How has MENA turmoil affected external powers’ interests?

Ahmed Aboudouh

Hello, everyone. I am Ahmed Aboudouh, Associate Fellow at the – with the Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House. I would like to welcome you all to this event, a webinar called The Impact of the Current Middle East Escalation on External Powers’ Interests. And in this discussion, we will just focus on the United States, UK, China and Russia. This is part of a series of events Chatham House has organised related to the issues and implications of the conflict in Gaza.

So, since the start, the Gaza War had a regional dimension, especially on Israel’s Northern Front, with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. This cross-border conflict has recently edged closer to an all-out war. The United States has been watching this with great concern for regional stability. Its deployment of two aircraft carriers at the beginning stopped the spiral to the worst scenario. But the United States Military found itself, in the end, directly engaged by carrying out airstrikes against Iran-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, after a drone attack on a US Military base in Northern Jordan killed three servicemen in January.

In the meantime, the US and UK are spearheading another airstrike campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen who thought to impede international shipping at the southern tip of the Red Sea, unless a permanent ceasefire in Gaza is reached. Until now, the campaign may have partly degraded the group’s drone and anti-ship missile stockpiles, but so far, it did not deter them from sustaining their attacks, this time against shipping vessels from the US, UK and their allies.

Although a consensus at the Security Council has emerged that the Houthi attacks must cease, China and Russia criticised the United States on the basis that its military intervention does not have a UN mandate and they say it could further exacerbate the tensions in the region. But both countries did not show inclination of being directly engaged in de-escalating efforts in the region, although many would say that this escalation in the region may have great consequences directly for their interests.

So, to discuss all these dynamics and try to answer some important questions, I’m very delighted to bring in a distinguished panel of speakers, who will focus on these four countries’ interests in the region in the wake of what’s going on now. Let me start by introducing Jasmine El-Gamal. She is a former Middle East Advisor at The Pentagon, where she served three Secretaries of Defense and was advising on Middle East issues and crises. We have also joining us from the UK, here, Jane Kinninmont. He is – she is the Policy and Impact Director at the European Leadership Network and was previously Head of Programmes for The Elders and also, an ex-Chatham House colleague.

We have, also, joining us from Shanghai in China, Professor Sun Degang. He is the Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, and he’s a prominent Writer and Researcher, who writes extensively on China-Middle East relations. And last, but not least, joining us from Abu Dhabi, my friend, Dr Li-Chen Sim. She is the Assistant Professor at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi and also, a specialist in the political economy of Russian and Gulf energy.

So, before we start, I would like to note that this discussion will be recorded and is now being livestreamed. The recording will be posted on our website later today. I encourage all of you to post or tweet on X, using the hashtag #CHEvents and the handle @chathamhouse. So, what I will do is I will kick this off by asking our speakers to share their opening remarks for a few minutes each, before asking a few questions and then, open the discussion for your questions. So, please feel free to use the Q&A function at the bottom of the Zoom feed to send your questions and I will pick them up during the audience session later.

So, let me turn to you, Jasmine. The floor is yours.

Jasmine El-Gamal

Thank you so much, Ahmed, and to Chatham House, MENA, for having me. I’m really pleased to be part of this panel. I will start a bit broad, to leave room for questions later, but I’m just going to give, sort of, a broad overview of how US policy has shifted in the region from a pre-7 October context to a post-7 October context and to where we are now. Because I view those – I view that day as a before and after. What was before has been completely destroyed, so to speak, and we are dealing with an entirely new regional and indeed, world order, as I see it. So, that’s why I say pre-7 October and post.

So, let me just start with the fact that when it comes to, or when it came to US policy pre-7 October, it was very much focused on a top-down peace strategy, a peace amongst rulers. That long-term stability in the region would have to be built on Israel’s integration into the region, mostly economically and security wise, and that an integrated Israel into the Middle East would be the most sufficient way to counter maligned Iranian influence in the region. So, that’s where – that’s what the strategy was built on.

I don’t agree with people who say that the Palestinian question was completely ignored, but it was definitely viewed as a, sort of, build it and they will come. As in build the overall infrastructure of regional peace and the Palestinian question would eventually be resolved within that peaceful infrastructure. Now, in itself, that might not have been about strategy, except for the fact that it ignored long simmering tensions in both Gaza and the West Bank, as well as a rising strand of extremism in Israeli politics and amongst the Israeli public itself. The assumption by the Biden team was that top-down peace could and would be enforced by the people at the top and that the Palestinian question was simply not that urgent.

And so, the fault in the strategy was that it was only top-down focused and not paired with a simultaneous bottom-up effort to integrate people in the region, not just the countries in the region, but people in the region with one another, through a normalisation and a discussion about narratives, a recognition of longstanding traumas and grievances and so on.

Now, in my opinion, that meant that it would never have been a true success, not in a sustainable away, and obviously, the strategy was rooted in an extreme fatigue with Middle East crises, not just by President Biden, but by previous administrations, as well. But there was a deep desire by President Biden and his team to get out of the Middle East in a day-to-day manner, to stop having to put out fires, to stop having to send US troops to the region and to focus, instead, more on long-term serious threats and priorities for US security, such as China, Russia, Ukraine, US-European unity and so on.

Now, 7 October upended that entire strategy in an day and a night. The situation in Gaza and the West Bank had become unsustainable, but that wasn’t paid much attention to because the Biden administration didn’t want to see that. And that is my main criticism, not just of the Biden administration, and I say this as someone who worked in US Government. This is a problem with US and really, Western government strategies in general when it comes to the Middle East or other regions, is that we see things the way we wish they were or the way we want them to be, not necessarily how they are. So, after 7 October, the Biden administration went exactly into the mode that they were trying to avoid, which was crisis mode. Except that now, it was extreme crisis mode, putting out fires left and right. Multiple crises activated by the Israeli response to 7 October, and of course, we can get into those later. The Houthis, Hezbollah, Iranian backed militias in Iraq and Syria and so on.

Now – and I’m almost done, sorry. Now, you can’t fight fires. No administration, no government, can fight fires and do long-term strategy at the same time, right? Governments are just made of people, at the end of the day, and people have limited capacities. But the minimum should be do no harm to that long-term strategy while you’re putting out those fires. Now, the Biden administration is doing neither. They are neither putting out fires short-term, nor protecting that long-term vision. Both of those issues are at risk, both the short-term and the long-term, and we can talk about why that is, of course. I just don’t want to take up too much time right now.

I’ll just end by saying that I thin – while I think the damage that has been done has been irreversible in many ways, to the region, within the region, between the region and the West, especially the US, the damage to US leverage and credibility, it – you know, the region – if Jake Sullivan famously said “The region” was “quieter than” it had been, “in a long time before 7 October,” it is now more unstable than it has been in a very long time. But in order to not end on a negative note, I just wanted to say the positive aspect of all of this is that people worldwide are engaged more than ever on these issues. They have ideas, they have things they want to say, and they want to be heard. And so, all the US has to do to change course is to listen and I do believe that there is a way to change course by listening.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you so much. That’s, you know, very, very important points that beg huge questions. But I would like, first, to go to Jane to give her the chance to – for her opening remarks, and go back after all of you have spoken, to the questions. Please, go ahead, Jane.

Jane Kinninmont

Thank you. So, the UK tends to stick fairly close to the US when it comes to Middle East security policy, but it does have differing interests in the region because it’s closer in terms of geography and in terms of history. Of course, the UK has a long history and arguably, a lot of historic responsibility for the way that the region is now. It has a huge amount of expertise, networks, contacts, Brits in the region and people with diaspora links here. And this part of the world is also really key for the UK’s economic strategy, particularly with the GCC states being priorities for trade and investment and agreements.

So, I think that while, for many countries in the world, including the UK, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had really pulled the security focus east, the UK hadn’t stopped paying attention to the Middle East. It was very focused on the region, but it was neglecting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It had really let it slip down the priorities in a way that has turned out to be very shortsighted. Of course, the Foreign Office has had a consistent policy of support for international law and a two-state solution, but that wasn’t really among the priorities of the Government.

And we can see this very clearly if we look back to the recent Integrated Review and then, the Integrated Review Refresh, where the UK set out the government priorities for foreign policy a couple of years ago and then, refreshed last year. And in the original Integrated Review, there’s a lot about the Middle East and talk about the role that the UK can play in preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, in stabilising conflicts in Yemen, in Libya, in Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and yet, there was absolutely no mention of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was mentioned as a partner for trade, for tech – and for technology collaboration. The words “Palestinian, Palestine, West Bank, Gaza” completely absent.

And that really was a change in UK policy to let it slip off the radar so much. I think it is part of what’s contributed to having to then pile on the diplomatic efforts only when it’s very late in the day and when violence has arisen. And so, I really agree with Jasmine’s point about that, and I think this is a core problem that needs to be addressed for the future. Because when you react to a crisis, you’re tackling it too late. It’s also quite convenient for adversaries of the UK to see this cri – sort of crisis happening, because it does tend to distract from other issues, as well. But we can come on to discuss that in more depth.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Right. Thank you so much, Jane, yeah, and likewise, I have many questions already in mind, especially on the UK being the latecomer to the core issue in the Middle East, and a source of instability. But more on that later, as you said. Now, I would like to turn to Professor Sun Degang in China.

Professor Degang Sun

Thank you so much, Ahmed. In fact, China is a very important stakeholder of the Middle East, West Asia, North Africa, because China is the largest trading partner of West Asia and also, Africa. China is the largest buyer of oil from the Middle East. That’s why in March last year, China promoted the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, one year later, it turned out to be a wave of conflict, not a wave of reconciliation. However, China’s response to the Gaza crisis and its spillover effect is very cautious, because China has three layers of interest. The first one is commercial interest, because China does not want to have its interest, especially commercial interest, harmed. Especially the Red Sea crisis and China’s investment in West Asia and North Africa may be affected by the spillover effect of the Gaza conflict.

The second interest is political interest, because China want to see a better law and a larger law in United Nations and also, in the conflict resolution, because China wants to keep a zero enemy policy between Palestine and Israel, between Iran and the Arab countries and between outside powers and the Middle East. So, this is the second interest, a political interest.

The third one is China’s strategic interest. That is China would like to take the Middle Eastern crisis as a leverage to have a dialogue with USA. Currently, when now, USA is in economic isolation and sanctioning against China in hi-tech area, China would like to persuade USA that China and the US can co-operate in the Middle Eastern crisis. Therefore, in the Gaza crisis and its spillover effect, China would like to protect its three layers of interest: commercial, political and strategic. Thank you so much, Ahmed.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you for this backed remarks and full of very valuable points, which also, you know, trigger a lot of questions in my mind already. But I would like to turn now to Dr Li-Chen Sim for her remarks and then, go directly into a question session.

Dr Li-Chen Sim

Thank you very much, Ahmed. So, for my part for the opening remarks, I just want to say a couple of things. One, Russia’s interests and presence in the Middle East has grown tremendously. If we think about Russia and the Middle East in 2000 versus Russia and the Middle East after 2014, there is a huge difference, right? So, I think that’s the first point I’d like to make.

The second point is that even though it’s grown in – Middle East has grown in importance for Russia, I would argue that the Middle East is not Russia’s core foreign policy focus. It’s not even the second highest foreign policy focus. Obviously, the core focus would be on the West and then, you know, further down would come the near abroad region, the post-Soviet area. So, the Middle East, it’s not really its top priority and I don’t think that has changed since 7 October.

The third aspect I’d just like to briefly touch on is I thought that I’d touch about Russia’s strategic interests and its economic and cultural interest in the Middle East, largely written, so as to set the scene for some of the discussions that I can foresee on whether those interests have changed in the Middle East. So, traditionally, or at least in the past ten years, Russia’s strategic interests in the Middle East would include things like Russia wants to be seen as a great power in the world, right, not just a gas station masquerading as a country, or not even as a regional power. But it wants to be seen as a great power among the Middle East audience. Into the strategic interests, Russia also wants to reduce the support for the US-led liberal order, the US-led post-Cold War order, in the Middle East. So, those, I think, are its two key strategic interests.

When it comes to Russia’s economic interests in the Middle East, there are quite a few. Obviously, trade and investments, food, including fertilisers, arms sales, a decent oil price, as well as co-operation in, like, nuclear energy and even in space, right? So, I think those are some of its key economic interests. It also has cultural interests in the Middle East, things like trying to advance Russian culture. It’s set up quite a few cultural institutes, kind of like, the equivalent of the, you know, confusion in institutes, but these are the Russian equivalents in some of the states in MENA.

So, I think I’ll stop there, but just to set the scene, those are some of its more traditional strategic, economic and cultural interests and we can talk later about whether those have changed. Thank you.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you so much, Dr Sim. That was very, very insightful, as well. Now I would like to focus more on what’s going on now in the Middle East after 7 October. Obviously, there is a regional escalation. Whether that is in Syria, in Lebanon by Hezbollah, in Iraq and of course, by the Houthis in the Red Sea and Yemen.

So, I would like to turn now to Jasmine, and you mentioned a couple of very important questions about the US strategy before 7 October and after 7 October. And obviously, they’re not fire fighters, according to you now, nor they are thinking strategically. How can you describe, then, the Biden administration’s strategy in light of the US strikes – airstrikes in Syria, Iraq and against the Houthis in the Red Sea? What is the endgame here? Is it confronting the axis of resistance, backed by Iran, only? Is it finding a conflict resolution in the Gaza context, or is it only destabilising the situation as much as possible and then, moving onto the second stage, which is designing our overall strategy in the Middle East? What it is – what is it, so far?

Jasmine El-Gamal

So, I think it can be described in a couple of different ways, or at least two, sort of, lines of effort simultaneously. The first is this continuation to strive towards what they see as their long-term goal of normalisation, particularly, of course, with Saudi Arabia. Obviously, the UAE has already normalised relations with Israel, which was a huge deal in itself. You have the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan that are stable, and so, really, the normalisation with Saudi Arabia is the big prize. It is a huge priority for the Biden administration, and they continue to set their eyes on that goal, believing that eventually, the ‘Day After’, in Gaza, once they can find a plan for the Day After, stabilise the situation, they can reach that goal. Now, we can talk, of course, about whether or not that’s a realistic goal or not. I mean, as I assessed, I believe that their short-term actions are actually making their long-term goals farther and farther, or more and more, unattainable. But I’d be happy to hear, obviously, conflicting assessments.

Now, when it comes to putting out fires, of course, you have the strikes against Iranian backed militias in Iraq and Syria that are very much a tit for tat. You know, you don’t really see a long-term strategy in those moves because the pattern is the same and has been the same, even before 7 October, even though, obviously, they’ve increased since 7 October. There’s a strike against US interests, there’s a retaliation, or vice versa, and so on and so it goes.

There is not, to my knowledge, a long-term plan for how to strategically address Iranian influence in the region and this is where I talk about how the US and to a certain extent, Europe, like to see the Middle East the way they would like to see it. In a perfect world, Iran would have no role in the Middle East. Iran would just – you know, the Mullahs would disappear and a pro-Western government would come in place and that would be the ideal situation. That is not the reality on the ground as it is, and I don’t know that the US and its Western allies have been very strategic in dealing in the reality as it is. The Iranians obviously have their own interests in the region. They are using those proxies, to a certain extent, to a) advance those interests, but b) also build leverage so that if and when there is time to speak to the US about a broad deal, that they have that leverage to bring to the table.

So, I would say, just in sum, there are these short-term, sort of, tactical retaliatory strikes, at the same time trying to de-escalate the situation enough to get to a Day After scenario in Israel. I would say the biggest shortcoming of that short-term putting out the fire tactical situation is that I don’t think the US fully sees or appreciates, or wants to see, that what is happening with Israel right now and the extreme right tur – right-wing turn in Israeli politics and the Israeli society, it’s not just a Netanyahu problem. I believe that this is an issue that successive administrations will have to deal with, with successive Israeli Governments. And so, that issue of the Day After in Gaza, it feels a bit like putting an ostrich, sort of, sticking its head in the sand, not really wanting to see how dire the situation is and how far apart the two sides are. Of course, with the added layer of trauma, dehumanisation and all the other stuff that we talked about before.

Ahmed Aboudouh

That’s very interesting and actually brings me to Jane to answer a quite similar question, but taking from your comments, Jasmine. Jane, Jasmine mentioned that the United States, until now, is trying to destabilise and de-escalate and not trying to implement any meaningful strategy in the long-term. But if we adapt, or if we apply this to the UK, as you said earlier, in the Integrated Review, the Middle East – the Palestine-Israeli conflict was not mentioned and the presence could not be felt, actually, in the Middle East in the past few years. But now, all of a sudden, the UK is spearheading, as I said before, the strikes against the Houthis with the US and trying to play a very active role, diplomatically, to find some solution in Gaza. Do you think – what are the calculations in the UK, and do you think this is an – a beginning?

Jane Kinninmont

Hmmm hmm.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Is the UK there in the Middle East to stay now?

Jane Kinninmont

I think the US – I think the UK is here to stay. I think the calculations are related to the relationship with the US, as well as the longer term UK interests. And so, I think that a large part of the reason that the UK got involved in the airstrikes against the Houthis has been to send a message to the US that it is still the special relationship. You know, part of the argument for why the UK went into the Iraq War. There have been fears that post-Brexit, the UK could be seen as less relevant, at least by democratic administrations. The UK really wants the US to regard it as an important supporting actor, in a way, in the Middle East.

But getting involved in those airstrikes was something quite new compared with the longer term strategy that the UK has had towards Yemen. The UK, like the US, supported Saudi Arabia with arms and with tactical advice when Saudi Arabia launched its war against the Houthis back in 2015. But in the last few years, the UK had really been a proponent of political dialogue and a peace process for Yemen. I think longer term, there will be an opportunity after a ceasefire in Gaza, to get back to a more political and more diplomatic approach to de-escalation.

Everybody knows, and the UK and US will say it, they’re not going to totally stop these attacks by airstrikes. They can only disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capacity. That’s the stated aim. But really, solving the problem, it is going to require working with Saudi Arabia, working with Egypt, you know, working with those that can put economic leverage into the mix to incentivise the Houthis to behave in a different way. But it’s really hard to do that, kind of, regional coalition building while the Gaza War rages on.

Ahmed Aboudouh

It – I agree with everything you said, but I would like to go back to the point of the UK is here to stay, you know, and we will see what’s going to happen. I have some, oh, really, some very interesting questions from our audience, especially on the UK’s strategy in the Middle East, that I would like to visit later. But now, I would like to turn to Degang and ask him about China, because as you said before, “China has three layers: commercial, political and strategic,” in the Middle East, which is very, very obvious. But also, you said that the – China wants to use the escalation in the Middle East to have ‘dialogue’ with the Middle East. Is that leveraging? Are you pointing at China using the crises and the escalation in the Red Sea and across the Middle East as leverage when – and during its discussion on other things with the US?

And I also have another question that everybody’s actually asking now, whether here or the US or all over the world. China seems to be one of the powers that its interests are really harmed by, especially, the Red Sea escalation, given the volume of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Why didn’t China decide to give assistance to the US and UK in de-escalating the situation in the Red Sea?

Professor Degang Sun

Thank you so much. That’s a very good question. In fact, China is in dilemma in front – in face of Houthis’ attack on the Red Sea shipping lanes, and we know that China’s commercial interests are very important, especially between its trade with Africa, European Union and the Middle East. But on the other hand, we know that, in fact, Houthis’ attack has its grievance. That is from Chinese perspective, the root cause is not Houthis’ attack. The root cause is the Gaza crisis.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Hmmm hmm.

Professor Degang Sun

So, Chinese believe that if we want to solve the problem of the Red Sea crisis, we need to settle the dispute in Gaza. Otherwise, China will be the victim. We know that China’s vehicle, textile, daily commodities and machinery will be shipped from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, China is the stakeholder. That’s why China was in dilemma, and we know that in UN Security Council Resolution 2722, China abstained. It abstained because it has commercial interest, but on the other hand, China does not want to offend US or UK because it wants to have dialogue.

So, in the long run, China does not want you to say Houthi has escalation of attack on the commercial vessels. Otherwise, China’s commercial interests will be harmed. But on the other hand, China wants to keep dialogue with UK and US and the European Union. That’s why China abstained. Thank you.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Great. Thank you so much, and I would like to go directly to Dr Sim and ask her, if the Middle East is not a core interest for Russia, so what is the objective that Russia wants to achieve from all the statements it’s been putting out and also receiving twice? Hamas delegations to Moscow trying to play a mediating role in releasing Israeli hostages, and at the UN siding with China and, you know, against the US draft resolutions related to Gaza, but also criticising the airstrikes all over the region. What do they really want here?

Dr Li-Chen Sim

Right, thank you for the question, Ahmed, and I would answer that question by just recalling that when I made my opening remarks, I said that Russia had, you know, a few interests, but among its strategic interests was two, right? Russia wants to be thought of as a great power in the Middle – a great power in the world by Middle Eastern states and it also wants to reduce support for the US-led international order. And so, I think that in the crisis in the Middle East now, it’s actually advancing those, you know, two kinds of strategic interests. So, let me explain.

So, with regards to Russia as a great power, you will recall that, you know, in 2020, there was a war, for example, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the terri – the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia did actually come to Armenia’s aid, even though they have a defence treaty, and so, you know, even Russia’s regional hegemony was seen to be a bit shaky, because, you know, Azerbaijan won that conflict.

So, I think at least in Gaza, it’s got an opportunity to show that hey, Russia is actually a global power that can be engaged in two military conflicts in two different theatres, right, one in Europe and one in the Middle East. So, at least it’s got its attention, you know, in two different theatres. So, it’s like a great power, right? Not just a regional one, but it’s a great power and therefore, it has done all these activities that you mentioned, you know, hosting the various intra-Palestinian discussions, etc., etc. And so, that sends a message to the Middle East, you know, “Hey, we are a great power. We can be involved. Even if we are very focused on Ukraine, we can still be involved in trying to bring together Palestinian factions,” even though most people would argue, and I agree that there was – nothing came of it, but it’s still a very important message, right, that Russia is a great power, right?

And with regards to its second strategic interest, which was to reduce support for the US-led liberal order, again, I think the Gaza War helped in trying to reinforce the message that the US has double standards, right, when it comes to human rights. So, obviously, it’s very concerned about Ukrainians, but it’s less concerned with, say, the Syrian suffering, you know, a few years before and also, today, with the suffering in Gaza. So, it helps to, basically, hit the US on the head by all its statements that it’s come up with. It’s hit the US on the head, it’s hit the Europeans on the head, to say that “Look, this is not what Russia likes.” You know, “This is a terrible” – you know, “It’s not a good US-led order, and it’s just taking advantage of these – the issues in the Middle East to try to shore up the fact that, you know, it is against the US-led order and therefore, you should, you know, welcome Russia’s efforts at building a more inclusive, polycentric or, you know, a more multilateral order.”

Ahmed Aboudouh

But to follow-up on this quest – on this discussion, there is a – a point just came up in my head about Ukraine, because there is a compelling argument that Russia is actually using the US and Western interest now, increased interest in the Middle East, and distraction, to make some gains in the context of the Ukraine War and to recapture strategic positions. Briefly, is that the case, in your view?

Dr Li-Chen Sim

To recapture strategic positions in Ukraine?

Ahmed Aboudouh

Yeah.

Dr Li-Chen Sim

Yes, definitely. You know, so it’s hoping that the West is too distracted, you know, that it has to send – for example, you know, the US has sent troops to have – to build the piers, the pier in Gaza, oh, and, you know, the pier – and the maritime security bridge with Cyprus. So, it’s – the US has expended resources to do this. You know, obviously, missiles here in the – protecting the Red Sea. And so, they are hoping, obviously, that these kinds of distractions, both operationally and policy wise – Jasmine mentioned that, you know, states can’t fight both, you know, operationally, as well as think long-term.

So, they’re obviously trying to break the unity of the West, which had been so firm in Ukraine, and trying to just, you know, put some holes and put the screws in to break the unity of the West through the Gaza War. You know, through the different positions adopted by some of the European states versus the US. So, definitely, it is trying to, you know, bring forth some advantage in Ukraine, but I don’t – you know, it is advancing some territories, definitely, but it’s not always because the West. It’s also because of, you know, defic – their own manpower strength, some deficiencies in the, you know, Ukrainian Army, but also, of course, the lack of, you know, support, material support, etc., from the West.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Great. Thank you so much. This – yeah, I always thought that. Watching the news and seeing what’s going on in Ukraine and compare it to China’s statements – sorry, Russia’s statements and related to the crisis in the Middle East, I always suspected – I’m not a specialist on Russia, but I always suspected something fishy is going on. That Russia is using what’s going on now in the Middle East to get – to make some gains.

Now, I would like to open the floor for our audience to – who has been su – have been submitting their interesting questions throughout the discussion, and I would like to pick this question for all of you from Raphael Maretto, and he’s – basically, to sum this up, because it’s quite long, he’s asking about the impact of the rise of non-state actors in the Middle East. And obviously, if we are talking about Hezbollah or the Iran Shia proxies in Syria and Iraq, or the Houthis, they are all non-state actors. And they are now shaping the strategic posture of the United States, the UK and many external powers.

I would like to direct this question to all of you, briefly, to ask you the direct implications of the rise of these non-state actors, armed groups, and the prominent roles they are now assuming in the Middle East on the interests of these powers. Let me start with Jasmine.

Jasmine El-Gamal

It’s a great question, of course, and the prominence of these non-state actors has been a huge factor in the instability that we’ve been talking about in the region. I would say two things quickly. Non-state actors in general, and this applies to the Middle East, as well, they thrive on two things. One is popular support and the other is patronage. And so, to attack these non-state actors and to counter them in a sustainable way, you have to approach them from those two angles. You have to chip away at their popular support, and you have to nego – preferably negotiate for a diplomatic solut – towards a diplomatic solution with their benefactors. So, you, sort of, hammer them from both sides.

Now, what the US has been doing with Gaza is that it has almost refused to acknowledge the extent to which the Gaza crisis has contributed that – to that popular support, that the Houth – that these non-state actors, obviously, have been getting. These non-state actors are not popular in the Middle East, in themselves, but they have been using the conflict to gain that popular support that they so need as fuel, and there has been no negotiation with their benefactors. So, not really a win on either side when it comes to how to really sustainably approach these non-state actors.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Can you go ahead, Jane, and on the same question?

Jane Kinninmont

Sure. I mean, this conflict shows the relevance of non-state actors and the growing capability of some of them, especially Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, but it’s not new. You know, this has been the issue that has been defining the UK and US approach towards the Middle East since 9/11, and I think that a lot has been learned in the time since then, particularly about taking a differentiated approach to each group, looking at the specific context that it emerges from. And while, you know, a number of them are sponsored by Iran and are a part of a network that Iranians call their own ‘deterrence network’, there needs to be a level of strategy that is dealing with Iran on that. But there also needs to be strategy specific to each of the movements, you know, so that the approach to Hamas is different from the approach to Hezbollah and is different again to the approach to the Houthis.

And I think that there is quite a sophisticated understanding of that, but it’s a very slow process, because you’ve got to start to heal the wounds and the holes in the states that have allowed these movements to grow and thrive and make money. Some of it is also about clamping down on the finances, and you need international c0-operation to do it, as well, because they tend to have international networks and you really need to build consensus. And I think one of the issues at the moment with the Houthis, to come back to that, is that because for many countries, it is something that relates to Gaza and the lack of a ceasefire, it’s been really hard to build consensus.

If the Houthis had started disrupting Red Sea shipping at any other time, I think it would be really quite easy to contain this. At the end of the day, it is still a small movement from the poorest country in the Arab world. But it’s because not everybody wants to stand shoulder to shoulder with the US, be those European countries or Arab countries, at this time, that they have this opportunity to play a role that they would not normally have.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you so much. I would like to give the chance now to Professor Sun, but please be very brief.

Professor Degang Sun

Yes.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you.

Professor Degang Sun

Thank you, and in fact, China wants to send a signal to US that China is not US rival, but US partner in the Middle Eastern governance, because the rise of non-state actors [inaudible – 45:38], is the outcome of governance deficit. China is not US enemy. The two sides can co-operate in the Middle East security affairs. Otherwise…

Ahmed Aboudouh

But how – yes.

Professor Degang Sun

Yes?

Ahmed Aboudouh

Sorry to interrupt you, but how China sees the non-state actors’ rising influence in the Middle East, is that a direct threat to its interests?

Professor Degang Sun

Of course, because China is the largest investor and also, the largest trading partner of the Middle East. US is not relying on the Middle Eastern oil, but China is. Therefore, China says US cannot leave the Middle East. The Middle East needs US because it can be a stabilised force for China and the rest of the world. Thank you.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you. Dr Sim?

Dr Li-Chen Sim

Yeah, I think from Russia’s perspective, the non-state actors are qui – actually, quite useful in getting the story through that, you know, they are – because the non-state actors actually reduce the support for the US-led order, as Jane has mentioned just now. And so, Russia is quite happy to support them, you know, because they actually contribute to this decline in the US-led order, at least among Middle Eastern audiences.

But here, I just want to point out that I think there’s also a very big internal or domestic element to the support for – the danger for support for non-state actors in Russia, and that is this. Don’t forget that, you know, Russia has had its troubles with extremists, right? So, too much support for these non-state actors could result, for example, in let’s say, sentiments being – you know, sentiments being fuelled among its southern populations in Chechnya, amongst its populations in Dagestan, right? And that will just break open the whole Pandora’s box of Islamic insurgencies, which they had quelled, you know, how many years ago?

And I think a very good example is recently, last year in Dagestan, there was a group of Dagestani youths who broke into the airport trying to look for a plane, you know, with – of Jewish visitors. And so, the Russians are very, very careful that they don’t want to be too supportive of these non-state actors, to the point where it fuels, you know, demands for more action amongst certain communities and therefore, it makes it problematic for social harmony in Russia.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Great, and this is linked to a question, and I think you gave an answer already, from David Ranan. “To what extent is it plausible that Iranian proxies are working to support Russian interests?” And I think you already gave an answer to this. If you want to add anything, please, you are welcome to chip in.

But now, because you mentioned the domestic dimension, I think I would like to direct this question from Niles Webb to Jane. And Niles asks a very interesting question, “UK debate about the war has been heavily shaped by domestic debates about extremism and antisemitism. SNP, Lib Dems, Labour and Conservatives have all carved out a position defined by considerations of morality and international law. US debates are similar. Does this dynamic prevent the UK or US,” and please focus here on the UK, “from probably – properly calculating the interests it has at stake in the conflict?”

Jane Kinninmont

Yeah, I think this is a really, really interesting point. I think that, of course, the initial UK Government reaction was shaped by a sense that they wanted a partnership with Israel, and they felt a huge solidarity with it in the face of a very vicious attack, primarily against civilians. But there was also the case, in domestic politics, that somehow, you know, being pro-Palestine got identified, basically, with being woke in this, kind of, culture war context that we’ve got here in the runup to an election, whenever exactly that’s going to happen. I think this is really problematic.

Also, for the Labour Party, I think policy has been heavily shaped by domestic political calculations and the desire of Keir Starmer and his team to distance themselves from Jeremy Corbyn and then be as unlike Corbyn as possible, rather than really thinking that their policies would have an impact on the ground. You can question whether they did – you know, whether the opposition party’s stance is important for what happens on the ground.

I do think it’s been quite significant that David Cameron has been leading on this policy for several months now. I think it has made a big difference, because he, as an individual, obviously, he’s got an interest in trying to ensure a good election result for the Government, but he is not seeking re-election and he is someone that we can plausibly imagine is more focused now on his legacy, and he knows the region very, very well. I think that that has helped to insulate it somewhat from domestic political posturing, and he’s been really focusing on behind the scenes work with Arab leaders, trying to think about the Day After and what is possible. He took quite a significant step in saying that the UK would consider recognising a Palestinian state before an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. That is something that may also have influenced the US position, and I’d be interested to hear Jasmine’s thoughts about whether that’s significant. But I think that has been quite helpful.

I would also say that, you know, the Labour and Conservative positions have not been that different. You know, they – it’s taken a long time for the Labour Party to call for a ceasefire. Even after Keir Starmer called for a ceasefire, there were still local Councillors being suspended because they had called for a ceasefire too early. So, in a way, there’s a lot of problems that this issue is creating in domestic politics that are not that relevant to what the UK as a country is doing in the region. But they are seen, of course, because people in the Arab world are watching what happens in UK politics and often are quite baffled and wondering why the discussion is very simplistic and superficial and short-term, when we should be a country with a great knowledge of this part of the world.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Great, thank you, and as you mentioned, maybe Jasmine would be interested in jumping in to answer the domestic dimension, but also, let me add these two relevant questions to you, Jasmine, from Francisco Castello Branco and Omar Muneeb, who ask about European – obviously, any speaker is welcome – “Do you believe Joe Biden is going to support Israel until the election in November?” But also, Omar says, “What would the tipping point for the US to stop a significant policy shift towards Israel? We have been seeing a shift in rhetoric recently regarding Rafah, but no concrete policy shift.”

I would like – of course, these are very important questions, but I would like to focus on the regional dimension here, not the Gaza conflict itself, because this has been addressed before. But this is – what do you think, Jasmine, the domestic discussion now going on in the Middle East, will – in the US, will they result in a policy shift throughout the Middle East, not only towards Israel?

Jasmine El-Gamal

You know, I think that – I think often about how the timing of what happened couldn’t have been worse. We have this incredible crisis in the Middle East, one of the largest that we’ve seen in, you know, really, decades. I mean, I think this is much more significant than the Iraq War, even, in terms of its regional and global implications and societal implications throughout the region. And that it had to happen in the largest election year in the world, in the history of the world, where elections are going around everywhere. Already, in an election year, you will have these dynamics that Jane was talking about, the populist, you know, rhetoric, the, sort of, weaponisation of religion and identity and things that really matter to people. Already these things are go – you know, ma – taking maximalist positions to differentiate yourself from your opponent.

Now, the – all of these factors have been aggravated a million times over by what’s happening in Gaza and in the Middle East, and the thing is, at least in the US, you have an eight month window now for the Biden administration to start to turn this ship around before there is a potential for a second Trump administration, which would turn everything that we’ve been talking about upside down, right? So, you have eight months now, and to answer the questions about, you know, will the policy change, will the rhetoric change? Will there be a policy shift towards the region in general? I think there is a potential for the Biden administration to take some steps in the next eight months, even while he’s campaigning.

The Michigan vote, for people who are following, sort of, domestic US politics and the uncommitted vote, the number of people who turned out in Michigan and Minnesota, that was a real signal, a public signal to the White House, and they did start shifting their tone afterwards. They also started doing the airdrops afterwards, which, you know, again, we could – separate issue whether that was a good idea or not, strategically. Not in terms of just getting food to Palestinians. But – so, their – the shift, the US shift towards the region could take two completely different outlooks come November, depending on who the President is, and to mitigate that damage, to try to set – to do as much good, to reduce as much potential for harm as possible, in the next eight months, so that even if Trump becomes President, then we have reduced some of the, sort of, the temperature of the situation, so that it is not so flammable, if and when Trump were to come back into office.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you. This is very, very interesting, and I think we all have to wait and see, because we are all keeping an eye on the – what’s going on in the US now in a runup to the election, which will have great implications in the Middle East, as usual.

So, just to remind you, we have four minutes to go. I have a final question from Hafsa Kuskus, and she’s bringing up the “international global norms.” And I would add to her question the international system. And this is, basically, for any one of you to chip in. So, “how these countries, especially the great powers, are trying to save their interests and support them, and maintain energy security and the freedom of navigation, but at the same time, maintain the global norms that are the pillars of the liberal international order.” I guess a lot of accusations can be, or have been heard, about the US role in these regional strikes. China used this many times. Russia, I suspect, did, as well.

So, what about this conflict around the norms and principles that are supporting the international order in the context of escalation in the Middle East? Anyone would like to chip in?

Jane Kinninmont

I will jump in. I think it’s a fascinating question. I’ll try and be brief. I think Western countries are, kind of, scrabbling to regain ground because they realise that there was a serious weakening of Western positions on the so-called rules-based international order, when people contrasted the stance taken on international humanitarian law in Ukraine and then Gaza. You cannot directly read across one conflict as being the same as the other. They are different contexts. We can debate that, but when it comes to how a war is fought, there are rules that are supposed to apply internationally, regardless of how that war started.

And, you know, the failure to speak up about cutting off food, fuel, electricity, etc. – the electricity still hasn’t been restored to Gaza. And I think belatedly, Western governments are waking up to this, not least because they’ve found that it’s backfired when it comes to getting Middle East solidarity with Ukraine. So, that is why now you are seeing so much focus on humanitarian aids and trying to get food into Gaza through all sorts of, often overly complicated, mechanisms. Because it’s clear that it is a massive own goal not to stand up for the principles that you espouse.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Great. Anybody else?

Jasmine El-Gamal

I – can I – I would just add, I really – I agree with everything Jane just said, and I guess I would just add a domestic element to that, as well. Because as much damage of – has been done to Western credibility when it comes to upholding international norms, you know, across the world now you have both countries, allies, adversaries, looking at the West and saying, “You’ve just lost all credibility. The international system only applies to a certain set of people.” King Abdullah of Jordan said, “It’s based on your colour, your religion, your nationality.” And that has been hugely damaging.

But the – another hugely damaging aspect of that, which is related, is the damage it has done to Western norms of freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Jane was talking about this earlier when it comes to the debate here in the UK about domestically, that countries in the West have allowed the debate and what’s happening in the Middle East to bleed into their own purported values of freedom of expree – speech, freedom of expression. Where now you have Western democratic countries talking about banning protests and arresting people and making the Palestinian flag illegal. And all of this stuff that really should, and would, never happen in a Western democratic country. And so, we also cannot allow that to bleed into domestic Western politics the way it has, because that also damages credibility and moral high ground abroad.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you.

Professor Degang Sun

Can I add…?

Ahmed Aboudouh

Sorry? Yes, but…

Professor Degang Sun

Can I add something?

Ahmed Aboudouh

Yeah, go ahead.

Professor Degang Sun

Yes, in terms of norms and liberal order in the Middle East, I think there are two contradictions. One is between Global South and the Global West.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Hmmm hmm.

Professor Degang Sun

I think you can say that South Africa and Brazil represent the Global South, they have their different norms about the order in the Middle East. The second one is inside the Global West, UK and US – UK, US and European Union have different norms on the future of Palestinians. Therefore, I think that clashes will be a very im – very detrimental factor for the liberal international order in the Middle East. Thank you.

Ahmed Aboudouh

Thank you so much for all your remarks. That was a very interesting discussion. I learned a lot from all your interventions and I’m sure our audiences did, as well. Thank you for joining us today and thank you for our audience. We had a great number of participants. Thank you for making the time to join us, and looking forward to chair more interesting events like this one.

I would like to remind our audience that videos from this event will be posted on our social media platforms and the whole video will be posted on our website and will be ready today. Thank you so much and have a good day. Bye, bye.

Jasmine El-Gamal

Thank you.

Professor Degang Sun

Thank you so much.