This phase of ‘situational neutrality’ began when Lukashenka distanced himself from the Kremlin’s aggressive actions against Ukraine in 2014, notably by refusing to recognize Crimea as part of Russia following its annexation. A similar period of engagement between the regime and the West occurred between 2008 and 2010, when Lukashenka distanced himself from Russia’s aggression against Georgia.
For several years during the period of ‘situational neutrality’, the Lukashenka regime successfully resisted Russia’s plans to establish a permanent military base on Belarusian territory. While a Russian military presence remained, there was an effort to contain its expansion, particularly at a time when states on NATO’s eastern flank were seeking to increase the number of allied troops stationed on their soil. As part of its ‘buffer’ posture during this time, Belarus sought to hold military exercises with international observers present, maintained dialogue with NATO and even conducted joint exercises with the UK in early 2020.
Border crossings between Belarus and neighbouring EU countries represented one of the most successful examples of cooperation between the sides. At one point, it was even possible to cross the border to Poland by kayak.
Just as Belarus today profits from serving the needs of the Russian economy, it once benefited economically by accommodating Russian, Western and Ukrainian interests simultaneously.
Just as Belarus today profits from serving the needs of the Russian economy, it once benefited economically by accommodating Russian, Western and Ukrainian interests simultaneously. For example, a common criticism voiced in Russia at that time was that Belarus supplied the Ukrainian armed forces with fuel refined from Russian crude oil. Belarusian exports of shrimps and apples to Russia – the latter exceeding Belarus’s actual production five-fold – became emblematic of how Minsk helped circumvent Russia’s counter-sanctions on Western agricultural goods after the annexation of Crimea.
Since the regime also agreed to scale back its repressive practices during that period, the West gradually restored relations with Minsk. Although the Minsk agreements have since been criticized, the Ukraine peace talks held in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015 were at the time considered a symbol of Lukashenka’s multi-vector foreign policy. These talks were later followed by regular security conferences, relations with the Ukrainian leadership and other gestures of engagement.
By the time of the 2020 presidential election, the regime’s contacts with the West were both more frequent and more positive than those with Russia. Lukashenka’s re-election campaign was built on anti-Kremlin rhetoric, and at the time he was importing oil from the US, with imports having begun earlier that year after another energy conflict with Russia.
