Raya Jalabi
Hi, everyone, I’m Raya Jalabi. I’m the Middle East Correspondent for the Financial Times, and I’m thrilled to be chairing today’s panel discussion, “Understanding the Role of Armed Actors Across the Middle East.” Joining our distinguished panel of experts today will be Emile Hokayem, Director of Regional Security and Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Institute – International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mohammad Ali Shabani, Editor of Amwaj.media, Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, Senior Researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, and Renad Mansour, a Senior Research Fellow and Director of Iraq Initiative at Chatham House.
Today’s discussion will be on the record, and it is being recorded. We encourage you all to tweet or post on X, using the hashtag, #CH_Events, and the handle, @ChathamHouse. To ensure we get the most out of our wonderful panel of experts, I’m going to kick us off with a few questions, which will hopefully lead to a lively conversation, and then I’ll turn to the audience for all of your burning questions. Please submit your questions throughout today’s discussion using the Q&A box at the bottom of the Zoom feed, and I’ll pick some out for the Q&A portion later.
Almost as soon as war erupted on 7 October, the conflict spilled out from Gaza and Israel into neighbouring Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, as well as Yemen and the Red Sea, all the while, fuelling fears of a full-blown conflict in the Middle East breaking out. This has included tit-for-tat attacks between separate states and armed groups, which largely fall across two poles, the US and Israel on one side, and the Iran and its constellation of armed allies on the other, the so-called Axis of Resistance. This includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces, or Al-Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, as well as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and, of course, Hamas.
What makes this panel different to so many others like it is that it’s comprised of people who’ve done a lot of field research and have spent time with these groups and within the communities they proport to represent. As such, we’ll attempt to make sense of how these groups function militarily, economically, and ideologically, both in a domestic and transnational sense, as well as unpacking their relationships to Iran.
So, I’d like to kick us off with a deceptively simple question to Emile, which is, what kind of relationship do these individual groups have with Iran? Should they be considered partner, proxy or network? Is it a spectrum? And to what degree does Iran exercise control over these groups across the various theatres? Which is a question I’m sure a lot of today’s guests would like to know.
Emile Hokayem
Well, thank you very much, Chatham House, and Raya, for chairing. This sounds like a – some kind of academic argument, determining, yeah, the exact nature of the relationship between Iran and this variety of groups that has – that have relations with Tehran. But in fact, using for instance, the label “proxy,” which is quite common, I would say is lazy and reductive. It fails to capture the wide spectrum of relationships that exist, and there are real variations in ideological, organic, operational ties there, that, kind of, explain why these groups operate in specific ways in specific geographies.
You know, yes, I mean, you know, on one hand, you know, Hezbollah is definitely the closest to Iran, because of this long history, because of this level of trust that has developed and so on, but just because it’s the closest, doesn’t mean it’s a proxy. If anything, you know, Hezbollah can be considered the, you know, the trusted younger brother, who actually informs Iranian policy. So, you know, the idea that Hezbollah is, you know – it’s trust more than control and command and control.
You know, the Houthis, and we have a specialist here, so I won’t go too far on that, but the Houthis are elsewhere on the spectrum, and, you know, at one point, Hamas used to be thrown in the mix. And obviously, Hamas is a very different beast that originates from a different tradition, and has actually had real strategic differences with Iran, at times, and to be clear, owes its revival in Gaza post-2014, and especially in 2017, to Iran, as well.
So, you know, it is really simplistic to go with the label “proxy,” and I think the Iranians themselves are smart and sophisticated enough to see them as different, and having a different use on – depending on the geography they operate. But we are very quick, sometimes, at choosing the shortcut, the Hezbollah model, as if, you know, there was one ideal that Iran is trying to achieve, and perhaps someone in Tehran is dreaming about that, but in reality, when it comes to policy, there is significant difference.
Raya Jalabi
And just on that, is there some kind of ideological cohesion amongst the different groups?
Emile Hokayem
There’s ideological convergence, I would say. There is a – over time, has been a greater – a shared understanding of the geopolitical, strategic dynamics in the region. There is a greater embrace of the – this rejectionist mindset, and so on, but is it complete alignment? Is it, you know, that all the tenets, the ideological tenets are shared and espoused the same way? No, not really. Again, it’s a spectrum. You will find groups that are more aligned with Tehran and others that, you know, more distant from that perspective. But I think, you know, if you look at the long-term, the trajectory, I think there are greater convergence, yes.
Raya Jalabi
Mohammad, could you tell us a little bit more about how Iran sees these relationships, and should we looking – should we be looking at the Iranian state apparatus as cohesive in and of itself? Do those, sort of, relationships – are they defined by perhaps competing spheres of influence within the Iranian state itself?
Mohammad Ali Shabani
First of all, thank you so much Chatham House for organising this timely event, and Raya for chairing it. I think, first and foremost, I’d also like to add something to what Emile said, and that is, I think one key component which binds together many of these disparate actors is the absence of alliance options. So, if you’re the Houthis, or if you’re Hamas, or if you’re the PMU, who else, apart from Iran, can you ally? I think the answer to that question says a lot. So, it’s a – in many ways, also, a marriage of convenience, so to speak, in some aspects of it. It’s not just a pure ideological affinity.
And another thing to also look at is the evolution of how these groups have funded themselves. So, in the initial years after the US invasion of Iraq, there was a lot of Iranian support. Now, as a combination of the evolution of the Iraqi state, and also because of the US sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme, we have a situation where, for instance, the PMU is funded now to the tune of $3 billion a year, and given that the Sudani administration approved a three year budget last year, effectively, it’s been allocated $9 billion through 2025. That is a huge sum. These groups are no longer reliant on Iran, overwhelmingly, for funding. This creates a very different relationship.
So, going back to your, you know, core question, which is, how does Iran view these groups? I think it’s not about command and control, it’s much more about co-ordination, and I think that’s really what Iran is struggling with, and I think that’s the overarching theme of what we’ve been seeing since October 2023.
Raya Jalabi
There’s been some discussion, Mohammad, about Iran perhaps playing a moderating role within the Axis. Sometimes – you know, we were talking earlier, before the panel started, about the role that they played in 2006. So, I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit more about that. Does Iran – can it play a moderating role, especially given the increased co-ordination that’s been happening since 7 October?
Mohammad Ali Shabani
So, because of the prevailing dynamics in the media, where many of these groups are described as “proxies,” Iran is stuck in a dynamic where it’s held liable for the actions of groups it can perhaps not 100% contain, right?
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
So, in Iraq, what we see is – we – what we’ve seen specially in past few weeks is that the Quds Force Commander had to go to Baghdad, and he had conversations, tried to impress upon Iran’s allies there that it makes sense, it’s more pragmatic right now to cease attacks on US forces, especially after the Tower 22 incident. So, again, going back to your initial question, I think it’s about the level of co-ordination that Iran can garner, can facilitate. And it’s worrying, because I think Iran, it’s operating within a spectrum, in its alliance network. In places like Yemen, the level of co-ordination is not near where it would like to be. Even in Iraq right now, as we’ve seen in past few weeks, it can cause a lot of headache for Iran, inadvertently, perhaps.
And then, another question was about the extent to which Iran can exercise this kind of co-ordination. We’ve seen that it managed to do so with these groups, but we’ve seen a – somewhat of a ceasefire in the past ten days or so, but how long this will hold and what may happen if there’s further escalation that Iran doesn’t want, that’s an entirely different question altogether.
Raya Jalabi
And something we’ll get back to later on, I hope, and including, also, the financial model, which I’d like to discuss in more detail further on. Because you mentioned Yemen, let’s jump to Maysaa. The Houthis have emerged as one of the most energetic forces in the current context, post-7 October, even though they’re often described as having a different and more nuanced relationship with Tehran, so I’m hoping you can tell us a little bit more about the Houthis’ position with the so-called Axis, and what is their relationship to Tehran?
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
It is very problematic, definitely, from people who exaggerate the relationship between the Houthis and Iran, and others who are very underestimated. But I will say something, first of all, the Houthis, they are different Shia faction. So – but also, they are not representing a classic Shia school, or a traditional Shia school. It is a new – they are – they operate a new political theory and new religious ideas, and all of them revolve around the leadership, which is Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and if you want to be a Houthi, you have to pledge allegiance to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi himself, and he has a – he enjoyed – he enjoys a divine status among the Houthis.
If we want to understand how the Houthis move, we have to understand Abdul-Malik al-Houthi himself. He has a small circle around him, for different reason, because – mainly, for security reasons, and he doesn’t trust many people, actually. And he has a military background. His background is totally military, so he always trust the military people, the military personnel, and those military people, they are always trained at Iran, they are influenced by Iran. So, when he took the – when he takes the decision, the circle around him, the small circle around him, is mainly military circle, who has – oh, and the military wing, Iran has a really great influence in there, because they trained at Iran, most probably, and most of the co-operation and support come – came from Iran. So, indirect way, it – Iran has its influence on them. It’s not necessary to give them orders, but in indirect way, they – it has its influence on them. This is first.
The second point, this – the first speech for Abdul-Malik al-Houthi after 7 October, it was in 10 October, and he said, clearly, that, “We are co-ordinating with our allies in the Resistance Axis, how to react, and when we are going to” – yeah. So, he was very clear there is a co-ordination. Another point, other credible reports, they talk that – about some people who are dead from the Houth – from the US and UK strikes, and some of them they are not Yemenis. They are Iranian, maybe experts, I’m not sure. Yemen has enough people, quite, actually, and that they have enough weapons, also. And Iran learned – taught them how to manufacture the weapons, and they inherited the military capabilities of the Yemeni Army, which was not easy one.
As – and Houthis, they are unique and different than the Iraqi militias or Hamas or Hezbollah, in sense that they have a state, almost. It’s not internationally recognised, but they have a big geography. They control a big geography actually, and they controlled – under their authority, there is 20 million people. They have their financial resources, they have a big taxation base, because they have 20 million people under their control. So, they – and they inherited this Yemeni state institution, it was a very centralised state. So, at some point, they could – they may not need Iran. If Iran abandoned them, they can continue, actually. They have their own reasons to continue.
And at some point, also, they want to be connected with Iran because the Houthis, they don’t want to be a local group, and this is very clear in their ideology since day one, since the group – Hussein al-Houthi, found the group in 2000 – and by the end of the 90s, actually. He start his lectures, which become the literature of the Houthis, he was very clear, and he was very obsessed and concerned about the situation outside of Yemen, and how was clea – very clear that we are not only concerned about Yemen. We are concerned about the whole Muslim nation, and we don’t recognise the national borders.
So, the Palestinian cause, it is in the centre of their ideology, and they don’t want to define themselves as a Zaydi group, because Zaydism only exists in Yemen, and Zaydi group, as maybe some of you knows – know that, that the Zaydis, they are the smallest Shia group. They are not the same Shia group of Iran and Iraq and Lebanon, and they only exist in Yemen. So, they don’t want to be a local Zaydi group inside Yemen only. They want – they always like to define themselves as a Shia group, not only Zaydi, because they want to connect themselves to other groups outside of Yemen. So, Iran serves their regional ambitions.
Also, Iran, from the very beginning, also, Hussein al-Houthi, who found the group, and his father, Badreddin al-Houthi, they visit Iran many times during the 80s, so, they have that – Iran inspired them, also. So, we can say there is something very well documented about how – to what extent it is the relationship between them and Iran. I mean, in some issues, I know very well that they disobey the Iranian advisors to them, for example, in domestic issues, but in regional ones, I think they always co-ordinate with Iran. For example, when they approach with the Saudis and reach the deal with the Saudis, it was only happened after the Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement, not before that.
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
So, in the regional level, I think there is a co-ordination between them, always.
Raya Jalabi
Thank you, Maysaa, that was really interesting. I think, Renad, if we could piggyback onto that. You’ve done a lot of work that looks at the internal dynamics with the Hashd, and looking at the different competing spheres of influence. I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit about that, given that we’re talking about – you know, Maysaa brought up this idea of domestic interest trumping transnational ones, perhaps, when it comes to the Houthis prioritising their own domestic needs, versus Iran’s more transnational ones. So, I’m wondering if you could talk about that with regards to the PMF. And if you could, also, dis – if you could – you know, would you describe the PMF as a cohesive entity, and if not, why not?
Dr Renad Mansour
Well, I think one of the challenges of many trying to understand an organisation like the PMF, the Popular Mobilization Forces, is how incoherent it seems at times. You have many different groups, you know, many different fighters, and many of these groups change their names, especially those linked to the Resistance. So, it’s not a coherent entity, and it’s particularly difficult to those who come in looking for, okay, who is a state actor and who is a non-state actor? These kind of forums and categories have really been unfit for purpose in any of these countries, and especially with many of these actors.
Certainly, you have PMF leaders and groups that see themselves more locally, that are more interested in local power and becoming part – you know, fighting for competit – competing for power in the Iraqi state. They have Members of Parliament, they have senior Civil Servants, they have Judges. They – I mean, they are a political entity, by design of what the post-2003 Iraqi state is, and so, they’re not an anomaly.
But of course, you also have groups within the PMF that are closer to this, you know, Axis of Resistance. These are more vanguard groups, that have less of a stake, let’s say, at the local, but more of a stake at the transnational. And by stake, I mean both ideological, in that they don’t actually – many of them don’t even believe in these borders, but certainly, many of them move back and forth across these borders, for economic, political, power reasons, as well as for ideological reasons in their Resistance. But I guess, the challenge has always been these groups are still connected, and so, rather than thinking about it as an organisation with a clear hierarchy, with a single leader, these are networks. These are networks that span across politics, economics, military, ideology, but also, networks that span across state and non-state, and also, networks that span across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen.
So, the networked approach is really the, you know, the – I think the lens that needs to be used to look at these kind of groups, to try and understand what is their trajectory, where are they going, and what is their equa – you know, what are their power, their – you know, their power? Unfortunately, you know, if you look at some of the responses to these groups – I mean, in Iraq, for example, the US has striked and killed their senior leaders, the US has sanctioned their banks and businesses, the US has attacked and destroyed their weapons hubs and trading hubs and weapons depots. But none of this has worked.
None of these policy responses, killing their leaders, sanctioning their banks, none of these seem to work because there’s a simple, I think, incoherence to the approach to these groups. And that incoherence is fun – based on a fundamental, sort of, inability to navigate the networks that make up the PMF and these allies across the region.
Raya Jalabi
Something you and I talk about a lot is this question of whether or not these various groups, these various networks, can be defined as strong. Do they have, sort of, strong state-society relationships? Do – are they strong ideologically, economically, politically? How would you define the PMF, in that sense?
Dr Renad Mansour
Again, you have groups within the PMF, the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and others, that are competing for public authority in Iraq, that are competing in local elections, presidential elections, national elections. That are using the ideology not necessarily of sectarianism anymore, although they have that, but using more Iraqi nationalism, and really trying to present themselves as Iraqi. And this is where the tension comes between Iran and Iraq for some of these groups, because as you’ve seen, and as you know, across Iraqi society, there’s also a rejection of Iran’s influence. Many Iraqis, including Shia Iraqis, are protesting against Iran’s influence, and these are still the base from which these groups that are linked or allied to Iran, are looking to win over.
So, it’s very complex, in terms of the way in which they try to gain legitimacy, and to represent these populations. However, they’ve made a calculation, and that calculation as being part of the Iraqi state is far more strategic, both economically, politically, and even ideologically, than being a non-state actor. And because of that, they are in – they are desperate to be seen as state actors, and to be part of that state, which means representing these people.
But we’ve seen that, you know, these groups, as well as the wider Iraqi elite, have a massive legitimacy crisis, and have – you know, the voter turnout in the elections has been declining, spiralling down, every time. And this is where Israel, kind of, comes in. The Israeli, the Is – cause of Israel, the, sort of, cause to support Palestinians, is a way in which some of these groups are now trying to gain ideological support amongst an Iraqi public that is also horrified by what they see happening in Gaza.
Raya Jalabi
I guess, a lot of their legitimacy was eroded through what many protesters, certainly in 2019 and onwards, have seen as state-sanctioned corruption, which is, you know, quite often tied to these groups. So, that leads us to a, sort of, question about financial flows. Because historically, for many years, the conversation has been dominated by perception that cash and arms flow in – uniquely in one direction, from Tehran to various satellites. But for much of the past decade, Iran has been hobbled, to a certain degree, by international sanctions, as Mohammad was saying earlier. So, I’d like to ask you whether or not you think this model is still accurate, Renad, because Iraq is obviously looked at as the terrain in which – you know, a terrain which is rife with state-sanctioned corruption, a lot of which benefits Iran, to a certain degree.
Dr Renad Mansour
Well, I mean, I guess some people would look at Iraq as the bank for much of this Axis. I mean, it’s such a wealthy country. Its annual budget can go up to $150 billion, a year, and certainly, you’ve seen in the past access to that cash, and access particularly to US dollars, in Baghdad, very important for these groups, but that’s at the transnational level. Also, keep in mind that, you know, we’ve had conversations across Iraq, for example, you know, looking at those who participate in the informal economy, let’s say, the, kind of, smuggling and other checkpoints, and this and that. And, yes, you could make good money off that, but having influence over a Ministry, and having influence over the, kind of, politically sanctioned corruption that can procure massive state contracts is the model, is the big breakthrough for these groups.
The reason why they’ve become wealthy isn’t because they control checkpoints across these borders. The reason they’ve become wealthy is because they’ve managed to gain significant influence, and play the game. This is the game in Iraqi politics, it is, and all sides do this, that you gain control of senior Civil Servants to procure contracts to companies that allow them to have access to state coffers. And that’s why, right now, they’re happy with – you know, many of these groups are happy with the Government in Iraq, and, to some extent, are a bit concerned about what regional escalation and instability could mean.
Raya Jalabi
Emile, I’d like to ask you the same question. Do you think that that model is still accurate, when it comes to Hezbollah and Lebanon, because it has a very different relationship to the state than, say, the PMF does, in Iraq?
Emile Hokayem
Yeah, I think at a fundamental level, Hezbollah was always faced with a dilemma. If it increases its role in politics and governance, does it erode its ethos of resistance? And I think that was a decision – that was a dilemma that was very clear in the 90s and 2000s. You know, and ultimately, I think Hezbollah entered politics, not because it wanted to capture state assets, and in any case, Lebanon is not that wealthy and would have trouble to actually finance – well, back then, sorry – or actually, even now. The point is that it’s not the same, you don’t have the oil rent that you have in Iraq, right? You don’t have money flowing from central budget in such sums.
So, Hezbollah, essentially, decided to prioritise its strategic and operational autonomy, and saw governance – and is sucked into governance as a hindrance to the bigger purpose, to the identity, quite different from what Renad and Maysaa have outlined, right? Where, you know, the – those groups want to be par – really part of the state, want to capture a specific Ministry, want to engage directly in taxation, and so on. Hezbollah did not go in this direction. By the way, that applies to Hamas as well, which, you know – and that was one of the big debates between Hezbollah and Hamas. Like, by dominating Gaza, you’re doing governance, but that will erode your ethos of resistance over time.
So, for Hezbollah, the game was different. First, it knew that it could count on Iran in a very sustainable way, and, you know, there’s no, you know, sign that somehow Iran charges Hezbollah for the advanced weaponry it sends, and so on. Yes, there are clearly monetary flows, but over time, Hezbollah has diversified its income. There are serious allegations of, you know, being engaged in trafficking across the region, more broadly, you know, having done investment, and so on. So, it’s – they have diversified from Iran, but I think the – that relationship, the financial one, remains important. But Hezbollah was also allowed to dip into Iraq, for instance, and, you know, post-2019, in post-2019 Lebanon, having access to dollars made a big difference in Lebanon, and Hezbollah was clearly one of those entities that could get access to dollars, probably, primarily, from – through the Iraq route, as well.
So, it – the financial relationship does not define the broader relationship, and because Hezbollah is ultimately a strategic instrument in Iranian security and defence policy, I don’t think this is where the Iranians would go stingy, and they know that Hezbollah would struggle to raise the kind of income it would need from the domestic Lebanese economy. So, the model is very different there.
Raya Jalabi
Mohammad, do you have anything to add on that, from your perspective?
Mohammad Ali Shabani
I think it’s useful to gain an understanding of the bigger picture of what these, kind of, sums of support really mean for Iran in terms of its economy. I think a year or two after the Trump administration took power, they issued new figures, or estimates, of Iranian support for these groups. And up until that point, this was 2018/2019, the estimate had been that Iranian annual support for Hezbollah was $200 million a year. They revised it up to $700 million a year. And as part of that figure, they argued that for the previous seven years, Iran had spent a grand total of 16 billion in the region. 12 billion of this had been allocated to Syria, but out of those 12 billion, the vast majority had actually been oil credits.
So, if you actually dig down, you look into all of these figures, and you take into account even the oil credits, so all of these oil – crude oil exports to Syria, the annual sum came up to about $1.7 billion a year, which is something like two to 3% of Iranian GDP. So, it’s very insignificant from the Iranian perspective that, let’s say, okay, you’re actually maintaining a regional alliance network, you’re making sure that 30 million Syrians have fuel oil, that their state is able to run, and you’re financing this with 2% of your economy, if that’s really the case.
So, I think if you really look at the bigger picture, and look at the impact this may or may not have on the Iranian economy, it also helps you recalibrate your expectation of what you – of what economic pressure on Iran can really achieve. If you – for instance, let’s say, regional spending made up a fifth of the Iranian economy, that would be something that maybe sanction could, kind of, undermine, but now we’ve seen that there’s almost been no effect. In fact, the opposite, it’s almost accelerated the financial autonomy of these groups, because I can imagine there have been many rough conversations over the past decades in which these groups, which previously since 2003, received funding, were told, “We can’t fund you guys forever. It’s time for you to grow up, you know, it’s time for you to generate your own sources of revenue, much more accelerated manner than we would have liked to initially.”
And that’s where you see in places like Iraq, for instance. By 2014 the PMUs were formed, there had been sustained efforts to institutionalise them. You know, they – we talked about the budget previously, they received about $3 billion a year in budget for years now. This has been put down in law through 2025. So, if you’re a PMU leader now, you can count on $9 billion through 2025, you can plan, you can do things that otherwise you couldn’t, right? So, it’s – it brings another level of financial decision-making for these kinds of leaders.
And even if you look at the personnel level, right now, within the PMU budget, the registered or salaried Officers are more than 200,000. That doesn’t mean that the PMU has 200,000 members. It means that more than 200,000 salaries are going into this organisation.
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
How they chose to redistribute those salaries is a different question altogether, right?
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
But this means that there’s a resource, right?
Raya Jalabi
Maysaa, since we’ve talking about how is state effective – a relationship with the state helps fund these groups. So, what is the dynamic like for the Houthis in Yemen, given they have – they control such a large swathe of the geography?
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
The Houthis, they have the biggest population of Yemen, two thir – one third of the Yemeni population – or two thirds of the Yemeni population, sorry. And they are – they control 20 million out of 30 million, so most of the population is under their control. But the gas and oil – and Yemen, in general, is a very poor country, even before the war, but the gas and oil, they are un – out of control of the Houthis. They fought for long to capture Marib, which is a rich governate, and it was one of the longest battles in the Yemeni War, and one of the most bloody one. It continued for one year – for two years, to fight among – over this governate, Marib, because it’s a very rich one.
But when the Houthis felt that they can’t continue in that, and they lost a lot – hundreds of thousand maybe, of Soldiers there, the fighting stopped in Marib, and, after that, they went to the agreement with the – to negotiated with the Saudis. And part of the negotiation, it was the financial ones. They want the Saudis to pay the salaries. Definitely, the Houthis, they have their revenues. I mean, Hudaydah Port, communication, customs, taxation, and they tax a lot on the people who they – actually the taxes are under the Houthi cond – under the Houthi ruling have been not only doubled, it’s – sometimes it’s become ten times more, for some businessmen. They say they paid more than ten times more than they paid before the Houthis. So, they pay – they received a lot of money, but definitely there is a corruption, there is misgovernance, and also, at the same time, there is a war, a big war…
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
…where they have to manage it, and they have to pay for the weapons, to pay for the Soldiers, to pay for all of this. And they said that they are not going to pay for the public servants, in the government, regularly, only maybe twice a year they pay for them. And because this salaries, they came – they should be come from the gas and oil revenues, they have to share them with, and this is a big debate…
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
…especially from the southlands, because they want – they don’t want to share this wealth with them. That’s – at this point, some people thought that it is a good leverage for the Saudis to have a leverage on the Houthis, it’s by money, because they need money. And they struggled, they really struggled after the truce had been implemented. It started in April 2022, until the September, until Hamas attacks and Gaza war and all of this happened, the Houthis they face a lot of uprisings against them, many demonstrations, many protest. Although they are very, very tough with the people, and they establish a police state, a brutal police state in these areas.
But all – because the people, they were very angry from the economic conditions, and many other things, especially the ideology and other things, they want to impose their ideology on the state and the people. Among all of this, they faced a lot of protest and demonstrations, even in some areas like ev – like, for example, Sanaa, in 26th of September, the people went to the streets, and the Houthis arrested maybe thousands of people at that day. It was just two weeks before Gaza war.
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
So, the Houthis, Gaza war came as a golden opportunity to divert attention from this poor conditions, when the people complaining from their governance, because the war, during the war, seven years of war with the Saudis, it provide them a cover of legitimacy. The people, they didn’t legitimatise the Houthis, because they don’t believe in their ideology. Their way in taking the power, it was a violence – a violent way. So, they be – the people are very aware of all of this, so it is an illegitimate power.
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
But the war, as defending national Yemeni people group, fighting against aggression, external aggression, which is the Saudis, at that time it give them a kind of legitimacy. Now, again, another legitimacy has been provided to them by Gaza war.
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm, thank you, Maysaa. I – we have one more question – actually, I’m going to take a question from the audience, ‘cause it fits into what we’re talking about in terms of the financial flow. So, we have a question from Dominic Pratt, who asks, “Does Iran have a hand in the regional Captagon trade?” I know it’s something that we haven’t really discussed yet, but obviously Captagon is a major source of revenue in both Syria and Lebanon, so I’m wondering if maybe, Emile, you could take this question?
Emile Hokayem
So, certainly, Iran’s partners in Lebanon and Syria are involved in the Captagon trade, and, you know, if you look at this from Iran’s – from Tehran’s perspective, great, they’re diversifying their income. Whether Iran is guiding, encouraging that trade, sees it as, you know, as a source of profit for itself, and so on, I – doubtful, I would say. But certainly, you know, Iran’s – some of Iran’s closest allies in this part of the world are some of the lead producers and exporters of Captagon.
But they are not alone in it. You know, there are groups on the Syrian side who obviously are aligned with the Assad Government, who are major players, who benefit from that and are not as dependent or as linked to, Tehran. So, it’s more of a, again, a convergence of interests. It certainly makes Tehran happy to see that they’re able to generate revenue from elsewhere, but I don’t see Iran as – yet, I mean, there’s no evidence yet, of Iran as a primary player in that. The evidence may emerge, but we have to keep an open mind.
Raya Jalabi
We also have a question from Gillian Dare, she’s asking, “What is the relationship between some of these groups?” So, the Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah, and “What is the relationship between themselves?” I think I’m reading that question right. And she asks, you know, whether “competition for influence within these groups destabilises some of the dynamics.” If Mohammad, you could take that question.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
I think that’s an excellent question. One of the things that has come up among the Analysts within the co-called Resistance camp over the past couple of months, is the idea of horizontal integration. And it’s this idea of, again, co-ordination that we’ve been seeing since October 2023. We’ve seen the establishment of joint operation cells in Beirut, which is not a new thing. It existed 2006, but we see more players being involved in it. We also see an establishment of joint operation cells in Baghdad. We even see reports of some being established in Sanaa, this isn’t new.
These cells permit horizontal collaboration, even if Iran – if Iranians are not in the room. I think Iranians are in the room, but I think the bigger idea is that now we are seeing institutionalism, the kind of structures being set up, that, whether or not IRGC Commanders are there, they’re able to talk to each other, to actively, in practical terms, co-ordinate with each other.
And when you talk about things like competition, I think it becomes much more diffuse. If you look at a joint operation cell, you have an actual physical rooms with actual military Officers in there, and you can speak of something practical. When you speak about rivalry, it becomes much more imaginative. So, for instance, I can argue that the Houthis, since October 2023, have really been the star within the Axis. They really rose to fame by being the only major actors able to, you know, act against Israeli maritime interest or trade interest, etc., and maybe this has created some kind of rivalry with Syria, and others members of this alliance network.
Some would point to some Iraqi groups, for instance, become much more active, because they also want to show off. They also want to say that, “We have a role to play within the Resistance. We are the real opponents of this Israeli-US hegemony.” But it’s very difficult to ascertain the – I mean, what parameters would you use to, kind of, substantiate this, right? ‘Cause it’s much more abstract.
But I think one thing to really look at in terms of practical terms, that’s much more non-abstract, is these joint operation cells, which is really proof that this conflict since October 2023 has generated co-ordination on a new level, a much more practical level, among these groups, and this co-ordination can be horizontal. It’s not just about Iran leading the way. These groups can co-operate with each other without Iran’s involvement.
Raya Jalabi
Renad, how do you see that question of co-ordination between the groups?
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, I think it’s an important question, because it, kind of, goes back to the initial conversation of this idea of proxy, and really, the spectrum. All of these groups they have all sorts of interests. Sometimes they’re local, and sometimes they’re transnational, and, you know, I would look at the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq as probably one of the weakest groups out of this Axis. And the reason why I say that is because of the incoherence within this. So, you have – you know, there – a few weeks ago, there was a vote in the Iraq Parliament, another vote for – to expel US troops, and it never reached quorum. And it wasn’t just the, you know, the sides that are, you know, let’s say, are – that want to keep the US that didn’t vote, but also some of the sides from – linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces didn’t show up to vote, because there’s massive internal debate over this.
You have, as – you know – we – like in Leb – you know, we talk about Hezbollah and Lebanon, but you certainly have groups linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq that are happy and content with the Government right now and the trajectory. And this see this transnational conflict as potentially destabilising, and they are at odds with others that are less locally inclined, or nationally inclined, and that require the transnational, and so require the horizontal.
This means ultimately, that the PMU, the PM – the Popular Mobilization Forces, are going to be a challenge for any kind of horizontal movement, because of these competing internal interests that are playing out politically in Parliament, and across the country. And so, to go back to that, it furthers complicates how much there could be horizontal, but fundamentally, that debate between is it the local interests, versus this transnational interest, that these groups will move towards?
Raya Jalabi
There are quite a few questions about Hamas, so I’d like to ask Emile if you can – you know, given that all of this entire conversation is happening against the backdrop of 7 October, we should really talk a little bit about Hamas’ particular relationship to Iran, and the others in the Axis. And if you could briefly describe how you see that changing as the war continues.
Emile Hokayem
Certainly, you know, if you draw a spectrum of where Hamas sat compared to other actors, vis-à-vis Iran, Hamas would have been, you know, at its – the extreme end or what – of that spectrum. It is Sunni, it has a different – different ideological routes. It – yes, it has some affinity with the Islamic Republic, but strategically, in – especially when the sectarian passions were at their peak in the region, Hamas’ thinking was elsewhere, and we clear – we all know about the split over Syria.
Now, what happened is that in 2014, Hamas was dealt a significant military blowback during a previous round of Israel-Hamas fighting. And then, in 2016 – 15/16, it becomes clear that Bashar al-Assad was going to survive, and come on top of the struggle in Syria while…
Raya Jalabi
Yes.
Emile Hokayem
…Hamas sided with the other side. And Hamas has some regional relationships, are not as strong as it hoped to be and so, you have a debate inside Hamas about what to do. How do you get on top, how do you make sure that you are not irrelevant, and so on? And two individuals, in particular, emerge, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, and Saleh al-Arouri, who’s described as a deputy leader, was killed in early January in Beirut, was – but was very much like a – you know, probably the top guy at some point. And they’re the ones who reestablished ties with Iran, with Assad, with Hezbollah in particular. Hezbollah served to some extent as a conduit, and that’s where the various partners in that Axis are useful to each other. You know, there was some greater cultural proximity, physical presence and so on.
Now, Hamas today faces a – you know, existential questions, essentially. You know, Hamas in Gaza post-7 October, you know, it will likely survive as an insurgency, but will it have enough material forces, cohesion, organisational structure, to do power projection, I mean, as they did in 7 October? Probably not. They will be under – irregardless of how this thing ends, you know, they will be under pressure, including from the Egyptian side, and others, where, you know, an embargo will be – and a blockade will be harshly enforced.
But, also, importantly, and, you know, I offer this without any hard evidence, but it’s become clear that the – it’s actually the Hamas branch that decided to mount 7 October, without necessarily Hamas in Beirut or elsewhere knowing, or knowing in detail about this. This is what’s very much a statement by the Hamas branch in Gaza, saying, “Don’t forget us, don’t have a West Bank first strategy. Don’t just work through Hezbollah, or whatever.” Tou know, “Remember where we come from, remember our bastion in Palestine.” And I think, you know, this – you know, 7 October came, in a way – I mean, you know, as awful as the act was, was also, like a statement of despair by Hamas in Gaza, it’s like, “We exist.”
But now, Hamas, because of that, maybe change fundamentally. I suspect that – I don’t have expertise in Hamas in the West Bank, but Hamas may become more dependent on its regional partners. Hamas, you know, post-Gaza, may have to grow more in Lebanon and Syria, you know, capitalise on this, you know, this newfound fame, and, you know, to recruit there in co-ordination with Hezbollah and other of Iran’s partners there. And that may change the nature of the organisation, that may change its orientation.
So, you know, I think that there are big changes in Hamas’ future. Obviously, it’s – you know, seems obvious what I’m saying, but militarily, it’s not going to look like the same organisation. It will be an insurgency, but it will not be that fighting force that we – Hamas itself thought it was on 7 October. So, yeah, I mean, something to watch, and by the way, I think the dependency on Iran, but also, more importantly, on Iran’s partners in the region, will increase, and that’s going to be a big issue for Hamas’ identity.
Raya Jalabi
We have a lot of really good questions. I’m going to try and condense a couple. We’ve had a couple of people asking us about – regarding the Houthis. Do we think that the situation is intimately tied to Israel-Gaza, or have coalition strikes created a new dynamic, which could mean that maritime instability continues in the event of a Gaza ceasefire? And we’ve had quite a few questions, also, about what – you know, “What are the geopolitics beyond the region looking like when it comes to all of these dynamics?” So, I guess, for Maysaa, if we can start with this idea of, you know, what is the new – you know, the new dynamic that’s been created by these US and UK and coalition strikes, you know, is that – what does that mean for the Houthis going forward?
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
For the Houthis is a good opportunity to prove that their discourse since they – the group emerged, that they are fighting the US, and Israeli is too. And though. they always say that Saudi Arabia is only fighting them because they want to serve the interest of Israeli and America. It’s not for their own interests. So, it’s part of their ideology that they are anti-imperialism and anti-Saudi Ara – anti the US, and you have to understand that they are the first generation of a very ideological group…
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
…and they are not very pragmatic. So, the pragmatic way of thinking, and political way of thinking, you will not find it a lot with the Houthis.
So, yeah, it is definitely very connected to the Gaza war, and they never attack the Red Sea before that, so they took it as excuse. But I’m afraid to say, okay, they may stop their attacks once the Gaza war stop, and even less than that, for example, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, at some point, he said, “Okay, just allow the humanitarian aids, and we are going to stop the attacks,” but no-one listens to him. Because the Americans and the British, they want to disconnect the attacks from Gaza war. They want to deal with it as a threat separately, not something cred – related to Gaza war.
So, now, definitely – but here, the idea, are they going to stop if Gaza war is stopped? I think, yes, to save the credit they – that they received, they have – they received popular credit from these attacks, so they have to save it by showing that they are committed, but after that, they may attack it again.
Raya Jalabi
Hmmm.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
I mean, they are unpredictable group, in general. It’s very difficult to understand them and understand the motivation, because they are somehow reckless, and they are ideological group. They are not very pragmatic.
Raya Jalabi
Speaking of…
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
So…
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
Hmmm, yeah.
Raya Jalabi
Sorry, Maysaa, sorry.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
No, no, that’s okay.
Raya Jalabi
Just speaking of pragmatism, we have a question about, “To what extent can Axis involvement in the war damage each group’s own existence in the long-term?” So, you know, what – summarising what this question says, is this damaging? Is the participation in this current conflict damaging to any of the groups? And since – Maysaa, if you can just continue with your thought on that.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
Yeah, before the Gaza war, for the Americans, for example, they allow the Hou – the Saudis to reach an agreement with the Houthis, and there was leaking information about this agreement, that it is agreement that allow the Houthis, or give them the authority or – all their leverage, without anything in return, any concessions in return, okay? So, at that time, the – that – and we – some people warned the Americans that this could be – mean that the Houthis will dominate all of Yemen, because they are the strongest military group inside Yemen. It’s something similar to Taliban scenario in Afghanistan. Without the Saudi cover, without the Saudi military support to their allies in Yemen, the Houthis can take all of Yemen.
At that time, the Americans, they don’t care, they feel it’s fine for them. The Houthis, they are threat for the Saudis, and if the Saudis find an agreement with them to secure their borders so it’s fine. There is no harm if the Houthis took all of Yemen. But now, that calculation of the Americans, and the British and the Western camp in general, have been changed. They felt that the Houthis could be threat and we should reassessment our policy towards the Houthis. And the first thing that now they are doing, that they are asking the Saudis to review the roadmap agreement between them and the Houthis, because they are not satisfied with this agreement in the same way before the Gaza war.
Raya Jalabi
Yeah.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
So, this is the first thing. But now, in the long run, definitely, the Americans they have election, and it’s still very early to say what they are going to do in the long run, but in the long run, I think they start to think that the Houthis, they are threat, and they have to empower the anti-Houthi camp against them, but they are very dividing, it’s very difficult to manage them, it’s very difficult to manage their divisions and to make – to compromise between them. So, I think their options are very limited with the Houthis.
Raya Jalabi
Mohammad, how do you see that question with regards to whether or not it’s going to damage the existen – you know, the participation in the war is going to damage the existence of gro – other groups in the region?
Mohammad Ali Shabani
I think if you look at things from the perspective of, let’s say, Hezbollah, and perhaps Emile is more better situated for something like that, Hezbollah has been placed in a position where it’s had to expend hundreds of its forces. It’s been compelled to roll out weaponry it perhaps didn’t want to, and, most of all, it’s being, on a daily basis, I would argue, pressured by Netanyahu to step up in a manner it doesn’t want to. And this can damage its deterrence, this can damage, also, the group within its own community. Maybe their expectations of certain actions that it’s not taking, and this goes back to the pragmatism that you brought up previously.
Hezbollah has shown pragmatism towards Israel. We saw a major breakthrough just the other year which was the demarcation of the maritime boundary, and right now, one of the major initiative is to also demarcate the land boundary. So, if the take away from all of this which is what should occur right now is that you have a demarcation of the land boundary, that’s a major act of pragmatism, that can also be construed as a major win for Hezbollah in the longer term. Because again, if you look at the reaction to the maritime boundary, the IRGC media in Iran described that as “a victory without war.” So, there’s clearly Iranian backing for an initiative like that.
That could be something positive that comes out of all of this, but if that doesn’t materialise, in the absence of that, I see major damage for many of the groups in the region, including Hezbollah. In Iraq, what we are seeing is division among the resistance factions, right? So, that’s another thing to look at, as well.
Raya Jalabi
We have another really interesting question, I’m aware we’re running short on time, but, Mohammad, how – someone’s asked how Iran’s – “Has Iran’s influence to several of these groups been weakened by the killing of Qasem Soleimani?”
Mohammad Ali Shabani
I think previously much of Iran’s regional policy was channelled through one individual, who was head of one institution, and what we’ve seen in the absence of Soleimani is a refracturing of Iranian power, and ultimately, the rise of a multiagency process, which looks a lot more similar to what Western governments are up to in the region. I think, tactically, in the short-term, Soleimani’s death was probably a setback for Iran, but I think the grander scheme of things, the involvement of more actor, the rise of much more of an establishment agency process, means that Iran’s influence will be much more sustainable. It’s able to have much range in its interactions, because again, you’re not reliant on one individual as much. That’s my general observation of that.
Raya Jalabi
I’m going to violate my personal rule, and not allow – and now going to allow closing remarks from everyone, because we’re almost out of time. So, if everyone, you can – starting with Mohammad, you can give a one minute summation of your most important points to take away from this conversation today.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
I think it can be very confusing to understand what Iran is really up to in the region and how its relations with our allies are. If it’s not financial, if it’s not political, if it’s not ideological, what is it? I think the one defining factor is a) absence of alliance options, which we continue seeing as a driving factor for alliances, b) the role of technology transfer in shaping relationships. This is really key, to look at technology and its role in shaping political relationship. I mean, specifically anti-ship capabilities in Yemen, missile capabilities in Iraq, things of that nature.
Raya Jalabi
Thank you. Maysaa?
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
First of all, that we should understand the Iranian influence on the Houthis, it’s because of their regional ambitious and because it serves what they wants, it’s the regional ambitious. Second, think that this – what happened in the Red Sea definitely changed the trajectory of the Yemeni war for long time. Yeah, I mean, before this Red Sea attacks, Yemen was very close to end the war by an agreement between the Saudis and the Houthis which would dismiss the anti-Houthi camp.
Now, the situation would be different. The viewpoint of the Houthis have become – have changed forever. Now they look to them as not a loc – an only local Yemeni group. They are not Taliban in Afghanistan. They are more than this. They look for a regional rule, which is very true, and it is in their ideology since day one. So, this change the trajectory of the war in Yemen, and instead of compromising, and instead of going to end the war and end the military intervention of the Saudis or the external players, indirectly, directly, now, the situation will be different. No-one knows what is going to happen, but there is an – an escalation is coming in Yemen. Maybe Yemen will be the next frontline after Gaza.
Raya Jalabi
Thank you. Renad?
Dr Renad Mansour
Yes, you know, on the eve of 7 October, the Biden administration in the US was trying to sell the Middle East as being solved, you know, as no longer in conflict. And that’s all unravelled quite violently in the region, and so, we really need to ask why that is, and what was being masked? And I think some of the things we’ve discussed today are those types of conflicts, both domestic, local, national and transnational, that are very much right there and that cannot be unmasked, and that require thinking differently. They require thinking outside the box, what are these groups? What are their relationships? What is – how do they relate to the state, to the, sort of, transnational, sort of, horizontal axis, as we discussed?
There’s fundamentally, you know, inability I think for the US and many of its allies to really approach these types of actors, and it’s easy to declare mission accomplished. Bush did it, you know, five/six weeks after the war in 2003, but here we are, you know, more than 20 years later, and we’re living through what so-called mission accomplished looks like.
Raya Jalabi
And, lastly, Emile, and if I could ask you to broaden it out a little bit, geopolitically, since you are our broadest panellist.
Emile Hokayem
Certainly. Just a couple of points. Up until now, states are fine fighting with non-state actors. So, you know, no state wants to fight another state, but there are tripwires there, there are triggers. I think the most obvious one would be, you know, Israeli decision to go after Hezbollah, you know, large-scale attack, that somehow draws in Iran. I think that’s the clearest shortcut to the something quite regional and catastrophic. So, the risk of all-out escalations, I think, are still very present, we shouldn’t be complacent. I tend to be on the pessimistic side. So, that’s number one.
The second point is, you know, Hezbollah has shown restraint on – until now, but for strategic reasons. It is Iran’s more formidable instrument of deterrence and punishment, and, you know, it will be really deployed if Iran feels that its own sovereignty, its own strategic interests, are at stake. And this has been the problem with Iran’s strategy. In a way, it worked too well, you know, it turned Hezbollah in this formidable group, and then, do you really want to risk it, right? I mean, you know, you’re waiting for the right moment to really go all in, and that’s a problem for Iran. The other actors that we’ve talked about are just easier to dispense with, to deploy, take hits and so on.
The other issue that is worth keeping in mind is that these groups, we discussed them as, you know, element, mostly of instability and destabilisation in the region, their impact on society. I mean, Maysaa addressed that in Yemen, and the others, as well. But fundamentally, it’s what they do to their own societies, you know, this constant militant approach, this radicalising approach to everything, that makes public policy impossible. In none of the countries that we’ve discussed there’s anything good on track, and these groups are, most of the time, you know, the main – not the only, but the main obstacle to that.
And, finally, look, the world has no answers to any of that. You sense the fatigue. The Red Sea is really the strategic issue at the moment, and the other strategic interest is to avoid an all-out war in Lebanon. But beyond the region, there is a complete lack of creativity, of a commitment, I would say, despite everything else. So, I don’t think that at the end of this particular horrible cycle of violence, anything good is likely to come out. I’m sorry, we’re Analysts, we very rarely have good things to tell our audiences.
Raya Jalabi
Well, on that positive note, I want to take the time to thank you all very much for your insights. We have more than 40 questions that I have not been able to answer, or get to, but thank you, everyone, for your questions, and thank you, panellists, for your insights, and thank you, Chatham House.
