Christopher Sabatini
Thank you for coming. Haiti’s very much in the news, oftentimes, almost always, for reasons of crisis and tragedy. We’re trying to avoid that in this discussion here. Obviously, if you’ve been following the events in Haiti, with the turmoil over the TPC, the Transitional Presidential Council, which was created in April 2024, to try to basically, fill the void of a lack of a government. There was no elected government in 2024. The Parliament had been dissolved. The acting President, Ariel Henry, had effectively – was prevented from landing in the airport by gangs. And so, CARICOM negotiated this nine-member TPC, Transitional Presidential Council, with the idea that a – within that time, the TPC could re-establish some elements of security, but also be able to provide a framework for elections so that it could be replaced.
Its mandate ends on the 7th, just a few days from now. What will come next, we don’t know. We’re already seeing jockeying within the TPC over some members, five in particular, trying to extend their mandate. They also tried to remove their appointed Prime Minister. It’s the second Prime Minister they’ve had. The first one, Garry Conille, was removed after a short six months. We really don’t know what’s going to happen, but clearly, what the TPC has done in the meantime, in the short year and a half or almost two years of its existence, is ba – fail on a number of issues to establish governance, to establish security. And so, the question now is what will come next and also, all the pending issues on security.
The goods news is there’s several things. First of all, for some reason I – really, I don’t understand, Haiti is sending two members to the Winter Olympics. I don’t know what their sport is. They also have a team going to the World Cup. We can hope that they can get visas, but that’s actually quite exciting to think that the Haitian team have made it to the World Cup. And besides that, and probably perhaps more importantly, is that the UN in September, after a meeting that Chatham House convened in New York, approved the Gang Suppression Force, which is a ramped up, more improved version, if you will, of a multinational security support system, a mission that was set up earlier to try to provide a UN presence in response to the security situation in Haiti.
The Gang Suppression Force is much more robust. We’re already seeing, actually, the numbers of troops, commitments. It’s all volunteer. This is why, if you notice the title of this seminar is actually on, sort of, what this means for the global system. We see a world in which the era of UN peacekeeping missions is much – maybe over with, certainly is much more attenuated, which means that without a UN peacekeeping mission, there can be no, sort of, use of UN dues, member paying dues, to support this. So, it will have to depend, in part, not entirely in the GSF, on voluntary contributions, both in terms of troops, as well as in terms of support for all of the array of assistance on both security but also development and the like. So, we’ll see, and I think all eyes will be on what happens with the TPC on the 7th.
The United States has acted very forcefully to try to force some sort of compromise. It’s sent a very strong message that what it wants to do is – the TCP’s mandate will end on the 7th, and you’ll start afresh on the 8th. To do that, to ensure that it has sanctioned five members of the TPC and recently sanct – renewed sanctions or implied visa restrictions on three of those TPC members who were intent, it seemed, on removing the Prime Minister.
But we’re going to try to focus here on where we are institutionally and not just on, if you will, the, sort of, troubles and dynamics. One of the reasons we at Chatham House started the Haiti Project, now about a year ago, with Alice and Alexandra and Roberta, and others, Rob Greenhill, was trying to avoid this idea of inevitable failure. We talk about ‘Haiti fatigue’ and there is clearly a long history of failure. The truth is, is we can’t dwell on that too much. We need to recognise what went wrong. We need to draw from comparative examples of successes, which is why, in part, this team is here, but we also need to avoid falling into the trap of just this, what I call this doom loop, oh, it’ll all go bad. We can’t – Haitians deserve more than that. Between January of last year and November – October/November of this year – of the year – so, basically, nine months, more than 8,000 Haitians were killed. The level of displacement is about 1.4 million Haitians, about half are food insecure.
This security issue affects more than just the lives of people. There’s also very gruesome tales of rape and abuse of women that need to be addressed, and so, I’m happy to have the panel here. Let me introduce everyone, by first name, actually. Simon is with the UN and is – works on, basically, I’ll let you explain a little bit more, filling in the ensuring the human rights compliance of UN Resolutions, in this case, been working on Haiti. We’ll talk to him about that. Roberta Maggi is the Lead Author of this report that I hold up, a little dogeared. It’s good reading, so that’s why its dogeared. It’s been read, Roberta. As is Alexandra Farsari. And the idea of this report, which we’ll touch on, but this isn’t – this – the meeting here is broader than that, the idea of this report is, basically, to set out a security roadmap.
During the time of the TPC, it failed to deliver a coherent, consistent security roadmap, you know, that can serve as a discussion point for international – the international community and the Haitian Government, or a Haitian government, in-term government or the like. This is an effort to get that conversation going. Doesn’t intend to be perfect, it doesn’t intend to include everything right now, but it draws from Roberta’s expertise in North Africa, in the Middle East, on if you will, the political economy of conflict and the sequencing of reforms and the overhaul of reform institutions.
And then we also have Birte, who’s a Professor at the University of Liverpool, who has written recently an article in “International Affairs.” She’s done work alone on Haiti and past UN missions, but in the most recent article, “International Affairs,” compares the Haiti mission with missions in the Balkans. Again, the ideas, and I say this perhaps for self-serving reason, as a Comparative Political Scientist, I believe there’s a certain merit in understanding the comparisons and trying to move those forward.
What we’ll do is I’ll run this as a conversation, not as a series of panel discussions, and so I’m going to invite everyone to comment on the panel, but then we’ll open it up again, probably even before a question and answer period, to start a freewheeling conversation as much as we can. We have a number of participants online. For the online participants, please just raise your questions and assuming they’re appropriate, I will read them out loud. If they’re not, I reserve the right not to. I’d also like to welcome the Haitian Ambassador, my friend, Anaïse, here. Thank you very much for coming. Thank – I’m glad – I’m so happy that you’re here in London. She’s been a great advocate for Haiti, a great counterpart on this, so I thank you, and your lovely husband, Stan, who’s also here.
Okay, let’s get started. Simon, the turmoil we’re seeing right now in Haiti, again, not focusing on that, but give us an idea of other cases you see. What effect will that have on the ability of the UN to stand up its BINUH mission? BINUH is the – basically, the mission of the UN under this – well, under the GSF. What’s your sense of how will this affect that? What needs to be done? Are there pending reforms? Give us a sense of how these two things pair up.
Simon O’Connor
Sure. No, and I’ll just – I think I’ll perhaps start by just walking through a little bit what the UN presence is in Haiti.
Christopher Sabatini
Yes.
Simon O’Connor
‘Cause I think that’s also part of some of the challenges is understanding that relationship. So, BINUH you rightly point out, is the UN mission, it’s headed by the SRSG. It’s a special political mission. It has been there for quite some time. It has just had its mandate renewed last week by the Security Council unanimously, and its role is precisely in effect of supporting the Haitian authorities on a range of issues, and we can go into some of that.
What the GSF is, and the GSF is not part of BINUH, I’ll just be quite clear about that, but the GSF will be supported by the UN through what’s called the UN Support Office for Haiti. Now, some of this is just the internal dynamics of the United Nations and the different responsibilities between the Department of Peacebuilding Political Affairs and the Department of Operational Support. So, the GSF will receive support from the UN Support Office in Haiti, which is being set up as we speak, and will, in effect, be fully operational by the 1st of April. BINUH has, and will continue, its political mandate in supporting the Haitian authorities on a range of issues, including supporting them on issues around security, with the HNP, with the Haitian Armed Forces.
And I think in the context of the current environment, and this is, of course, our experience elsewhere, the UN is present in many situations where there are levels of transition, if there is a lack of clarity in terms of leadership, that could certainly have practical consequences in terms of the ability of, for example, the UN Support Office, to ensure it is ready to support by the 1st of April. What that means in practical terms, they may not be an interlocutor, for example, if there is uncertainty with regard to Haitian authorities, to do some of the practical and in fact, legal issues that need to be done to enable that presence to continue and operate within the country.
Equally, the absence of an interlocutor with authorities, and we have this in many different contexts, can be a challenge in terms of standing up and deploying security forces from other countries. Because equally, there needs to be arrangements in place, sometimes called a Status of Forces Agreement or a Status of Protection Agreement, that clearly require, in the context of Haiti, a signatory on the side of Haiti and similarly, a signatory on the side of the member states that are making those contributions. So, there could be practical consequences in terms of the timeline for deployment, and we all know the necessity for deployment to…
Christopher Sabatini
And what…?
Simon O’Connor
…occur.
Christopher Sabatini
Give us an idea, what is the timeline right now of the deployment?
Simon O’Connor
The timeline for the deployment at the moment, as things currently stand, and of course, this is still an ongoing conversation, would be that the GSF would deploy probably an initial operational capacity. We know the ceiling that the Security Council has provided the GSF is 5,500 military and Police personnel. It won’t deploy them overnight. That’s not how…
Christopher Sabatini
No.
Simon O’Connor
…these things happen, but you could – or there would be an expectation that we would have an initial operational capacity, which probably means somewhere in the region of 750 or 1,000 personnel by the 1st of April. Now, there’s a question about whether that’s the 1st of April in country and then there’s a timeline that leads into their ability to then conduct operations, but certainly through April and May, there’s an expectation that that is when – and this is the discussion, of course, in New York and elsewhere, that that would be the point at which the GSF proper, rather than the GSF through the transition process as we currently have, would be in a position to operate.
And then clearly, as you’ve said already, there has been many pledges made and the Standing Group of Partners are in the process of deliberating, as I understand it, on the pledges that have been made, to match them to the tasks required of the GSF. But certainly, the position from the UN is that they want to stand up the UN Support Office by the 1st of April in order that the personnel and troops committed to the GSF can deploy and be present by that date.
Christopher Sabatini
One quick question on one of the complaints about the previous mission, the multilateral – the MSS, was that they were confined to the barracks in Port-au-Prince and there’s no, sort of, outward projection. Are there efforts even already to try to develop infrastructure to allow for deployment of some of these forces?
Simon O’Connor
Certainly. In the context of – I mean, the MSS had some ability, with op – forward operating basis. It’s certainly been recognised and of course, discussions on what the concept of operations would be and what the approach would be for the GSF moving forward would necessitate them to have a presence, you know, outside of what was currently, the A – LSA area, or the camp of the MSS.
So, absolutely, and of course, this is an element within the context of the roles and tasks within the UN Support Office, would be – and this has been done elsewhere with UN presences in, for example, Somali, where they would be in a position to support the infrastructure that’s necessary for precisely that. And absolutely and colleagues in the room will know much better than me, there is a clear need for the footprint of the GSF to expand and be expansive, and that necessitates forward operating basis. So, they need to be present and there are certainly ongoing activities, including building, as I understand it.
Christopher Sabatini
Good.
Simon O’Connor
But again, that goes back to my earlier point that there are many obstacles, of course, in this context, but you would not want to exacerbate those obstacles by not having an interlocutor to enable the practicalities of that readiness to be in place.
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you. I’ve just noticed we have 130 people online and it’s also being livestreamed, so just – it’s – a lot of them from Haiti. So, we’ll be getting a lot of questions, I hope, from Haiti. Birte, you’ve studied the Haitian missions in the past, you’ve compared them to other situations. How does elite cohesion affect this – the implementation of these efforts of the UN? How does this compare to previous interventions? Could you give us a sense there?
Birte Julia Gippert
Yeah, thank you very much, Chris. So, I think what this comes down to is a question of relationships, right? So, how do UN missions build relationships within the operation? So, there needs to be cohesion within the deployment itself, and we’ve seen that in the previous missions, for instance, during the time of MINUSTAH that was a problem. But also, of course, these relationships need to be built between the operation and local political elites and also, local communities, right? This is not only a mark of respect to Haitian sovereignty, but how these relationships are built and how this cohesion works between the different groups, it’s also a question of perception, a question of whether the mission is considered legitimate by relevant groups within Haiti, be they local elites, be they communities, be they civil society groups.
And we know from past research and past experience in Haiti and beyond, indeed as you said, in my article I tend to look at comparative perspectives, that how these operations are perceived matters, because it translates into increased support, increased co-operation, from communities, from political elites, within the host state. And we also see the flipside of that, right, so the opposite. We’ve seen considerable pushback and demonstrations against UN deployments recently in Mali, recently in the DRC and South Sudan, when what the UN mission does/doesn’t respond to or isn’t considered to be responsive to what the host state or the host population, or different communities, want them to do, and then we see this, kind of, pushback. And that undermines not just the standing of the operations, but what they can physically do.
So, I think what we need to consider about the idea of relationships is the importance of a political compact, an agreement between whatever form of government we will have next in Haiti, hopefully an elected one, and the UN operations, and plural here, right? BINUH has a particular set of relationships, the UN Support Office and of course, also, the GSF. So, ideally that’d be a bit like you guys have said on the roadmap, there needs to be a shared strategic vision of what is the political vision for Haiti? And that needs to be based in Haiti, right? So, that needs to be very much owned and developed within Haiti by the government, by local stakeholders, and that needs to set out very clearly what is the relationship with the third parties, so with the UN and with all sorts of other bilateral and multilateral actors that are supporting in Haiti?
So, particularly if we’re looking back at previous instances, so when, for instance, the MINUSTAH mission deployed, it was similar to today, a transitional government that authorised the deployment and that was, basically, there for the first two years of the mission. And the status of the tradi – of transitional government is problematic, right? The past one, as today this one, are not perceived as legitimate by many Haitians. So, that raises questions of the consent, does the government actually have the authority to invite a mission? This isn’t so much a question of legality, right? From a legal point of view, yes, it does, it’s the government of the state, but more in terms of the political authority question, right? Are they the right authority to actually bring in armed actors with a right to use lethal force against, you know, communities in Haiti?
So, this sort of question of consent, then, is a life thing. This is a question not just when the mission is coming in, but also throughout the life cycle of the operation. And here again, I think we can draw a bit of a parallel, because the situation changed considerably in 2006 with the election of René Préval. And then suddenly, the UN had a political opposite that they could work with and then they did develop that political agreement, that political compact that clarified quite clearly, strategically and operationally, what is the political vision for the country and where does the mission fit in? What exactly is their role, the role they can play? And when we think about how MINUSTAH engaged with the gangs, Préval went through quite a clear set of steps to, effectively, try and engage them through talks, through diplomacy, trying to get them to disarm. Finally sekking – setting an ultimatum, before greenlighting MINUSTAH to, you know, to do its thing and to actually start the gang raids afresh after the first round, after 2006.
So, I think this question of the political agreement and the consent is really, really important for the GSF, as well, and for the UN Poli – Support Office here. So, what…
Christopher Sabatini
Okay.
Birte Julia Gippert
…sort of operational agreements are there? Particularly, where does the GSF end and where do Haitian state institutions come in? And this comes back to what Simon was saying just now, what is going to be the interface, the operational interface? If the GSF does, indeed, come in and is hesitant, for instance, to make arrests, will they detain people and hand them over to the Haitian National Police so they can be processed through the Haitian criminal justice system? What are these interfaces looking like, not just on paper, but practically? How is this actually going to work? How are these connections going to work?
So, it’s not just the question of sequencing, as you guys have raised in the report, but also the question of division of labour, right? How are these different actors going to play together and is it going to work seamlessly and legally? Because of course, everyone needs to know what the legal basis is on which…
Christopher Sabatini
Right.
Birte Julia Gippert
…they’re getting.
Christopher Sabatini
And Roberta, I’m going to get to you about the, sort of, Haitian-owned security plan in a second and how it compares to other situations, but Simon, I want to ask you to follow up a little bit on what Birte just said. And what is your sense of that, you know, that commitment of this government, the legitimacy and capacity of the current government, TPC or whatever follows on the aid from February, to basically, sort of, have that, sort of, authority to invite and co-operate?
Simon O’Connor
Yeah, I mean, I think the – I think there are a number of elements to that and Birte is right about this notion of a ‘compact’. And of course, the work that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has been doing, particularly with the MSS, in terms of developing the architecture for, you know, human rights compliance by that force, has been occurring simultaneously with our engagement with the Haitian National Police. And of course, we have the political engagement through BINUH, so there are multiple layers of that, sort of, intersection that I think Birte is talking about.
And I would say, you know, insofar as I see it, and I, you know, don’t always work at the political level, I work at a technical and operational level, as well, but I can see that level of commitment in terms of wanting to move the needle on these issues, moving forward, right? And the key for us at this stage, and this is my, you know, daily activities, is in looking at ways to ensure that when deployed, the GSF is in the best possible position from its understanding of what that environment is into which it’s deploying, to provide both means of conducting operations that provide protection, but equally, working in partnership with the Haitian authorities to the le – to the tactical level, on actually delivering on that. And I think there’s certainly ways in which that can be unpacked and concretised precisely as a – as Birte said, “not just on paper, but” in “practical” terms, and there’s certainly a number of examples we can talk to in that regard.
Christopher Sabatini
Roberta, I’m actually adding more questions to you before I speak, but there’s one online that’s relevant to this and it’s – I think you’re well positioned to answer it, which is – this is from Louis-Henri Mars. “For the GSF to be accepted, should relations have to be built not only with local elites, but with the whole of Haitian society?” And you’ve work – looked at this in other cases, Libya, Syria and other cases. So, I’ve given you, I think, three separate questions. Please go ahead and explain a little bit in terms of the role of elite cohesion, how issues of, sort of, a weak, if you will, host government, and then the process of building buy-in, if you will, of legitimacy of a UN mission within society.
Roberta Maggi
Thank you. Thank you, Chris, for the three questions, for the opportunity to be here. It’s truly a privilege to be part of this discussion and to exchange with all of you and with our audience, as well. So, if I take Birte’s point on past missions and the different points that Simon also raised on mandate design together, what strikes me from a comparative perspective is that Haiti fits a pattern that we’ve seen before across the world, including in parts of North Africa and the Middle East.
What the Chatham House research that we worked on together, Chris, and with the other colleagues, shows, quite clearly, I would say, is that Haiti is no longer simply dealing with gangs or a criminal type of violence. It’s dealing with a fully developed security marketplace where protection is bought, it’s priced, it’s brokered, because public authority is unreliable. And so, I’ll circle back to elite cohesion in a bit, but obviously, this penetrates different societal levels, different types of stakeholders, and it’s quite pervasive. And so, in that sense, we’ve got gangs, private security companies, vigilante groups, hybrid state actors, that all in different ways supply types of coercion. While households, firms, sometimes NGOs, sometimes even state bodies, are forced to buy into that system simply to move to operate or to survive. And this is, sort of, the status quo that we’re dealing with from the security perspective in Haiti and that we also came into this research project dealing with.
So, that immediately, in my mind, makes Haiti comparable to places like Libya or Yemen, where insecurity wasn’t just a symptom of state weakness, but it really became an economic system embedded in its own governance, if you will. So, in Libya, one of the clearest lessons was that integrating armed actors into state structures before establishing oversight and accountability hollowed out the state from the inside. So, militias were absorbed into formal security institutions for short-term stability. So, think of it in line with traditional stabilisation doctrines, but that was done without folding them into unified command, without vetting, without any semblance of budgetary control and various other practical things. And so, over time, they became gatekeepers of state resources, of appointments, of rents, and they became a real barrier to genuine reform, making it almost impossible. Now, our Chatham House research flags a similar risk of Haiti if coercive actors, whether vigilantes, auxiliary forces, reconfigured security units, you name it, are absorbed or expanded before clear statutory roles, civilian oversight and justice chain capacity are in place.
I would also say that Yemen offers a second warning. There, there are armed actors with consolidated power via control of logistics notes. So, this would be ports, fuel, transport corridors, and they’re turning extortion into a predictable business model. And our research shows that Haiti’s gangs, in particular coalitions, like Viv Ansanm, are operating in much of the same way, because they’re taxing movement, they’re rationing access to fuel and infrastructure, and they’re converting, almost, territorial control into steady forms of revenue. And we’ve seen that with different forms of taxation that have been imposed across Haiti. Now, the implication of this is that focusing solely on visible violence misses part of the centre of gravity in Haiti, because if enforcement doesn’t target facilitators, choke points and illicit economies, it remains, sort of, tactical gains that can always be reversible, depending on the balance of hard power.
And so, that brings me to sequencing. Now, across the comparative cases and the in-depth study that we’ve conducted at Chatham House of the Haitian context, our research is very clear that order matters and sequencing matters. Because when coercive force expands faster than governance, security gains risk collapsing back into the same coercive marketplace that I really need to stress is very deeply entrenched in the Haitian economy right now. And so, our recently published roadmap, which I want to caveat, is not a rigid blueprint, but rather is a set of essential steps and priorities grounded in months of consultations and comparative exp – consultations with Haitian stakeholders from across, sort of, government, civil society, leading – community leaders and also from comparative experience, in various bouts of expertise.
This roadmap links to three linked priorities in sequence, and it has a series of sequencing balancing acts within each of these priorities. So, first, we looked at “governance guardrails,” so this includes things like clarifying roles across Police, military, intelligence, justice and more, which also takes us back to Birte’s very pertinent point about not just having the strategy, but also having the physical capacity and an idea of roles of responsibilities and who’s supposed to do what. We also talked there about insulating appointments and procurement from political capture and things like establishing credible oversight.
Secondly, we have the imperatives around “shrinking the course of marketplace” itself. So, here we talk about targeting facilitators, arms flows, logistics notes, financial enablers, while also rebuilding the justice chain so that arrests can translate into prosecution and detention, rather than just recycling violence and continuing vicious circles. And then, third, once the foundations are there, we talk about “scaling coercive force,” because that’s where it really makes sense. Not because there’s no force early on, but because expanding it and relying on it only works sustainably, based on our lessons learned, when it’s anchored in institutions that can hold territory, impose accountability and retain legitimacy. And this is where points raised by my co-panellists before on having reliable interlocutors really hold true and strike through.
And so, this is why in the report the GSF is described not as a solution in itself, but as a “high stakes test of sequencing,” almost, because if enforcement is not tightly linked to BINUH’s work on justice, on governance, on accountability, then Haiti risks repeating a bit the MINUSTAH pattern, right, of having tactical gains but also legitimacy erosion and then, an eventual recapture of space by armed actors.
So, I’ll just finish on one last thought, which is that the comparative lesson to retain here is that we already know what happens when coercion runs ahead of accountability, and so, sequencing governance first isn’t necessarily idealism, but it’s the only way that force can stop feeding the market that it’s meant to dismantle.
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you. You’re not going to get away from the question about the idea about Haitian sec – created security plan. Can you talk about that briefly, and then I’m going to have bathe – both Birte and Simon talk about it? Sorry to put you on the spot, Roberta, but how does that…
Roberta Maggi
Hmmm.
Christopher Sabatini
…proceed? How do you both in – what you describe here, you and Alexandra describe here, but also on occasions you’ve seen, how does that proceed to make sure that Haitians, basically, determine their own security?
Roberta Maggi
So, part of the uncertainty around what’s going to happen after February 7th also looms over the entire design of what an inclusive process of deciding security priorities look like. I think Haitian experts and civil society leaders have been really excellent for many years at being consistent with their messages around security, around mobility, around what are the priorities in terms of day-to-day life, physical security, etc.? But there’s still a lot of confusion around where a legitimate authority might come that at some point would be able to trigger the launch of a consultative process with the security agencies, with the experts, with the international community, and how that would all fit in.
So, in our roadmap we have a series of procedural proposals on this, including on where to find Haitian institutions that have broad-based societal buy-in and that could actually be, in the absence of a structured authority with a transition, a, sort of, locus of legitimacy to bless this process. One of the institutions that’s mentioned in that way in the report is, for example, the Office of the Ombudspersons of Haiti, which has retained its presence, its consistency and is still widely regarded as a legitimate body that could potentially hold this type of convening power and have oversight over the process. To ensure that it remains inclusive, that it remains insulated from broader political jockeying and from broader corruption trends within Haitian state authorities that we’ve witnessed over the past few months, not least within the Transitional Presidential Council. So, there’s a lot of that going on.
And I think that this also ties in with the question that you were raising, Chris, that we had in the Q&A, around elite cohesion, which is if we’re trying to launch this type of process, do we actually have the political space to launch a process that isn’t completely characterised by elite capture?
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Roberta Maggi
And I think this is going to be one of the main questions around process design to get to a nationally recognised strategy for how to proceed with security sector governance, security sector reform, and the various legal reforms that also need to stem from that, the various criminal justice reforms that also need to stem from that.
Christopher Sabatini
So…
Roberta Maggi
I don’t think – yeah.
Christopher Sabatini
Hold – wait there. So, I’m getting questions also online, but – so I’m going to read two of the questions. I want all of you to follow up on Roberta’s very good synthesis on what should be done on, sort of, design, elite participation or cohesion participation, in the security plan. But I want all – so, prepare your questions. Let me first ask the question here, but we’ll be circulating with microphones in a second, but this is important too because it’s – it – there were several – this is one of those points where there’s a lot of questions that overlap, so I can ask, basically, one question by combining three. Which is, basically, ultimately, gang suppression isn’t going to depend on violence. It’s going to depend on the ability of the economy to grow, to produce jobs, to reintegrate the youth that make up, if you will, the foot soldiers of these gangs, many of them perhaps unwillingly.
So, we have a question from Louis-Henri again about, you know, “What’s being doing in terms of the exit door for gang members? Who would do it?” And this is important, too, because I don’t want to sound dramatic about this, but we’re dealing in a post-development world. The USAID has been eliminated, the UK, the EU are cutting their development budgets. How is that vacuum going to be filled? It’s one thing where we have a gang suppression mission and the potential for kinetic activity around that, but who is going to do – who’s going to fund, who is going to implement all – everything from DDR to reintegration, all of these – reintegration being the ‘R’, all – and job creation and economic development? Where does this come from and who’s going to do it?
But then the other question from our friend, Bill O’Neill, hello Bill, “Is there a safe way for youth, who comprise about half of the gang members, to leave the gangs, and is there a programme to offer them rehabilitation and re-education?” So, start with you, Simon, the two questions, big questions, basically, and if you can answer them quickly so we can get, also, the audience. A Haitian-owned solution to security, how do you structure with that, and what happens with the economy? Let’s imagine, even if we did manage to take out all the gang leaders, where do these people go?
Simon O’Connor
Sure. I mean, I’ll speak just to that, as well, through the lens of the purpose of the deployment of the GSF, ‘cause…
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah…
Simon O’Connor
…that’s…
Christopher Sabatini
…that’s your…
Simon O’Connor
…much of what I’m…
Christopher Sabatini
…alleyway, yeah.
Simon O’Connor
…working on and driving with. And Bill, of course, is someone I know very well, so he knows some of the answers to the questions he’s asking. But I mean, I think the – certainly in the context of that Haitian-owned role in terms of the security forces, as I’ve mentioned already, in the engagement that we’ve had with the HNP, both through the…
Christopher Sabatini
Haitian National Police.
Simon O’Connor
…National Police, apologies – with colleagues in BINUH and also with colleagues who have worked collectively with the MNS. I’m recalling that the MNS’s mandate was to conduct joint operations with the HNP. Now, the GSF has a slight differential on that mandate, but equally, it’s not going to be able to move forward, as has already been put – pointed out as well, by Roberta, in an environment that is already saturated in terms of security actors.
So – and the – but the other point is that although, of course, we’ve had missions for lengthy periods of time, any intervention of this tort – this sort is intended to be timebound. So, the GSF and the GSF resolution, does speak to this, the Special Representative is required to present, in effect, an exit strategy for the GSF pretty much soon as he comes on board. So, I think certainly going into this process, there needs to be that understanding that yes, there is a reason and a rationale why the Security Council has taken the approach to propose a ceiling of 5,000 troops to deploy to Haiti. But that has to be only in the context of their ability to create an environment where these issues around ownership and around responsibility and around the capacity for the Haitian authorities, including HNP, but others, justice sector and others, to be able to build up.
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Simon O’Connor
Right? So, in many ways, they’re a bulwark for many of these other things to take place. They’re not responsible for everything and nor should they be, but their success will be in their ability to create that environment for a number of other things to happen.
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Simon O’Connor
And DDR is one such example. What I would say in the context of DDR, just very broadly speaking, although sometimes I’m not sure it’s the right term for the Haitian context ‘cause it has…
Christopher Sabatini
DDR is disarmament, demobilisation…
Simon O’Connor
Demobilisation and…
Christopher Sabatini
…and rehabilitation.
Simon O’Connor
…reintegration.
Christopher Sabatini
Integration.
Simon O’Connor
But in broader sense of the meaning of that term, the GSF would certainly have a role to play in the first D, but they would only have a role to play in setting those conditions to enable the second D and the reintegration to take place. And as you say, that’s very much predicated on the ability and the capacity for the economy to also absorb the, frankly, children, who will be separated from the gangs, and rightly so.
So, I think I wouldn’t really be in a position to necessarily speak directly to the economics question, but certainly with the ability of the GSF, and this is, of course, why we’re prepared and ready to engage with them, as we did with the MSS, is to enable them to conduct their operations in a way that doesn’t exacerbate these existing challenges and the existing vulnerabilities.
Christopher Sabatini
Okay. Birte, you – quickly, then I want to get to, then, Roberta. Birte.
Birte Julia Gippert
Hmmm. I think I want to pick up on a point, if I may, that’s, sort of, been floating around, but that I think it’s worth unpacking, and that’s the principle of community protection, right? So, it comes back to some of the questions online. This isn’t all-state centre. This isn’t necessarily about the political…
Christopher Sabatini
No.
Birte Julia Gippert
…elites, right?
Christopher Sabatini
No.
Birte Julia Gippert
And the process, it’s about the communities who’ve been bearing the brunt of the gang activity. So, I think what we need to think about for any forthcoming deployment and learn the lessons from the past here, is that these missions need to be responsive to what the communities want, but that also means understanding how the communities experience insecurity and experience violence, and that, of course, is not a homogenous picture, at all. The gangs are, of course, a threat in and of themselves, but one of the complexities of the Haitian gang landscape is, of course, also that to a degree, the gangs also provide services.
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Birte Julia Gippert
Which is one of the reasons why they have become entrenched to the degree they have, and it’s simply not a black and white picture.
So, even if the GSF were to use force in order to remove the gangs, that may solve part of the problem, but it also exposes, or uncovers, another part, which is who’s going to fill that vacuum? The HNP is a very, very important partner, but of course, their capacity has been drastically reduced, right? The HNP today is not what they were in 2009 or 2010, before the earthquake. So, in that sense, it’s also a question of, okay, so you get rid of the gangs, but what next? And this comes back to, sort of, your classic, right, freeing up, holding territory and filling it with something else, well what else?
And I think a point I would like to make is we speak a lot about DDR. MINUSTAH was given a DDR mandate, and it very quickly became aware that it’s completely inappropriate, and it was changed to what was really more a community violence reduction programme, which also brought with it problems. But what it – what a CVR mandate does compare to a DDR mandate is it flips the focus on the communities, and it is, at least in my humble opinion, better at shining a light on those complex community relationships with the gangs, with the violence, with the entrenched nature of insecurity. So, I think that’s something – that community focus is something that I find very important and I mean…
Christopher Sabatini
Roberta…
Birte Julia Gippert
…Simon has a much better insight than I do in how far that is currently being taken up and developed. But that’s something I think we need to, sort of, unpack and focus on more.
Christopher Sabatini
Great. Roberta, before we turn to the audience, quickly, your thoughts.
Roberta Maggi
Great, thanks, Chris.
Christopher Sabatini
Okay, by the way, Roberta’s report and Alexandra’s report talks about DDR and all of these things about economic.
Roberta Maggi
Hmmm.
Christopher Sabatini
But, you know, one of the things we hope to do at Chatham House is hold what hasn’t been held, to my knowledge, is a donors’ conference on the – and, you know, again, it’s a reflection of the breakdown of the global system and the lack of leadership in mo – a number of sectors. Who’s going to pro – inject the capital, recommend the reforms, the grants, improve access to credit? No-one’s stepping up. Sorry, Roberta.
Roberta Maggi
No worries at all. So, to answer the two questions on economic growth and on youth, I’ll try to do that shortly and at the same time. In our roadmap, we talk about different “pathways to off-ramping,” because DDR is, first of all, it’s what you make of it. I’ve always tended to understand DDR less as a security exercise and more as a socioeconomic exercise, so I would fall in the category of those who care about the economy on this. But so, with different pathways, depending on the type of offence, depending on age, that would, sort of, make the juvenile justice system function, as well, especially in terms of kids and youth, because part of the underlying causes here is there’s a lot of – no, there’s a looming crisis of homelessness. There’s a lack of economic opportunities. The reasons why people join gangs to begin with, especially as children, are not necessarily a quest for agency or a gun or violence. Sometimes they’re a quest for a roof and getting off the streets. So, we try in the roadmap to differentiate different aspects of that, and I’ll encourage the audience to read, also given time constraints.
I would like to make a quick nod to the fact that depending on how counter-gang operations are run in the forthcoming months, there is an overwhelming risk of an increasing humanitarian crisis in Haiti. More humanitarian needs, more physical infrastructure discussion, more need for food, more need for shelter, there’s already a huge, displaced population. These are all things that will be added to the bill of an already, as you said, Chris…
Christopher Sabatini
Hmmm.
Roberta Maggi
…shrinking availability of funds for development and for humanitarian assistance. So, I just wanted to make a nod on that, because yes, DDR is a socioeconomic exercise, but I don’t think that we’re done quite yet witnessing the destruction of a Haitian economy. And so, I wanted to throw that into the [ring – 49:33].
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you. Let’s get some questions. We’ve got a lot of really good questions from here and comments. Questions from the audience, please put your hand up. You and then a nice – oh, actually, let’s go first to the Ambassador from Haiti, first, and then I’ll get to you, sorry, as you imagine.
Christopher Sabatini
Please introduce yourself, not that you need any introduction.
Her Excellency Anaïse Manuel
Hello, everybody, I’m Anaïse. I’m the Ambassador of Haiti to the UK. Thank you so much for this…
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you.
Her Excellency Anaïse Manuel
…thoughtful and…
Christopher Sabatini
That’s…
Her Excellency Anaïse Manuel
…overdue roadmap. I have a question. The roadmap, of course, it rightly stresses the accountability for the Haitian actors are fuelling this crisis. What about the international actors who are also contributing to this? And how does it address the regional and maritime dimensions fuelling the crisis?
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you. Let’s start with you, Simon.
Simon O’Connor
You know, thanks for that. Thank you, Ambassador. I think – I mean, as you know, from the UN’s perspective, the UN has a mandate to monitor and report through its human rights service in BINUH, and that is done extensively. Of course, there are restrictions, there are limitations, and colleagues work tremendously hard, together with civil society in Haiti, and it – and that is an absolute critical element of the work that we do. But it’s also been a critical element of the work that we’ve done with the MSS. We very much engage the MSS and the Haitian civil society collectively in the work that we’ve been doing and would aspire to do the same thing with the GSF. And of course, that has an ability to address issues from an accountability perspective, as well.
I don’t want to go into too many specifics, but certainly in the context of the use of force within Haiti, the UN, of course, doesn’t consider that anyone, you know, cannot be liable for their actions and be responsible in the context of the way in which their operations are conducted. And if issues are arising, and of course, reporting is being done on that, there are ways and means to address them, both within the Haitian system, but also externally, as well. And one of the issues I spoke to at the outset is this issue around the status of personnel who are deployed into Haiti, and this is an issue that is the subject of an agreement between the Haitian authorities and in the context of the MSS, with the six – five/six countries that contributed to the MSS. It will be the same, in many ways, in relation to the GSF, and would be the same for other external actors who come into to the country. And of course, as you know, there are other arrangements that are in place.
But I certainly agree, moving, you know, moving forward, the reporting that the human rights service has done will continue, the mandate has made that clear. There is also issues around the justice sector and issues around accountability, and for us, that doesn’t just mean issues on accountability for gang members or for Haitians or for – it’s a question of accountability writ large. And there are, of course, other levers that can be utilised in the context of the UN system more broadly, should issues arise, and certainly, we can look and explore some of those in detail.
Christopher Sabatini
My understanding, too, is part of the funding that Canada provided was to assist in maritime security, for example, and of course, you have now a US warship parked in the bay of Port-au-Prince, or co – off the coast of Haiti, too. I’ve lost track. The – what – you know, what is your sense of how that’s going to play into this and…?
Simon O’Connor
I mean, I think it – you know, it’s very clear that the occurrence of violence in Haiti is not simply limited to the borders of Haiti, of course. And there were discussions with regard to the MSS and a maritime contingent and those cond – those conversations, I am sure, will continue in terms of the pledges that have been made to the GSF in the context of the pledging conference that took place just before Christmas. And certainly, yeah, there needs to be an ability to ensure, and this goes to some of the points that Birte and Roberta have raised about ensuring that the GSF is deployed fit for purpose. And I think – I hope that’s part of the conversations that are going on within the Standing Group of Partners now in identifying what are the assets that are needed? You know, you do not need 5,000 troops of a single type. You need different kind of assets for different challenges…
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Simon O’Connor
…right? So, I think that is something that is critically important. We know, and of course, we worked extensively with the MSS, including with Kenya, before they deployed, and there is a question about ensuring that, yeah, there’s not just an uptake of whatever offers are made. There’s a very much clear, coherent strategy, and that goes to my earlier point that the Special Representative has to come up with an exit strategy. And that exit strategy has to be guided by the concept of operations for the GSF, properly drafted, and has proper assets and abilities to do that. And of course, part of the ability with the UN Support Office is the UN is able to provide some of those support functions in ways that others can’t.
Christopher Sabatini
Okay. I’m going to take a rapid-fire list set of questions here and also online, and we’ll just try to quickly answer them all. So, you’re next, sir, thank you for waiting.
Member
Yeah, this is [inaudible – 55:38], the legal representative of the University College of London. So, how can the international partners, such as the UN, support Haiti’s security and the recovery without substituting or awakening Haitian state institutions, or should there a line or a standard to be drawn between the assistance and the overreach? Thank you.
Christopher Sabatini
Good, thank you. Other hands, oh, Alex.
Karl-Philippe Alexis
Can you hear me?
Christopher Sabatini
Oh, yeah, for – yeah, right – it was here, Aiden, this gentleman here and then Alexandra, who you don’t know, but she’s that person right there.
Karl-Philippe Alexis
Yeah, hi. So, Karl-Philippe Alexis from Quisqueya University in Haiti. So, there’s this, I would say, perspective that we’re seeing with the US right now with the new administration, that they’re, kind of, rejecting what was done before and doing it their own way. How do we make sure that, with the midterms coming up and other things, that there’s not a reversal of the – their – the direction where things are going right now with the US?
Simon O’Connor
Yeah.
Christopher Sabatini
Sure. Let me just add a question on that, too, ‘cause it’s a question of the HOPE to HELP, for terror-free access to US markets of textiles that has now just been renewed for one year only. Another point, and that, you know, will obviously caught up in US domestic politics. Alex, please.
Alexandra Farsari
Well, hi, my name is Alexandra Farsari. I’m also a Researcher and co-author of the report. Obviously, so many questions, but my main question is of course, the main step forward to is to build that infrastructure and institutional capacity that sets Haiti apart from other countries in the region. So, what is the main step to ensure that such accountability infrastructure is built with the regional actors, with the political contributions, so you have that foundational step prior to the roadmap, as well?
Christopher Sabatini
Other questions. Okay, I’m going to go online and quickly rattle off a whole bunch here, and then I’m going to leave it to you to try to sort out the difference – the answers, ‘cause there’s some really good ones. One by the sched – Jamie Williamson says that he works on an – with an international – leads it, “international organisation that works on human rights and private security.” “What can be done in terms of working with UN Diplomats and business to,” if you will, “build in some safeguards for private security and also support the GSF and the UN going forward?” And “Has the Presidents of Vectus Global,” formerly known as Blackwater, right, is it, “has that blurred the issues?”
Another one asks, another – Michelet Romulus, asked about, “Is there a possibility of having a national forum to discuss a lot of these issues, to create the, sort of, buy-in and legitimacy and popular participation on that security plan?” I would also refer you, Michelet, to what’s going on with the Patriotic Congress, of which Karl Alexis is a part of, and which Carole Berotte has sent me a few e – me – questions here, reminding me that it’s actually ‘three ships’, not two. I stand corrected, Carole. If you know, Carole, she’s a strong personality, I mean that as a compliment. And then the issue from Marco Negrete, “How does transitional justice fit in?”
So, we’re going to go in reverse order, if we may. Roberta, do you want to start here?
Roberta Maggi
Yeah, absolutely, thanks a lot, Chris. So, I’ll say a couple of words on private security and a couple of words on the forum, if you’ll allow me. So, on private security in Haiti, this is an issue that we touched on in the roadmap, but we touch on it more in the bigger report that’s going to come out in the spring, and so, in there I authored a specific section on private security. But the key point here is that private security, in order to be beneficial to a transition, requires regulation and there’s a huge regulatory gap in Haiti at the moment because there is no legislature in Haiti that is capable of – that is empowered and capable of gathering and legislating on private security.
The arrival of Erik Prince definitely changes things up, because it makes that regulatory gap all the more important to fill. This is because of lessons learned from other contexts in the past, as well. But so, on private security, I would say yes, definitely there’s a role. Definitely there have been very positive examples of public-private partnerships in the past, but these only work when there’s proper regulation from a recognised legislature. And so, that’s why in the roadmap we also included an entire section on reactivating the legislature, having Parliamentary elections and what kind of legislative work can be done before the reactivation of Parliament and immediately after the reactivation of Parliament.
Regarding the national forum to create buy-in, first of all, Chris, I completely agree with you on hi – on spotlighting the fantastic work of the Kongré Patriyotik on this. I completely echo that sentiment, and I would say that a national conference in the same style as the Dominican Republic is something that can be done. It probably requires a champion that can be either someone internal to Haiti or someone external to Haiti, that would act as a neutral convenor only, or a facilitator. It doesn’t necessarily impact the work that can be done on trying to define priorities from a security and justice perspective, because one can be more political, as national conferences usually tend to be, and the other needs to be perhaps sometimes a bit more technocratic and a bit more, sort of, going into the nitty-gritty to lay the groundwork for implementation. But I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive and I do think that anyway, there’s going to have to be some kind of national forum for the political crisis and the legitimacy crisis that Haiti currently faces.
And so, on that note, Chris, unless there’s something else that you want me to address, I yield…
Christopher Sabatini
Okay.
Roberta Maggi
…the floor back to you.
Christopher Sabatini
Very good. So, thank you. Birte, your comments, reflections on all the questions we’ve heard, state capacity, issues of reintegration, issues of co-ordination, please.
Birte Julia Gippert
I think I’m going to have to be selective. I’m sorry, I can’t fit everything in.
Christopher Sabatini
That’s – no, that’s true, we’re running…
Birte Julia Gippert
We’re – okay.
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah, please.
Birte Julia Gippert
So, I think I’d like to combine two of the questions on accountability and state capacity, and I think it’s important to remember that Haitians have a par – very particular memory of past UK engagement and the lack of accountability.
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah.
Birte Julia Gippert
And this is not just limited to the use of force, although that’s one of it, but also, obviously, to the cholera outbreak. So, I think in any kind of UN engagement going forward, it’s really important that there’s a sense of how deployments are going to be accountable, particularly if they’re forceful, right, lethal force type engagements. And I think we can, sort of, differentiate the MINUSTAH period and, sort of, the stuff that happens 2004/2005, before the elections and afterwards, not just because the relationship with the government and the political compact, but also because there was a different use of force concepts in force. And we’ve seen in the early raids, quite high civilian death toll, without any sort of acknowledgement, really, a meaningful acknowledgement by the UN of the role it’s played.
And what – and there’s been, actually, a really good study published late last year that has looked, sort of, more widely into the use of force by the UN, and actually finds across a lot of missions, that there’s just simply not much of a procedural aspect to it about how force gets used, how the UN keeps tabs on its own forceful engagements and then reports and reflects on it. And I think that is something that, going forward, especially for forceful employments – deployments within the UN, would be really important, simply for an accountability and transparency point of view. So, I don’t know if that’s something that has been considered in the planning of the GSF, but certainly it’s something that we should be learning lessons from the past and also from other operations. I know in the DRC, a lot more has happened operationally on that.
With regards to transitional justice, I think this is the point where I flag to the roadmap, and I quite liked how you were thinking about it in terms of differentiating gang members, right? Because when we talk about gangs, we all, sort of, have this immediate thought about here’s a bad grown adult with a weapon threatening civilians, but of course, it’s way more complex than that. And the idea that there has to be a clear differentiation of almost, like, different layers of involvement, coerced versus voluntary, adult versus child, and a lot more nuance in between. It’s really important to think about how can we actually deal with this and how can we differentiate between the people who’ve committed crimes and the people who have committed crimes because crimes were committed against them at the same time?
And I think that is something that really needs to be a Haitian led, Haitian owned process, because the only criminal justice capacity within the country that has that legitimacy, or could potentially hold it, is the Haitian system. But here, it really comes back to who’s going to fund that. Even within MINUSTAH, penitentiary reforms were always the afterthought. I’ve spoken to quite a few people who were involved with it, who did brilliant work, but from a funding point of view, it was consider – it received considerably less than the operational support to the HNP. And I think this is where we really have learned across peacekeeping over the last 20 years, criminal justice is one system. It has to be integrated. It really makes no sense to fund the Police if you’re not funding the justice and penitentiary side of things. And then…
Christopher Sabatini
Okay…
Birte Julia Gippert
…one thing…
Christopher Sabatini
…let’s stop there ‘cause we’re – we got – poor Simon has one minute.
Simon O’Connor
No, that’s fine, because I totally echo the comments from Roberta and Birte. But I will try to be a bit sanguine, ‘cause…
Christopher Sabatini
Yeah…
Simon O’Connor
…I…
Christopher Sabatini
…I – that’s…
Simon O’Connor
…you know, we – in OHCHR we spent two years working with the MSS on precisely the issues around what’s called the compliance mechanism, which is called for in the Security Council Resolution, which is about preventing, addressing, investigating and reporting on violations. The first word of that is ‘prevention’ right? So, the deployment of a force is because there is a considered necessity for force to be used, right? The question is how do you calibrate that use of force? And that’s certainly the engagement we have and we will, if we’re asked, work directly…
Christopher Sabatini
That’s true.
Simon O’Connor
…and technically at a tactical level with the GSF and with the HNP, and that’s precisely what we’ve done with the MSS, in order to calibrate that issue on the use of force and other protection issues that are out there. Let’s be clear, there are a range of issues that are not just about the use of force when it comes to the presence of security forces.
So, you know, I would end up on that note, and I think, you know, the GSF, as I think I made the point earlier, is not intended to replace the HNP. Clearly, there is a stopgap question and there’s that ability for a force to deploy to create an environment conducive to a range of other issues and activities going on. And I agree entirely that the GSF does not operate in a vacuum. It operates on a spectrum and that spectrum covers a range of issues, including issues around accountability, and that accountability means issues around policing, justice and penitentiary. So, there are, yeah, a multitude of ways, the GSF will look to all of this, and our role in supporting the GSF will be in looking at the question of calibration of the conduct of their operations.
That is in the use of force, that is in a number of other issues, but equally, through the presence we have in BINUH and the human rights service, we will look to the broader questions around respect for human rights in Haiti.
Christopher Sabatini
Thank you. So, let me say a few things just in conclusion, very briefly. First, there’s obviously a lot to do, but I think we need to maintain a certain level of realism but optimism. We cannot throw up our hands, and Haiti extends to more than just the country of the tragedy of 11 million people. It is ex – an example of the breakdown of the international system, of multilateral system intended to respond to security crisis, to defend citizens’ rights, and a failure of that system to respond effectively and if you will, sort of, play catchup to all of the components and dimensions of the security crises.
It’s not just Haiti, but it also is not just the multilateral systems of the UN. It’s also the failure of development now, to be able to respond effectively to all the things that have to happen other – afterwards to make sure that securing Haiti and citizens’ lives and the economy is sustainable and it works, and we simply don’t see that. USAID has been dissolved, aid developed budgets have been cut across the board, who’s going to fill that gap? And this is one of the things we hope – and this project was funded in part, largely, by WK Kellogg Foundation. I want to thank them for their support for this. We hope to continue on this, ‘cause again, it – Haiti is essential. We care about this, but this is larger than Haiti and we need to understand. Whether it’s Sudan, Somalia, DRC, these are going to be issues of state collapse and failure and security crises that will – for which we’re no longer equipped as we were before. As imperfect as the responses may have been, we don’t have the answers now, given the current state.
I would also like to say there are other people working on this issue and Claudia’s here from the Florida International University, they also did their own roadmap. And I say that because, as I’ve been saying overall, if think tanks and others and NGOs are competing over this space to dominate this narrative, FIU is certainly not. In fact, I’m directing you to read their report as well, because if we are engaging in, sort of, petty discrepancies over who do – should do what and how we can argue this, we’re in the wrong business. So, I encourage you all to help, read, articulate, try to change the narrative, because this is, again, it’s more than just Haiti. It extends to Africa; it extends to the Middle East.
I want to thank you all for being here. I want to thank for Chatham House to actually engage in this topic. It was a new topic for Chatham House. I want to thank the Ambassador for coming and our friend of Chatham House, her husband, Stan, who would be here probably without the Ambassador, and I want to thank all of you. I want to thank the authors. We will have a longer report out on this soon. It’s a 20,000-word report, so we spared you that. This is only a discussion document based on deeper and longer and research that Roberta and Alexandra did. So, thank you all. The report is on the website. Think of it as a discussion document. Thank you for joining and please stay tuned. We hope to continue to work on this beyond just today. So, thank you all [applause].
