How can African institutions deliver in the Great Lakes peace process?

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Welcome, everyone, to this Chatham House Africa Programme webinar on, “How can African institutions deliver in the Great Lakes peace process?” My name is Joshua Walker, and I am the Director of Programs at the Congo Research Group at New York University.

Now, today’s webinar’s important in particular because of the rather unorthodox institutional configuration of the correct peace process in the Great Lakes. We have a US-led process between the DRC and Rwanda, a Qatar-led process between the DRC and the AFC and 23 rebel movements, albeit with substantial US support, and a supporting role being played currently by the African Union mediator, the Togolese President, Faure Gnassingbbé, who’s joined by five facilitators, all former African Heads of State or governments.

Now, I say unorthodox, because if we think back to, for instance, the role played by South Africa in the Sun City negotiations, or the ICGLR in the previous M23 crisis, this US/Qatar-led process is something that we haven’t seen in the region. And indeed, before early 2025, this current process was entirely African led. Angolan President João Lourenço had been mediating between the DRC and Rwanda under the auspices of the AU since 2022, until a planned peace agreement signature in December 2024 was derailed when Rwandan President Paul Kagame refused to attend the ceremony at the last minute. At the same time, there was an East African Community-led process between the DRC Government and Congolese armed groups, that had begun in 2022 under the leadership of then Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. But it, too, ultimately struggled and effectively ended in late 2023, as Congolese President Félix Tshisedkedi accused Kenyatta’s successor, President William Ruto, of, “Mismanaging the process.”

But beyond these political processes, over the last four years, the Eastern DRC has seen not one, but two regional peace operations. One led by the East African Community, which was asked to leave by President Tshisekedi following his disappointment that they hadn’t been more aggressive with the M23. And a second one led by the Southern African Development Community, which ultimately left after being defeated in the takeover of Goma in January 2025 by the M23 and Rwanda Defence Force. So, today, both of these are gone, everything has shifted and the question is, how and why did we get here and what role can African institutions play to advance the current process or set of processes?

So, to speak about these questions and more we have a superb set of panellists, and before I introduce them, I just want to remind everyone that this event will be held on the record. The Chatham House Rule will not apply. You can submit written questions through the Q&A box throughout the meeting, and we’ll select them and ask panellists some of these questions during the Q&A portion of the event. And I would just add, if you are directing this to a specific person, please ensure that you mention that in your question. If you want to post about this event on social media, the hashtag is #CHAfrica, and now I’d like to introduce our panellists.

First, we have Dr Paul-Simon Handy, who is the Regional Director – excuse me – for East Africa and Representative to the African Union at the Institute for Security Studies based in Addis Ababa. Dr Handy has held several positions, senior positions, since joining the ISS in 2007 and served on the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic from 2013 to 2019. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at Rhodes University in South Africa, and he previously held teaching positions at the Free University of Berlin, before serving as Associate Fellow with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin.

Our second panellist, Michel Noureddine Kassa, began his career in humanitarian work with Action contre la Faim and MSF, before a formative posting in South Africa during that country’s transition, from 1991 to 1994, where he engaged with a range of political actors, including people like F. W. de Klerk, to secure humanitarian protections and access. Subsequently, he was recruited by the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and he established a humanitarian co-ordination office, which was later formalised as an OCHA office, with ten sub-offices. And he conducted negotiations across the Congo wars to maintain civilian access and restore critical infrastructure, including air, rail and river connections. And then after spending two years at OCHA’s headquarters in Geneva, Michel left the UN to found an independent initiative in Kinshasa focused on cohesive leadership, spending two decades bringing together Congolese leaders and influencers at all levels, to foster dialogue and collaborative approaches to shared challenges. This initiative concluded in December 2025.

We’re also very lucky and grateful to Dr Emmanuel Makumba Mali, who is the Director of Democracy and Good Governance at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, ICGLR. His career in public policy and international relations has focused on promoting sociopolitical stability in the Great Lakes region, particularly through advocacy for good governance, mediation and conflict prevention. In his previous role as Director of Peace and Security at ICGLR, Dr Mali was instrumental in co-ordinating the establishment of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus, or EJVM+, under the Doha peace Framework.

And finally, we are also delighted to have Stephanie Wolters with us. She is a Senior Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs, focusing on geopolitics in the Great Lakes region. Stephanie also serves as a Director of Okapi Consulting, an organisation developing peacebuilding media in conflict zones. And she’s worked in the Great Lakes region since 1998, including as a Correspondent for the BBC, Reuters and The Economist, and as Chief News Editor of Radio Okapi. She specialised in conflict dynamics and political economy and has worked as a Researcher in more than 30 African countries.

So, really a stellar group of people today, and I want to turn to our panellists for about five minutes each and I want to start with you, Paul-Simon. I want to ask, can you explain to the audience here what has been the nature of the engagement by the African Union, as well as other regional bodies, over the last four years in this conflict? Why is it that the US and Qatar ended up, effectively, taking over this process last year, and where do we stand today in this process that ultimately combines a superpower, a middle power and African multilateral organisations?

Dr Paul-Simon Handy

Thank you very much, Joshua, and thanks to Chatham House for putting together this impressive panel. To answer your question, I would like to say three thing. Maybe short input about the background of the involvement of African multilateral institutions in the Great Lakes peace process. Maybe do a – one or two minutes assessing the co-ordination efforts between what appears to be rather regional competitors than regional organis – regional economic communities. And then I will end with some lessons I think that we have learned, or are still learning, because the process is ongoing, on mediation in the Great Lakes, but also lessons that could be of use for other conflicts in Africa.

I mean, you’ve mentioned the process of – the – namely, the involvement of African organisations in the last four years and the role, the critical role they have been playing in the conflict the Eastern DRC and the Great Lakes. Initially, it was rather bilateral, each organisation dealing with actors. It was disjointed as approach, but then it slowly got better co-ordinated, even though the results were struggling to emerge. We should also say that the conflict has often outpaced the institution designed to prevent, resolve and manage the various dimensions of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. In fact, one of the biggest problem we’ve often had with mediators is, given this complex and protracted nature of the conflict, often we ask the question, “What is exactly the conflict that – or the crisis that mediators are actually mediating about?”

So, we had this process that you mentioned. The East African Community having a two-pronged approach, rather proactive, but that failed, for the reason you mentioned. The host government was at odd with the East African Community’s approach. They had a mediation process, facilitation process, but also a coercive process, a capacity to coerce actors into abiding by the political progress that was made. And then, SADC, the Southern African Development Community mission, SAMIDRC, was deployed on the footsteps of the EACRF exit in December 2023.

But the force, as we know, they lacked – they didn’t have a political process, just like EACRF had, SADC didn’t have a political process, but they also lacked adequate capability and cohesion between even member states of SADC. This led to the exit approximatively 12 weeks after the fall of Goma and Bukavu. And we also had some ICGLR AU anchored Rwanda process, led by President João Lourenço, and as you pointed out, Joshua, it failed in August 2024, although there was a ceasefire agreement.

So, the difficulties faced by regional organisation and actors in Africa, against the backdrop of regional competition and military defeat, because there was also military defeat, led to the involvement of the AU, alongside the EAC and SADC. So, how did the AU co-ordinate it and cohabitate it with international actors? So, the co-ordination of the AU was a bit difficult. The regional efforts really intensified mid to late 2025 and the merger of the two efforts by – of the efforts by the two regional economic communities, EAC and SADC, was formalised in August 2025 in Nairobi with the appointment of the five Panel of Facilitators, ex-Presidents Obasanjo, Kenyatta, Masisi, Sahle-Work of Ethiopia and Samba Panza of the Central African Republic. And were all working under the mediator, the main mediator of the AU, President of Togo, Faure Gnassingbé.

But once put in place, the mediation architecture appeared to be more confusing than anything else to – for all involved actors and this made it easier, actually, for all non-African actors to deepen their involvement. So, while Africa was still building the architecture for co-ordination, Washington and Doha were closing deals. And we know very much the Declaration of Principles, the Washington Peace Agreement and the Washington Accord signed by the Presidents in December 2025. However, the ceasefire is still fragile. The M23 problem is not resolved. The African architecture is in place, but underused, underutilised, despite the effort that were made, particularly after the January 2026 meeting in Lomé that was designed to consolidate African coherence. There has been much progress, but the results are slow to come.

So, what lessons? And I will end with that. What lessons can we draw from this process? I will name five lessons. The first one is that in reality, the difficulties faced by the Great Lakes mediation process are rather symptomatic of the crisis of mediation worldwide and the transactionalist term that mediation has taken. Dealmaking is being used as a strategic tool to get results, but partial results, and this leads me to the second lesson is that what we see, observing mediation processes across the world, the era, maybe, of comprehensive peace agreements seems to be coming to an end, but it also correlates with the downfall of UN multidimensional missions. What we see is that small and issue-based agreements are progressively replacing comprehensive peace agreements. I can come back to that.

The third lesson we can learn from it is that we need to avoid the bureaucratisation trap. We observe that the AU has recorded more successes in the past when it didn’t have a dedicated mediation division. Since the AU has it, results have been slow to materialise. It’s not just the AU’s fault. Of course, the nature of conflict is changing and the context – the global context is also playing a role, but substance should actually take precedence over architecture. That is another lesson.

So, the fourth lesson is that the principle of subsidiarity has not really proven efficient in the Great Lakes region. Indeed, the region has no dedicated regional economic community in the strict sense, but it has the ICGLR, which could have been the equivalent of the Helsinki Process in Europe, assuring into co-operative security. But African member states do not always provide their regional organisations with a minimum of resources to discharge their respective mandates.

And the last lesson is bridging the legitimacy gap. It is often said that the AU provides political legitimacy to mediation processes if – even when they are led by external actors. But we should distinguish between input legitimacy and output legitimacy. For the moment, the AU has invested more in input legitimacy. As the result, input legitimacy meaning partic – AU has been particularly trying to be on the table and involved in processes. But the AU has been relatively weak in output legitimacy as the result of being involved has not always translated in better output. The AU and African multilateral organisations have been claiming a space that they didn’t sufficiently occupy in the specific case of the mediation process in the Great Lakes region. Thank you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Paul-Simon. There’s a lot to discuss there and I think we’ll have a chance to do that, but I want to move to our next speaker now. Now, Michel, you’ve spent much of your career working on local mediation and local peacebuilding processes in the DRC and, you know, one of the criticisms of the current process, and I think this is a criticism of many peace processes, is that it doesn’t pay enough attention to the, sort of, specificities of local conditions on the ground. So, how – can you explain how these, kind of, high-level processes, be they AU-led or led by Washington and Doha, how can and should these high-level processes interact with and take into account the grassroots local level peacebuilding that you’ve worked on during your career?

Michel Noureddine Kassa

Thank you, Joshua. I hope I will not disappoint you by being very elusive to the processes and focus on the concrete aspects of the question. I will focus on one concrete case that is key to building some form of stability in Congo, in my view. All that in the hope of raising your attention to three notions that in the way that they are practised, reflect the gap between local, national, regional and pan African approach to crisis, and these are sovereignty, legitimacy and leadership. Apologies in advance for just scratching the surface.

The first, the example is very concrete, it’s Uvira, one of the epicentres of DRC’s crisis, home to all the communities of southern South Kivu. It’s also a typical hub for smuggling the region’s resources. It epitomises the country’s problems. Both the political and military authorities are somewhat overwhelmed by local armed groups exerting a mix of violent anarchy and extreme tribal polarisation. Sorry for being a bit quick, because I’m a bit worried about Joshua’s stick.

In late October 2025, a small-scale NG – international NGO and local actors of the civil society held two retreats back-to-back. First, four days of conversation between influential local figures of all communities, with a view to rebuilding confidence. The exchanges were – produced – they took – it took place without complacency, there – those exchanges, and yet, with a great deal of good faith. I’ll cut short that one and get directly to the second retreat immediately after, the day after the end of the first retreat. That it placed all these participants, those local actors, in front of the Governor, FARDC Officers and top-ranking officials, who came from Kinshasha, the Secretary General of Interior and Security and the Special Advisor to the Vice Prime Minister. Also were present tens of Wazalendo representatives. So, you see the picture.

For the first time while the war was on with the AFC, local populations of Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga, represented by influential local figures, civil society, local fonctionnaire, were able to state in no uncertain terms and without the political – the Politicians of Kinshasa behind them, their grievances to the state and to the polarising armed groups treated by – sometimes by the public opinion as patriotic actors, as a way of containing their influence on the ground. It was an occasion, as well, for many to say that simple truth, every community of South Kivu has some notabilities collaborating with the AFC. In other words, there’s no community as such can – that can be labelled 100% patriotic. Meanwhile, just like in 2012, are many, for example, Banyamulenge Soldiers fighting the AFC on the frontline, with the AFRDC, while many other comm – local communities prefer to keep their children as defence community groups, away from national cohesion and from the national army.

So, we see here a notion and practice of patriotism from different angles in a way that is seldom discussed in national and multilateral processes. In other words, these actors brought together last October in Uvira, they – where they were beginning to chart a path towards what has always been promoted in frameworks and agreements of Doha, Washington, Addis, Nairobi, getting to the core of stakeholders’ perception and interest, exchanging without intimidation, bringing to account all levels of influence and decision-making instances, and especially the central state. But also, the notabilities based in Kinshasa or the diaspora, the [terror or the finance? – 22:33], in other words, the Mafia connections exerting the moto-péage.

Was there a follow-up at Kinshasa level? Quite little and to be fair, the AFC M23 offensive in December dashed most of the dynamic. But at least the state has regained some form of authority and legitimacy vis-à-vis the armed groups that are there in South Kivu. And also, it was clear to all in October that this could be a reset moment for all categories of actors without – towards the rule of law and national cohesion, a real one. Was there any mark of interest from regional instances? No. Have we contacted the African Union, the ICGLR? No and we should have, as we did, for example, with Ambassador Mulamula back in 22 – 2008 in Goma. But one issue with regional and multilateral instances is their fear of that upsetting the member states, while we try our best to de-intimidate the exchanges for the sake of peace dynamics. And also, by the way, Doha, Washington, which for a number, to paraphrase Mr Henry.

Now let’s get to the more construction aspect of the question, how – when should local processes be integrated into the broader framework, national, regional and international? At least three challenges of – or opportunities are at play when it comes to integrating local players, local issues in – and local issues in highly exposed gatherings. Those are sovereignty or national pride, leadership and how this notion is perceived and identification of stakeholders and participants in peace processes.

From a personal experience in real life, I’m inclined to think that these three notions much too often become tools that effectively contribute to keep away local players and to dilute their inputs, their specific dimension in peace processes. Let me elaborate on that quickly. This is where…

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

One minute.

Michel Noureddine Kassa

…the notions of priority, low legitimacy and leadership play their part for the better or for the worse. What is the – addressing the question should derive, what do we get in integrating grassroots actors in the conversation, and how and when? Addressing this question should derive from another question, which is, are the interest of grassroots people in Eastern DRC well understood and integrated in their social complexity by the Congolese delegates in regional/global meetings? The answer is not often, because of the ways by which the delegates are identified and selected in general. Not often, also, because of the choice of delegate is part of a sovereign package. I’ll get back to that maybe in the discussions.

This reality leads us to the conundrum of how representative, informed, constructive are the notabilities of Kivu provinces established in Kinshasa or in the diaspora? In their view, what is legitimate, what is not about the crisis, in their – in DRC, in their province of origin? What – how do they juggle between their loyalties vis-à-vis DRC, their community of origin, their approach to violent options versus negotiated compromises? In response to crisis, how rigid or flexible is their reading of the region’s history? How do they juggle between the imperatives of territorial integrity by any means possible, the interaner – the international humanitarian principles, the need to serve for long-term reassurance and commitments between communities?

And maybe I’ll get to the – since the minute is gone, I need to wrap up and conclude. This is where the pieces of the puzzle can be put together. Authorities, civil society, practitioners, should see the domestic part of the process as the most crucial, legitimate and impactful one. All too often I’ve seen members of the civil society more interested in getting exotic invitations overseas than joining us in the field. The central state that – likewise the civil society and the notabilities and diaspora, must first listen to local voices and that includes local armed groups of all communities, of course. Let them express their frustrations and pains. Pay it back to their respective bed, enable them to reassure one another and most importantly, perhaps, listened with most interest to their joint agreements of all these communities between – because these joint agreements incarnate the most precious part – the most precious asset. It’s a cohesive local leadership

And as – and thereafter only, can there be a more self-assured DRC delegation ready for candid discussions and negotiations at regional and multilateral level. This is a, kind of, third path, quite comparable to the one described for Lebanon today in the daily L’Orient-Le Jour between Hezbollah and Israel. I’ll stop there. I hope I’ll – I’ve been understood, because I’ve cut short some parts of my presentation.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Michel, and I – yeah, I hope we can return to some of the things you raised. I mean, in particular, I think the question about lack of follow-up by Kinshasa, about the way that these processes sometimes make both the lack of follow-up, but in particular the lack of follow-up at the national, and that link between the national and the local level, you know, is often overlooked, I think, particularly at these high – in these high-level processes that we’re dealing with at the moment.

I want to turn now to Emmanuel. Now, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or ICGLR, has of course, played an important role in the conflict resolution in the Great Lakes over many years, particularly with the Extended Joint Verification Mechanism. And recently, the Extended Joint Verification Mechanism Plus was finally formally adopted by the DRC Government and the AFC M23 as part of the Doha Framework, bringing together the protocol on a ceasefire. And so, from your perspective, sitting in the ICGLR, what – can you tell us about the state of implementation of the EJVM+, what its challenges are and what role, more broadly, you see the ICGLR being able to play in the current institutional configuration of the peace process [pause]?

You’re on mute.

Dr Emmanuel Makumba Mali

Thank you very much, Josh, for that particular question and also, thank you to the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the invite, and also, delighted to meet the famous speakers and also, thank those who have spoken before me for their insightful understanding of the situation we are in.

So, before I go straight to your answer, I would like just to give a context of where we are coming from and how ICGLR position itself in the crisis. As you have ably mentioned, Josh and fellow – my other speakers, this conflict spans for more than three decades in the region. It’s very complex and one of the protracted crisises in Africa. We are looking at over 120 armed – active armed groups in the east end of DRC, namely Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, and we also have some cross-border armed groups also operating in the same area. This has led to more than seven million internally displaced people and of which, five million are from the Eastern DRC.

The ICGLR as an institution has its backing from as way back as 2000, with its protocols being signed in 2006 to establish all these institutions, and our role since then, we have been very active. We have a history of finding ourselves and also trying to resolve similar disputes, not very complicated as the one we have, but we are very active in the Burundi crisis. We are also very active in the initial Sudan crisis, South Sudan, Central African Republic, which is just having a lot of process at the moment. And in the DRC, we have our involvement since the crisis in 2012/2013, when the first M23 crisis emerged.

We are signatories to the Peace and Security Cooperation Framework, and we also have institutions which are right now, in Goma we have the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre. We also have the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, which you mentioned, and I wish to state that under the Doha Process, yes, ICGLR has been very active to ensure that we have a framework to monitor the ceasefire. And I wish to add that this was not an accident per se, because we had meetings starting from last year in November at the Summit of ICGLR, which was held in Kinshasa, where the Ministers of Defence pronounced themselves that ICGLR has to engage with all parties to the crisis in the Eastern DRC. And hence, we had to start the processes of engaging, which led to the development of the MoU and terms of reference of our engagement between M23 and the DRC Government.

Our – on the 2nd of February, we had the terms of reference endorsed and most recently in Geneva, we had the MoU between ICGLR, the Government of DRC and AFC M23, where we signed an MoU of how we are going together to monitor the ceasefire, under the framework of the Expanded Joint Verification Plus. The Plus itself does not take away the fact that our initial and our designed EJVM still exists, but the Plus comes with regards to where the monitoring of the ceasefire has been done, which is mainly in the east end of DRC. And the Plus involves the bringing in of other partners, observers, the African Union, Qatar, the US Government, AFC M23 and MONUSCO. So, that is the configuration.

With regards to progress, I think they are early days, but I can confidently say that the meetings we have had under the Oversight Verification Mechanism, OCVM, have been positive, because parties have been able to engage, have been able to highlight areas of consent and jointly agree on how to move forward. That alone provides a platform for dialogue, for understanding and also, brings in an element of consistency from the parties. The presence of Doha – the presence of the Qatar Government, the presence of the US Government, also brings in a leverage which we have used at ICGLR to ride on and also has provided a platform for co-ordination of these activities.

So, with regards to where we are coming from, I think it’s early days. There are lessons which we have learnt along the way. I think the Doha Platform provides and helps us have a strong co-ordinated and complementary medication process. It has also been able to recognise and utilise existing platforms, like the EJVM. It has not gone, like in the other old processes [audio cuts out – 36:13] where the new platforms are developed, but it has insisted on using the existing regional platforms. That has also revitalised and re-engaged ICGLR into the discussions and placed at the centre. It has also recognised the platform of having the African Lake process, because Togo also sits in the OCVM as an observer and also provides the platform the African Union.

With regards to participation of civil society and local institutions, I think that’s one area which I agree with my previous speaker, Michel. I think there is a room and there’s room for that, but I think what was more important then was to have, first and foremost, an institution which is recognised, accepted by both parties, but now we have that, we have to move this and how do we bring in those parties now to ensure that the local voices are heard?

As ICGLR, we have our own programmes which are meant to ensure that communities are knowledgeable of the EJVM. In March, we undertook a mission to Uvira with our colleagues from MONUSCO, where we are going to explain what EJVM+ is, what it intends to do and the mechanism around that. And we had a discussion with community leaders, government leaders, civil society leaders, private sector, religious leaders, youth groups, for two days, just to explain what EJVM is, its mandated role and how – and also, soliciting support form the communities to provide all necessary information to ensure that EJVM is a success.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

One minute, Doctor.

Dr Emmanuel Makumba Mali

Yes, and I was finishing. I think going forward, what is important is to ensure that working with our international partners, there’s need for us to continue leveraging on them, continue calling for more dramatic pressure from them, political support and financial support, they’re very key. For us as a regional order, we recognise that international partners are important. However, if you have to have sustainable peace, it – the onus is on ICGLR to ensure that it’s able to maintain and utilise its regional legitimacy and also push for local ownership. But over and above, I think these are early days. What is key now is that the mechanism is accepted by both parties, both parties are on the table, and we are agreeing on how to move forward as a unit and – which is more fundamental and I think a point of departure from most of the initiatives we had in the past. I thank you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Emmanuel, and I’m going to want to return in a little bit to this question of how leverage works and how the, sort of, setup works with the different observers in the EJVM+. But I want to turn now to Stephanie. So, Stephanie, as I said in the introduction, you’ve long been a key observer of the DRC in regional politics and geopolitics. So, I’m wondering if you can give us a – zoom in a little bit on the inter-regional and intraregional politics and rivalries that have shaped the M23 crisis, as well as these various African institutional responses to it,

Stephanie Wolters

Well, thanks, Joshua, that’s a very, very big question and I have five minutes. But I think it’s the right question, though, because I was going to work my way towards saying that I think the thing that’s missing and the thing – the aspect of this conflict that – where I see regional organisations and also, the African Union having a complementary and leading role, is the Regional Dialogue, the regional peace process. We don’t’ have a regional peace process. That to me is the piece that is missing here. And if we are to try and rehabilitate, and I do put it that way, the East African Community’s past efforts and the SADC’s efforts and get them to be useful, rather than just joining an architecture for the sake of being associated with it, I think that that’s an opening that is there and ready for the taking. And not just ready for the taking, but crucial to some kind of longstanding peace.

And you asked the question, I mean, what are the regional rivalries? I mean, we’re looking today at a con – we’re – at the – you know, how do we – what are we even talking about today? What was the diagnosis that the East African Community and SADC made when they went in there? They went – you know, they went in to address a particularly acute crisis, the M23 taking vast amounts of territory over a certain period of time. It was isolated as something that was largest Rwandan driven relatively early on. Of course, that – you know, acknowledging that depended on which regional body you were in.

But for all intents and purposes, we’ve ignored a lot of the other relationships in this region in our analysis and in our approach to how to resolve the M23, but the greater – bigger Great Lakes conflict. I mean, there’s the dynamic between Rwanda and Uganda. Not very long ago those two countries weren’t even speaking. They were originally co-sponsors of the M23, under Tshisekedi, after his initial, sort of, overtures to the region to try and recalibrate that relationship and put it on a better footing after that failed. The relationship with Uganda got much better and Uganda got more, sort of, out of Kinshasha, including joint military operations and joint road products and so on, than Rwanda got out. And this is one of the key triggers of the conflict that we’re in the sixth year of, and yet, we don’t have that as part of a conversation in conjunction with all of these other efforts, and I think that’s pretty fundamental.

I mean, obviously, we had, between the East African Community, which became the first regional economic community to actually include all the Great Lakes countries, and which went in for many of its own reasons. And I think the motivations for why these regional bodies got involved is really important, too, because ultimately, the kind of motivations led to the kinds of withdrawals that we saw from them, as well. So, that lack of staying power over the misunderstandings that led to the end of their military missions.

So, the East African Community, I think, wanting to go in there and do a quick job of things, mixing up a little bit on the political side, you know, M23, but all the other armed groups. Was the Nairobi Process ever really going to work? What was it going to address? And how was that going to work at a time when there was a massive escalation of military engagement in the east led by the M23, which actually galvanised many of the armed groups which might otherwise have participated in Nairobi? So, where did that analysis come from? Why was that the motivation? And obviously, we know that that didn’t work. I think also the misunderstanding about, you know, what exactly was the mandate? Was – if you look behind the, you know, behind the façade, it’s obviously the East African Community having a difficulty going head-on with Rwanda, its own member state. I mean, this puts it in an extremely awkward position.

SADC then comes in, I think does an equally superficial analysis of the actual depth and nature of the problem. Also, I think Russia’s in fairly quickly. Motivation is, you know, defence of a member state, but underestimates, in my view, the M23, dramatically underestimates Rwanda. South Africa, I think didn’t quite take the measure of just how antagonistic Rwanda was to having SADC in its backyard and to having SADC dealing with a conflict which Rwanda very much wants to control and wants to control that region. Which is, you know, why it didn’t want to lose control over the EAC process.

So, South and SADC, I think underestimating what they were walking into and ultimately, walking away from the situation, granted, of course, after a military defeat, but without acknowledging that that’s why they left. You know, the – SADC – I mean, the South African President goes to Parliament and says, “We can leave now because there’s actually peace in Eastern DRC.” I mean, nothing could’ve been further from the truth, and so, I think, you know, these two efforts to go into the DRC – and you rightly point out that actually, until last year, you know, this was all African-led. I mean, the AU was certainly behind the curve, but nobody else was putting in the kind of effort that these two regional bodies put in with two big military forces. I mean, it was massive, right?

But I think a lot of mistakes were made and a lot of the things that hold back African peace a peak – peace efforts, you know, an unwillingness to, kind of, diagnose the problem holistically, but also to speak the hard truths, was definitely at the heart of some of that. So, I’m getting a look from you that I think I might need to finish, or do I still have a minute or two? I can’t hear you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Say…

Stephanie Wolters

I’ll…

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

…a minute and a half.

Stephanie Wolters

Okay, so, I mean, you know, what – I mean, if we’re trying to figure out what the utility is, you know, what were the principles? What are the norms that these two bodies were trying to address when they went into Eastern DRC? I think, you know, we had side taking. In the end, we had SADC completely collapsing its view of the conflict. It had gone in, sort of, diagnosing very clearly the role that Rwanda and the RDF were playing, and it then gets militarily defeated, humiliated and all sorts of other things. And then, kind of, switches over into a much more neutral language and aligns itself with the East African Community.

And the few things that I’ve seen coming out of SADC and the EAC, the summit they held in February last year, the first joint summit, you know, the – at the time, they were saying, “Let’s merge Rwanda with Nairobi.” And then they also, actually, even flagged the idea of a possible AU hybrid force, and neither one of those things have happened. I don’t think we need any more military forces in the Eastern DRC, just for the record, so that probably wouldn’t have been a good idea, but in my view, they’re really trying – they’re running after the conflict.

And I think that the one thing we don’t have is time. We also don’t have a lot of progress on the implementation of Washington or on Doha. We don’t even have a signature for Doha, and so many things that still remain unaddressed, I think. And so, what we really need are efforts that are going to address the things that haven’t been addressed, and I think there are a lot of them. Like I said in the beginning, the regional dynamics, the dynamics between Burundi-Rwanda, Rwanda-Uganda, Uganda – you know, I mean, it’s – these are – it’s hard for me to understand why we’re not already doing that. But I think that is a place where African regional economic communities and the AU can play a really important role and that’s a whole new process which addresses many of the things that aren’t being addressed in the other dialogues. So, thank you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Stephanie, and there’s some interesting overlap with – between your comments and those of Paul-Simon, really all of the panellists. So, before we get to some of the questions in the Q&A, I had a few follow-ups, and I guess, very quickly, Paul-Simon, I wanted to ask, well, you mentioned at one point that you felt that the African architecture was being ‘underutilised’. And so, I wanted to know what you meant by that, but secondly, if you can – and very briefly, you know, as you sit in Addis Ababa, of course, you know, the Great Lakes is one conflict or a conflict system among several on the African Continent today. It’s Sudan, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and so, how does the particular approaches that we see to the Great Lakes, how do those differ from, or how are they similar to, you know, sort of, the way that the AU and other regional bodies are approaching conflict on the continent?

Dr Paul-Simon Handy

Yeah, no, thanks for that. Then, on your question of the architecture being underutilised, I think the short answer was – could be that it was underutilised because it was inefficient. But it has taken quite a long time, but now, we, at least, have an architecture. Now we need to fill it with substance, with strategy. But I’m just afraid that – and I’m not sure what exactly is the crisis that this architecture intends to solve. Because there’s several layers and dimensions of the crisis in the East – in the Great Lakes, and Stephanie insisted on the regional dimension, actually, that the Peace Security and Cooperation Framework was supposed to be addressing. But we’ve – unity of purpose in mediation is actually quite important. Else mediators – I mean, there’s a saying today that “Mediation is being transactional,” but in reality, even the actors who are being mediated are also transactional and know very well how to forum shop.

Coming to you – your other question about difference, maybe, between the DRC process and other involve – and other crisis in which the AU and other – and regional economic communities are involved. Well, the cri – the conflict in the Great Lakes has been there forever, for 30 years. There have been many instances of involvement, disengagement, reinvolvement and so on and so forth. I mean, Michel was alluding to a phase where he was saying that sometimes, he look at – he looks at what is happening now and it reminds me of something that happened 20 years ago.

So, we are in this cycle of a repeated moment in the crisis in the Great Lakes. Now the AU, together with regional economic communities, have developed tools to engage in the Great Lakes region, or at least not in the Great Lakes region, in the crisis in the Eastern DRC. There’s a difference, because the Great Lakes region’s crisis is for the moment being a bit neglected, unfortunately. So – but those tools are cohabitating and sometimes competing with the – with external processes. So, external processes, or external actors have some leeway that the AU and regional economic communities don’t have. Particularly, they have leverage, so they can coerce belligerents into the negotiating table, what the AU has not been able to do.

So, belligerents rather go to those or are forced to go to those and can afford ignoring African own processes. So, it’s also the question of how much member states, how much African actors, respect their own organisations and their own processes. Because the delegitimization of those processes starts with the little importance, that significance that African actors provide them.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Paul-Simon. That actually dovetails well with a point I wanted to raise with Emmanuel, which is specifically that you, you know, you mentioned that the leverage provided by the US in Qatar has been a help to the EJVM+ and to the ICGLR. But can you explain a little bit more about how that works and how, in particular, you entail that leverage working on the ground? You mentioned there would be US and Qatari par – and MONUSCO participation of the – as observers, at least, or I guess in MONUSCO’s case, as a participant in the ceasefire observations. So, how does this, sort of, new combination of leverage from outside work with ICGLR processes?

Dr Emmanuel Makumba Mali

[Pause] Thank you very much, Josh, and thank you, Handy, for that question. I think the involvement of Doha, of the invo – or involvement in Doha Process and also having the US and Qatar working with the ICGLR, has led to some progress on the ground. I think if you look at the chronology of what happened when Goma fell and also, in December, we had Uvira also being taken and also, the announcement that there was a withdrawal. I think there was a lot of negotiations behind the façade which was not brought to the media, but we know very well that the US Government and Doha really brought the parties to say there’s this process. If there’s a challenge, if one feels that the other party is not adhering to what has been agreed, you have to right to bring the other party – come to the table and address those matters.

Also, the – actually, the acceptance and also, the signing of the MoU itself really show that this is different. The MoU provide – establish a formal framework for collaboration between ceasefire monitoring and verification under the pro – under the Doha Process. It also, for the first time, provides a body, a neutral body, a non-military body, let’s say, to provide a factual situation what is happening. Where both parties at the same time are able to see the same things and report, and that helps us to move away from the back and forth. And because of the presence of the party of Qatar and the Washington, the significance of the whole process becomes huge, and it provides a framework to seek readdress, timely. It also provides a framework to monitor in real time if parties are adhering to what has been agreed.

Well, there is a question if this – if – is the region missing in all this, that there’s no regional process? There’s also – there’s on international track. I think I beg to differ, because we, as in ICGLR, have – are able to say confidently that there is a regional process going on and there is also – I – it – continental process going on. As we speak now, ICGLR is busy co-ordinating and organising, together with the African Union, the visit of two eminent former Presidents, members of the panel, to Goma and Bukavu for humanitarian and also to ensure that civil society organisation are involved in the process. I can confidently say that Her High Excellency Madame Samba will be travelling to Goma and Bukavu. I can comfortably say that His Excellency Masisi visited Bujumbura to engage with stakeholders on the ground in the region. He has also planned to visit Uvira and Goma soon and he’s working with ICGLR and all the stakeholders in the region.

So, there is a regional approach, there is a continental approach and there is also, a lessons learned why we have five members of the panel and why Togo is also on – leading the process. There is – there are lessons learnt and the complex is not a one track. It is very complex. There are issues to do with national resources. There are issues to do with cross-border movements. There are issues to do with legitimate ethical and ethnic issues. So, there are issues to do with governance issues. So, the multiplicity of issues makes the process complex, and it requires a non-linear process. It requires a multipath process and what is key in this sense is, how do we then co-ordinate ourselves?

And I think the African-led process provides a co-ordinated approach. Maybe there could be areas of capacity. There will be areas of parties within the Secretary being overwhelmed, but the structures are there. Maybe what is needed is to sit down to reflect how do we further strengthen them? But there als – there is also a process of ensuring that parties are well informed of what is happening under one leadership, which is the President of Togo providing that leadership. So, the processes are there. The regional architecture is there. The continental framework is there. I think what is missing, or what can be improved on, is co-ordination of these efforts and also, finding a niche for private sector, finding a niche for civil society change groups and also local actors, which Kass mentioned, can also be a process we develop together to include them.

For civil soci – for ICGLR, we have our own platforms. We have the Youth Forum, which is also working around the issue of I – youth peace and security. We have the Women Regional Forum, which is also there and the civil society forums. Maybe the issue is how do we revitalise and capitalise these processes and their involvement in these processes? So, from my end, I think we can leverage what the international law process brings, but the ownership and legitimacy is with the region, I submit.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much, Emmanuel. I want to quickly – before we get into the questions in the Q&A, I want to – I have one or two other quick questions, but I’ve – I acknowledge that they’re big questions. And Michel, this one is for you and it’s a bit provocative, okay? So, you know, one of the things that you pointed out in your presentation, which I think is really interesting, is that we know that beyond the regional dimension and the international dimension of this conflict, there’s also a national problem in terms of the understanding of some of the local conditions in places where conflict is occurring by Kinshasa, right? You asked – you’ve said are these actors ‘well understood’ by Kinshasa? ‘Not often’.

Now, I want to bridge that with something else that’s being talked about a lot in the DRC these days, which is the idea of a National Dialogue. Now, a National Dialogue, you know, I think in the sceptics’ view, is going to be just another opportunity for, kind of, a redistribution of the, kind of, the national cake, as it were, you know, a redistribution of posts, as we’ve seen in the past. But I want to – from your pers – point of view, from your perspective, if you were designing a National Dialogue in the DRC, taking into account all of these, you know, kinds of subtleties that you were alluding to, how would you structure a dialogue like that to make it meaningful and not just be an elite captured process?

Michel Noureddine Kassa

Thank you, Joshua. I think…

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

You’ve got two minutes.

Michel Noureddine Kassa

Oh, alright. We have a whole set of memories and past experiences over the past 30 years of attempts to bring together the Congolese, public opinion, to – and to try and find a minimum level of cohesion in such a vast country and of – and then, within an array of opinions. And I think the one case to – was to me, a good trial, it was the regional conferences, the Provincial Conferences that Laurent-Désiré Kabila tried to set up 28 years ago during that E – that AFDL war. And I think the good point that he thought of a bottom-approach, by which the local communities, the local society – civil society, would, as I said before, would be de-intimidated and get to the core of their local problems. And I would say be a bit more precise on what they expect from the state, from the central state. Probably be a bit more concrete on what decentralisation would mean.

The problem that we had then, and we still have today, is that the de-intimidation – de – non-intimidating setup or framework is still something that I have not witnessed most of the time, especially when it’s made in a quite institutional way. The dialectic between institutions and informal dynamics in Congo is still something that needs to be worked out and I think we get back to the terms I had mentioned before, legitimacy. Who’s got the legitimacy? This is a question that has been raised almost everywhere in Congo since 1960 and it’s still something that is in – an extremely dangerous tool, also. Because sometimes people can get to a very sensible solutions, but if some other groups find themselves – do not, as we say in Kinshasa, do not find themselves in the solution, they might create – they might delegitimise those solutions in the eyes of the public opinion, depending on their ability to influence the public opinion, to get close to the decisionmakers and so on.

So, the two minutes are gone, but I would say it should start from a local perspective and we are – we should still find a way of getting together the institution. Without the state, it’s pointless to organise anything. With the state, there’s some understanding that needs to be done between local actors and central actors, as well, and the state, so that the conversation is fair and free.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thanks, Michel. I’m going to now take some of the questions from the Q&A, but Stephanie, I’m going to start with you, since I didn’t ask you a follow-up. And this one comes from Omar El-Sisay, who’s asking, “How do you perceive the Great Lakes process to advance in a situation marred by a critical lack of trust between regional actors?” And I think, you know, part of that is also, I think, you know, what is the future of something like the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework? You know, you said that there wasn’t actually – I mean, I think if you speak with people say in the UN Special Envoy’s Office in Nairobi, they would say, well, there is actually a regional peace effort that’s ongoing, which is the Addis Ababa Framework agreement, which still exists.

So, how do you, sort of, diminish lack of trust between regional actors and re-dynamize regional efforts?

Stephanie Wolters

Yeah, thank you, Josh. I also would just want to say quickly to Dr Mali that I think he misunderstood me. I wasn’t saying that the AU facilitation wasn’t working. I was saying that there’s no regional peace process, and by that, I mean a discussion between regional Heads of State in the Great Lakes.

And to your question, Josh, I think that, you know – and I, you know, I know well the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, and I think on paper in 2013, and even beyond paper, that was a very, very useful tool. But it never became the convening forum, it never became the discussion forum that it was meant to be, and I think that is because fundamentally, there wasn’t a commitment to letting go of the interests that drive conflict in the Great Lakes. And the PSC Framework couldn’t compel people to walk away from their interests. And in fact, none of the regional organisations or the regional – or the peace process we – or processes we’ve had, have ever compelled anybody to fundamentally change how they interact with the DRC and how they pursue their myriad interests, whether they’re economic, political, security or whatever, in the Eastern DRC. And so, I think that’s a fundamental problem.

But there – you know, how do you build trust? I mean, first of all, I think that we don’t have a level playing field when it comes to how we analyse the drivers of violence in the region. And I am saying ‘region’, not just the DRC, but we have to acknowledge that disproportionately, this violence plays itself out in Eastern DRC. I mean, we’re not seeing Ugandan civilians and Rwandan civilians who are being killed by armed groups in their country as the result of a regional conflict. So, we have to be honest about, you know, the fact that Ugandan involvement has stoked violence. We have to be clear, and we are clear now, of course, in 2026, about Rwanda’s role, but also Burundi’s role. The different – you know, the extent to which repressive political environments in the region lead to people – lead to the exporting or political crises to other countries, and I think we have to start there.

And, you know, there is – I mean, I know that we now have a highly sophisticated illicit economy that benefits a regional, you know, mafia elite, and obviously, those are people who are not going to be interested in peace or in change to the status quo. But there is plenty to be gained from a plea – from a peaceful region, economically, as well. You know, Uganda – the DRC is Uganda’s third largest export market. It’s Rwanda’s largest export market. Those countries can’t survive economically without the Eastern DRC and those are things that we need to, I think, put also front and centre and talk about that.

So, I – for me, that’s what this regional peace process would be, would be a discussion of the current interests and, you know, it would have to be a very frank one, that will involve a level of honesty that, you know, I know is – it’s a lot to ask. But that’s how we make our way back to trust and that’s how we make our way, well not back, but that’s how we make our way to some level of trust and some level of common interest that isn’t driven by subterfuge and illicit economies and, you know, walking into your neighbour’s country and arming armed groups because that’s – that suits you. The status quo suits the elites, and I think we need to tackle that and then we can talk about trust.

And I just don’t think that any of the mechanisms we currently have, have achieved that and have been able to achieve that. I’m not saying we can’t build on some of them. I think, you know, there’s no point in reinventing the wheel, but we have to be honest about what works and what doesn’t work if we’re trying to foster a real change. I hope I answered that.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Yes, thank you very much, Stephanie. This is – this question I actually like to pose it to Paul-Simon and Emmanuel. It’s a question – sorry, one second. So, sorry, the question comes from Lin Goedeker, who’s asking, you know, “In practical terms, how does the complicated African process meaningfully relate to and synergise its work with the Washington and Doha tracks? And how can the AU demonstrate relevance that it can give increased legitimacy?” And I think this, sort of, links up, Paul-Simon, with the question of legitimate inputs and legitimate outputs, but “How can it give increased legitimacy in the eyes of regional international actors?”

So, maybe, Emmanuel, though, could you start and speak to us a little bit about the, kind of, complicated structure of – and I know you’re only speaking for ICGLR, but, you know, sort of, the way that fits with the other parts of the African institutions’ interventions? And then Paul-Simon.

Dr Emmanuel Makumba Mali

Thank you very much. The first part of the question I think deals with the issue of development of mutual trusts. I think ICGLR was meant to promote mutual trust in the region. Without mutual trust, all the documents we sign become irrelevant and it’s our day-to-day duty to promote and ensure that we create an element of trust in the processes.

With regards to the complexity of having the Doha Peace Process, the Washington Accord, in terms of institutional arrangement, it’s not very complicated, because the African Union is a member of the Doha Peace Process and all the meetings have had, the African Union has had the permanency in its deliberations. We also have technical staff under the African Union in [inaudible – 71:42] Secretariat. So, all the Doha Peace Processes meetings, they have participated, both at a technical level and political level. Togo is also a permanent member of the Process.

In the Doha Process, the Washington – the US Government is a member of the Doha Process, permanent member of the Doha Process, and hence, they’re able to understand issues discussed in the Doha Process and they’re able to engage with the discussions going on in the Washington Accord process. And also in the Washington Accord process, the African Union, at the highest level, is a member, including Togo. Even in the meetings which were held last month, those two institutions were there as members of the processes. So – and that back and forth helps us to relate to the issues, to avoid duplication and also, to ensure that there’s consistency in terms of agreements reached.

You should remember that in the Doha Process – the Doha Process is more of a continuation of the Nairobi-led, His Excellency Uhudu proc – Uhuru process. So, there it is the Government of the DRC and AFC M23 meeting to discuss relations – issues which relate to the DRC. And those two are from the DRC and the issues are around the ceasefire, the issues are around humanitarian, the issues are around exchange of prison and security arrangements. And hence, things which to a larger extent, promote inclusivity, promote internal governance and accountability. Those are the issues, rights and citizenship of the actors, those are the issues under there. And hence, as the ICGLR, these are the issues which are also part of our mandate. We – under the protocol of democracy and good governance, we discuss those issues. Under the protocol of mutual defence and non-aggression, we discuss those issues.

The Washington Accord brings in an element, also, of trade. The Regional Framework for Economic Integration, the re – brings in that element, which was a missing element from all the discussions we’ve had. “What happens when the ceasefire ends? How do you prevent a relapse?” Those are the discussions we are having in the Doha and also in the Washington Accord process. These are discussions which were never there, the relationship between peace and security, with democracy and good governance, with economic development, regional integration, bringing everything together. And hence, each panel member has a thematic area with a thematic group to assist them, to help them understand the dynamics and what the presidency of Togo brings is to bring all these thematic areas to one basket. One area where they’re able to say how does this relate to that? How does the work of His Excellency Obasanjo relate to the work of His Excellency Uhuru? How does this work of His Excellency Uhuru relate with His Excellency Masisi?

And that’s the – that is the co-ordination which I’m talking about which we have to walk on, we have to build on. But on the ground, I think to – it sounds complicated, it sounds very expensive, but that speaks to the nature of the conflict we have. The nature of the crisis we have, it’s complex, it’s expensive, it needs all the actors on deck. It needs all the path to be leading to one objective. But over and above, the issue of ownership which Kass was talking about is critical, and I agree with him, how do we bring in the local actors to join this bus which is already moving? That’s where the challenge is. How do we ensure that we are not stuck with the hangovers of the past?

There are lot of legacy issues hanging and those legacy issues, if you continue building on them, we will not move, and hence, this platform provides an understanding that parties are now talking in the EJVM+. It provides an understanding that parties are open to mediators to enter and discuss, which is good. Parties are open to high – have high-level and technical discussions, which is good, and we need to build on those. And the question is, what kind of skills should we bring on the table to help these parties to continue dialoguing and also being able to report on what they have signed on since the start of the OA – or Doha Process, since the start of the Washington process?

I think these are the discussions which we should have moving forward, because if we have a hangover of who did this, who did that? Then we will not – we will get stuck into the history, which is very complex. The history’s very complex, but there’s a path now which parties can work with ICGLR, can work with the EJVM, to ensure that we deliver, to ensure that we stop the guns from firing and we promote dialogue on the table where parties come together. I just thought of sharing that, but my broth – my big brother with massive experience in this region, will add more. Paul, please, add more.

Dr Paul-Simon Handy

No, thanks a lot, there, Dr Mali. Really useful, I think, to also mention everything that is being done and sometimes underreported on a daily basis. And Joshua, to your question about how do you increase the AU, not just, yeah, legitimacy, so to say, in that regard? I think in that sense, for the AU, what is important? Mediation is about – is as much political as it is technical. The political aspect has to do with people feelings, their positions and so on and so forth. Interest, whether you lose, whether you win. Stephanie was very clear about what people might be losing, should it be peace and might be – or what they might be winning, as well.

And the technical aspect is quite key, because the political acumen gives you access to the belligerent, but once you have that access, you need to have technical capacity, and those technical capacities – mediation is a profession, yeah? It’s not something that is improvised. So, there are experts out there and when they are not, we need to train them. So, I think having say that, I think the AU should increase its technical capacity in managing this series, actually, of conflicts Africa is facing.

But on the other side, the AU should not, and that also is valid for regional economic communities, they should not duplicate available resources. Where we can, we can use the UN resources and I think, both in terms of mediation, but also in terms of knowledge of the situation in Eastern DRC, we have MONUSCO and MONUSCO belongs to all of us. MONUSCO’s daily job is actually to analyse and provide solutions to the conflict. And I sometimes think that the co-ordination problems Dr Mali was referring to just now, one of that is that I think MONUSCO is underutilised by many actors and MONUSCO sits on a wealth of knowledge about the country, as much as the Office of the Special Envoy sits on a wealth of knowledge about the region. That is often not sufficiently exploited by African actors, who sometimes tend to reinvent the wheel. We shouldn’t duplicate assets and units, organisations that already exist. We shouldn’t recreate them just to make them more African. African member states are also member states of the UN. Thank you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you, Paul-Simon. I want to turn now to a question from Richard Moncrief, and I’ll try to summarise it, but – and I – this is – I would address this to Stephanie, Michel – as well as Michel. And I think you both have an interesting perspective on this. But he says – essentially, you know, he takes up Paul-Simon’s comment about asking, what crisis is it that African Diplomats are mediating and what are we talking about here? And he says, “There are two perspectives on this. One is that violence in the DRC is endogenous and its impact is regional, and so regional bodies in the PSCF are mobilised to support GDR and dialogue in the DRC to calm the region, with the tacit assumption that the DRC is a weak state,” which, you know, may or may not be a good analysis. And then, “Secondly, the other perspective is that this is not a 30-year old crisis, but it’s actually a five-year-old crisis and it’s – at its root, it’s about Rwandan expansionism.”

And so, the – I think the question here that Richard is pointing to is that there’s a confusion in the interpretation, which leads to confusion in the mediation, particularly where on the one hand, you have Rwanda framing the crisis as a Congolese crisis and as a Congolese domestic issue. Whereas I think actually, you could say on the other hand, you have the D – the Congolese state framing the current crisis, at least, as entirely dependent on Rwandan expansionism. So, maybe Stephanie, can you speak to that, and then, Michel?

Stephanie Wolters

[Pause] Yeah, thanks, thanks, Richard, for that question. I mean, I think that goes to the heart of many of the issues we have, and I’m not sure that – I mean, I’m not sure that that question is being asked very often in the right rooms. I don’t know that I have necessarily a complete answer to it. I don’t think you’re expecting that anyway, but I mean, it’s obviously – you can’t separate one from the other. I mean, what we’re looking at now than the last five years is variations on old crises that have mutated. They’ve become more intense. Rwanda’s willingness to risk is greater than it used to be. Its willingness to be – to take hits on its reputation is greater than it used to be.

So, clearly, there are greater stakes, which makes it that much harder to extract or to extract some kind of an end to this particular element of a longer set of crises, but what everybody’s mediating today is specifically what erupted in 2021. Why we haven’t been able to, or why there’s no – how we fell into the trap of only looking specifically at the dynamics between the M23 and Kinshasa, and I think that’s – you know, dividing those two, as we all know, is also complicated, although probably, you know, inevitable and necessary. And looking at it in a vacuum is, I think, partially because we – there’s an exhaustion about it. There’s, as we know, a tremendous reluctance until quite recently to really come down hard on Rwanda, which delayed a lot of the different responses, and so, we’ve made it – I think everybody’s made it easy for themselves.

I mean, I remember when the East African community initially mooted the idea of the Nairobi talks and the EACRF, I think we were actually in the same conversation around that, and they came in and said, you know, “We’re going to fix this in six months.” I think that we had a lot of players who were motivated to go in there thinking that they could do something and we just haven’t – we haven’t pulled the bigger issues into the conversation. I mean, I think today what we’re looking at in the discussion, and then I’ll stop and let Michel, obviously, answer, even in the Do – in the DC process, we haven’t put anything on the table that prevents Rwanda from coming back in five/ten years. We’ve got the FDLR issue that’s at the centre of this conversation, I mean, which isn’t specific to the current M23 RDF Kinshasa crisis. It’s an old issue. So, I think that we’re not – the different players are going for a quick fix when there isn’t one. So, that’s the best I could do, hmmm. Thanks.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thanks, Stephanie. Michel?

Michel Noureddine Kassa

Thank you, Joshua and Richard, and thank you, also, Stephanie. I think the point on FDLR is key. I’ll go to the – I’ll go back to the Addis Framework of 2013. I think what we had there was precious. It’s just that the – some political problems arose right after the signing of the framework that led the whole agreement to fail. But there were six national engagements for DRC that are still valid. One of them was the SSR, another one was decentralisation, tolerance, reconciliation, national – economic reforms, rule of law. Who in Congo would refuse that? The only – the point was that Rwanda didn’t have been – and ha – was not under pressure for its own national engagements.

And I think the two bridges between what was in the framework on the Congolese side and what was not in Rwanda’s side – on Rwanda’s side, to the dismay of then President Kabila, is the joint issue, I would say, of FDLR and the Tutsi refugees, the Rwanda Fund refugees. And I would say the important Rwandan war that exists in Eastern DRC and to the point that it gives us a flavour of the – of a war that existed in the early 90s and that has evolved in Rwanda while it has kept all its toxicity in Eastern DRC. And I think it’s not a response to Richard’s question, but I think we should get back to those national engagements. They are still valid and we should get thoroughly with local actors, as much as national actors, on the double issue of FDLR and refugees – Congolese refugees and the Rwanda Fund element of the crisis in DRC.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thanks, Michel. We only have a few minutes left, but I want to merge two sets of questions that have arosen – arisen in the chat and maybe, Paul-Simon, you might get the last word on this. The first one says that, you know, “You’ve contented,” and I think probably accurately, “that small issue-based or transactional agreements are progressively replacing comprehensive agreements.” And we’ve seen this, obviously, not just in the Great Lakes, but beyond. “At the same time, we have a critique of previous agreements which – saying that there is – in previous agreements, there’s often been a lack of sanction for non-compliance, an emphasis on short-term solutions, while forgetting the root causes.” Although I think root causes itself is an objective contention, depending on the parties.

So, you know, in the current configuration, if comprehensive peace agreements didn’t address root causes or compliance, what hope do we have of addressing those things in short-term, sort of, more issue specific, agreements?

Dr Paul-Simon Handy

I think we are living in difficult times. We need to lower our expectations about what we can achieve. Comprehensive peace agreements are just not achievable at the moment, particularly in a crisis like the DRC, which is a amalgamation of several crisis, actually. So, long-term, 30 years is not long-term enough, but long-term, definitely, a bit more modest about what is achievable in the timeframe. But also, maybe looking at the long-term as an end result of a longer process involving, particularly the wor – the type of work that Michel is doing, has been doing for decades. Because at the end of the day, whichever agreement is signed by political representative, it will have to be implemented by the people. So, at the end of the day, they count, if they don’t implement, and generally, they are against what is being signed by their political principles.

I think might sound a bit pessimistic and certainly not the right way of ending a conversation like this one, but I really think that if the PSC Framework remains essential, but it will certainly not com – end or lead to a comprehensive piece that will make everyone – that will come to a consensual end. So, what we probably will have is partial agreements on specific sectors, political, economic, social, investment and so on and so forth. At the end of the day, that is the amalgamation, the addition of all those small agreement, sometimes negotiated by different actors, that will lead us, in some years, probably decades, to peace.

The real problem and I – Stephanie was alluding to it a bit, the real problem of regional peace in the Great Lakes is that we want to build collective security when the enemy is within. Generally, collective security is about an enemy that is outside, but how do you build collective security to protect yourself from your neighbour? That’s the real challenge that Great Lakes countries are facing and the boom of the illicit economy has made too many actors interests – interested in war rather than peace. Thank you.

Dr Joshua Z. Walker

Thank you very much. Thank you, Paul-Simon, Michel, Emmanuel and Stephanie, and everyone who participated in this Chatham House Africa webinar. I hope that although Paul-Simon left us with some sobering words, there’s also a glimmer of hope in that we can’t afford to not be hopeful. So, thank you very much.

Dr Paul-Simon Handy

Thank you.