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Understanding and improving sanctions today

Why and how many sanctions fail, and what to do about it

Research paper

Published 14 July 2025

ISBN: 978 1 78413 655 0

Image — People queue at ATM machines in the run-up to Syria being reconnected to the international SWIFT payment system, following the removal of sanctions, 17 June 2025, Damascus, Syria. Copyright © Ed Ram/Getty Images.

Crowds await outside a bank to withdraw money before Syria rejoins SWIFT

Dr Christopher Sabatini

Director, Latin America Programme

Lydia Lysard

Content Developer, Sponsored Events and Partnerships, Fundraising and Partnerships

Sanctions are a key instrument of foreign policy and economic statecraft, applied with increasing frequency by the US, the UK and the EU. Given the growing prevalence of these tools, there are mounting concerns about the efficacy, enforcement and unintended consequences of sanctions, as well as their impact on international norms and geopolitics.

The large number of sanctions currently in force has increased cooperation between sanctioned countries, including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, the US’s use of secondary sanctions prevents Western allied governments and businesses from investing in sanctioned countries. This allows investors from Russia, China and Iran to scoop up valuable assets and ensures their long-term global influence. Despite concerns over the efficacy of sanctions and the implications for geopolitics, the use of these measures is likely to continue.

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136550

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Summary

Sanctions have become a key instrument of foreign policy and economic statecraft, applied with increasing frequency by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Types of sanctions encompass a growing set of tools including asset freezes, travel bans and trade sanctions, such as arms embargoes and controls on imports and exports. While increasingly viewed as an attractive foreign policy tool, there are mounting concerns about the efficacy, enforcement and unintended consequences of sanctions and their impact on international norms and geopolitics.
These unilateral sanctions are fundamentally different from sanctions applied through the United Nations. The growing body of sanctions levied by individual countries and institutions, such as the EU, occur outside the international procedures and norms established under the UN. This paper concerns itself with these unilateral, non-UN sanctions, including their growth, range, objectives and impact on diplomacy and geopolitical fragmentation.
The proliferation of sanctions with different policy goals raises a range of questions, challenges and risks for policymakers, businesses, multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Significant challenges in enforcement – arising from the raft of sanctions imposed by different jurisdictions and the difficulties facing policymakers and businesses in coordinating across countries and departments – affect the success of sanctions, public perceptions of their efficacy and their legacy in relation to geopolitical fragmentation and a country’s long-term political and economic trajectory. Their justifications have also raised concerns among scholars and policymakers, over multiple or competing goals and hyperbolic language that place unrealistic expectations on their outcome and undermine long-term effectiveness.
The impacts of sanctions on local populations, economies and geopolitical alliances have also triggered concern. Their potential adverse effects on principled humanitarian action, particularly in areas of armed conflict, intensify the challenges faced by NGOs attempting to provide humanitarian relief to local populations. In some cases, sanctions have led to the concentration of economic power by the government they were designed to target, furthering the regime’s power and contributing to economic crises. Western sanctions have also driven increased cooperation, alliances and partnerships between countries including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. The US’s use of secondary sanctions – or extra-territorial sanctions – has also prevented Western allied governments and businesses from investing in countries and blocked trading of debt. As a result, investors from companies opposed to the US and the goals of the sanctions – from Russia, China and Iran – have scooped up those assets, including distressed debt bonds, ensuring their economic (possible political) influence even after sanction goals have been met.
Despite these concerns, the use of unilateral sanctions is unlikely to fade any time soon. This paper outlines recommendations for policymakers, particularly in sanction-applying governments in the West (the overwhelming majority of which are in the Global North) to guide future sanctions policies. These include:
- Sanctions should be justified by a clear objective: Governments imposing sanctions need to have specific reasoning, be clear on their objectives and communicate these transparently with allies as well as their targets. Having a limited policy goal that is publicly stated from the beginning of the process, and communicating this to all parties, is essential for developing trust and legitimacy.
- Coordination with allies is essential: Sanctions are more effective when coordinated across multiple actors – among allies or within political and economic forums such as the G7 or the EU. Coordination on strategy, targets and third-country engagement to build support for sanctions regimes is essential, along with synchronization on implementation, enforcement and litigation.
- The vetting of sanctions and dialogue across affected stakeholders can be improved: While channels to allow for input from the private sector and government partners on sanctions have improved, there are still gaps in coordination among sanction-issuing entities and with the private sector. Developing a regular, potentially annual multi-stakeholder arrangement to review sanctions processes and their intended and unintended consequences is essential. The first priority should be communication and coordination not only with other sanctioning governments but also with non-sanctioning governments that share the same goals to review their impact. A central part of this process should be the development of a metric to measure both the success of sanctions in meeting their (reduced, clear) objectives and their unintended consequences.
- Sanctions should be part of a broader strategy: Sanctions work best when they are employed as part of a broader strategy that includes diplomatic, economic and humanitarian levers. Even in their initiation, sanctions development should articulate and include a ‘plan B’ for what happens if they do not achieve their intended ends, including the potential for escalation or the adjustment of goals and steps for their liberalization. Too often sanctions remain inflexibly locked in place, a result of insufficient early planning.
- Countering the axis of the sanctioned and addressing accusations of hypocrisy: Given the shifting geopolitical dynamics that have occurred in recent years and continue to evolve, policymakers are confronted with the need to counter the ‘axis of the sanctioned’ as well as accusations of hypocrisy and double standards in foreign policy decisions. Sanctioning countries should adopt a more collaborative approach towards working with partners in the ‘Global South’, who are at the sharp end of the results of economic coercion by the US, when it comes to sanctions. Secondary sanctions in particular should be considered and applied with caution.
- Developing a checklist of best practices in sanctions development and enforcement: When beginning to develop and design sanctions, policymakers must consider how they will implement them in the long term. Where multiple government entities are involved in sanctions enforcement, there should be a common vision and a ‘whole-of-government approach’ to enforcement efforts.

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