Laboratory accidents can have serious and potentially catastrophic consequences, whether they involve occupationally acquired infections among laboratory workers or biocontainment breaches that result in dangerous pathogens escaping into the community. They pose a threat not only to the human population, but also to animals and plants, endangering life and livelihoods, economies, food security, biodiversity and the ecosystem generally. As evidence and concerns have grown, laws, regulations, and biosafety and biosecurity guidance to control pathogens and their use have increased and been strengthened. However, laboratory accidents still occur regularly – and while there are intrinsic risks associated with pathogens and certain laboratory activities, many of these accidents are avoidable. Meanwhile, the number of laboratories and pathogen research projects is expanding.
The situation is a concern for laboratory workers and managers, the wider scientific research community, industry, development partners, policymakers, political leaders, law enforcement agencies and the general public alike. While accountability for day-to-day biosafety and biosecurity lies generally with those directly in charge of laboratories, the biosafety and biosecurity frameworks are set at a higher, policymaking, level.
Concern over the possibility and implications of such accidents has been brought into sharp focus in recent years, with speculation regarding the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of the COVID-19 pandemic. The source of the pandemic remains undetermined, but fears persist around the possibility of it having originated from a laboratory accident. These fears, as well as the pace at which new technologies are becoming available and their increasing ease of access, have reinvigorated discussion around the need for regulation and governance to keep pace with advances in pathogen research.
Much more can be done to minimize the risk of laboratory accidents worldwide. Taking a ‘One Health’ approach, where the risks to people, animals and ecosystems are considered together, is important. Neither the documentation nor the reporting of accidental breaches is mandatory in most countries, and it is recognized that what is reported constitutes a significant understatement of the problem. Improving understanding of the true scale of the problem and the causes of accidents, and identifying and filling gaps in the evidence base, are vital for successful and sustainable biocontainment as well as improved biosecurity. It is important that this work uses existing evidence of what really works and is locally appropriate to reduce the likelihood and consequences of accidents.