DPI can be transformative for societies, but it requires commitment to shared standards, steadfast implementation and strategic investment. This approach can be particularly challenging in a context of tight government budgets and shortsighted leadership.
This research paper has presented the case for adopting a DPI approach that enables governments to develop more sovereign, secure and modern social technology ecosystems. It has outlined the value that DPI can bring to sovereignty, resilience, security and public sector modernization, in addition to the economic opportunities and the role of DPI in promoting global collaboration. Throughout, the paper has highlighted important elements of the increased global uptake of DPI approaches, from Brazil to Ukraine. The analysis here is bullish on the need for new digitalization strategies, while recognizing that the more comprehensive migration of our lives online demands appropriate governance to prevent the abuse of new forms and concentrations of power.
DPI is more than a technical solution: it is a new theory of change that reframes the digital state as a platform for innovation and sovereignty. Countries are looking to renegotiate and reinvigorate the stewardship of their societies’ digital foundations as a strategic necessity in a world of geopolitical instability, technology sovereignty struggles and tight public budgets.
There is a growing research and evidence base on how countries might embrace a DPI approach, from the G20 declarations and World Bank programmes to work by global philanthropic and research organizations. States must begin with a set of guiding principles – interoperability, reusability, openness and the ability to securely share data – that shape both the design and the governance of digital infrastructure. The lessons from DPI show that to successfully revolutionize a country’s digital infrastructure, these principles must be at the centre of any DPI or sovereign technology strategy.
States must begin with a set of guiding principles – interoperability, reusability, openness and the ability to securely share data – that shape both the design and the governance of digital infrastructure.
- First, governments must continue to strengthen their capacity to shape technology beyond regulation and rule-making. From the US to China, and in middle powers like the UK and France, new investment – for example in attracting talent, digital literacy and civil service up-skilling – is strengthening state capacity to effectively procure, maintain and design digital public services.
- Second, governments can boost interoperability across the public and private sectors by committing to openness. When government technology (such as gov.uk) is designed using a range of open standards and safeguards – such as open application programming interfaces (APIs), open documentation, open licensing and open-source codebases (the collection of source code used to build software) – it creates a robust and flexible foundational layer of technology that others can develop and build upon. This ensures interoperability, reduces vendor lock-in and supports future adaptation without costly reinvention.
- Lastly, collaboration is strength. No state should expect to build digital technology in a vacuum. Partnerships (regional, multilateral, mini-lateral, public–private and technical) increase resilience, accelerate learning, reduce costs and create shared leverage in shaping global norms.
Recommendations
Moving from principles to practice requires coordinated action across multiple domains. There is no single blueprint, but there are common steps that can guide implementation.
1. Establish a political and institutional mandate for DPI
A DPI approach begins with a clear political commitment that recognizes digital infrastructure as a strategic asset and as a critical element of public sector reform. In many cases this has been done through intergovernmental bodies or forums, but a more concerted political effort is also needed to prioritize and make the case for digital infrastructure at the national and local levels.
Alongside political leadership, institutional mechanisms are essential to encourage citizens and allay any concerns over the adoption of this technology. This could take the form of mandated government departments like the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology in the UK; US-style public–private taskforces, where government agencies and private entities collaborate to deliver and finance public services; or a digital architecture board, with statutory powers that promote the adoption of common standards and reusable solutions to drive technology alignment across government. This is particularly important in political environments where the risk appetite for government innovation is low. This can include countries with heavily embedded bureaucratic legacy structures, governments interested in short-term gains, states with powerful interest groups, and those with a public that values tradition over innovation and where citizens show concern or distrust about the ability of governments to protect digital privacy.
2. Grow technical capacity
Modern states must develop public and private institutions capable of designing, stewarding, operating, procuring and regulating those technologies identified as critical to a nation’s digital sovereignty. Middle power and developing countries must conduct comprehensive and realistic assessments of their achievable domestic capabilities – as opposed to carrying out short-term box-ticking exercises – and pursue complementary partnerships that are both strategic and mutually reinforcing.
Capacity must grow within the public sector – if necessary, using investment from the open-source community and private actors. As stated earlier, financing DPI is more cost-effective in the long-term than existing investment methods for unfit, siloed digital schemes. In addition, states must also take steps to reform and modernize government workplace culture and collaboration, stabilize institutions, implement transparent procurement procedures, and make strategic investments in infrastructure, technology and, crucially, human capital. Governments should look to recruit and retain technical talent with strategic visa policy, upskilling opportunities and competitive salaries.
Useful models for increasing technical capacity include the UK’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA) and Government Digital Services (GDS), both of which prioritize operational agility, innovative ‘sandboxing’ and independence. Another possibility is the creation of publicly mandated focused research organizations (FROs), successful examples of which include the Large Hadron Collider and the Human Genome Project. DPI tends to flourish when public infrastructure creates space for private innovation. Open, modular technology allows startups and enterprises to build and innovate new products.
3. Identify use cases through cost–benefit analysis
Early use cases for DPI should be chosen on the basis of feasibility and national priorities. A coordinated analysis on the benefits of DPI should weigh long-term efficiency gains against upfront infrastructure costs. This will require coordination among significant government budget holders, digital regulators and sector-specific agencies to ensure accountability and alignment of incentives. For countries currently lagging behind DPI leaders in digital public service provision, there are significant opportunities in simply replicating existing DPI successes, where similar contexts exist. However, DPI is diverse, and examples like the Ukrainian government’s drive for services capable of functioning during conflict show that different governments will have differing priorities for building new digital foundations.
4. Plug into global DPI networks
A major strength of the DPI approach is that it enables countries to foster interoperability and collaborate across borders while preserving national autonomy. These alternative diplomatic channels are vital levers in the current, shifting global governance landscape. To boost interoperability and strengthen partnerships, once DPI capacity is established, countries should participate in emerging regional or sectoral DPI communities of practice that help set international technology standards that reflect national strategic priorities or values. Such initiatives include the Global Digital Compact, 50-in-5 initiative, Global Digital Health Certification Network, and Digital Public Goods Alliance.
Recommendations in practice
The UK government’s 2025 announcement of mandatory digital IDs demonstrates the political commitment needed for DPI implementation. This initiative could leverage existing institutional capacity, notably ARIA and the GDS, both of which have already built expertise in digital infrastructure. This capacity would need additional investment and a procurement process guided by the Digital, Data and Technology Playbook (UK government guidance for digital projects) to ensure the adoption of a suitable, safe public–private partnership for digital ID.
The government has identified a specific use case: right to work checks. While this provides a concrete starting point, for some, this limits the potential of the technology, which could have also extended to delivering better public services in other areas such as healthcare or taxation. Ensuring interoperability across departments and embedding data sharing could help future-proof the digital ID for further expansion, and potentially improve delivery of public services, increase efficiency, reduce duplication and enhance governance. With a more digitally connected government, the UK could better understand and address complex societal challenges, such as social care, health disparities, quality of education and homelessness.
Public concerns around data privacy and government oversight must be addressed. This could be done through a system similar to the Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture, an India-developed proposal for a joint public-private oversight instrument that enables individuals to share their personal data with service providers and third parties through personalized and specific consent controls. In India, the country’s instant payment sector is a diverse and competitive market, with platforms like Google Pay, PhonePe, Amazon Pay and BHIM, all offering instant, real-time transfers. These providers all have different data and privacy policies dictating the use of user’s data. The government has recognized this shortcoming. By consolidating and pooling consent mechanisms, governments, like those in India and the UK, could introduce a system with familiar and standard wording that is more likely to be trusted by users. By carefully designing systems with users’ needs, consent and interactions in mind, governments can create stronger foundations for trusted private sector partnerships and enable more advanced digital infrastructure, like secure, privacy-protected e-commerce platforms. This advancement would enable providers to reduce fraud and streamline processes while giving consumers greater control over their personal information.
Rather than developing digital ID systems in isolation, the UK should actively engage with the global DPI community. As this paper emphasizes, countries can learn lessons from existing DPI implementation, adopting proven vendors and building blocks, and participating in international standards-setting frameworks. The paper provides numerous examples of successful DPI deployments and collaborative initiatives that UK policymakers should study and engage with. This approach would help the UK avoid costly mistakes, accelerate implementation and ensure that a UK digital ID system benefits from best practice and adheres to international standards.
