system have also assaulted the British political system. And so, you know, whether it’s search for identity, whether it’s a response to immigration, you know, whether it’s people’s sense of displacement, in – you get a mixed view, in that probably most Americans who are knowledgeable on foreign affairs, would have liked Britain to have remained in the European Union to be a force and player. But people recognise that decision has been made, and so, there’s also an understanding, given America’s own sense of sovereignty and independence, why Britain would – at least some people in Britain would want to move out of it. So, this brings you back to the devil in the details of how it’s done. And so, I think there’s an empathy.

My own view is that the United States, for its own interest as well as Britain’s interest, should be more creative in supporting it. So, I’ve written, in a couple of places, why the type of trade agreement we should have is not just, sort of, the pure small items. But perhaps we should negotiate it as the North American economies, so with Canada and Mexico together, and help set rules for the future, and connect Britain in the larger international economy. And it’s a good example of how individual actions have to fit within a strategic framework. But I think the bottom line of it, Robin, and you’re an experienced hand at this, is that people have to face the realities. So, if Britain withdraws, if Britain seems to become Little England again, the world will move on and that’s why I’m, you know, been quite vigorous about saying the intellectual, the historical experience, the security, the economic power, the institutions, when I was at the World Bank, DFID, which has now been absorbed, your Development Agency, was quite a player, in terms of shaping ideas. And so, it’s how you leverage the capacity, and Britain has significant capacities, if it so chooses to engage wisely.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

We’re listening carefully, you know, we’ve got choices to make over the coming months, and early years as well. We’ve got a lot of questions, I’ll ask you one, and it’s a very targeted one, ‘cause I think people want to take advantage, also, of your experience, and not just your historical knowledge and experience. Alejandra Pescador, and then actually after that if Rishab Chatti wants to come on camera, we’ll see if we can get Rishab on, on camera to ask what I think is a nice big question. But a very targeted one from Alejandra Pescador, six party talks North Korea seems to have disappeared off the screen. I remember the one warning, it looked like Barack Obama gave to Donald Trump when he had that meeting in the White House in the, sort of, transition period.

Hi, Rishab, we’re going to get to you in a minute, hold on. So, just, you’re the next the question, glad that we can get you. Alejandra Pescador is about North Korea, and I remember that when Trump was sitting there in the White House and Obama was, kind of, giving this look, you felt he’d given him North Korea, you know, and Trump had gone, “Oh my God, is this something I’m going to have to deal with?” And he had this sort of slightly shaken look on his face. What’s your sense about North Korea, is this something that’s just a little thing that bops up and down now and again, or is it a real global risk, and does it matter, therefore, if it’s now gone completely off the agenda?

Robert Zoellick

Well, I think the US policy towards North Korea during the Trump administration have reflected his fundamentals, which is that he likes the idea of a big transaction. He wants to – his ego needs to be courted. He’s not very attentive to details. Also, importantly, he wants to be different from his predecessors, so they wouldn’t deal with Kim Jong-un and he wants to have a face-to face-contact and so, I don’t think it’s produced a darn thing. But having said that, I think that this is – in a way, there’s a little analogy to the chapter I do on Charles Evans Hughes and arms control. Some arms control efforts just get lost in the technical details.

The story of that chapter, which deals with the strategic weapons of the era, battleships, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, suggests the need to connect an arms control strategy with a regional security strategy and, by the way, I have another chapter, or chapter dealing with the Russia-Japanese War. I don’t think you can deal with North Korea, unless you see the relation not only with South Korea, but Japan, and China, and Russia. It’s the cockpit of security issues in Northeast Asia. So, I think if you want to test whether you can transform North Korea, whether it’s willing to, and by the way, in the meantime, sort of, protect against some of the dangers, you would need a more multiple track effort.

I mean, this again, in German unification, we had to work on multiple efforts here with economic and conventional forces, and others. So, you know, why not a conventional forces reduction effort in – on the Korean Peninsula, which could save money and, sort of, reduce some of the anxiety. I think you need a six party talks to deal with the security issues, you’ve got humanitarian issues, you’ve got economic issues and ultimately, the question is, can you build enough confidence in North Korea, where people are willing to move off the nuclear deterrence as their principle, sort of, idea for the future? And it’s not surprising that, given the history, that this would take time to do and so, I’ve read, sort of, John Bolton’s scree against all this, you know, he kind of wants to go from zero to a 100 at once. I don’t think that’s practical and, you know, this is, kind of, the practice of diplomacy applying itself. But also, my point is, you’d have to bring the arms control into a larger regional security, and economic and political agenda.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks for that, Bob. Look, we’re heading a bit over time to those who are still on the call, ‘cause we’ve got so many, we’ve got a lot of good questions and a couple more I want to get. I’m going to turn to Rishab now, I’m going to ask one more question from the list, but I’ll ask it on behalf, and then we’ll see what the time is, Bob, and I think we may draw it to a close then. So, Rishab, why don’t you come on camera and get your question in? Fire away, you’re with us.

Rishab Chatti

Oh, sorry, I’d like to thank you for your and for joining us. My question was, you did mention five traditions of American foreign policy, and I was curious as to the impact that had, or how President Trump’s election had an impact on these traditions, and how that might change with the outcome of the upcoming election?

Robert Zoellick

Yeah, well, that’s a great question, and obviously, I’m not a big fan of President Trump, but on North America, I think he’s pulled us in the wrong direction, I mean, of the wall with Mexico isn’t exactly the way to, sort of, build a deeper relationship. But let me drive it a little further. They renegotiated NAFTA as this US MCA agreement, and that was telling because Trump wanted to get rid of NAFTA and, frankly, President López Obrador probably wanted to get rid of it too. But the benefit of 25 or 30 years of integration was they really couldn’t. But to give you a small example, the investment rules have been watered down and when I was talking to the Mexican negotiator of NAFTA, who was a colleague of mine at the time, he said, “You know, it’s such a shame because we use the investment rules to frankly import rule of law into Mexico,” right? And so, if you’re interested, in terms of Mexico’s economic and political development, you would welcome investment into Mexico, that’s not the way that Trump, sort of, views things and obviously, you know, declaring Canadian aluminium a national security threat is somewhat beyond me. So, can this be changed? Yes, and on the positive side, one of my suggestions, if Biden’s elected, is in addition to acting on immigration, connect it with approach towards North America.

On alliances, Trump obviously feels the United States has been taken advantage of, he threatens to withdraw from alliances. I don’t think he understands, kind of, the mutual, sort of, interest and nature of that. People within his administration have argued they’ve kept alliances going. Frankly, it’s a serious question, if he’s re-elected, whether those alliances will survive. Now, on the other hand, you know, in a practical sense, Japan, South Korea, need the security protection. People in Europe can decide how much is Europe able to stand up its own security capacity, you know, so you could turn these things around, if you also broaden them, with some of the topics I talked about like biological security and environmental security topics.

On public – on trade, he’s obviously a protectionist, deepest protectionist since Herbert Hoover, and I think that hurts the United States. Congressional and public support, as I’ve explained, he represents a constituency, but it’s a negative, divisive constituency and, as I’ve suggested, I think there’s public support there for a different American engagement, but the role of our leaders is to catalyse it. And as for America’s purpose, you know, his ideas, America First, doesn’t have to become America alone and I think America has lost some of its soft power appeal because of his presence. So, I think it’s been a very negative turn for the United States, and we’ll see what happens in the election.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks for that one, Bob. Look, I’m going to squeeze one more in. We’ve gone – we will have gone ten minutes over by the end of it, but we don’t want to miss this opportunity to get your thoughts, and I’m going to, just for speed’s sake, going to ask the question that John Mason posed on our Q&A line. “Has the emergence of technology changed the game for foreign policy, you know, in a quantum tech era has the spatial geographic field been displaced by the shared mental field of contestation?” So, you know, we have shared mental fields, before you used to have geographic separated fields, but has – you know, here you’ve got a sweep of history, has technology changed American foreign policy?

Robert Zoellick

Well, I’m really glad you both asked that question. I put a chapter in about a man named Vannevar Bush and you wouldn’t find Vannevar Bush in most histories of US foreign policy. And, just to give you a little flavour for it, in July 1945, which is where I opened the chapter, he’s associated with three events: one the nuclear bomb test, the atomic bomb test ‘cause he’s the principal liaison with Franklin Roosevelt. Second, he launches a report that is called Science – The Endless Frontier. He basically manoeuvres Franklin Roosevelt to ask him to write this report, based on their World War Two experience. And he outlines what Ed Stanford has called the triple helix system, the importance of basic research from the government, universities, and the business sector. And it’s my belief that, frankly, that was critically important in the United States competition with the Soviet Union, and the turnaround in the 80s where the Soviet Union couldn’t catch up.

I think it’ll be important in the contest with China, and I also wanted that chapter to explain how diplomacy can relate to other scientific topics, such as pandemics or climate change, ‘cause I also had experience in the 92 Framework Agreement. But third, Bush has one other thing, and you can’t make this up, he writes an article in The Atlantic magazine that imagines what he calls to be a Memex machine, and in a sense, he’s envisioning the early personal computer. Now, this is 1945, big computers are just starting to get on the scene, and he – a Navy radar man, often in Leyte in the Philippines, comes across this article in a reprint in Life Magazine in a Red Cross library. And it inspires him to go back and do computer engineering, and he’s one of the fathers of the personal computer system, and by the way, another one of Bush’s graduate students found in Silicon Valley. So, I consciously put that in because, as you were sort of alluding to, Robin, foreign policy often talks about geopolitics, and I’ve tried, in this book, to insert the economics that you and I think is important. But I also believe science and technology, and the policy frameworks, domestically and internationally, to be very important and, by the way, that goes back to our question about the future role of the United Kingdom.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

So, final thought, that the geopolitics could end up squashing the opportunity for technology, if you see what I’m saying, and right now the geopolitics and the technology have become completely enmeshed, and it’s as if America can’t give up being the global technology leader, this exalted position it’s held now for whatever we want to call it, 70/80 years, probably. Could America, you know, with its foreign policy, live with another power as powerful as it is in technology?

Robert Zoellick

Well, I think the United States, you know, the resources and culture of innovation and technology in the United States, are not to be underestimated. I mean, even in the field of energy, when you – which was not actually a new technology, but it’s the systems, you know, the whole fracking revolution transformed the world energy market and, you know, where did that come from? It came from capital markets, entrepreneurial spirit and others. I’m not a great technologist, but I serve on the board of Twitter, and I do this in part because it’s fascinating for me to see the different sort of business and other outlook. I think where the danger comes will be on the data issue. And so, the – in a sense, you know, China already decided to create the splinternet, and US companies in the information space are not allowed in China, it’s not a shock that there’ll be restrictions on China. But if all forms of personal data are considered national security, then the ability to use big data to drive businesses in fields such as life sciences, is going to be very, very limited. And I don’t think our government or other governments have fully, sort of, worked through what they need to protect for security purposes, and to what degree will the quarantines, sort of, add costs.

So, at the end of the day, it’s a little bit like my point about the world of 1900. You could create a much more fragmented and splintered system, but in that, it’s interesting, you’re seeing, for example, in East Asia, as this fragmentation occurs, my friends in Singapore are trying to create a special, sort of, cross-border data system. People will come up with alternatives. My worry is they’ll just be much more costly, less productive, undermine the ability to get global growth, and those are all things we’re going to need.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Well, it brings back to this idea that it’ll be particularly important to your comment about alliances being part of the American tradition, if America tries to go it alone, in a way, on a data technology approach, it probably won’t have the critical mass you were just describing…

Robert Zoellick

Yeah

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…as being more important. If it can team up with ‘likeminded countries’, and in particular Europe, and overcome the technology divide, there could be opportunities. Look, Bob, we could keep going. I apologise to those people whose questions I didn’t get to. But I think if anyone wanted to have their appetite whetted for reading a book that I feel you could almost take slices out of, and I’m not normally a book promoter in these roles, ‘cause we enjoy the conversation, but I think the way we wove in your America in the World: The History of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, where you wove in the stories there was very appealing, especially at this moment where we’re all trying to understand where America might go in the future. So, Bob, thank you very much.

Before everyone peels off the call, can I just say very quickly that we’ve got a – we’re reinstalling our COVID Meeting series, starting again at 11 o’clock this Wednesday, with Dr Michael Ryan, the Executive Director of Emergencies at the World Health Organization, will be the guest. And I think we’re calling it Living with COVID now, rather than Fighting COVID, we’ve made some appropriate post-summer adjustment, and in particular, maybe reflecting the reality in the UK and many other parts of the world. So, for guests and members who want to get a very different type of diet to the one they just had now, it’s available Wednesday 11 o’clock next week.

But Bob, back to you, thank you very much indeed, great talk, book sounds fascinating. I’m glad you were able to set politics to one side and sail into the shoals of history, and the debate tomorrow will bring us all back with a bump. But in the meantime, we will bask in your comments. Thank you very much, Bob, all the best.

Robert Zoellick

Thanks for having me, Robin.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Our pleasure. Thanks very much. Thanks again for being here with us. Bye.